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THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  •  BOSTON  •  CHICAGO  •  DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •  SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON    •  BOMBAY   •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


THE    ESSENTIALS    OF 
PHILOSOPHY 


BY 
R.  W.  SELLARS 

ASSISTANT  PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY, 
UNIVERSITY  OF  MICHIGAN 


^m  fark 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1917 

All  rights  reserved 


c- 


Copyright,  1917 

By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  August,  1917. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

Page 
What  Philosophy  Is 1 

1.  A  Preliminary  Definition.  2.  The  Attitude  of  the 
Philosopher.  3.  The  Difference  between  Scientists  and 
Philosophers.  4.  The  Competency  of  the  Philosopher.  5.  The 
Older  and  the  Newer  Conceptions  of  Philosophy.  6.  The 
General  Philosophical  Disciplines.  7.  The  Special  Philosoph- 
ical Disciplines.     8.  The  Topics  which  need  Stress. 


E^^'>'OJ!>^»n<r<lryy       chapter  n 


Common  Sense  and  Philosophy 17 

1.  The  Common-Sense  View  of  the  World.  2.  Natural 
Realism.  3.  The  Recognition  of  Natural  Realism  in  Philos- 
ophy. 4.  Philosophy  must  start  from  Natural  Realism. 
5.  Natural  Realism  and  Science.  6.  Natural  Realism  not  a 
System.    7.  DiflSculties  Confronting  Natural  Realism. 

CHAPTER  HI 

The  Breakdown  of  Natural  Realism  ....       30 

1.  A  Systematic  Attack  upon  Natural  Realism.  2.  Per- 
ceived Objects  are  Functions.  3.  The  Physical  Thing  and 
its  Appearance.     4.  The  Lack  of  Correspondent  Variation. 

5.  The  Differences  between  the  Perceptions  of  Individuals. 

6.  Can  Natural  Realism  account  for  Memory?  7.  What  is 
Perceived  involves  Construction.  8.  The  Physiological 
Theory  of  Perception.     9.  Conclusion  and  Warning. 

CHAPTER  IV 

Representative  Realism 42 

1.  The  Value  of  an  Historical  Approach.  2.  Representa- 
tive   Realism    follows    Natural    Realism.      3.  Rationalistic 


vi  CONTENTS 

Page 
Representative  Realism.   4.  Cartesian  Metaphysics.    5.    Des- 
cartes' Method.    6.  Representative  Realism  raises  New  Prob- 
lems.   7.  Locke's  Position.     8.  Locke's  View  of  Knowledge. 
9.  Doubts  Confronting  Representative  Perception. 

CHAPTER  V 

The  Rise  op  Idealism 55 

1.  What  is  Idealism?  2.  Berkeley's  Position.  3.  The  First 
Stage.  4.  Berkeley  attacks  Locke's  Philosophy.  5.  Berke- 
ley's Animus.  6.  Berkeley's  Disproof  of  Representative 
Realism.  7.  Berkeley's  Construction.  8.  Idealism  does  not 
change  our  Experience.    9.  Gaps  in  Berkeley's  System. 

CHAPTER  VI 

Skepticism 65 

1.  Bewilderment.  2.  Hume's  Summary  of  Results.  3. 
Hume's  Attack  upon  Mental  Substance.  4.  Consciousness 
is  a  Flux.  5.  Hume's  Rejection  of  Berkeley's  Spiritualism. 
6.  Taking  Stock. 

CHAPTER  VII 

The  Period  of  Preparation  ......       74 

1.  Kant  tries  to  meet  Hume's  Skepticism.  2.  Kant  Stresses 
Conceptual  Knowledge.  3.  Two  Meanings  of  the  Word 
Knowledge.  4.  Kant  and  Hume  Skeptical  of  the  First  Kind  of 
Knowledge.  5.  Kant's  Doctrine  of  the  Categories.  6.  Kant 
Thinks  of  the  Categories  as  Subjective. 

CHAPTER  VIII 

The  Field  of  the  Individual's  Experience  ...       86 

1.  From  Natural  Realism  to  Descriptive  Empiricism.  2. 
Whose  Experience?  3.  Mental  Pluralism  and  Solipsism. 
4.  Kant's  Appeal  to  Consciousness — In  General.  5.  The 
Standpoint  of  Descriptive  Empiricism.  6.  The  Subject- 
Object  Contrast.  7.  The  Elementary  Unity  of  Togetherness. 
8.  Is  the  Self  Dominant  in  the  Field  of  Experience? 


CONTENTS  vii 

CHAPTER  IX 

Page 

Distinctions  within  the  Field     ......      98 

1.  Two  Dimensions  of  the  Field.  2.  The  Coexistential  Di- 
mension favors  Realism.  3.  The  Temporal  Dimension  op- 
poses Natural  Realism.  4.  Things  and  Ideas.  5.  Sense  and 
Imagination.  6.  A  Thing  and  the  Thought  of  it.  7.  Reflec- 
tion on  these  Distinctions. 

CHAPTER  X 

The  Reflective  Development  of  these  Distinctions  .     108 

1.  What  is  a  Percept?  2.  The  Logical  Function  of  Percep- 
tion. 3.  Scientific  Knowledge  an  Achievement.  4.  A  Re- 
statement of  the  Distinction  between  Things  and  Ideas. 
5.  The  False  vs.  the  Correct  Form  of  this  Question.  6.  Is  the 
Distinction  between  Consciousness  and  a  Realm  outside  Jus- 
tifiable.' 7.  Analysis  of  the  Term  Extra-Mental.  8.  A  Defini- 
tion of  Critical  Realism.  9.  Theory  of  Knowledge  needs 
Logic. 

CHAPTER  XI 

The  Reference  of  Knowledge     .         .         .         .         .         ,122 
1.  Knowledge  involves  Judgment.     2.  Judgment  Defined. 

3.  Logic  takes  both  Knowledge  and  Reality  for  Granted. 

4.  The  Reference  of  Judgment.  5.  Reference  for  Critical 
Realism.  6.  Is  Reality  present  to  Thought?  7.  Is  each  Indi- 
vidual Confined  to  his  Consciousness?  8.  Being  distinct  from 
Knowledge.  9.  We  want  to  be  the  Reality  known.  10.  Knowl- 
edge our  only  Escape  from  Individuality. 

CHAPTER  Xn 

Traditional  Assumptions  and  Attitudes       ....     135 
1.  Important  Distinctions.    2.  Rationalism.    3.  Sensation- 
alism.    4.  Apriorism.     5.  Empiricism.     6,  Attitudes  toward 
Knowledge. 


viii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XIII 

I,  Page 

i  Epistemological  Theories 146 

-'^  1.  The  Value  of  an  Epistemological  Summary.     2.  The 

.^  Nature  of  Epistemology.    3.  Idealism.    4.  Objective  Idealism. 

H  5.  Realism.    6.  Gnostic  vs.  Agnostic  Realism. 

CHAPTER  XIV 

Truth  and  Error 157 

1.  Knowledge  and  Truth.  2.  The  Meaning  of  Knowledge. 
3.  Three  Common  Theories  of  Truth.  4.  The  Correspondence 
Theory.  5.  The  Coherence  Theory.  6.  Pragmatism.  7.  Truth 
as  a  Cognitive  Value.  8.  The  Criteria  of  Truth.  8.  How 
Non-apprehensional  Realism  Avoids  the  Copy  View.  10. 
Knowledge  is  a  UtiUty. 

CHAPTER  XV 

Materialism  and  Spiritualism 171 

1.  Epistemology  and   Metaphysics.     2.  Materialism   and 
Y  Spiritualism.       3.  Materialism.       4.  Spiritualism.       5.  Two 

Types  of  Spiritualism. 

CHAPTER  XVI 

Dualism  and  Critical  Naturalism 183 

1.  Natural  Dualism.  2.  What  are  Mind  and  Matter.? 
3.  Why  Mind  and  Matter  are  held  to  be  distinct.  4.  The 
Setting  of  Physical  Science.  5.  The  Setting  of  Psychology. 
6.  Is  this  Contrast  Justified?  7.  Cartesian  Dualism.  8.  We 
do  not  Apprehend  the  Physical  World.  9.  A  Monistic  Inter- 
pretation of  the  Distinction  between  Consciousness  and  the 
Physical  World.    10.  Critical  Naturalism. 

CHAPTER  XVII 

The  World  as  known  by  the  Physical  Sciences:  Space      .     195 
1.  About  the  Categories.    2.  Space  a  Category  of  the  Phys- 
ical Sciences.    3.  Five  Kinds  of  Space.    4.  Sensational  Space. 


CONTENTS  ix 

Page 
5.  Perceptual  Space.    6.  Conceptual  Space.    7.  Mathematical 
Space.    8.  Is  Space  Infinite  and  Infinitely  Divisible?   9.  Space 
as  a  Category.     10.  Is  the  Physical  World  Finite?     11.  Is 
Consciousness  Extended? 

CHAPTER  XVIII 

-J    Time 205 

\iA  1.  About  Time.    2.  Three  Kinds  of  Time.    3.  Perceptual, 

or  Personal,  Time.  4.  Mathematical  Time.  5.  Time  as  a 
Category  of  Scientific  Knowledge.  6.  Change  the  Objective 
Basis  of  Scientific  Time.  7.  Had  the  World  a  Beginning? 
8.  Conclusions.     9.  Consciousness  and  Time. 

CHAPTER  XIX 

Substance  and  Substantiality 216 

1.  The  Physical  World  consists  of  Things.  2.  The  more 
Abstract  Idea  of  Matter.  3.  Descartes  and  Locke.  4.  Em- 
pirical Things  and  their  Attributes.  5.  Knowledge-About  vs. 
Being.      6.  Nature    is    Substantial.      7.  Properties    express 

^      Knowledge  about  Nature.    8.  Constant  Properties.    9.  Mat- 

I       ter  for  Physics.    10.  What  is  Energy? 

CHAPTER  XX 

Mind,  Soul  and  Consciousness 229 

1.  The  Nature  of  Mind  a  Problem.    2.  Primitive  Notions 
^       of  Mind.    3.  Mind  in  Ancient  Philosophy.    4.  Mind  in  Mod- 
ern Philosophy.    5.  Consciousness  displaces  Soul.     6.  Mind 
and  Consciousness. 

CHAPTER  XXI 

Reflections  on  Psychology 230 

1.  The  Subject-Matter  of  Psychology.  2.  Orthodox  Psy- 
chology. 3.  The  Purpose  of  the  Psychologist.  4.  A  Current 
Paradox.  5.  Psychology  as  the  Study  of  Behavior.  6.  The 
Value  of  Behaviorism.  7.  An  Inclusive  Definition  of  Psy- 
chology.   8.  What  is  Mind?    9.  Consciousness  and  Mind. 


X  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XXII 

Page 
The  Relation  between  Mind  and  Body  ....  252 
1.  The  Mind-Body  Problem.  2.  Solutions  Offered.  3.  Du- 
alistic  Theories.  4.  Interactionism.  5.  Parallelism.  6.  Epi- 
phenomenalism.  7.  Monistic  Theories,  8.  Psychical  Monism. 
9.  The  Double-Aspect  Theory.  10.  The  Unity  Theory. 
11.  What  is  the  Mind? 

CHAPTER  XXIII 

Purpose  and  Mechanism 268 

1.  The  Presence  of  sharp  Contrasts.  2.  The  Mechanical 
View  of  the  World.  3.  The  Teleological  View  of  the  World. 
4.  The  Present  Situation.  5.  The  Criticism  of  Mathematical 
Rationalism.  6.  The  Ambiguity  of  the  Mechanical  View. 
7.  The  Revival  of  Vitalism.  8.  Are  there  Levels  of  Causality? 
9.  Efficient  Causality  and  Purpose.  10.  Is  the  Brain  as  Mind 
a  Mechanical  System?  11.  How  shall  we  Conceive  of  the 
Efficacy  of  Consciousness? 

CHAPTER  XXIV 

The  Place  of  Values 284 

1.  Knowledge  and  Valuation.  2.  Naive  Realism  and 
Values.  3.  A  Realism  still  more  Primitive.  4.  The  Stand- 
point of  Non-apprehensional  Realism.  4.  The  Place  of  Values 
for  these  Levels.  5.  The  Science  of  Axiology.  6.  The  Objec- 
tivity of  Values. 


THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER  I 
WHAT  PHILOSOPHY  IS 

A  Preliminary  Definition. — Speaking  in  general  terms, 
we  may  say  that  philosophy  is  a  persistent  attempt  to 
understand  the  world  in  which  we  live  and  of  which  we 
are  a  part.  This  preliminary  definition  stresses  the  broad- 
ness of  aim  characteristic  of  philosophy.  It  is  an  effort 
of  the  intellect  of  man  to  answer  fundamental  problems 
and  gain  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  universe. 

The  conception  of  the  exact  nature  of  philosophy  has 
varied  from  period  to  period  as  man's  view  of  the  world 
and  of  his  place  in  it  has  changed.  Hence  the  history  of 
philosophy  has  usually  been  the  best  index  of  those  gradual 
alterations  in  the  dominant  interpretation  of  man  and 
reality  in  which  science  and  religion  find  their  focus. 
Plato  believed  that  a  supersensible  realm  of  ideas  existed 
apart  from  the  world  of  perceptual  appearance,  and  his 
philosophy  was  at  once  a  cause  and  an  effect  of  this  out- 
look. It  explained  what  reality  was  and  how  the  human 
mind  obtained  valid  glimpses  of  it.  During  the  Middle 
Ages,  man  was  prone  to  consider  earthly  things  the  crea- 
tion of  a  supernatural  deity,  and  his  philosophy  was 
simply  the  earnest  search  for  a  systematic  and  consistent 
answer  to  such  riddles  as  forced  themselves  upon  his 
attention.     In  the  eighteenth  century,  men  were  con- 

1 


2  THE  F-SSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

vinced  that  there  was  an  external  physical  world  and  that 
their  knowledge  of  it  was  contingent  upon  the  sensations 
produced  in  their  minds  by  the  stimulation  of  their  sense- 
organs.  Certain  general  problems  immediately  resulted, 
and  philosophy  was  the  persistent  reflection  upon  these 
general  problems.  Thus  philosophy  has  always  been  reflec- 
tion upon  basic  problems  such  as  the  nature  of  reality,  the 
distinction  between  the  apparent  and  the  real,  the  conditions 
of  human  knowledge.  It  has  always  been  the  conviction  of 
the  philosopher  that  these  questions  are  unavoidable  and 
that  they  can  be  solved  only  by  intensive  reflection.  A 
definite  part  of  our  task  in  the  present  introduction  will 
be  to  explain  the  specific  nature  and  inevitableness  of 
these  problems  with  which  the  philosophers  of  all  ages 
have  busied  themselves.  Only  in  proportion  as  a  concrete 
understanding  of  philosophical  problems  grows  upon  the 
student  will  he  really  imderstand  what  the  veritable 
function  of  philosophy  is. 

The  Attitude  of  the  Philosopher. — ^The  attitude  and 
ideals  of  the  philosopher  are  essentially  the  same  as  those 
of  the  scientist.  Both  have  the  same  mental  curiosity 
and  keen  desire  for  valid  knowledge,  the  same  willingness 
to  bend  theories  into  line  with  experience,  the  same  faith 
in  methodical  analysis  and  persistent  investigation  and 
reflection.  Were  we  defining  philosophy  by  reference  to 
the  trained  mental  attitude  and  intellectual  habits  de- 
manded, we  should  identify  it  with  science.  In  this  sense 
it  is  a  science.  Probably  the  philosopher  ought  to  em- 
phasize this  aspect  of  his  subject  in  this  day  in  which  so 
many  people  know  something  of  the  spirit  of  science. 
The  philosopher  at  his  best  is  inspired  with  the  same  dis- 
interested zeal  to  solve  intellectual  problems  as  is  the 
specialist  in  some  branch  of  theoretical  science. 


WHAT  PHILOSOPHY  IS  S 

In  this  age  of  early  instruction  in  the  special  sciences, 
the  student  who  finally  comes  to  philosophy  with  mixed 
feelings  of  hope  and  doubt  has  already  some  acquaintance 
with  the  lives  of  such  men  as  Newton,  Galileo  and  Darwin. 
He  knows  and  admires  in  them  their  whole-hearted  en- 
deavors to  solve  problems  in  the  domain  of  nature.  It  is 
this  spirit,  as  much  as  what  they  have  accomplished  in 
the  solution  of  specific  problems,  which  attracts  the  gen- 
erous minded.  We  can,  therefore,  best  convey  to  the  be- 
ginner a  true  idea  of  the  philosopher  by  saying  that  he 
has  the  outlook  of  the  scientist.  Both  concern  themselves 
with  knowledge  and  both  seek  it  openly  and  in  disregard  of 
consequences.  The  philosopher  is  not  a  mystic  nor  the 
champion  of  some  esoteric  cult;  he  is  a  scientist. 

The  Difference  Between  Scientists  and  Philosophers. 
— And  yet  there  is  a  difference.  When  a  man  is  called  a 
scientist,  we  tend  to  ask  whether  he  is  a  botanist  or  a 
physicist  or  a  mathematician  or  a  chemist  and  so  on,  with 
the  other  alternatives  in  view.  We  don't  think  of  a  man 
as  being  a  scientist-in-general.  We  suppose  that  he  is 
pursuing  some  particular  kind  of  investigation  which  is 
easily  classified  as  along  with  other  lines  of  investigation. 
But  to  a  good  many  a  philosopher  is  just  such  a  strange 
creature,  a  man  who  wants  to  be  a  scientist-in-general. 
Let  us  see  whether  we  can  explain  the  difference  between 
the  work  of  a  specialist  in  science,  a  devotee  of  some 
particular  science,  and  the  work  of  a  philosopher,  without 
leaving  the  impression  that  the  philosopher  is  a  sort  of 
jack  of  all  trades  and  master  of  none,  a  man  who  wants  to 
be  a  scientist  and  yet  won't  adopt  a  specific  field. 

The  real  question  is  this,  Do  the  special  sciences  exhaust 
science?  Philosophy  is  not  a  special  science  with  a  par- 
ticular subject-matter  as  a  field  for  exploitation  outside 


4  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  and  coordinate  with  the  subject-matters  of  other  special 
sciences.  "The  important  distinction  is  that  the  sciences 
concentrate  attention  on  particular  parts  or  aspects  of  the 
knowable  world,  abstracting  from  the  rest;  while  it  is,  in 
contrast,  the  essential  characteristic  of  philosophy  that  it 
aims  at  putting  together  the  parts  of  knowledge  thus  at- 
tained into  a  systematic  whole;  so  that  all  the  methods 
of  attaining  truth  may  be  grasped  as  parts  of  one  method; 
and  all  the  conclusions  attained  may  be  presented,  so  far 
as  possible,  as  harmonious  and  consistent."  H.  Sidgwick, 
Philosophy,  Its  Scope  and  Relations,  p.  11.  Philosophy 
has  for  its  aim,  then,  not  the  discovery  of  some  province 
which  has  not  already  been  worked  by  the  usual  methods 
of  observation,  experimentation  and  conjecture,  but  the 
interpretation  in  a  critical  and  coordinating  fashion  of  the 
principles,  assumptions  and  conclusions  of  the  special 
sciences. 

Philosophy  attempts  to  round  out  and  develop  the  con- 
tributions of  the  special  sciences  into  a  consistent  view  of 
the  world  and  of  our  knowledge  of  it.  Let  us  take  the 
latter  point  first.  All  of  the  sciences  assume  that  man  can 
gain  knowledge  of  the  world;  but  none  of  them  investigate 
the  nature  and  conditions  of  knowledge.  Yet  surely  science 
cannot  be  complete  until  this  fundamental  assumption  of 
all  science  is  investigated.  Again,  the  sciences  employ  such 
concepts  as  space,  and  time,  and  matter,  and  mind,  and 
causality  without  always  giving  a  searching  examination 
of  the  meanings  these  terms  ought  to  have.  Philosophy 
regards  such  a  critical  investigation  of  commonly  used 
terms  as  imperative  if  a  harmonious  and  satisfactory  view 
of  the  world  is  to  be  achieved.  Why.^  Because  it  has 
found  again  and  again  that  no  synthesis  can  be  begun 
without  running  up  against  general  problems  involving 


WHAT  PHILOSOPHY  IS  5 

the  interpretation  of  such  terms.  "What  the  metaphysi- 
cian asserts  is  not  that  there  are  facts  with  which  the 
various  special  branches  of  experimental  science  cannot 
deal,  but  that  there  are  questions  which  can  and  ought  to 
be  raised  about  the  facts  with  which  they  do  deal  other 
than  those  which  experimental  inquiry  can  solve."  Taylor, 
Elements  of  Metaphysics,  p.  9.  The  student  will  be  intro- 
duced to  these  questions  in  the  main  part  of  the  book  and 
will  be  able  to  judge  for  himself  how  necessary  and  real 
they  are.  He  will  see  that  they  are  problems  which  can 
be  met  only  by  reflection.  The  senses  and  the  devices 
of  the  laboratory  will  not  help.  We  conclude  that  philos- 
ophy must  not  be  contrasted  w^ith  science  but  only  with 
the  particular  sciences.  It  seeks  to  perform  a  work  of 
supplementary  reflection. 

The  Competency  of  the  Philosopher. — ^To-day  we 
associate  science  with  a  method,  that  of  detailed  investiga- 
tion and  tested  conjecture.  Has  philosophy  a  method  or 
is  it  forced  to  rely  on  unmethodical  inspiration?  Is  the 
philosopher  more  like  a  poet  than  like  a  scientist?  Much 
has  been  said  about  the  speculative  method  and  about 
speculation  in  a  derogatory  way.  It  is  often  hinted  that 
the  philosopher  spins  his  conclusions  out  of  his  own  con- 
sciousness and  that  they  can,  therefore,  have  little  tested 
validity.  Such  statements  are,  however,  of tenest  made  by 
those  who  know  practically  nothing  about  philosophical 
systems  and,  themselves,  entertain  the  strangest  ideas 
about  the  world  at  large.  The  chapters  that  follow  must 
justify  philosophy  to  the  serious  reader  if  anything  can 
that  is  written  in  this  book;  but  a  few  words  can  be 
said  in  anticipation  of  the  proof  by  eating. 

Just  because  philosophy  is  a  reflective  criticism  and 
synthesis  of  the  theoretical  conclusions  of  the  sciences,  it 


e  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

cannot  test  its  conclusions  by  detailed  facts  of  its  own 
finding.  It  can,  however,  and  must  test  them  by  the 
theories  and  principles  put  forward  by  the  various  sciences. 
In  a  very  real  sense,  these  are  its  data.  Just  as  a  particular 
hypothesis  in  any  field  must  be  comprehensive  enough  to 
cover  all  the  facts,  so  a  philosophical  hypothesis  must  be 
capable  of  covering  the  better  founded  theories.  It  goes 
farther  than  this,  so  far  as  it  criticises  concepts  and  dis- 
tinctions which  are  not  well  founded.  The  method  of  the 
philosopher  is  to  raise  necessary  questions  of  a  general 
character,  examine  the  concepts  employed,  suggest  modi- 
fications and  adjustments,  and  so  to  assist  the  process  of 
unification  which  is  all  the  time  under  way.  The  philos- 
opher must  have  a  well-trained  and  instructed  mind  and 
be  in  close  touch  with  science.  The  logic  of  his  method 
does  not  differ  from  the  logic  of  systematic  conjecture,  for 
even  the  specialist  needs  a  creative  imagination.  His  data 
are  principles  and  distinctions  which  conflict  more  or  less 
and  must  be  so  changed  as  to  result  in  an  adequate  and 
consistent  view.  His  speculation  is  reflection,  and  he  re- 
fuses to  believe  that  even  the  laboratory  has  made  reflec- 
tion unnecessary. 

But  the  philosopher  possesses  a  peculiar  advantage  by 
reason  of  his  training  in  logic  and  psychology.  These  af- 
ford him  a  knowledge  of  knowledge  and  of  its  conditions 
and  genesis  that  is  extremely  valuable.  Why  this  is  so 
will  become  clearer  as  we  proceed.  But  a  couple  of  points 
may  be  noted  here. 

Logic  is  a  science  of  thinking  and  has  given  much  atten- 
tion to  the  mental  processes  involved  in  all  investigation. 
It  is  an  abstract  science  which  stresses  the  foundations  of 
knowledge  and  makes  the  enquirer  more  aware  of  the 
relative  strength  of  the  different  parts  of  a  science.    There 


WHAT  PHILOSOPHY  IS  1 

is  also  a  comparative  side  to  logic.  The  assumptions  and 
methods  of  the  different  types  of  sciences  are  compared. 
It  is  easy  to  see  why  training  in  logic  gives  the  philosopher 
an  advantage  over  the  narrow  specialist. 

A  knowledge  of  psychology  is  of  advantage  because  it  is 
the  fundamental  mental  science.  A  thinker  who  knew 
only  the  physical  sciences  would  be  unable  to  gain  as 
comprehensive  a  view  of  reality  as  one  who  was  also  ac- 
quainted with  mind.  We  shall  see  that  psychology  throws 
a  deal  of  light  upon  many  problems. 

But  the  philosopher  has  another  advantage  in  his  knowl- 
edge of  past  attempts  at  solving  world-problems.  Distinc- 
tions have  grown  up  gradually  which  are  of  the  greatest 
assistance  to  reflection.  What  men  like  Plato,  Aristotle, 
Kant  and  Leibnitz  thought  cannot  help  but  be  of  value 
to  the  thinker  of  to-day.  There  can  be  little  doubt 
that  training  in  the  understanding  of  the  various  sys- 
tems of  the  past  develops  the  power  of  abstract  thought. 
It  likewise  warns  the  thinker  what  mistakes  to  avoid 
and  what  concepts  have  been  outgrown.  Thus  the 
history  of  philosophy  gives  an  invaluable  perspec- 
tive. 

The  Older  and  the  Newer  Conceptions  of  Philosophy. 
— ^As  we  have  hinted,  philosophy  is  a  very  old  subject  and 
its  view-point  has  changed  from  age  to  age  while  yet  re- 
taining a  certain  continuity.  "The  word  philosophy  is  of 
Greek  origin.  It  was  first  employed,  not  as  a  technical 
term,  but  as  a  word  in  general  use.  The  reader  of  Herodo- 
tus will  find  it  in  the  well-known  story  of  Solon's  meeting 
with  Croesus.  Croesus  welcomes  the  Athenian  with  the 
remark  that  the  fame  of  his  wisdom  and  of  his  travels  has 
already  reached  him,  *that  thou,  philosophizing,  hast 
visited  a  vast  part  of  the  world  for  the  sake  of  reflection.' 


8  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Evidently,  the  expression  *for  the  sake  of  reflection'  in- 
tends to  explain  the  word  *  philosophizing.'  What  makes 
Solon  a  *  philosopher'  traveller  is  the  surprising  circum- 
stance that  he  does  not,  like  the  merchant  or  soldier,  pursue 
a  practical  object  in  his  journeys.  Thucydides,  Isocrates, 
and  others  use  the  word  philosophy  in  a  like  sense,  to 
characterize  a  general  theoretical  education  as  distin- 
guished from  the  technical  or  practical  one."  Paulsen, 
Introduction  to  Philosophy,  p.  20. 

The  first  technical  philosophers  were  men  who  sought 
to  offer  a  general  theory  of  reality  as  a  whole.  These  men 
were  called  physicists  because  they  speculated  about  the 
stuff  and  constitution  of  nature.  Their  advent  was  im- 
portant because  they  were  the  first  to  turn  their  backs  on 
mythology  or  the  account  of  the  world  in  terms  of  super- 
personal  agency  and  to  assume  the  possibility  of  natural 
processes  in  an  independent  world.  Their  guesses  were 
crude  and  yet  daring.  Sometimes,  indeed,  they  showed 
a  remarkable  measure  of  insight  into  principles  of  explana- 
tion which  have  since  been  re-discovered  and  developed 
by  the  special  sciences.  The  physicists  were  metaphysi- 
cians who  did  not  have  the  precious  advantage  of  the 
knowledge  since  painfully  gleaned  by  the  methodical  in- 
vestigations of  science.  They  made  rational  hypotheses 
about  nature  on  the  basis  of  such  experience  as  they  could 
gather.  Every  student  should  read  the  fragments  of  the 
teaching  of  Heraclitus  in  order  to  realize  how  much  a  keen 
mind  can  discern  by  reflecting  upon  the  broad  aspects  of 
human  experience.  Everything  is  in  flux;  yet  there  is 
measure  and  law  in  this  constant  flow  of  things.  Later 
came  the  system  of  Democritus  who  first  clearly  broached 
the  hypothesis  that  all  things  are  made  of  atoms,  of  small 
bits  of  matter  whose  external  relations  can  change.    Even 


WHAT  PHILOSOPHY  IS  9 

mind  was  for  him  made  up  of  the  finer,  smoother,  subtler 
atoms.    He  is  the  first  materiaHst. 

Gradually  more  specific  knowledge  was  gathered  and 
men  became  more  accustomed  to  reflective  thought. 
Mathematics  and  astronomy  began  to  grow  and  take 
shape.  Observations  in  meteorology,  medicine,  anatomy, 
psychology  were  made  and  held  together  by  theories.  But 
there  was  little  division  of  labor  and  one  man  often  made 
himself  master  of  nearly  all  the  fields.  The  philosopher 
was  the  investigator  and  speculative  genius  who  sought 
to  bring  such  knowledge  as  he  had  into  line  with  some 
unified  view  of  the  world  as  a  whole. 

As  time  passed,  the  social  and  mental  sciences  were 
added  to  the  subjects  investigated  and  theorized  about 
by  the  philosopher.  Such  geniuses  as  Plato  and  Aristotle 
created  wonderful  intellectual  systems  purporting  to  or- 
ganize together  in  one  comprehensive  view  the  various 
aspects  and  implications  of  human  experience.  Thus 
Aristotle's  system  covered  physics,  zoology,  psychology, 
ethics,  politics,  economics,  rhetoric,  poetics  and  meta- 
physics. He  endeavored  to  advance  these  special  disci- 
plines and  yet  bind  them  together  into  a  system  which 
would  furnish  an  interpretation  of  the  world. 

For  the  Middle  Ages,  also,  philosophy  was  synonymous 
with  human  knowledge.  The  philosopher  was  both  the 
lover  of  wisdom  and  its  possessor.  Abelard,  Albertus 
Magnus  and  Thomas  Aquinas  were  learned  men  and  keen 
thinkers;  but  the  task  they  set  themselves  would  appear 
to  the  man  of  the  twentieth  century  impossible.  How 
can  one  man  ever  hope  to  cover  so  many  fields  success- 
fully? The  reason  was,  of  course,  that  knowledge  was 
yet  pretty  limited  in  its  scope.  "Gil  Bias,  in  Le  Sage's 
famous  romance,  finds  it  possible  to  become  a  skilled 


10  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

physician  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye,  when  Dr.  Sangrado 
has  imparted  to  him  the  secret  that  the  remedy  for  all 
diseases  is  to  be  found  in  bleeding  the  patient  and  in 
making  him  drink  copiously  of  hot  water.  When  little 
is  known  about  things,  it  does  not  seem  impossible  for 
one  man  to  learn  that  little.  During  the  Middle  Ages 
and  the  centuries  preceding,  the  physical  sciences  had  a 
long  sleep.  Men  were  much  more  concerned  in  the  thir- 
teenth century  to  find  out  what  Aristotle  has  said  than 
they  were  to  address  questions  to  nature.  The  special 
sciences,  as  we  now  know  them,  had  not  been  called  into 
existence."    FuUerton,  An  Introduction  to  Philosophy y  p.  9. 

Modern  philosophy  is  usually  connected  with  the  names 
of  Francis  Bacon  (1561-1626)  and  Ren6  Descartes  (1596- 
1650).  For  these  men,  also,  philosophy  was  universal 
knowledge  and  included  the  special  sciences  as  its  parts. 
To-day  we  are  more  apt  to  make  a  distinction  and  to 
speak  of  Descartes  as  both  a  scientist  and  a  philosopher. 
His  chief  work  was  entitled  Pnndpia  Philosophice  and 
consisted  of  four  books.  The  first  book  contained  a  brief 
discussion  of  theory  of  knowledge  and  metaphysics;  the 
second,  the  principles  of  mechanical  physics;  the  third, 
the  cosmology;  the  fourth,  a  series  of  physical,  chemical, 
and  physiological  studies.  It  was  believed  that  all  these 
studies  would  converge  upon  a  unified  view  of  things. 

During  the  last  two  centuries  while  the  special  sciences 
were  growing  as  never  before,  they  were  partially  estranged 
from  philosophy.  The  Newtonian  view  of  the  world  gave 
the  physical  sciences  a  setting  which  seemed  to  them 
fairly  satisfactory,  and  they  were,  besides,  engrossed  in 
the  solution  of  specific  problems.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
teachers  of  philosophy  in  the  universities,  following  the 
trend  toward  specialism,  had  concerned  themselves,  in  the 


WHAT  PHILOSOPHY  IS  11 

main,  with  the  mental  sciences  and  with  the  traditional 
metaphysical  systems.  In  other  words,  the  philosophers 
unconsciously  became  specialists  by  having  parts  of  their 
over-broad  domains  removed.  This  was,  of  course,  an 
inevitable  process,  but  it  had  a  momentous  effect.  It  led^ 
on  the  whole,  to  a  temporary  estrangement  between  science 
and  philosophy,  an  estrangement  which  lasted  the  greater 
part  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Only  of  late  has  there 
grown  up  a  frank  interaction  between  the  two. 

The  General  Philosophical  Disciplines. — This  inter- 
action between  science  and  philosophy  comes  out  most 
clearly  in  the  so-called  general  philosophical  disciplines, 
metaphysics,  theory  of  knowledge  and  logic. 

Since  the  other  philosophical  disciplines  minister 
to  metaphysics,  this  discipline  is  often  identified  with 
philosophy.  Metaphysics  has  for  its  aim  the  achievement 
of  a  comprehensive  and  consistent  theory  of  reality.  It 
is  evident  to-day  that  no  such  theory  can  be  achieved 
which  does  not  take  careful  account  of  the  conclusions  of 
the  various  sciences.  Metaphysics  would  seem,  then,  to 
be  an  attempt  to  correlate  the  results  of  science  with  such 
other  information  about  reality  which  it  may  admit  and, 
in  a  way,  to  anticipate  the  course  of  science  in  the  future 
to  the  degree  that  practical  necessity  and  the  speculative 
impulse  dictate.  We  may  say,  then,  that  this  branch  of 
philosophy  is  distinct  from  the  special  sciences  but  is 
forced  to  be  in  intimate  touch  with  them. 

The  second  discipline  is  theory  of  knowledge.  This 
branch  of  philosophy  is  practically  a  special  science.  It  is 
the  science  of  the  nature,  conditions,  and  reach  of  knowl- 
edge. What  is  knowledge?  How  is  it  related  to  conscious- 
ness .^^  How  does  it  tell  us  about  reality?  Can  we  have 
knowledge  of  a  reality  outside  of  consciousness?    These 


12  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

are  typical  questions  of  theory  of  knowledge.  It  is  readily 
seen  that  metaphysics  must  be  relative  to  the  conclusions 
reached  in  this  preliminary  philosophical  discipline.  It  is 
not  too  much  to  say  that  modern  philosophy  differs  from 
ancient  in  its  stress  upon  the  necessity  of  theory  of 
knowledge. 

Logic  covers  a  wide  ground  extending,  as  it  does,  from 
theory  of  knowledge  to  formal  logic.  The  logician  ex- 
amines the  principles  of  correct  thinking  in  both  ordinary 
argumentation  and  scientific  investigation.  The  logic  of 
science  carefully  investigates  the  methods  and  presuppo- 
sitions of  science.  How  are  facts  determined.'^  What  is 
the  nature  of  explanation  .^^  What  is  the  role  played 
by  hypotheses?  These  are  a  few  of  the  questions  whose 
answers  are  sought  by  the  logician.  When  he  further 
asks  what  is  meant  by  cause  and  the  uniformity  of  nature, 
by  space  and  by  time,  he  approaches  the  domain  of  theory 
of  knowledge  just  as  this  other  discipline  shades  off  into 
metaphysics.  The  truth  is,  that  there  is  no  hard  and  fast 
line  between  these  general  philosophical  disciplines.  As 
a  rule,  logic  does  not  allow  itself  to  ask  certain  questions 
which  grow  out  of  its  own  investigations.  And  it  is  this 
restraint  which  separates  it  from  theory  of  knowledge. 
Theory  of  knowledge,  again,  has  definite  problems  which 
have  a  unity  of  their  own.  The  philosopher  who  is  work- 
ing in  this  field  concentrates  his  attention  upon  these 
problems,  and  regards  the  further  questions  which  open 
up  on  their  solution  as  metaphysical.  Thus  there  is  a 
continuous  development  from  logic  to  theory  of  knowledge 
and  thence  to  metaphysics. 

The  Special  Philosophical  Disciplines. — Besides  these 
general  philosophical  disciplines,  there  are  particular  disci- 
plines which  are  usually  assigned  to  the  philosopher.    The 


WHAT  PHILOSOPHY  IS  13 

reason  for  this  situation  is  twofold.  When  we  examine  the 
history  of  philosophy,  we  find  that  one  of  its  functions  has 
always  been  the  discovery  and  fostering  of  new  special 
sciences.  After  these  have  secured  a  healthy  growth,  they 
separate  off  from  philosophy  and  adopt  the  characteristic 
methods  of  empirical  investigation.  But  philosophy  usu- 
ally retains  an  interest  in  the  problems  which  they  repre- 
sent and  is  constantly  making  suggestions  as  to  the  larger 
bearings  of  these  problems.  At  the  same  time,  many  of 
these  special  disciplines  involve  the  mental  sciences,  in 
which  realm  the  philosopher  is  peculiarly  at  home  because 
of  his  training  in  logic  and  psychology.  Where  there  is 
a  recognized  division  of  labor  between  the  special  in- 
vestigator and  the  philosopher,  the  function  of  the  phi- 
losopher is  to  study  the  general  principles  involved  and 
the  relation  of  the  field  to  other  fields,  while  the  investi- 
gator, who  is  more  apt  to  think  of  himseK  as  a  scientist, 
gathers  and  organizes  his  data. 

^hics,  or  moral  philosophy,  is  a  special  philosophical 
discipline  which  has  the  science  of  ethics  as  its  scientific 
counterpart.  It  is  the  philosophy  of  conduct,  and  exam- 
ines those  principles  which  underlie  the  distinction  be- 
tween good  and  bad,  right  and  wrong.  The  teachers  of 
this  discipline  seek  to  be  both  investigators  and  philos- 
ophers. In  other  words,  they  usually  try  to  unite  in  them- 
selves the  double  function  of  philosophy  and  science. 

Political  philosophy  has  a  history  similar  to  that  of 
ethics.  It  was  a  discipline  nourished  by  philosophy  and 
still  retaining  this  old  connection.  Alongside  of  it  has 
grown  up  political  science  which  deals  with  the  empirical 
facts  and  established  principles  of  that  aspect  of  human 
relations.  Here,  again,  a  division  of  labor  has  developed. 
Philosophy  concerns  itself  more  with  the  fundamental 


14  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

principles  and  distinctions,  while  political  science  keeps 
its  feet  planted  pretty  firmly  on  the  ground  of  concrete 
fact. 

Esthetics  is,  once  more,  both  the  science  and  the 
philosophy  of  the  beautiful.  Just  because  the  human 
element  in  art  is  so  large,  sesthetics  is  inevitably  a  philo- 
sophical discipline.  It  raises  questions  of  value  which  lead 
on  into  the  farthest  reaches  of  human  life. 

These  special  disciplines  concern  themselves  primarily 
with  human  life.  They  deal  with  values  and  aspira- 
tions. 

The  Topics  Which  Need  Stress. — So  many  subjects 
are  touched  upon  by  philosophy  that  it  is  a  matter  of  some 
difficulty  to  know  just  what  to  stress  in  an  introductory 
work.  There  is  the  temptation  to  cover  all  the  philo- 
sophical disciplines  in  a  cursory  manner,  giving  here  a 
short  summary  of  the  problems  of  theory  of  knowledge, 
there  a  description  of  various  metaphysical  positions,  in 
the  next  section  a  brief  discussion  of  ethics  and  ending 
with  a  hasty  account  of  sesthetics  and  philosophy  of  re- 
ligion. It  is,  however,  my  own  conviction  that  it  is  far 
better  to  present  a  pretty  thorough  discussion  of  the 
general  basic  disciplines,  theory  of  knowledge  and  meta- 
physics, which  underlie  all  the  others.  There  are  intro- 
ductory courses  in  ethics,  logic  and  sesthetics  which  deal 
with  these  special  philosophical  disciplines  in  a  far  more 
satisfactory  manner  than  a  general  introduction  could  do. 
An  introduction  to  philosophy  is  therefore  more  and  more 
coming  to  mean  an  introduction  to  those  general  problems 
which  confront  all  knowledge.  He  who  has  wrestled  with 
these  can  face  the  more  empirical  questions  of  the  second- 
ary philosophical  subjects  with  equanimity. 

Acting  upon  this  decision  not  to  scatter  our  attention 


WHAT  PHILOSOPHY  IS  15 

over  too  wide  and  heterogeneous  a  field,  we  shall  concen- 
trate, first,  upon  the  problems  of  theory  of  knowledge  and, 
then,  upon  those  of  metaphysics  or  ontology.  We  shall, 
I  believe,  become  convinced  that  the  answer  to  ontological 
problems  depends  in  a  larger  measure  than  has  been  ac- 
knowledged upon  the  answer  given  to  epistemological 
problems.  Only  the  final  chapter  will  concern  itself  with 
values. 

The  method  we  shall  use  may  be  called  the  genetic  for 
want  of  a  better  name.  We  shall  begin  with  a  description 
of  the  outlook  of  ordinary  experience  and  gradually  pass, 
as  the  facts  warrant,  to  a  more  critical  position.  We  shall 
not  make  definitions  or  doctrinaire  assumptions  our 
starting-point  as  has  too  often  been  done.  In  order  to 
make  use  of  the  genuine  contributions  of  past  thinkers  in 
the  way  of  discovering  what  assumptions  have  led  into 
blind  alleys  and  what  have  further  possibilities  in  them, 
we  shall  consider  in  some  detail  the  systems  of  a  few  pivotal 
writers.  But  the  history  of  philosophy  will  always  be 
kept  subordinate  to  the  main  purpose,  that  of  a  clear  and 
consistent  statement  of  problems  and  their  solutions,  so 
far  as  solutions  are  realizable. 

He  who  wishes  to  profit  from  work  in  philosophy  must 
be  willing  to  live  into  the  subject  and  to  make  it  his  in- 
timate companion.  He  must  try  to  grasp  abstract  dis- 
tinctions and  follow  out  their  implications  in  a  persistent 
way.  For  such  a  one  the  reward  is  very  great.  The  world 
becomes  clothed  with  deeper  meaning,  and  man's  mind 
opens  up  depths  which  are  otherwise  hidden  from  view. 
The  secret  of  the  universe  is  not  open  to  casual  inspection. 
I  venture  to  predict  that  the  student  will  have  a  quite 
different  view  of  the  world  he  lives  in  before  he  has  mas- 
tered many  of  the  following  chapters. 


16  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

References 

Calkins,  The  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy,  chap.  1. 

Fullerton,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  1. 

James,  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  chap.  1. 

Jerusalem,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  First  Division. 

Kiilpe,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chaps.  1  and  4. 

Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  Introduction. 

Santayana,  The  Life  of  Reason,  1 . 1-32. 

Sidgwick,  Philosophy,  Its  Scope  and  Relations,  lectures  1  and  2. 

Taylor,  Elements  of  Metaphysics,  chap.  1. 


CHAPTER   II 
COMMON  SENSE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

The  Common-Sense  View  of  the  World. — The  outlook 
upon  the  world  which  people  have  before  they  study 
science  or  philosophy  very  deeply  may  be  called  that  of 
common  sense.  Certain  distinctions  are  accepted  as  a 
matter  of  course,  although  they  are  not  worked  out  clearly 
or  in  detail.  Every  one  is  aware  of  and  uses  the  contrast 
between  the  mental  and  the  physical,  between  himself  as 
a  perceiver  and  the  objects  which  he  perceives,  between 
himself  and  others.  Nature  is,  again,  a  term  for  a  per- 
durable realm  about  whose  history  something  is  known 
and  which  will  outlast  the  human  beings  who  come  and 
go  upon  its  surface.  It  would  be  foolish  for  the  philosopher 
to  attempt  to  belittle  this  knowledge  which  hard  expe- 
rience has  forced  upon  mankind.  The  plain  man  knows 
as  well  as  the  scientist,  the  poet  as  well  as  the  philosopher, 
certain  elementary  and  brutal  truths  about  man's  place 
in  nature.  The  latest  dramatist  but  repeats  what  Soph- 
ocles already  knew.  Man  is  so  obviously  only  a  part  of  a 
larger  whole. 

We  have  good  reason  to  believe  that  the  common  dis- 
tinctions we  all  make  are  the  result  of  adjustments  and 
experiences  which  could  have  led  to  no  other  conclusions. 
I  sit  in  my  study  and  listen  to  the  sounds  which  come  to 
me  from  the  street.  They  mean  to  me  a  busy  life  of  traffic 
and  enterprise.  I  pick  up  a  newspaper  and  read  about 
the  course  of  the  war  in  Europe,  about  a  destructive  earth- 

17 


18  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

quake  in  Italy,  about  the  completion  of  a  railroad  in 
Alaska.  I  divert  myself  in  the  evening  after  the  day's 
work  by  reading  a  chapter  in  Gibbon's  History.  Thus  I 
distinguish  the  past  history  of  peoples  from  their  present, 
the  physical  world  and  its  catastrophes  from  the  activities 
of  men.  I  can  picture  to  myself  the  quiet  scenery  around 
the  Huron  or  lose  thought  of  myself  in  following  the  ad- 
ventures of  such  a  remarkable  man  as  Napoleon. 

Common  sense  would,  then,  seem  to  present  an  organi- 
zation of  many  and  diverse  experiences  into  a  stable  world 
of  objects  and  events  classified,  on  the  whole,  in  a  satis- 
factory way.  The  individual  can  no  more  escape  from 
these  classifications  and  distinctions  than  he  can  from  his 
feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain.  To  develop  them  is  pos- 
sible, as  science  has  proved,  but  to  ignore  them  strikes 
us  all  as  impossible  and  even  unthinkable.  When  the 
spring  comes,  I  look  in  the  cellar  for  the  spade  I  placed 
there  last  fall,  find  it  and  go  out  to  dig  up  the  soil  and 
prepare  it  for  the  seed  I  intend  to  plant.  As  a  matter  of 
course,  I  assume  the  reality  of  all  these  objects  and  of 
the  relations  between  them.  At  every  moment  in  the 
day,  I  am  called  upon  to  make  adjustments  to  my  sur- 
roundings and  to  other  people,  and  it  does  not  enter 
my  head  to  doubt  that  they  are  as  real  as  myseK.  I  am 
one  among  many  in  a  tremendously  large  and  complex 
world. 

Natural  Realism. — The  plain  man  is  a  realist.  He 
perceives  what  he  unhesitatingly  calls  physical  things  and 
reacts  to  them  in  established  ways.  He  lives  among  these 
perceived  things  adapting  himself  to  them  and  making 
them  his  instruments.  Physical  things  are  out  there  in 
space  away  from  his  body  yet  in  relations  with  it.  Other 
individuals  can  see  the  same  things  in  much  the  same 


COMMON  SENSE  AND  PHILOSOPHY  19 

way,  for  they  are  independent  and  open  to  inspection 
through  the  sense-organs.  There  the  things  are,  quite  un- 
affected by  his  seeing  them. 

But  we  must  modify  this  dominant  view  somewhat. 
Common  sense  is  always  naively  realistic  whenever  there 
is  no  pressing  reason  why  it  should  cease  to  be  so.  And 
this  is  the  situation  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases.  "When 
we  see  a  tree  we  think  that  it  is  really  green  and  really 
waving  about  in  precisely  the  same  way  as  it  appears  to 
be.  We  do  not  think  of  our  object  of  perception  being 
*like'  the  real  tree,  we  think  that  what  we  perceive  is  the 
tree,  and  that  it  is  just  the  same  at  a  given  moment 
whether  it  be  perceived  or  not,  except  that  what  we  per- 
ceive may  be  only  a  part  of  the  real  tree."  Broad,  Per- 
ceptioriy  Physics  and  Reality,  p.  1. 

The  physical  world  is,  then,  regarded  as  common  to  all 
observers  and  independent  for  its  existence  and  properties 
of  this  intermittent  inspection.  When  we  try  to  discover 
what  the  plain  man  means  by  perceiving,  we  are  left  with 
the  impression  that  it  is  of  the  nature  of  an  event  in  which 
the  independent  object  is  revealed  to  the  individual.  The 
only  condition  of  this  event  which  is  clearly  recognized 
is  the  use  of  the  sense-organs.  He  who  does  not  have  eyes 
cannot  see  things.  But,  however  conditioned,  perceiving 
is  an  event  in  which  the  physical  world,  itself,  is  present  in 
his  field  of  vision.  The  individual  opens  his  eyes  and  turns 
them  in  this  or  that  direction,  and  at  once  definite  things 
are  present  to  his  conscious  self.  In  large  measure,  seeing 
would  appear  to  be  simply  a  name  for  this  fact  of  presence, 
of  openness  to  observation  when  the  eyes  are  used,  just 
as  hearing  is  a  name  for  the  presence  of  sounds  when  the 
ears  are  stimulated.  Perceiving  is  a  more  general  term 
having  a  less  definite  reference  to  any  one  of  the  senses. 


20  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

It  would  seem,  therefore,  not  to  explain  anything  but 
just  to  describe  a  fact. 

Common  sense  has  no  reflective  theory  of  the  nature 
and  conditions  of  the  event  which  it  calls  perceiving  a 
thing.  Certainly  there  is  no  awareness  of  the  activity  of 
any  peculiar  ego  or  self  from  which  energy  goes  forth  to 
touch  the  thing  and,  as  it  were,  light  it  up.  We  see  what 
is  around  us,  and  we  who  see  these  things  are  concrete 
individuals  not  so  very  different  from  the  things  we  see. 
Probably,  the  plain  man  of  to-day  accepts  the  teachings 
of  science  in  the  main  and  has  some  thought  that  the 
sense-organs  must  be  stimulated  and  these  stimulations 
carried  to  the  central  nervous  system.  But  just  why  this 
physical  process  should  lead  to  the  vision  of  the  physical 
world  out  there  in  space  he  does  not  know. 

Again,  common  sense  has  developed  and  possesses 
certain  meanings  which  it  firmly  and  automatically  at- 
taches to  these  perceived  objects.  They  are  independent 
of  the  event  of  perception,  which  is  a  purely  human  affair. 
We  cannot  stare  rocks  and  trees  out  of  countenance  though 
we  may  break  them  into  pieces  by  means  of  dynamite 
judiciously  planted  and  exploded.  The  physical  world  is 
also  judged  to  be  permanent.  The  hills  and  heaths  are 
eternal  as  measured  against  the  brief  span  of  life  granted 
to  human  beings.  These  meanings  have  their  factual 
foundation  and  seem  to  us  inevitable  and  unavoidable. 
In  a  sense  they  are  hypotheses  but  they  are  satisfactory  so 
far  as  they  enable  us  to  account  for  the  order  of  our  ex- 
periences. We  see  the  same  things  again  and  again  be- 
cause they  are  permanent  and  open  to  inspection.  Why, 
indeed,  should  not  these  things  we  see  and  to  which  we 
react  be  as  permanent  as  ourselves?  There  would  seem 
to  be  a  fundamental  validity  in  these  realistic  meanings 


COMMON  SENSE  AND  PHILOSOPHY  21 

which  have  grown  up  so  naturally  in  human  experi- 
ence. 

When  the  student  is  startled  by  the  attack  upon  Natural 
Realism  made  by  the  philosopher,  he  should  bear  in  mind 
the  frank  recognition  which  has  been  here  given  to  the 
plain  man's  realism.  If  the  philosopher  teaches  that 
Natural  Realism  is  untenable,  he  will  present  what  appear 
to  him  to  be  good  and  sufficient  reasons. 

The  Recognition  of  Natural  Realism  in  Philosophy. — 
Even  philosophers  who  have  been  forced  by  their  reflec- 
tion to  doubt  the  independent  reality  of  the  visible  world 
have  acknowledged  that  humanity  is  ordinarily  realistic. 
Let  us  glance  at  the  testimony  of  Berkeley  and  Hume,  two 
thinkers  whose  arguments  have  done  much  to  break  down 
Natural  Realism.  "It  is  indeed  an  opinion  strangely 
prevailing  amongst  men,"  writes  Berkeley,  "that  houses, 
mountains,  rivers,  and  in  a  word  all  sensible  objects,  have 
an  existence  natural  or  real,  distinct  from  their  being 
perceived  by  the  understanding."  Principles  of  Human 
Knowledge y  Sec.  4.  Similarly,  Plume  observes  "That  how- 
ever philosophers  may  distinguish  betwixt  the  objects  and 
the  perceptions  of  the  senses;  which  they  suppose  co- 
existent and  resembling;  yet  this  is  a  distinction,  which  is 
not  comprehended  by  the  generality  of  mankind,  who  as 
they  perceive  only  one  being,  can  never  assent  to  the 
opinion  of  a  double  existence  and  representation.  Those 
very  sensations^  which  enter  by  the  eye  or  ear,  are  with  them 
the  true  objects,  nor  can  they  readily  conceive  that  this  pen 
or  paper,  which  is  immediately  perceived,  represents  another 
which  is  different  from,  but  resembling  it.  In  order,  there- 
fore, to  accommodate  myself  to  their  notions,  I  shall  at 
first  suppose  that  there  is  only  a  single  existence,  which 
I  shall  call  indifferently  object  or  perception,  according  as 


22  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

it  shall  seem  best  to  suit  my  purpose,  understanding  by 
both  of  them  what  any  common  man  means  by  a  hat,  or 
a  shoe,  or  stone,  or  any  other  impression,  conveyed  to 
him  by  his  senses."  Hume,  Treatise  of  Human  Nature, 
p.  202.  In  short,  Hume  agrees  that  the  generality  of  men 
regard  their  perceptions  as  physical  objects  and  physical 
objects  as  their  perceptions.  Hence,  he  criticises  a  theory, 
to  which  we  shall  refer  later,  that  our  perceptions  are 
only  copies  in  the  mind  of  physical  things. 

It  would  be  easy  to  quote  other  philosophers  as  testifying 
to  the  universality  of  Natural  Realism.  Sir  William  Ham- 
ilton compiled  more  than  thirty  closely  printed  pages  of 
references  in  evidence  of  "the  Universality  of  the  Philos- 
ophy of  Common  Sense,  or  its  general  recognition  in  Real- 
ity and  in  Name."  There  can  be  no  doubt,  also,  that  to-day 
there  is  a  strong  tendency  to  keep  as  near  to  common- 
sense  realism  as  possible.  I  shall  satisfy  myself  with  just 
one  more  reference.  "Naive  Consciousness  always  takes 
sensation  to  be  perception  of  a  complete,  externally  exist- 
ing, real  thing.  It  believes  that  the  world  lies  around  us 
illuminated  by  its  own  radiance,  and  that  outside  of  us 
tones  and  odours  cross  and  meet  one  another  in  the  im- 
measurable space  that  plays  in  the  colours  belonging  to 
things.  Our  senses  sometimes  close  themselves  against 
this  continual  abundance,  and  confine  us  to  the  course 
of  our  inner  life;  sometimes  they  open  like  doors  to  the 
arriving  stimulus,  to  receive  it  as  it  is  in  all  its  grace  or 
ugliness.  No  doubt  disturbs  the  assurance  of  this  belief, 
and  even  the  illusions  of  the  senses,  insignificant  in  com- 
parison with  the  preponderance  of  consentient  experience, 
do  not  shake  the  assurance  that  we  here  everywhere  look 
into  an  actual  world  that  does  not  cease  to  be  as  it  appears 
to  us,  even  when  our  attention  is  not  turned  to  it.    The 


COMMON  SENSE  AND  PHILOSOPHY  23 

brightness  of  the  stars  seen  by  the  night  watcher  will, 
he  hopes,  continue  to  shine  over  him  in  slumber;  tones  and 
perfumes,  unheard  and  unsmelt,  will  be  fragrant  and  har- 
monious afterwards  as  before;  nothing  of  the  sensible 
world  will  perish  save  the  accidental  perception  of  it  which 
consciousness  formerly  possessed."  Lotze,  Microcosmos^ 
Book  III,  Chap.  IV,  par.  1.  Surely  we  have  done  justice 
to  the  outlook  of  common  sense. 

Philosophy  Must  Start  from  Natural  Realism. — 
Philosophy  cannot  have  an  arbitrary  beginning  any  more 
than  an  arbitrary  ending.  Like  science  it  must  grow  out 
of  ordinary  experience  as  a  supplementation  or  correction 
of  it.  Science  arises  out  of  genuine  problems  which  must 
be  faced.  This  origin  gives  it  its  strength  and  reality. 
The  power  to  recognize  the  existence  of  problems  which 
must  be  met  is  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  men 
like  Galileo  and  Newton  and  Faraday.  Now  philosophy 
is  likewise  founded  on  specific  problems  which  have 
slowly  been  discovered  and  formulated  by  men  of  insight. 
The  general  setting  is  ordinary  experience.  Were  this  not 
so,  philosophy  would  be  unreal  and  artificial.  "Philos- 
ophy properly  begins  in  a  description  of  human  experience. 
It  must  give  close  attention  to  the  distinctions,  meanings, 
and  attitudes  which  are  characteristic  of  man's  natural 
view  of  the  world  in  which  he  lives.  Such  a  preliminary 
study  prepares  a  foundation  upon  which  the  thinker  may 
work.  .  .  .  The  advance  of  philosophy,  like  that  of 
science,  must  be  gradual,  and  the  starting-point  must 
be  the  experience  of  everyday  life."  Sellars,  Critical 
Realism^  p.  1. 

Natural  Realism  and  Science. — We  shall  see  that  the 
conclusions  and  constructions  of  science  conflict  with  the 
outlook  of  Natural  Realism.    But  as  long  as  possible  this 


24  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

conflict  is  ignored  by  the  specialist  in  science.  He  lives 
and  thinks  within  the  outlines  set  by  common  sense.  The 
physical  world  which  physics  and  chemistry  study  is  out 
there  in  space  and  essentially  perceivable.  It  is  true  that 
color  is  now  considered  an  effect  produced  in  the  sensitive 
organism  by  light  waves  which  impinge  upon  the  eye,  and 
that  sound  is  judged  to  be  a  sensation  caused  by  sound- 
waves in  the  air.  But  knowledge  is  still  thought  of  as 
dependent  upon  a  perceptual  observation  of  an  independ- 
ent world.  The  scientist  often  solves  particular  problems 
by  making  distinctions  between  the  real  process  in  nature 
and  the  perceptual  experience  of  the  observer — a  distinc- 
tion which  runs  directly  counter  to  the  outlook  of  common 
sense — without  realizing  that  his  assumption  implies  that 
the  objects  seen  by  him  are  not  physical  things  but  effects 
in  his  mind.  The  power  of  an  habitual  outlook  with  which 
he  has  not  reflectively  broken  is  so  great  that  he  can  be- 
lieve at  the  same  time  that  the  real  world  is  colorless  and 
soundless  and  that  it  is  colored  and  sonorous,  that  it  is 
composed  of  small  particles  in  ceaseless  motion  and  that 
it  is  just  as  it  is  seen.  The  reason  for  this  lack  of  con- 
sistency is,  of  course,  the  fact  that  the  solution  of  particular 
problems  bulks  larger  for  the  specialist  than  the  attain- 
ment of  a  harmonious  view  of  reality  as  a  whole.  The 
fact  of  knowledge  is  more  important  than  its  nature  and 
means  of  attainment. 

While  science  begins  with  the  outlook  of  common  sense 
and  seldom  reflectively  breaks  with  it,  it  is  forced  to  sub- 
stitute conception  more  and  more  for  perception.  Atoms 
and  molecules  and  electrons  and  ether-waves  can  only 
be  conceived  for  they  have  never  yet  been  literally  per- 
ceived. The  scientist  knows  that  knowledge  about  the 
world  is  not  as  easy  a  matter  as  the  untrained  man  is 


COMMON  SENSE  AND  PHILOSOPHY  25 

apt  to  suppose.  He  is  aware  how  many  hypotheses  have 
been  erected  only  to  be  given  up,  and  he  more  than  sus- 
pects that  the  physical  world  as  presented  in  many  text- 
books is  only  a  temporary  construct  which  will  be  modified 
with  the  growth  of  knowledge.  The  old  assurance  of 
common  sense  has  departed  never  to  return.  The  problem 
of  the  nature  and  conditions  of  knowledge  is  ripe  for  for- 
mulation. But  until  it  is  formulated,  consciously,  the 
scientist  hesitates  to  break  with  the  outlook  of  common 
sense,  the  chief  reason  for  his  hesitation  perhaps  being  his 
inability  to  replace  it  by  another  definite  outlook.  It  is 
here  that  the  philosopher  sees  his  function.  Do  the  facts 
which  the  scientist  has  gained  force  reflection  to  remodel 
Natural  Realism  in  a  radical  fasliion?  Is  the  real  table 
the  one  I  see  before  my  eyes,  or  the  one  I  conceive  in  terms 
of  physics  and  chemistry.^  And  how  is  it  that  I  am  able 
to  conceive  things  which  I  am  not  able  to  perceive.^ 

Natural  Realism  not  a  System. — But  we  must  not 
make  the  mistake  of  believing  that  the  ordinary  man's 
outlook  is  a  systematic  and  harmonious  one.  We  have 
just  indicated  that  the  point  of  view  of  the  scientist  fluc- 
tuates from  a  stress  upon  perception  to  a  faith  in  the  pow- 
ers of  conception.  The  situation  is  much  the  same  with 
enlightened  common  sense.  Natural  Realism  is  a  practical 
adjustment  which  organizes  the  facts  of  experience  in  a 
rough-and-ready  fashion.  When  difficulties  arise,  new 
distinctions  are  made  without  any  very  serious  attempt 
to  see  how  they  fit  into  the  more  usual  ones.  We  have 
given  a  broad  outline  of  the  outlook  and  must  now  pass 
to  the  qualifications  which  are  made. 

Why  is  it  that  I  see  one  side  of  a  thing  while  you  who  are 
standing  in  another  position  see  another  side?  Common 
sense  replies  **  because  you  are  standing  in  one  position  in 


26  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

regard  to  it  and  I  in  another."  Position  has,  then,  some- 
thing to  do  with  what  I  see  as  well  as  do  my  sense-organs. 
Why  is  this.f*  Common  sense  by  itself  has  no  answer  to 
give  except  the  empirical  fact  that  what  we  see  varies 
with  certain  changes  which  we  call  changes  of  position. 
But  if  perception  is  merely  an  event  in  which  things  are 
revealed,  why  cannot  we  see  all  the  sides  of  a  thing  at 
once  and  even  the  interior  of  it.'^  The  fact  is  that  we  don't; 
and  common  sense  naturally  accepts  the  fact  and  finds  out 
certain  empirical  relations  such  as  that  between  position 
and  aspect  seen.  But  it  is  not  until  science  discovers  the 
laws  of  optics  and  proves  that  light-waves  must  be  re- 
flected into  the  eyes  that  this  relation  receives  an  explana- 
tion. Common  sense  has  accepted  the  theory  of  science 
which  stresses  a  causal  relation  between  the  physical  thing 
and  the  eye  while  still  adhering  to  its  original  outlook. 
It  is  the  task  of  philosophy  to  determine  whether  the  old 
and  the  new  can  be  reconciled.  The  implications  of  the 
new  fact  must  be  worked  out  and  compared  with  Natural 
Realism. 

Again,  common  sense  sometimes  speaks  of  seeing  the 
side  of  a  thing  as  though  the  side  seen  were  a  geometrical 
part  of  the  thing;  at  other  times  it  speaks  of  seeing  an 
aspect  of  the  thing  or  the  way  a  thing  appeared  from  a  par- 
ticular angle.  An  aspect  seems  to  be  more  intangible  and 
somehow  more  a  function  of  the  position  of  the  observer. 
It  does  not  have  the  same  objectivity  as  the  term  side. 
Yet  common  sense  uses  now  one  term  and  now  the  other. 
What  it  is  certain  of  is  that  the  physical  thing  itself  is 
seen.  Further  than  that  it  has  not  worked  the  situation 
out. 

In  order  to  be  concrete,  let  us  take  the  shape  of 
a  table.    "We  are  all  in  the  habit  of  judging  as  to  the 


COMMON  SENSE  AND  PHILOSOPHY  27 

'real*  shapes  of  things,  and  we  do  this  so  unreflectingly 
that  we  come  to  think  we  actually  see  the  real  shapes. 
But,  in  fact,  as  we  all  have  to  learn  if  we  try  to  draw,  a 
given  thing  looks  different  in  shape  from  every  point  of 
view.  If  our  table  is  *  really'  rectangular,  it  will  look, 
from  almost  all  points  of  view,  as  if  it  had  two  acute  an- 
gles and  two  obtuse  angles.  If  opposite  sides  are  parallel, 
they  will  look  as  if  they  converged  to  a  point  away  from 
the  spectator;  if  they  are  of  equal  length,  they  will  look 
as  if  the  nearer  side  were  longer.  All  these  things  are  not 
commonly  noticed  in  looking  at  a  table,  because  experi- 
ence has  taught  us  to  construct  the  *rear  shape  from  the 
apparent  shape,  and  the  *rear  shape  is  what  interests 
us  as  practical  men.  But  the  'real'  shape  is  not  what  we 
see;  it  is  something  inferred  from  what  we  see.  And  what 
we  see  is  constantly  changing  in  shape  as  we  move  about 
the  room;  so  that  here  again  the  senses  seem  not  to  give  us 
the  truth  about  the  table  itself,  but  only  about  the  ap- 
pearance of  the  table."  Russell,  The  Problems  of  Philoso- 
phy, pp.  15-6. 

In  this  example  we  meet  with  the  distinction  between 
the  physical  thing  and  its  appearance  to  individuals  under 
certain  conditions.  We  see  the  physical  thing .^^  Yes; 
but  we  do  not  always  see  it  the  same.  That  is  an  empirical 
fact  which  common  sense  has  had  to  recognize  and  some- 
how appear  to  explain.  It  does  this  by  making  a  distinc- 
tion between  the  physical  thing  and  its  appearances.  But 
the  word  appearance  does  not,  of  course,  explain  anything. 
A  moment's  thought  shows  that  there  is  need  for  reflection. 
Philosophy  is  just  such  reflection. 

Difficulties  Confronting  Natural  Realism. — Ever  since 
its  inception,  philosophy  has  brooded  over  difficulties 
which   seemed   to  be  destructive  to  Natural  Realism. 


28  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Just  because  the  philosopher  could  not  be  satisfied  with 
the  lack  of  system  characteristic  of  common  sense,  he  felt 
the  sharp  edge  of  the  problems  indicated  above  and  of 
others  like  them.  Take  the  color  of  an  object  for  ex- 
ample. It  varies  according  to  the  nature  of  the  illumina- 
tion, the  distance  of  the  observer,  the  condition  of  the 
intervening  medium.  But  if  the  color  I  see  is  actually  the 
color  of  the  physical  thing  I  see,  as  I  ordinarily  take  it 
to  be,  how  can  it  vary  in  this  way  in  relation  to  factors 
outside  of  the  thing .^  The  color  I  see  would  seem  to  be  a 
function  of  conditions  of  which  the  physical  thing  is  only 
one.  And  so  it  is  held  to  be  by  science.  It  is  true  that  I 
am  apt  to  speak  of  the  real  color  in  contrast  to  the  apparent 
color.  But  a  little  reflection  convinces  me  that  this  is  only 
a  contrast  between  a  more  satisfactory  experience  and  a 
less  satisfactory  one.  The  real  color  of  this  piece  of  cloth 
is  that  seen  in  the  daytime  and  from  near  by;  its  apparent 
color  is  that  which  it  has  at  a  distance  or  under  the  gas- 
light. I  make  a  choice  between  two  colors  and  disavow 
one  for  good  empirical  reasons.  But  both  colors,  the  real 
as  well  as  the  apparent,  are  functions  of  conditions.  I  can 
never  observe  a  color  which  is  not;  and  so  it  seems  natural 
to  conclude — though  it  does  not  strictly  follow — that  the 
physical  thing  by  itself  and  in  its  own  right  has  no  color. 

Another  example  which  has  always  attracted  attention 
is  the  case  of  the  straight  stick  which  appears  bent  in  water. 
I  know  that  it  is  straight  because  I  can  take  it  out  again 
and  look  at  it.  Even  while  it  is  in  the  water  I  may  test 
its  shape  by  running  my  hand  down  over  it.  I  am  com- 
pelled to  conclude  that  what  I  see  is  conditioned  by 
processes  external  to  the  stick.  Science  has,  as  we  all 
know,  worked  out  the  problem  in  some  detail. 

Reflecting  on  these  and  similar  diflBculties  confronting 


COMMON  SENSE  AND  PHILOSOPHY  29 

Natural  Realism,  men  soon  began  to  doubt  the  testimony 
of  the  senses,  i.  e.,  began  to  wonder  whether  the  thing 
seen  was  the  physical  thing  at  all.  When  there  was  no 
adequate  construction  following  upon  this  doubt,  the 
movement  away  from  common-sense  realism  was  called 
scepticism.  Natural  Realism  broke  down  and  philosoph- 
ical systems  took  its  place.  How  can  these  difficulties 
be  met? 

References 

Berkeley,  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge  and  Three  Dialogues 
Between  Hylas  and  Philonous.  These  are  quite  basic  for 
modern  philosophy. 

FuUerton,  An  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  5.  Suggestive 
but  inconclusive. 

Hume,  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  pt.  IV. 

Russell,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  chap.  1. 

Sellars,  Critical  Realism,  chap.  1. 

Weber,  History  of  Philosophy,  sec.  22, 


CHAPTER  in 
THE  BREAKDOWN  OF  NATURAL  REALISM 

A  Systematic  Attack  upon  Natural  Realism.— Dif- 
ferent groupings  of  the  main  objections  to  Natural  Realism 
can  and  have  been  made.  For  our  present  purposes  the 
following,  although  it  does  not  claim  to  be  exhaustive, 
will  suffice:  (1)  the  fact  that  what  we  perceive  is  a  function 
of  many  processes  both  extra-organic  and  intra-organic; 
(2)  the  distinction  between  the  physical  thing  and  its 
appearances;  (3)  the  lack  of  correspondent  variation  be- 
tween things  and  that  which  is  perceived;  (4)  the  differ- 
ences between  the  perceptions  of  individuals;  (5)  the  dif- 
ficulty experienced  in  explainiag  images,  dream-life  and 
memory  on  the  basis  of  Natural  Realism;  (6)  the  synthetic 
or  composite  character  of  that  which  is  perceived.  Our 
aim  will  be  to  examine  these  objections  and  to  weigh  their 
cumulative  force.  It  is  obvious  that  they  bid  fair  to  force 
us  beyond  the  main  outlines  of  Natural  Realism,  viz., 
that  we  perceive  the  physical  thing  itself. 

An  important  question  of  method  arises  here  for  con- 
sideration. Because  of  these  objections  to  Natural  Real- 
ism, many  writers  have  swung  entirely  away  from  realism 
to  what  is  called  idealism.  We  must,  I  think,  set  our 
faces  sternly  against  any  such  hasty  leap.  Reflection 
arises  within  an  experience  already  organized.  To  sepa- 
rate the  problems  and  their  assumed  answers  from  the  con- 
text in  which  they  have  arisen  is  surely  unjustified.  Our 
first  endeavor  should  be  to  remodel  and  develop  Natural 

30 


THE  BREAKDOWN  OF  NATURAL  REALISM      31 

Realism  in  order  to  make  it  meet  objections.  I  hope  that 
the  sequel  will  show  that  the  realistic  meanings  of  both 
common  sense  and  science  can  be  retained  while  a  more 
adequate  theory  of  knowledge  can  be  substituted  for  the 
view  that  in  perception  we  apprehend  the  physical  world 
itself. 

Perceived  Objects  are  Functions. — What  we  perceive 
is  a  function  of  processes  which  may  be  divided  into  two 
classes,  the  extra-organic  and  the  intra-organic.  Thus  it 
is  an  object  which  has  conditions.  But  these  conditions 
are  not  given,  they  must  be  discovered.  I  see  this  book 
which  I  hold  in  my  hand.  My  experience  is  something 
which  presents  itself  and  investigation  is  required  to  enable 
me  to  know  all  that  must  take  place  before  this  apparently 
simple  event  can  occur.  Now  even  common  sense  is  well 
aware  of  many  of  these  conditions,  although  it  has  not 
realized  their  significance.  We  all  know  that  organs  of 
vision  are  necessary,  that  there  must  be  a  source  of  il- 
lumination, that  opaque  objects  must  not  intervene.  This 
knowledge  is  elementary  and  easily  gained  but  science 
alone  has  developed  its  implications.  If  perception  is 
merely  an  event  in  which  things  are  revealed,  why  cannot 
I  see  the  things  on  the  other  side  of  a  brick  wall?  The 
fact  is  that  I  do  not  and  so  common  sense  says  that  I 
cannot.  But,  as  was  pointed  out  a  while  ago,  the  reason 
has  been  given  only  by  the  tested  theory  that  something 
comes  from  the  source  of  illumination,  is  reflected  to  the 
eye,  and  somehow  there  conditions  what  we  see.  The 
opaque  object  prevents  the  arrival  of  this  something  which 
we  call  light.  Science  has  even  measured  the  rate  of  trans- 
mission of  such  processes  as  light  and  sound.  Only  he 
who  is  willing  to  contest  the  empirical  data  of  science  has 
the  right  to  doubt  these  conclusions. 


32  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

What  we  see  is,  then,  a  function  of  what  arrives  at  the 
eye;  what  we  hear,  of  what  arrives  at  the  ear.  But  internal 
processes  now  intervene.  In  the  case  of  sight,  the  retina 
and  optic  nerve  in  general  must  function;  in  the  case  of 
hearing,  the  auditory  nerve  must  be  stimulated  in  complex 
ways.  Such  processes  must  be  extended  to  the  cortical 
centres  even  before  perception  takes  place.  Admitted 
that  we  know  comparatively  little  of  what  occurs  in  these 
centres,  we  still  have  reason  to  beUeve  that  it  is  complex 
and  fundamental. 

The  direction  of  the  mediatory  processes  of  which  what 
we  perceive  is  a  function  is  provedly  from  the  physical 
object  to  the  brain,  while  the  direction  of  the  attention 
seems  to  be  from  the  concrete  individual  to  the  object. 
Immediate  experience  seems  to  inform  us  that  we  see  the 
physical  thing,  while  reflection  urges  upon  us  the  position 
that  what  we  see  is  a  function  of  processes  in  the  organism 
as  controlled  by  extra-organic  processes.  Can  these  two 
positions  be  reconciled?  An  easy  and  natural  way  to 
reconcile  them  is  to  conclude  that  what  we  perceive  is  not 
actually  the  physical  thing  although  it  is  inevitably  so 
taken  by  common  sense.  What  common  sense  sees  is  a 
product  of  whose  conditions  it  is  not  informed  and  which 
is  not  labelled  for  it.  Reflection  suggests  that  we  must  re- 
classify it.  It  must  be  home  in  mind,  however,  that  such  re- 
classification does  not  change  its  texture  or  the  way  it  is  given 
one  jot. 

The  Physical  Thing  and  its  Appearance. — We  have 
already  touched  upon  this  distinction  and  suggested  its 
significance.  It  will  be  noted  at  once  that  it  reenforces 
the  argument  offered  above.  When  closely  examined,  this 
distinction  is  found  to  be  a  recognition  of  the  fact  that 
objects  are  perceived  differently  under  different  conditions. 


THE  BREAKDOWN  OF  NATURAL  REALISM      33 

"For  example,  we  look  from  our  window  and  see,  as  we 
say,  a  tree  at  a  distance.  What  we  are  conscious  of  is  a 
small  bluish  patch  of  color.  Now,  a  small  bluish  patch  of 
color  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  a  tree;  but  for  us  it  repre- 
sents the  tree.  Suppose  that  we  walk  toward  the  tree. 
Do  we  continue  to  see  what  we  saw  before?  Of  course, 
we  say  that  we  continue  to  see  the  same  tree;  but  it  is 
plain  that  what  we  immediately  perceive,  what  is  given 
in  consciousness,  does  not  remain  the  same  as  we  move. 
Our  blue  patch  of  color  grows  larger  and  larger;  it  ceases 
to  be  blue  and  faint;  at  the  last  it  has  been  replaced  by  an 
expanse  of  vivid  green,  and  we  see  the  tree  just  before  us. 

"During  our  whole  walk  we  have  been  seeing  the  tree. 
This  appears  to  mean  that  we  have  been  having  a  whole 
series  of  visual  experiences,  no  two  of  which  were  just 
alike,  and  each  of  which  was  taken  as  a  representative  of 
the  tree.  Which  of  these  representatives  is  most  like  the 
tree?  Is  the  tree  really  a  faint  blue,  or  is  it  really  a  vivid 
green?  Or  is  it  some  intermediate  color?"  FuUerton,  An 
Introduction  to  Philosophyy  p.  60. 

Now  what  holds  for  color  in  the  above  example  holds 
also  for  shape  and  size.  What  is  the  real  shape  and  the 
real  size?  Do  we  not  have  to  pass  a  judgment  of  choice 
between  the  various  ones  presented?  But  so  long  as  we 
are  concerned  with  a  selection  among  presented  objects, 
such  a  choice  is  assuredly  practical  in  its  motivation.  I 
get  very  near  a  small  object  and  quite  far  away  from  a 
large  one  like  the  Capitol  at  Washington. 

But  once  I  have  made  my  selection,  a  further  diflSculty 
ensues.  What  are  these  other  rejected  objects?  To  call 
them  appearances  does  not  explain  anything.  Are  they 
physical  things?  But,  if  so,  what  space  do  they  occupy, 
and  how  can  we  deal  with  them?    Can  I  reside  in  apparent 


34  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

houses,  and  are  they  built  by  masons?  I  shall  leave  it  to 
the  reader  to  exercise  his  ingenuity  upon  appearances. 
But,  if  they  are  non-physical,  how  am  I  able  to  pass  from 
my  perception  of  them  to  my  perception  of  the  actual 
physical  thing  without  noticing  any  marked  difference?  Is 
it  not  obvious  that  what  I  call  the  perceived  physical  thing 
is  merely  the  standard  appearance,  not  differing  in  kind 
from  the  others?  All  of  them  are  functions  of  extra- 
organic  and  intra-organic  processes.  And  these  functions 
are  transient,  not  independent  of  the  individual,  and, 
therefore,  not  external.  Let  us  speak  of  them  henceforth 
as  percepts  or  thing-experiences. 

The  Lack  of  Correspondent  Variation. — ^The  third 
objection  to  the  main  thesis  of  Natural  Realism  falls  into 
the  same  group  as  the  two  which  we  have  already  exam- 
ined. The  principle  under  which  this  objection  operates 
has  been  formulated  as  follows:  "If  anything  X  exhibits 
variations  which  are  not  shared  by  Y,  X  and  Y  must  be 
distinct  existences."  Now  what  we  see  varies  from  mo- 
ment to  moment  when  we  have  every  reason  to  believe 
that  the  physical  thing  itself  does  not.  Common  sense 
believes  that  the  real  table  is  square  although  I  see  it  as 
possessing  obtuse  and  acute  angles.  What  I  see,  moreover, 
varies  with  every  change  in  my  position.  Thus  the  color 
I  see  as  well  as  the  shape  and  the  size  of  the  percept  varies, 
while  I  am  firmly  convinced  that  the  physical  thing  re- 
mains essentially  the  same.  Such  is  the  situation  so  long 
as  I  accept  the  meanings  of  independence  and  permanence 
for  the  physical  world.  Reflection  seems  forced  to  con- 
clude that  percepts  are  non-physical. 

Experience  forces  us  to  accept  a  still  more  basic  varia- 
tion. May  not  physical  things  have  even  ceased  to  exist 
while  we  are  perceiving  what  we  ordinarily  identify  with 


THE  BREAKDOWN  OF  NATURAL  REALISM      S5 

them?  Thus  far  we  have  stressed  changes  in  position  and 
the  resultant  modifications  in  what  we  perceive;  let  us  now 
introduce  the  time  element  along  with  space.  We  are  in- 
formed by  astronomers,  for  example,  that  a  star  which 
we  just  now  perceive  may  have  been  destroyed  centuries 
ago;  so  long  does  it  take  light  to  travel  to  us  through  inter- 
stellar space.  How,  then,  can  we  possibly  identify  what 
we  see  with  the  star  itself.'^  Again,  the  relations  between 
our  percepts  are  often  not  the  same  as  the  relations  between 
the  objective  occurrences  themselves.  Thunder  succeeds 
lightning  for  us,  but  we  are  certain  that  they  arise  at  about 
the  same  time.  Now  these  differences  in  temporal  order 
can  be  easily  accounted  for  by  reference  to  physical  proc- 
esses of  which  what  we  see  and  hear  are  functions. 

The  Differences  between  the  Perceptions  of  Individ- 
uals.— ^The  next  three  arguments  against  Natural  Real- 
ism also  fall  into  one  group.  They  stress  the  intra-organic 
factors,  especially  those  which  are  admitted  by  common 
sense  to  be  mental. 

What  is  perceived  by  an  individual  is  partly  determined 
by  his  interests  and  his  training.  The  artist  will  note 
shades  of  color  which  can  hardly  be  distinguished  by  the 
untrained.  The  same  is  true  for  sounds  and  harmonies 
and  for  flavors  and  odors.  It  has  been  discovered  that 
people  do  not  observe  the  same  events  when  they  are  ap- 
parently in  a  position  to  do  so.  At  the  least,  there  is 
selection;  at  the  most,  personal  elements  in  what  is  per- 
ceived. The  psychologist  is  convinced  that  what  is  seen 
is  largely  what  we  expect  to  see;  and  it  is  obvious  that 
what  we  expect  to  see  is  a  function  of  what  we  have  ex- 
perienced in  the  past.  But  the  past  introduces  the  per- 
sonal history  of  the  individual,  which  is  always  more  or 
less  unique. 


36  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

But  if  what  is  perceived  is  different  to  any  degree  for 
different  individuals,  it  is  impossible  to  say  that  they  see 
the  same  physical  thing.  It  would,  perhaps,  be  possible  to 
assert  that  different  persons  saw  similar  things.  Yet  these 
similar  things  are  believed  to  occupy  the  same  part  of 
space,  a  claim  which  conflicts  with  the  belief  of  common 
sense  that  only  one  thing  can  occupy  one  portion  of  space 
at  any  one  time.  But  my  percept  has  no  more  right  to 
be  regarded  as  the  physical  thing  than  has  yours. 

Can  Natural  Realism  Account  for  Memory? — Common 
sense  is  inclined  to  think  that  memory  and  ideas  in  general 
are  personal  and  mental.  Yet,  if  perception  be  merely  an 
event  in  which  physical  things  reveal  themselves,  how  can 
things  leave  traces  behind  them?  We  would  have  to  re- 
gard it  as  an  event  in  which  the  physical  thing  acted  upon 
some  more  or  less  permanent  part  of  the  individual.  The 
physical  thing  would  have  to  leave  its  impress  behind. 
But  perception  would  then  involve  a  double  action,  the 
reaching  out  of  the  individual  to  the  thing  and  the  ex- 
tension of  the  thing  to  the  mind.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how 
the  impress  in  the  mind  could  be  an  exact  copy  of  the 
physical  thing.  And  yet  Natural  Realism  would  be  forced 
to  some  such  assertion.  Certainly  our  images  are  like  our 
percepts;  but  this  may  be  because  both  are  mental. 

It  is  interesting  in  this  connection  to  note  how  soon  the 
outlook  of  Natural  Realism  was  replaced  in  ancient  philos- 
ophy by  the  theory  that  perceptions  are  impressions  pro- 
duced upon  the  mind  by  the  causal  action  of  the  physical 
world.  The  sensible  impression  is,  according  to  Cleanthes, 
the  Stoic,  like  an  impression  made  upon  a  material  object, 
like  the  mark  of  a  seal  upon  wax.  Memories  are  reproduc- 
tions of  these  original  impressions.  Of  course,  all  this  is 
crude,  for  these  thinkers  had  no  adequate  idea  of  the 


THE  BREAKDOWN  OF  NATURAL  REALISM      37 

mechanism  of  perception.     But  the  drift  of  the  thinking 
is  clear. 

To  meet  the  problem  raised  by  the  existence  of  images, 
concepts  and  memories,  the  advocate  of  Natural  Realism 
must  theorize.  It  is  evident  that,  there  is  some  sort  of  a 
genetic  relation  between  what  is  perceived  and  what  is 
remembered  and  conceived.  But  if  what  is  perceived  is 
physical,  how  comes  it  that  we  have  this  power  of  volun- 
tarily recalling  an  experience  like  it?  Either  memory  is 
another  kind  of  perception  and  what  is  remembered  is 
physical,  or  an  effect  is  left  in  the  individual  which  is  the 
source  of  memory.  But  such  a  change  in  the  individual 
must  be  dated  with  the  perception.  It  is  obvious  that 
perception  is  not  the  passive  event  that  unenlightened 
common  sense  supposes  it  to  be.  Reflecting  upon  these 
facts  and  implications,  enlightened  common  sense  has 
swung  more  and  more  to  the  conclusion  that  perceptions 
are  mental  and  are  of  the  nature  of  conditioned  changes  in 
the  individual.  It  is  true  that  the  plain  man  gets  along 
very  nicely  with  the  assumption  that  he  can  somehow 
pass  back  and  forth  between  physical  things  and  ideas,  be- 
tween the  world  out  there,  as  it  is  called,  and  ideas  referred 
more  or  less  vaguely  to  the  body.  But  as  soon  as  he  re- 
flects, he  begins  to  speak  of  sensations  as  mental  elements 
produced  in  his  mind  by  the  stimulation  of  his  senses.  The 
philosopher  realizes  that  common  sense  tries  to  hold  more 
or  less  contradictory  positions  at  the  same  time. 

We  are  now  more  than  ever  convinced  that  common 
sense  has  no  systematic  view  of  things  and  that  many 
problems  lurk  in  the  background  of  Natural  Realism  which 
are  not  often  noted  because  practical  interests  do  not  re- 
quire it.  The  outlook  of  everyday  life  is  vague  and  self- 
contradictory,  and  doubts  are  beginning  to  arise  whether 


38  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

it  can  be  rendered  consistent  by  the  exercise  of  any  amount 
of  ingenuity.  We  have  not,  indeed,  seen  reason  to  question 
the  existence  of  a  physical  world,  but  we  have  seen  good 
reason  to  doubt  that  what  we  perceive  is  the  physical 
world. 

What  Is  Perceived  Involves  Construction. — The 
philosopher  works  cooperatively  with  science.  He  must 
accept  his  facts  in  large  measure  from  special  investigators 
who  are  masters  of  technique  and  of  relevant  methods  of 
verification.  Hence  the  philosopher  has  the  right  to  appeal 
to  the  conclusions  drawn  by  psychologists  in  regard  to 
perception.  There  is  such  general  agreement  upon  the 
constructive  character  of  perception  and  the  facts  are  so 
well  founded  that  this  conclusion  can  be  used  with  assur- 
ance. The  child  does  not  see  what  the  adult  sees.  Past 
experience,  training  and  knowledge  play  into  and  condition 
what  is  perceived.  "The  results  of  all  of  the  various  ex- 
periences cooperate  in  giving  the  object  that  is  seen  the 
appearance  it  has.  To  put  it  the  other  way,  the  object 
that  is  seen  is  the  one  that  serves  to  explain  the  earlier 
experiences;  it  is  the  one  that  harmonizes  all  of  the  uses 
and  observations  of  it  in  the  past.  By  constant  trial  and 
use,  a  construction  develops  that  proves  true  when  tested 
in  any  way.  This  is  accepted  as  the  real  object  as  opposed 
to  mere  sensations.  Whenever  the  sensation  presents  it- 
self, this  developed  object  arises  in  consciousness."  Pills- 
bury,  Essentials  of  Psychology,  p.  159.  It  would  certainly 
seem  to  follow  that  each  individual  perceives  an  ob- 
ject which  is  largely  a  function  of  his  past  experience. 
But  who,  then,  perceives  a  truly  independent  physical 
thing.? 

We  need  not  labor  this  point.  All  the  objections  to 
Natural  Realism  which  we  have  examined  converge  cumu- 


THE  BREAKDOWN  OF  NATURAL  REALISM      39 

latively  upon  the  theory  that  what  is  perceived  is  a  func- 
tion of  many  factors,  some  external  to  the  organism  and 
some  internal.  And  it  is  just  because  these  factors  are 
not  announced  in  the  perception  that  it  is  so  naturally 
taken  to  be  an  independent  and  permanent  reality  simply 
revealed  to  the  percipient.  Natural  Realism  needs  no 
excuse;  it  is  an  outlook  which  could  not  help  developing. 
Yet  analysis  and  reflection  break  down  its  plausibility.  It 
should  be  noted,  however,  that  we  are  limiting  Natural 
Realism  to  the  view  of  perception  held  by  common  sense. 
We  have  not  challenged  the  realistic  meanings  which  ac- 
company it  but  only  their  special  application  to  what  is 
perceived. 

The  Physiological  Theory  of  Perception. — We  are  now 
in  a  position  to  examine  the  account  of  perception  accepted 
by  psychology  and  physiology  and  to  see  its  lack  of  har- 
mony with  the  characteristic  thesis  of  Natural  Realism. 
According  to  the  dominant  theory,  the  sense-organs  must 
be  stimulated  before  perception  arises.  The  excitation  is 
transmitted  to  the  cortex,  and  only  then  does  there  appear 
what  is  called  by  psychologists  a  percept  and  by  common 
sense  the  physical  thing.  Thus  the  percept  is  connected 
with  the  end-term  of  a  complex  process.  How,  then,  can 
it  be  identified  with  the  physical  thing  which  is  part  of  the 
beginning  of  this  process?  It  would  seem  that  the  plain 
man  has  been  identifying  the  effect  with  the  cause.  Most 
naturally,  of  course,  because  only  the  percept  is  given  in 
the  field  of  experience.  But  must  we  not  separate  these 
two  things  which  have  been  identified?  Must  we  not  dis- 
tinguish between  the  physical  thing,  which  helps  to  stimu- 
late the  body,  and  the  percept  which,  we  perceive  as  a 
result?  I  think  that  it  is  obvious  that  this  distinction 
must  be  made.    Thus,  the  physiological  theory  of  percep- 


40  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

tion  fits  in  with  the  objections  to  Natural  ReaHsm  which 
we  have  already  considered. 

Conclusion  and  Warning. — This  brief  examination  of 
the  inadequacies  and  difficulties  which  confront  Natural 
Realism  raises  many  important  questions.  It  is  surely 
evident  by  now  that  philosophy  cannot  be  escaped,  i.  e., 
that  there  are  grounds  for  serious  and  prolonged  reflection. 
He  who  has  gone  thus  far  can  hardly  turn  back.  I  do  not 
think  that  it  is  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  Natural 
Realism  has  broken  down.  Perception  cannot  be  an 
event  in  which  physical  things,  themselves,  are  present  to 
the  individual  perceiver.  That  which  is  present  in  the 
field  of  experience  is  a  function  of  many  conditions  and 
must  be  considered  non-physical.  There  is  good  reason 
to  consider  it  mental  even,  but  we  must  not  be  too  hasty 
in  our  classification.  Besides,  the  term  mental  needs 
definition. 

Another  point  must  be  noted.  Because  the  theory  of 
perception  characteristic  of  Natural  Realism  breaks  down, 
must  we  give  up  those  realistic  meanings  and  distinctions 
which  we  found  in  experience?  When  we  come  to  look 
at  the  movement  of  reflection,  we  soon  note  that  the 
physical  thing,  while  no  longer  present  to  perception,  is 
assumed  to  be  one  of  the  conditions  of  that  which  is  per- 
ceived. But  that  which  conditions  must  be  as  real  as  that 
which  is  conditioned.  We  assume  the  existence  of  the 
physical  thing  which  is  independent  and  permanent.  But 
if  it  is  not  perceived,  how  is  it  known?  The  question  which 
we  must  seriously  ask  ourselves  is  this:  Can  a  theory  of 
knowledge  be  achieved  which  will  do  justice  to  these 
realistic  distinctions  and  meanings  and  will  accept  the 
existence  of  a  physical  world  and  yet  not  be  open  to  the 
objections  which  have  proved  fatal  to  Natural  Realism? 


THE  BREAKDOWN  OF  NATURAL  REALISM      41 

The  history  of  philosophy  presents  us  with  the  efforts 
of  the  human  mind  to  break  loose  from  Natural  Realism 
and  still  retain  a  belief  in  a  physical  world  not  too  different 
from  that  which  common  sense  supposes  itself  to  be  per- 
ceiving. The  first  hesitating  step  beyond  common  sense 
is  usually  called  representative,  or  Lockian,  realism.  We 
shall  now  betake  ourselves  to  a  study  of  this  development. 

References 

The  references  are  essentially  the  same  as  for  the  first  chapter. 
To  these  may  be  added  the  treatment  of  perception  to  be 
found  in  any  good  psychology.    The  following  are  suggested: 

Angell,  Psychology,  chap.  6. 

James,  Principles  of  Psychology,  bk.  2,  chap.  19. 

Pillsbury,  Essentials  of  Psychology,  chap.  7. 

Stout,  Manual  of  Psychology,  bk.  4,  chap.  6. 

A  glance  at  causal  theories  of  perception  in  ancient  philosophy 
will  also  be  suggestive.  Let  the  student  look  up  the  teaching 
of  Protagoras  in  Gomperz's  Greek  Thinkers  or  Weber's 
History  of  Philosophy, 


CHAPTER  IV 
REPRESENTATIVE  REALISM 

The  Value  of  an  Historical  Approach. — The  human 
mind  has  always  taken  one  step  at  a  time.  When  a  new 
reflective  position  is  achieved,  it  is  worked  over  carefully 
and  practically  all  of  its  possibilities  exhausted  before 
another  step  is  taken.  Hence  the  individual  thinker  who 
has  seriously  adventured  himself  on  the  path  of  philosophy 
can  usually  find  at  least  the  preliminary  steps  which  his 
mind  is  inclined  to  take  already  examined  by  past  thinkers. 
What  extremely  able  men  have  so  carefully  done  cannot 
help  but  be  of  assistance  to  those  who  come  after.  It  is 
for  this  reason  that  philosophy  cannot  be  successfully 
separated  from  the  history  of  philosophy. 

The  three  British  thinkers,  Locke,  Berkeley  and  Hume, 
raised  the  essential  problems  of  philosophy  so  clearly  and 
stated  their  own  conclusions  so  simply  and  unambiguously 
that  no  better  introduction  to  philosophical  problems  can 
be  found  than  their  writings.  Benefiting  by  their  analyses 
and  reflections,  the  student  is  prepared  to  state  philo- 
sophical questions  from  different  angles  and  with  a  fairly 
precise  idea  of  what  mistakes  to  avoid  and  what  distinc- 
tions to  make.  These  thinkers  of  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries  supplement  one  another  to  a  remark- 
able degree,  and  there  is  a  marked  deepening  of  reflection 
as  we  pass  from  Locke  through  Berkeley  to  Hume.  The 
student  is  led  to  comprehend  different  points  of  view  and 
is  thus  induced,  and  even  obligedj  to  think  for  himself. 

42 


REPRESENTATIVE  REALISM  43 

Representative  Realism  Follows  Natural  Realism. — 
Many  of  the  difficulties  which  we  have  raised  as  very 
serious  objections  to  Natural  Realism  were  noted  by  the 
Greeks.  Many  thinkers  passed  to  relativism  as  a  result 
and  concluded  that  man  cannot  have  a  genuinely  objective 
knowledge  of  things  because  he  only  knows  how  they  af- 
fect him.  Sensations,  they  taught,  are  effects  in  us  rather 
than  apprehensions  of  the  inherent  characteristics  of 
things.  This  outlook  goes  back  at  least  as  far  as  Protagoras 
(circa  411,  B.  C.)  and  was  further  developed  by  Pyrrho, 
Arcesilaus  and  Carneades.  Man  is  the  measure  of  all 
things.  Protagoras  had  little  faith  in  reason  as  a  means 
to  a  more  adequate  knowledge,  and  science  had  not  de- 
veloped far  enough  to  suggest  ways  of  accounting  for  those 
illusions  which  impressed  these  early  thinkers  and  deter- 
mined their  skepticism  of  perception. 

But  modern  philosophy  arose  in  touch  with  a  vigorously 
developing  science.  As  a  result,  skepticism  did  not  easily 
gain  sway.  That  man  obtains  knowledge  of  the  world 
few  doubted.  The  real  question  was  the  nature  and  source 
of  this  knowledge  which  he  actually  possesses.  Another 
interesting  fact  is  that  Natural  Realism  was  rejected  from 
the  first.  In  its  place  was  put  representative  realism. 
Knowledge  is  now  thought  of  as  a  function  of  human  ideas 
instead  of  as  a  direct  apprehension  of  the  physical  world. 
Ideas  are  supposed  to  intervene  between  the  knower  and 
that  which  is  known  and  to  serve  as  cognitively  satisfac- 
tory substitutes  for  the  independent,  extra-mental  world 
which  is  still  believed  in.  To  know  the  corporeal  world 
is  not  to  apprehend  it  directly  but  to  apprehend  ideas 
which  are  somehow  like  it  and  so  reveal  it.  Thus  knowl- 
edge is  an  indirect  apprehension  or  an  apprehension 
through  the  medium  of  ideas.    The  apprehension  of  ideas 


44  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

is  the  best  we  can  do,  and  it  is  almost  the  same  as  the  ap- 
prehension of  the  corporeal  world  itself  because  ideas  are 
similar  to  physical  things.  This  reflective  step  away  from 
Natural  Realism  is  usually  called  representative  realism. 
Sometimes  it  is  called  the  copy  theory  of  knowledge.  It 
early  took  two  forms,  the  rationalistic  and  the  empirical. 
The  rationalistic  form  arose  on  the  continent  and  is  asso- 
ciated with  the  name  of  Rene  Descartes,  while  the  em- 
pirical form  arose  in  England  and  is  connected  with  the 
writings  of  John  Locke. 

Rationalistic  Representative  Realism. — Descartes  was 
a  rationalist,  that  is,  he  believed  that  the  human  mind  is 
able  to  produce  concepts  somewhat  independently  of  sense- 
perception.  He  accepted  the  concept  of  the  physical  world 
achieved  by  the  science  of  his  day,  but  he  realized  that 
this  was  not  the  world  which  we  perceive.  It  is  the  world 
as  we  conceive  it  after  due  reflection. 

Some  historians  of  philosophy  have  held  that  the 
Copernican  theory  of  the  solar  system,  so  opposed  to  what 
we  perceive,  encouraged  this  excessive  rationalism.  Prob- 
ably it  had  its  part.  But  the  fundamental  cause  was  the 
rise  of  mathematics  and  the  inability  of  the  logicians  of 
the  day  to  connect  mathematics  genetically  with  percep- 
tion. Perception  and  conception  tended  to  fall  apart  into 
two  mental  spheres  having  little  commerce  with  one 
another.  Thus  rationalism  has  always  displayed  an  ex- 
cessive disdain  for  perception  and  has  encouraged  a  de- 
ductive method  of  investigation. 

[^  The  following  account  of  the  Cartesian  theory  of  knowl- 
edge illustrates  rationalistic  representative  realism  very 
weU.  "We  find  in  the  mind,  to  use  Descartes*  own 
illustration  {Meditations y  Veitch's  trans.,  p.  120),  two 
wholly  diverse  ideas  of  the  sun:  the  one  idea,  the  sense- 


REPRESENTATIVE  REALISM  45 

image,  by  which  the  sun  appears  extremely  small,  seems 
to  come  to  us  directly  from  the  sun  through  the  senses; 
the  other  idea,  whereby  it  is  represented  as  many  times 
larger  than  the  whole  earth,  we  have  constructed  for  our- 
selves in  physical  science.  These  two  ideas  cannot  both 
resemble  the  same  sun,  and  reason  teaches  us  that  the  one 
which  is  given  us  in  sense,  and  which  seems  to  have  imme- 
diately emanated  from  the  sun,  is  the  most  unlike.  The 
true  nature  of  the  sun,  as  it  exists  without  us,  is  thus  re- 
vealed not  by  sense  but  by  thought.  Our  sense-images 
are  but  pictures  in  our  minds,  and  do  not  represent,  but 
misrepresent,  the  true  nature  of  the  real.  There  are  two 
external  worlds,  the  one  rich  w^th  its  bright  variety  of 
diverse  qualities,  appearing  to  the  'senses,'  the  other, 
poverty-stricken,  constituted  only  of  matter  and  motion, 
and  discovered  by  the  understanding.' j  Norman  Smith, 
Studies  in  the  Cartesian  Philosophy,  pp.  16-17. 

This  dualism  between  perception  and  conception  char- 
acteristic of  rationalism  must  be  held  in  mind.  It  has 
done  more  harm  to  philosophy  than  any  one  other  false 
assumption.  Conceptions  are,  for  Descartes,  mental 
objects  which  the  mind  contemplates,  but  they  are  not 
derived  from  perceptions.  They  are,  instead,  wholly  dis- 
tinct from  them  in  nature.  *'  By  this  strange  opposition 
of  conceptions  to  perceptions,  which  he  makes  to  be  ab- 
solute, Descartes  aggravates  the  difficulties,  already  great 
enough  in  all  truth,  of  his  dualism,  and  lands  himself, 
founder  though  he  be  of  the  physical  sciences,  in  a  rational- 
ism more  extreme  in  its  antagonism  to  sense-experience 
than  even  the  idealism  of  Plato.  The  causes  leading  Des- 
cartes to  this  position  are  to  be  found  in  his  absorbing 
interest  in  the  mathematical  sciences,  whose  method  he 
misconceived."    Ibid.,  pp.  17-18.    We  shall  have  occasion 


46  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

to  refer  to  the  consequences  of  this  vicious  dualism  in 
connection  with  several  problems. 

Cartesian  Metaphysics. — What  view  of  the  world  was 
affirmed  by  Cartesian  rationalism?  Since  much  of  our 
energy  in  the  latter  part  of  the  book  will  be  expended  in 
showing  that  the  Cartesian  view  of  nature  has  been  out- 
grown by  modern  science,  it  will  be  best  to  make  his 
outlook  very  clear.  We  shall  call  his  position  mathematical 
rationalism  or  rationalistic  representative  realism.  Such 
an  expression  sounds  pedantic  but  is  really  descriptive. 
The  real  physical  world  is  quite  different  from  the  world 
given  in  perception.  It  is  only  extended,  not  colored  and 
heavy  and  sonorous.  "The  nature  of  body  consists  not 
in  weight,  hardness,  color,  and  the  like,  but  in  extension 
alone  ...  in  its  being  a  substance  extended  in  length, 
breadth,  and  height."  The  real  world  is  the  world  as  con- 
ceived by  the  mathematician. 

Descartes  is  spoken  of  as  a  dualist.  He  taught  that  there 
are  two  substances  or  independent  realities,  mind  and 
matter,  and  that  these  have  nothing  in  common.  Matter 
is  extended  substance  and  mind  is  thinking  substance.  He 
is  no  skeptic  and  is  quite  convinced  that  he  can  penetrate 
to  the  very  defining  essence  of  these  substances  and  so 
know  that  they  are  fundamentally  and  inherently  differ- 
ent. But  how  does  he  know  all  this?  This  brings  us  to 
his  method  which  is  an  essential  part  of  his  theory  of 
knowledge. 

Descartes'  Method. — Descartes  invented  the  method 
of  systematic  doubt.  He  would  doubt  everything  he  could. 
This  method  has  exercised  a  malign  influence  upon  philos- 
ophy. "It  looks  sometimes  as  though  the  main  purpose 
of  philosophy  were  to  doubt  whenever  doubt  is  at  all 
possible,  as  though  its  main  purpose  were  not  to  explain. 


REPRESENTATIVE  REALISM  47 

but  to  explain  away."  The  real  basis  of  his  position  is  his 
mathematical  rationalism,  but  he  writes  as  though  he  had 
found  a  fixed  starting-point  in  a  mere  thinking  self — 
cogito  ergo  sum — whence  he  passes  to  God  and  thence  to  the 
world.  Modern  logic  maintains  that  doubts  must  be 
specific  and  definitely  motivated.  Descartes'  universal 
doubt  is  of  no  value.  The  method  we  are  adopting  in  this 
book  and  which  we  believe  is  justified  is  a  gradual  crit- 
ical advance  from  Natural  Realism  under  the  motive- 
force  of  reflective  problems.  A  general  doubt  is  only  too 
apt  to  lead  to  a  new  dogmatism  because  it  can  be  met 
only  by  an  arbitrary  standard  of  truth.  Let  us  listen  to 
his  own  words:  "But  after  I  have  recognized  the  exist- 
ence of  a  God,  and  because  I  have  at  the  same  time  recog- 
nized the  fact  that  all  things  depend  upon  him,  and  that 
he  is  no  deceiver,  and  in  consequence  of  that  I  have  judged 
that  all  I  conceive  clearly  and  distinctly  cannot  fail  to  be 
true  ...  no  opposing  reason  can  be  brought  against  me 
which  should  make  me  ever  call  it  in  question;  and  thus  I 
have  a  true  and  certain  knowledge  of  it."  Such  a  criterion 
of  truth  is  altogether  too  formal  and  personal. 

Representative  Realism  Raises  New  Problems. — 
Representative  realism  brings  with  it  problems  which  do 
not  exist  for  Natural  Realism.  The  idea  is  immaterial; 
the  physical  reality  is  material.  But  we  know  the  ideas 
directly  because  they  are  objects  which  we  contemplate, 
while  we  can  know  the  physical  world  only  indirectly 
and  through  these  ideas.  Ideas  are  cognitive  representa- 
tives of  the  material  realities.  They  are  mental  substi- 
tutes for,  or  signs  of,  the  physical  world  which  is  no  longer 
regarded  as  perceptible.  This  situation  is  characteristic 
of  representative  realism. 

The  more  empirical  form  of  representative  realism  was 


48  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

developed  by  John  Locke  (1632-1704).  His  frank  hand- 
ling of  the  problem  made  it  clear  that,  while  the  position 
as  a  whole  might  be  a  necessary  advance  upon  Natural 
Realism,  it  needed  further  working  out.  Are  these  ideas 
copies  of  physical  things.?  Or  are  they  mere  signs  not  re- 
sembling them?  What  is  the  exact  nature  of  scientific 
knowledge?  These  questions  were  soon  raised  and  led  to 
heated  discussions.  Unfortunately,  the  assumption  that 
knowledge  is  a  likeness  between  physical  things  and  mental 
objects  called  ideas  dominated  thought  for  a  long  time. 
Working  within  this  current  assumption,  Berkeley  startled 
philosophers  by  questioning  the  existence  of  the  physical 
world.  How  can  we  be  sure  that  there  are  physical 
things  if  we  cannot  perceive  them?  The  consideration  of 
this  problem  in  the  light  of  the  first  two  questions  led 
Berkeley  to  conclude  that  the  simplest  way  out  of  the 
difficulty  is  to  deny  the  existence  of  the  physical  world. 

Lockers  Position. — Locke's  purpose  was  "to  inquire 
into  the  origin,  certainty,  and  extent  of  human  knowledge." 
lie  decided  that  all  ideas  come  from  sensation  or  reflection. 
In  other  words,  he  believed  that  he  could  classify  ideas 
into  two  great  classes  according  to  their  conditions.  Those 
ideas  which  we  connect  with  the  operation  of  the  sense- 
organs  he  calls  ideas  of  sensation,  while  all  other  ideas 
are  assigned  to  more  internal  sources.  In  opposition  to 
Descartes  and  the  continental  rationalists  in  general,  he 
believed  that  all  objects  of  attention  have  an  empirical 
origin.  We  need  not  take  up  such  questions  as  his  use  of 
the  term  experience  and  his  conception  of  the  mind.  He  is 
unclear  and  self-contradictory  at  times,  and  often  confuses 
questions  of  origin  with  questions  of  function  and  validity. 
But,  in  spite  of  these  shortcomings,  it  is  easy  to  make  out 
the  drift  of  his  thinking. 


REPRESENTATIVE  REALISM  49 

"Ideas"  are  for  Locke  the  objects  of  the  understanding 
when  a  man  thinks.  To-day  we  would  be  less  likely  to 
use  such  a  general  term  and  be  content  to  speak  of  per- 
cepts, and  concepts.  But  as  soon  as  we  realize  Locke's 
standpoint  no  misunderstanding  need  arise  from  his  use 
of  the  term  idea.  Whatever  is  present  in  the  field  of  the  in- 
dividual's experience  and  can  be  the  object  of  attention  is  an 
idea.  Locke  seeks  to  analyze  such  objects  and  to  discover 
the  more  primitive  mental  elements  from  which  they  are 
formed.  It  is  evident,  then,  that  Locke  believes  that  all 
objects  of  which  we  can  be  aware  are  mental  and  that  such 
knowledge  of  the  physical  world  as  we  possess  must  be 
somehow  in  terms  of  these  objects. 

But  Locke  nodded  at  times.  He  did  not  realize  the  com- 
plexity of  the  problem  he  had  fearlessly  raised.  He  is 
absolutely  certain  of  the  existence  of  the  physical  world 
distinct  from  the  ideas  to  which  the  mind  is  existentially 
confined.  He  even  drops  back  into  Natural  Realism  at 
times;  and  even  when  he  does  not  commit  this  self-contra- 
diction, he  mistakes  his  certainty  of  the  existence  of  the 
physical  world  for  a  proof.  The  student  who  is  first  break- 
ing away  from  Natural  Realism  should  have  a  deal  of  sym- 
pathy with  Locke  and  a  sort  of  fellow-feeling.  Dogmatic 
common  sense  rings  in  his  protest:  "I  think  nobody  can, 
in  earnest,  be  so  skeptical  as  to  be  uncertain  of  the  exist- 
ence of  those  things  which  he  sees  and  feels."  In  the  fol- 
lowing passage,  Locke  indicates  why  he  is  so  certain  that 
the  physical  world  exists  and  his  reasons  certainly  appeal 
to  all  of  us:  "Thus  I  see,  whilst  I  write  this,  I  can  change 
the  appearance  of  the  paper,  and  by  designing  the  letters 
tell  beforehand  what  new  idea  it  shall  exhibit  the  very 
next  moment,  by  barely  drawing  my  pen  over  it,  which 
will  neither  appear  (let  me  fancy  as  much  as  I  will),  if 


50  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

my  hand  stands  still,  or  though  I  move  my  pen,  if  my  eyes 
be  shut;  nor,  when  those  characters  are  once  made  on  the 
paper,  can  I  choose  afterward  but  see  them  as  they  are; 
that  is,  have  the  ideas  of  such  letters  as  I  have  made. 
Whence  it  is  manifest,  that  they  are  not  barely  the  sport 
and  play  of  my  own  imagination,  when  I  find  that  the 
characters  that  were  made  at  the  pleasure  of  my  thought 
do  not  obey  them;  nor  yet  cease  to  be,  whenever  I  shall 
fancy  it;  but  continue  to  affect  the  senses  constantly  and 
regularly,  according  to  the  figures  I  made  them.''  Locke, 
Essay,  Bk.  IV,  Chap.  XI,  Sec.  7. 

But  the  problem  for  the  thinker  is  to  work  out  a  system 
which  will  justify  and  explain  his  beliefs.  Let  us  see 
whether  Locke  did  this  successfully. 

Locke's  View  of  Knowledge. — Locke's  view  of  knowl- 
edge has  been  called  representative  perception.  We  shall 
limit  ourselves  to  his  conception  of  the  physical  world  and 
show  what  knowledge  of  the  physical  world  means  for  him. 
It  is  best  to  distinguish  between  the  assurance  that  there 
is  a  physical  world  and  the  conception  of  it  that  is  enter- 
tained. He  admits  that  our  assurance  that  there  are  things 
existing  without  us  cannot  reach  demonstration;  *'yet  it 
is  an  assurance  that  deserves  the  name  of  knowledge."  It 
is  a  confidence  or  faith  that  has  a  good  basis  in  experience. 
His  chief  reliance  for  this  confidence  seems  to  be  the  dis- 
tinction between  perception  and  imagination. 

When  we  pass  to  an  examination  of  his  conception  of  the 
physical  world,  we  note  that  he  accepts  the  outlook  of  the 
science  of  his  day.  He  distinguishes  between  the  primary 
and  the  secondary  qualities  of  things  and  holds  that  only 
those  ideas  of  ours  which  are  designated  primary  are  copies 
of  the  actual  qualities  of  physical  things.  "I  say,  then, 
that  to  have  ideas  of  substances  which,  hy  being  conform- 


REPRESENTATIVE  REALISM  51 

able  to  things,  may  afford  us  real  knowledge,  it  is  not 
enough,  as  in  modes,  to  put  together  such  ideas  as  have 
no  inconsistence,  though  they  did  never  before  so  ex- 
ist. .  .  .  But  our  ideas  of  substances,  being  supposed 
copies,  and  referred  to  archetypes  without  us,  must  still  be 
taken  from  something  that  does  or  has  existed;  they  must 
not  consist  of  ideas  put  together  at  the  pleasure  of  our 
thoughts  without  any  real  pattern  they  were  taken  from, 
though  we  can  perceive  no  inconsistence  in  such  a  com- 
bination." Essay,  Bk.  IV,  Chap.  IV,  Sec.  12.  In  other 
words,  the  properties  which  we  assign  to  a  particular 
physical  substance  must  have  been  found  to  co-exist. 
Such  co-existence  is  a  matter  of  experience.  Thus  the 
chemist  works  out  the  properties  of  the  various  substances 
in  this  experiential  fashion.  Gold  has  certain  properties 
and  phosphorus  still  others.  "And  our  ideas,  being  thus 
true,  though  not  perhaps  very  exact  copies,  are  yet  the  sub- 
jects of  real  (so  far  as  we  have  any)  knowledge  of  them: 
which,  as  has  been  already  showed,  will  not  be  found  to 
reach  very  far;  but  so  far  as  it  does,  it  will  still  be  real 
knowledge." 

Let  us  examine  these  important  statements.  Locke, 
first  of  all,  distinguishes  between  the  primary  and  second- 
ary qualities  of  things.  He  removes  color,  sound,  taste 
and  smell  from  his  conception — or  shall  we  say  picture? — 
of  the  physical  world.  He  conceives  the  world  in  terms  of 
solidity,  extension,  figure,  motion,  rest  and  number.  In 
other  words,  he  pictured  the  world  as  the  physicists,  his 
friends,  would.  Were  he  living  to-day,  he  would  try  to 
understand  the  view  of  the  physical  world  held  by  modern 
science  and  would  accept  that.  Note  farther  that  he  ad- 
mits that  our  ideas  are  perhaps  not  very  exact  copies. 
He  can  think  of  no  other  meaning  for  this  cognitive  signifi- 


52  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

cance  of  our  ideas  than  copying;  but  he  realizes  that  he 
has  no  right  to  be  dogmatic  about  the  degree  of  similarity. 
Why?  Because  we  cannot  get  to  the  physical  things  them- 
selves to  compare  them  vyiih  our  ideas.  It  is  obvious  that 
this  difficulty  exists; for,  if  all  the  objects  of  which  we  are 
aware  are  ideas  and  physical  things  are  existentially  dis- 
tinct from  them,  no  comparison  can  be  instituted  by  the 
human  mind. 

Doubts  Confronting  Representative  Perception. — On 
the  whole,  Locke  stated  his  position  mildly.  It  was  not 
long,  however,  before  objections  of  a  fundamental  nature 
were  raised.  The  chief  objection  philosophers  have  felt 
can  be  put  in  the  form  of  a  question.  "How  do  we  know 
that,  corresponding  to  our  ideas,  there  are  material  things, 
if  we  have  never  perceived,  in  any  single  instance,  a  ma- 
terial thing?  And  the  doubt  here  suggested  may  be  rein- 
forced by  the  reflection  that  the  very  expression  *a  ma- 
terial thing'  ought  to  be  meaningless  to  a  man  who,  having 
never  had  experience  of  one,  is  compelled  to  represent  it 
by  the  aid  of  something  so  different  from  it  as  ideas  are 
supposed  to  be.  Can  material  things  really  be  to  such  a 
creature  anything  more  than  some  complex  of  ideas?" 
FuUerton,  An  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  p.  166. 

Those  who  have  felt  the  force  of  this  doubt  and  yet  have 
not  wished  to  relinquish  realism  of  the  Lockian  type  have 
sought  to  escape  by  making  sensations  merely  signs  and 
not  copies  of  physical  things.  Thus  in  the  famous  Physio- 
logical Optics  Helmholtz  wrote  as  follows:  "In  so  far  as 
the  quality  of  our  sensation  indicates  to  us  the  peculiarity 
of  the  external  influence  through  which  it  is  aroused,  it 
can  stand  as  an  indication  but  not  as  a  copy  of  it.  .  .  .  An 
indication  need  be  in  no  way  similar  to  that  which  it  in- 
dicates.   The  relation  between  the  two  reduces  itself  to 


REPRESENTATIVE  REALISM  53 

this,  that  a  similar  object,  coming  into  action  under  similar 
circumstances,  calls  up  a  similar  indication.  We  call  our 
ideas  of  the  external  world  true^  when  they  give  us  suffi- 
cient information  about  the  consequences  of  our  actions 
throughout  the  external  world,  and  bring  us  to  proper 
conclusions  regarding  its  expected  changes."  For  such  an 
outlook,  we  should  speak  only  of  an  external  or  extra- 
mental  world  and  should  regard  such  a  world  as  only  the 
most  plausible  hypothesis  to  account  for  the  temporal  and 
spatial  order  of  our  perceptions.  This  sign-theory,  which 
has  been  adopted  by  several  modern  scientists,  is  of  special 
significance  for  the  beginner  who  has  arrived  at  this  point; 
for  it  makes  him  realize  as  nothing  else  will  that  the  very 
expression  *a  material  thing*  may  be  meaningless.  If  we 
are  confined  to  ideas  which  are  signs  merely,  we  can  have 
no  well-grounded  idea  of  the  content  and  matter  of  ma- 
terial things;  if  we  retain  the  term,  we  must  be  on  our 
guard  against  carrying  over  the  concrete  objects  of 
common-sense  realism.  What  the  physical  is  in  itself 
becomes  a  problem  which,  by  hypothesis,  can  never  be 
solved.  One  must  immerse  himself  in  the  consequences 
of  this  sharp  break  with  Natural  Realism  before  he  is 
prepared  to  take  philosophy  seriously. 

It  is  not  a  far  step  from  representative  perception  to 
idealism.  Locke  had  decided  that  all  the  objects  of  the 
understanding  are  ideas,  though  he  cherished  the  faith 
that  these  mental  objects  are  copies  of,  and  therefore  cog- 
nitive substitutes  for,  physical  realities.  Berkeley  doubted 
that  ideas  could  be  accepted  as  representatives  of  that 
which  is  non-mental.  If  all  that  we  can  experience  is 
mental,  why  assume  the  existence  of  something  which  we 
can  define  only  in  negative  terms?  To  say  that  the 
physical  world  is  non-mental  surely  does  not  give  us  much 


54  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

information  about  the  content  of  it.  Moreover,  we  need 
not  grieve  over  the  loss  of  something  whose  nature  we 
cannot  form  an  idea  of.  We  can  suffer  no  loss  by  losing 
what  we  have  never  had.  But  we  are  now  ready  to 
grapple  with  ideaHsm. 

References 
Alexander,  Locke. 
Descartes,  Meditations. 

FuUerton,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  12. 
Locke,  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding,  bk.  4. 
Russell,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  chap.  2. 
Santayana,  Reason  in  Common  Sense,  chap.  4. 
Smith,  Studies  in  the  Cartesian  Philosophy,  chap.  1. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  RISE  OF  IDEALISM 

What  Is  Idealism? — The  term  idealism  has  different 
shades  of  meaning.  What  we  shall  try  to  do  here  is  to 
take  the  simplest  meaning  and  connect  it  with  the  teaching 
of  Berkeley.  Berkeley's  idealism  is  directed  against 
Lockian  realism  and  can  best  be  understood  in  this  setting. 
He  agrees  with  Locke  that  we  can  apprehend  only  our 
ideas,  but  goes  farther  and  maintains  that  we  have  no 
good  reason  to  believe  that  there  is  a  physical  world  corre- 
sponding to  them.  Thus  his  idealism  is  a  denial  of  the 
existence  of  a  physical  world  and,  on  the  positive  side, 
may  be  described  as  mentalism.  Spiritualism  is  another 
term  which  is  sometimes  used  to  describe  his  position. 
Nothing  exists  but  spirits  and  the  objects  of  their  per- 
ception, which  are  inseparable  from  them  and  have  no 
independent  existence. 

Berkeley's  Position. — On  the  whole,  Berkeley  devel- 
oped his  arguments  against  Natural  Realism  so  keenly  and 
systematically  that  later  writers  have  done  little  more 
than  add  to  them  here  and  there  and  re-state  them.  In 
doing  this  he  was,  however,  only  following  in  the  footsteps 
of  Descartes,  Hobbes  and  Locke.  But  these  thinkers  still 
believed  in  the  existence  of  an  independent  physical  world 
and  held  that  we  can  possess  knowledge  about  it.  Berke- 
ley was  more  radical  and  went  on  to  doubt  the  existence 
of  this  physical  world  which  cannot  be  perceived. 

There  are,  then,  two  stages  in  Berkeley's  argument. 

55 


56  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  first  stage  consists  in  the  proof  that  the  things  we 
perceive  by  sense  are  really  complexes  of  sensations  or  ele- 
mentary ideas.  In  the  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge 
he  adopts  the  terminology  made  familiar  by  Descartes  and 
Locke  and  speaks  of  these  objects  as  ideas.  In  the  Three 
Dialogues  between  Hylas  and  Philonousy  he  calls  these 
immediate  objects  of  perception  sensible  things.  His 
thesis  is  that  sensible  things  cannot  exist  by  themselves 
as  we  suppose  physical  things  do  and  that  they  cannot 
therefore  be  physical  things.  The  student  should  read 
the  First  Dialogue,  at  least,  and  ponder  over  i^.  7  ?  SaJiUjm^  d 

The  second  stage  consists  in  an  attack  upon  representa-,„yk^^ 
tive  perception.  He  attempts  to  show  that  the  copy-5ihJ2a. 
theory  of  knowledge  is  absurd  and  even  self-contradictory.'w-^J 
Since  this  is  the  really  new  element  in  his  philosophy,  we)|J<P^ 
must  examine  it  in  some  detail.  EI^ 

After  he  has  disproved  Locke's  position  to  his  own  M 
satisfaction,  he  goes  on  to  construct  a  spiritualistic  philos- 
ophy based  on  the  contention  that  the  only  active  reality 
of  which  we  can  conceive  is  mind  or  spirit.  It  is  obvious, 
however,  that  this  construction  presupposes  his  destruc- 
tion of  physical  realism.  I  presume  that  most  of  us  would 
contend  that  a  physical  realism  has  the  preference  and 
must  be  put  thoroughly  out  of  the  running  before  spiritual- 
ism has  any  chance. 

The  First  Stage. — When  we  brush  away  certain  tech-- 
nicalities  inherited  from  traditional  philosophy,  Berkeley's 
arguments  against  Natural  Realism  are  of  two  kinds.  He 
attempts  to  prove  that  what  we  perceive  is  a  function  of 
the  senses  and  is  not  substantial  enough  to  exist  by  itself. 
He  seems  even  to  assert  that  we  can  apprehend  a  relation 
between  the  self  and  that  which  is  perceived  which  makes 
it  clear  that  sensible  things  are  adjectives  of  the  self.    In 


THE  RISE  OF  IDEALISM  57 

the  second  place,  he  seeks  to  prove  that  what  we  perceive 
is  bound  up  with  elements  like  pleasure  and  pain  which 
are  avowedly  mental.  Many  of  his  terms  are  insufficiently 
defined  and  we  are  left  in  doubt  as  to  what  the  senses  are 
and  what  the  nature  of  *  being  perceived'  is.  The  self, 
spirit,  mind,  or  soul  to  which  he  appeals  so  confidently  is 
more  of  a  theory  than  an  element  within  experience.  But 
the  drift  of  his  argument  is  clear  and,  it  seems  to  me, 
convincing.  The  sensible  world  does  not  have  the  inde- 
pendence and  permanence  which  common  sense  assigns  it. 

But  it  is  evident  that  his  conclusion  thus  far  is  essen- 
tially the  same  as  that  which  we  have  already  reached. 
Are  we  necessarily  forced  into  idealism?  Or  is  there  some 
way  out  ?  Let  us  study  the  setting  of  Berkeley's  philosophy 
more  closely  to  see  why  he  was  convinced  that  the  break- 
down of  Natural  Realism  involved  idealism.  Other 
thinkers  had  gone  thus  far  and  had  still  retained  physical 
realism.  To  answer  this  question  we  must  pass  to  a  study 
of  the  second  stage  of  his  argument. 

Berkeley  Attacks  Locke's  Philosophy. — Philosophies 
are  intimately  bound  up  with  one  another.  It  is  often 
impossible  to  understand  just  why  some  thinker  drew  the 
conclusions  he  did  until  we  know  the  system  which  he  is 
attacking.  We  realize,  then,  that  he  assumes  that  a  refuta- 
tion of  his  opponent's  theory  involves  the  truth  of  his 
own — a  big  assumption  but  one  only  too  often  made. 
The  truth  is,  that  Berkeley  attacks  Locke's  construction 
of  a  physical  realism  less  naive  than  that  of  common  sense 
and  argues  from  a  victory  over  it  to  the  necessity  of  his 
own  idealism,  Locke  tried  to  develop  a  realism  which 
would  meet  the  demands  of  the  science  of  his  day,  but,  of 
course,  we  have  the  right  to  doubt  whether  Locke's  inter- 
pretation is  the  only  valid  one.    Of  that  more  later.    The 


58  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

point  to  bear  in  mind,  at  present,  is  that  Berkeley  attacks 
first  Natural  Realism  and  then  Lockian  realism. 

Berkeley's  Animus. — It  is  often  of  importance  to 
understand  the  controlling  outlook  which  lies  back  of  a 
thinker's  reasoning  and  determines  what  he  desires  to 
prove  or  disprove.  Philosophy  is  such  a  complex  affair 
and  affects  questions  which  are  so  personal  and  usually  so 
emotionally  held  that  very  few  thinkers  can  escape  a  dis- 
torting bias.  A  preference,  at  least,  is  at  work.  It  is  not 
surprising,  then,  that  some  have  allowed  their  prejudices 
to  dictate  a  thesis  to  be  proved.  It  can  be  said  in  their 
defense,  however,  that  this  dictation  is  largely  unconscious 
and  that  the  problems  are  often  so  subtle  that  the  historian 
can  explain  unfortunate  omissions  and  over-hasty  con- 
clusions without  appeal  to  conscious  deception. 

Now  Berkeley  makes  it  plain  that  he  desires  to  refute 
and  confound  atheist  and  materialist.  We  shall  expect, 
therefore,  that  he  will  not  spend  so  much  time  on  an 
attempt  to  think  out  a  new  and  more  adequate  form  of 
realism  as  on  the  discovery  of  contradictions  in  the  ac- 
cepted forms.  And  this  is  actually  the  situation.  While 
Locke  was  the  admirer  of  physical  science  and  a  con- 
vinced believer  in  the  physical  world,  Berkeley  was  a 
theologian  who  suspected  science  of  being  the  friend  of 
skepticism  and  materialism  and  their  chief  support.  Locke 
wished  to  construct  a  system  which  retained  the  physical 
world  and  conceived  it  in  the  language  of  physics.  Berke- 
ley, on  the  other  hand,  was  desirous  of  disproving  the 
possibility  of  such  a  world.  Hence,  it  was  Locke's  con- 
struction that  Berkeley  naturally  attacked. 

Berkeley's  Disproof  of  Representative  Realism. — We 
have  seen  that  Berkeley  and  Locke  have  much  in  common. 
Both  accept  the  position  that  the  objects  of  the  under- 


THE  RISE  OF  IDEALISM  59 

standing  are  ideas.  They  part  company,  however,  on  the 
question  of  the  significance  of  these  ideas.  1  The  prime 
basis  of  Berkeley's  criticism  of  Locke's  construction  lies 
in  his  denial  that  ideas  can  be  like  anything  without  the 
mind.  "  But,  say  you,  though  the  ideas  themselves  do  not 
exist  without  the  mind,  yet  there  may  be  things  like  them, 
whereof  they  are  copies  or  resemblances,  which  things  exist 
without  the  mind  in  an  unthinking  substance.  I  answer, 
an  idea  can  he  like  nothing  but  another  idea;  a  color  or  figure 
can  be  like  nothing  but.  another  color  or  figure.  If  we 
look  but  never  so  little  into  our  thoughts,  we  shall  find  it 
impossible  for  us  to  conceive  a  likeness  except  only  be- 
tween our  ideas."  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  Sec.  8. 
In  other  words,  Berkeley  asserts  that  the  principle  at  the 
foundation  of  representative  realism  is  self-contradictory. 
It  is  impossible  for  the  mental  to  be  like  the  non-mental. 
Does  not  likeness  imply  comparison?  And  can  compari- 
son operate  beyond  experience?  J 

^Another  argument  of  his  is  extremely  interesting  and 
meets  us  again  in  Hume  (1711-1776).  "All  our  ideas, 
sensations,  notions,  or  the  things  which  we  perceive,  by 
whatsoever  names  they  may  be  distinguished,  are  visibly 
inactive — there  is  nothing  of  power  or  agency  included  in 
them.  So  that  one  idea  or  object  of  thought  cannot  pro- 
duce or  make  any  alteration  in  another.  To  be  satisfied 
of  the  truth  of  this,  there  is  nothing  else  requisite  but  a 
bare  observation  of  our  ideas.  For,  since  they  and  every 
part  of  them  exist  only  in  the  mind,  it  follows  that  there 
is  nothing  in  them  but  what  is  perceived:  but  whoeVer  shall 
attend  to  his  ideas,  whether  of  sense  or  reflection,  will  not 
perceive  in  them  any  power  or  activity;  there  is,  therefore, 
no  such  thing  contained  in  them."  Sec.  25.  The  signif- 
icance of  this  argument  grows  upon  one  the  more  one 


60  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

reflects.  Do  we  divine  any  activity  in  our  percepts  and 
concepts?  Can  we  intuit  in  what  we  perceive  any  source 
of  activity  which  would  account  for  those  changes  we 
witness?  But  if  we  actually  perceived  the  physical 
world  itself,  it  would  be  strange  that  the  inner  springs  of 
action,  the  toil  and  moil  of  growth  and  creation,  were  not 
visible.  Even  magnification  does  not  reveal  the  activity 
of  change  in  what  we  perceive;  all  it  does  is  to  enlarge  the 
objects  seen  and  to  render  smaller  ones  perceivable.  And, 
as  Berkeley  points  out,  motion  is  not  activity  but  only  a 
change  in  position.  The  conclusion  he  draws  must  be 
admitted.  "A  little  attention  will  discover  to  us  that 
the  very  being  of  an  idea  implies  passiveness  and  inertness 
in  it,  insomuch  that  it  is  impossible  for  an  idea  to  do  any- 
thing, or,  strictly  speaking,  to  be  the  cause  of  anything: 
neither  can  it  be  the  resemblance  or  pattern  of  any  active 
being,  as  is  evident  from  sect.  8.  Whence  it  plainly  fol- 
lows that  extension,  figure  and  motion  cannot  be  the  cause 
of  our  sensations.  To  say,  therefore,  that  these  are  the 
effects  of  powers  resulting  from  the  configuration,  number, 
motion,  and  size  of  corpuscles,  must  certainly  be  false." 

These  are  the  two  main  arguments  which  Berkeley 
uses  against  representative  perception.  The  mental  can- 
not be  like  the  non-mental,  and  the  activity  which  we 
must  conceive  of  as  at  the  heart  of  reality  is  not  present 
in  what  we  perceive.   - 

Berkeley's  Construction. — Having  convinced  himself 
that  representative  perception  of  the  Lockian  type  was 
untenable,  Berkeley  proceeds  to  an  idealistic  construction. 
He  assumes  that  we  can  have  no  conception  of  the  phys* 
ical  world  which  assigns  activity  to  it.  Matter  must  be 
inert  and  passive.  But  if  so,  it  must  be  incapable  of  pro- 
ducing ideas  in  our  minds.     What  is  passive  cannot,  he 


THE  RISE  OF  IDEALISM  61 

asserts,  be  the  cause  of  anything.  But  ideas  must  have  a 
cause  since  they  are  not  under  our  control;  they  are  func- 
tions of  something  outside  of  the  individual  mind.  Now 
the  only  experience  of  activity  which  we  have  is  that  of 
our  own  minds.  Volition  is,  for  Berkeley,  an  experience 
of  genuine  activity.  But  it  is  obvious  that  we  do  not  pro- 
duce these  ideas  in  our  minds  though  we  can  reproduce 
them  in  the  form  of  images.  Hence,  the  only  thinkable 
cause  of  ideas  must  be  something  analogous  to  the  finite 
mind,  however  different  from  it  in  power  and  vastness  of 
comprehension.  Ideas,  therefore,  must  be  conceived  as 
the  signs  of  the  controlling  activities  of  a  supreme  mind. 
Put  at  its  best  and  simplest  and  eliminating  additional  doc- 
trines which  are  scarcely  as  defensible,  this  is  Berkeley's 
construction. 

It  is  quite  possible  to  give  up  representative  perception, 
as  Berkeley  does,  and  still  hesitate  to  speculate  so  boldly 
about  the  nature  of  that  which  controls  in  us  these  orderly 
percepts  of  ours.  In  the  preceding  chapter,  we  pointed  out 
how  such  men  as  Herz  and  Helmholtz  adopted  a  sign- 
theory  founded  on  the  recognition  of  arguments  essentially 
like  those  of  Berkeley.  Such  a  more  modest  and  negative 
position  is  the  reflex  of  a  hesitation  to  admit  that  the  phys- 
ical world  must  be  conceived  of  as  inert  and  of  a  doubt 
whether  the  analogy  from  the  human  mind  to  a  supreme, 
creative  mind  is  a  valid  one.  Historically,  these  doubts 
were  first  and  best  expressed  by  David  Hume  to  whose 
development  of  English  empiricism  we  shall  next  turn. 
Just  as  Locke  raised  questions  which  he  did  not  satis- 
factorily answer  but  which  led  forward  to  deeper  analyses, 
so  Berkeley  forced  the  human  mind  to  delve  more  deeply 
into  theory  of  knowledge.  After  we  have  thoroughly  di- 
gested Berkeley's  arguments  against  both  Natural  Realism 


62  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

and  Representative  Realism,  we  are  apt  to  be  baffled  in 
our  quest  after  a  reasonable  theory  of  the  physical  world. 
What  seemed  so  evidently  given  to  our  senses  is  still  there 
but  has  lost  its  stability  and  permanence.  We  become  con- 
vinced that  the  sensible  world  does  not  exist  apart  from 
perception.  Yet  we  demand  that  there  be  something  per- 
manent and  stable  to  control  what  we  perceive  and  to  de- 
termine the  order  of  our  perceptions.  What  is  this  con- 
trolling reality.'*  If  we  still  call  it  the  physical  world,  what 
justification  have  we  for  this  use,  and  how  shall  we  con- 
ceive it?  Berkeley's  searching  critique  of  Lockian  realism 
threatened  the  destruction  of  all  forms  of  physical  realism. 
Idealism  does  not  Change  our  Experience. — The  be- 
ginner is  only  too  prone  to  mis-interpret  idealism.  It 
cannot  too  often  be  stated  that  idealism  does  not  change 
any  feature  of  the  individual's  experience.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  Berkeley  claimed,  so  earnestly,  that  his  outlook 
was  really  nearer  to  that  of  common  sense  than  was  that 
of  Locke  with  its  separation  of  the  primary  from  the 
secondary  qualities.  The  sensible  world,  says  Berkeley,  is 
the  only  physical  world  and  it  is  as  you  perceive  it.  Only 
it  does  not  exist  when  it  is  not  perceived.  He  attacks  the 
independence  of  the  physical  world  of  common  sense  and 
not  its  empirical  traits.  It  is  the  truth  of  those  realistic 
meanings  of  independence,  commonness  and  permanence 
which  he  denies.  To  give  them  a  home,  Locke  had  con- 
structed a  world  which  could  not  be  directly  perceived. 
Berkeley's  solution  was  different.  Having  successfully 
disproved  Locke's  construction,  he  appealed  to  a  spiritual 
realism.  *'  You  may  indeed,  nay,  you  must,  live  and  think 
as  if  everything  remained  independently  real.  That 
is  part  of  your  education  for  heaven,  which  God  in  his 
goodness  provides  for  you  in  this  life.    He  will  send  into 


THE  RISE  OF  IDEALISM  63 

your  soul  at  every  moment  the  impressions  needed  to  ver- 
ify your  necessary  hypotheses  and  support  your  humble 
and  prudent  expectations.  Only  you  must  not  attribute 
that  constancy  to  the  things  themselves  which  is  due  to 
steadfastness  in  the  designs  of  Providence.  Think  and 
act  as  if  a  material  world  existed,  but  do  not  for  a  moment 
believe  it  to  exist."  Santayana,  Reason  in  Common  Sense, 
p.  115. 

Gaps  in  Berkeley's  System. — ^A  closer  examination 
soon  reveals  gaps  in  Berkeley's  system.  In  the  first  place, 
he  passes  too  quietly  over  the  question  of  a  common  world. 
We  have  seen  that  his  arguments  lead  logically  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  sensible  world,  which  I  ordinarily  take  to 
be  an  independent,  physical  world,  is  really  only  my 
idea.  It  is  a  complex  of  my  sensations  perceived  by  my- 
self. It  would  seem  to  follow  that  we  do  not  perceive 
the  same  world  but  only  corresponding  and,  supposedly, 
fairly  similar  worlds.  But  Berkeley  did  not  wish  to  break 
too  harshly  with  common  sense;  so  he  slurs  over  this 
problem.  But  one  of  his  main  arguments  for  the  existence 
of  a  God  depends  upon  the  existence  of  a  sensible  world 
which  exists  whether  I  perceive  it  or  not,  but  which  must 
exist  in  relation  to  some  mind.  The  only  mind  which  is 
adequate  to  perform  this  function  of  guaranteeing  a  per- 
manent sensible  world  is  a  supreme  mind.  Hence  God 
exists.  But  we  must  remember  that  this  sensible  world 
cannot  be  the  sensible  world  which  we  individually  per- 
ceive, since  that  is  unique.  Thus  he  really  only  asserts 
another  mind  of  a  higher  calibre,  quite  arbitrarily,  when  he 
believes  that  he  proves  the  existence  of  a  God  in  this 
fashion. 

Another  weakness,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  next  chapter, 
is  his  quite  inadequate  psychology  of  the  self  and  of  voli- 


64  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

tion.  He  assumes  that  we  can  apprehend  the  self  in  the 
creative  role  of  producing  images.  He  does  not  distin- 
guish clearly  between  his  inherited  concept  of  the  self  as  a 
soul  or  spirit  and  the  empirical  self  which  he  actually 
experiences.  Before  philosophy  could  go  much  farther, 
a  deeper  analysis  of  *  mind  *  was  necessary. 

Keferences 

/        Berkeley,  Three  Dialogues  and  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge, 

passim.  -"•^-^ 

Fraser,  Berkeley. 

Fullerton,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  12. 
ff^Sd'mg,  Histgry^pf  Modern  Philosophy,  vol.  1. 
Kiilpe,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  3,  sec.  26. 
Sellars,  Critical  Realism,  chaps.  4  and  7. 


CHAPTER  VI 

SKEPTICISM 

Bewilderment. — The  step  from  representative  realism 
to  idealism  was  well  calculated  to  produce  bewilderment 
in  the  minds  of  those  who  took  philosophy  seriously  and 
were  able  to  follow  Berkeley's  process  of  reasoning.  Many, 
of  course,  did  not  try  to  understand  his  arguments.  Be- 
cause they  did  not  know  Locke's  position,  they  did  not 
see  that  idealism  was  a  daring  challenge  to  it.  "It  has 
been  assumed  that  he  drew  no  distinction  between  real 
things  and  imaginary  things,  that  he  made  the  world  no 
better  than  a  dream,  etc.  Arbuthnot,  Swift,  and  a  host 
of  the  greater  and  lesser  lights  in  literature,  from  his  time 
to  ours,  have  made  merry  over  the  supposed  unrealities 
in  the  midst  of  which  the  Berkeleian  must  live."  Fuller- 
ton,  An  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  p.  169.  But  idealism 
could  not  be  conquered  in  this  way,  for  it  was  the  expres- 
sion of  a  genuine  reflective  problem.  Natural  Realism 
had  broken  down.  Could  representative  realism  be  car- 
ried through  in  its  place.?  To  deny  that  it  could  involved 
idealism  or  something  very  like  it.  A  more  fundamental 
analysis  of  human  experience  had  to  be  made.  It  was 
David  Hume  who  began  this  more  searching  analysis 
which  has  occupied  philosophy  ever  since  and  is  only  now 
showing  signs  of  having  reached  a  satisfactory  goal. 
Hume's  reflections  led  him  to  skepticism.  He  could  not 
see  that  either  representative  realism  or  idealism  was  well 
based.     Locke  and  Descartes  had  obviously  destroyed 

65 


66  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Natural  Realism,  and  Berkeley  had  just  as  obviously 
undermined  representative  realism.  The  task  which  re- 
mained was  to  take  stock. 

Hume's  Summary  of  Results. — Locke  had  taught  that 
the  primary  qualities  of  matter,  which  are  copied  in  human 
ideas,  inhere  in  a  material  substance  of  an  unknowable 
character.  Descartes'  matter  is  extension  and  is  known; 
Locke's  matter  is  a  "something  I  know  not  what  in  which 
qualities  inhere  and  which  supports  them."  While  ad- 
mitting that  he  had  no  idea  of  the  nature  of  this  underly- 
ing, unknowable  substance  which  possesses  the  archetypal 
primary  qualities,  he  felt  unable  to  relinquish  it.  His 
argument  is  dialectical.  Even  primary  qualities  are  only 
qualities  and  imply  something  more  substantial  as  a 
correlative.  They  must  be  qualities  of  something.  This 
something  was  Locke's  corporeal  substance.  Locke's 
metaphysical  reflection  stopped  at  this  point.  He  was  not 
altogether  satisfied  and  was  inclined  to  express  himself  hu- 
morously about  the  theory.  It  was  Berkeley  who  showed 
that  the  conceptual  schema  of  an  underlying,  unknowable 
substance  and  supported  primary  qualities  was  essen- 
tially meaningless.  Hence  he  rejected  such  a  material 
substance  and  refused  to  go  back  of  sensible  things.  In 
this,  Hume  agreed  with  him.  *'  Thus  the  first  philosophi- 
cal objection  to  the  evidence  of  sense  or  to  the  opinion  of 
external  existence  consists  in  this,  that  such  an  opinion, 
if  rested  on  natural  instinct,  is  contrary  to  reason,  and 
if  referred  to  reason,  is  contrary  to  natural  instinct,  and  at 
the  same  time  carries  no  rational  evidence  with  it,  to  con- 
vince the  impartial  enquirer.  The  second  objection  goes 
farther,  and  represents  this  opinion  as  contrary  to  reason: 
at  least,  if  it  be  a  principle  of  reason,  that  all  sensible 
qualities  are  in  the  mind,  not  in  the  object.     Bereave 


SKEPTICISM  67 

matter  of  all  its  intelligible  qualities,  both  primary  and 
secondary,  you  in  a  manner  annihilate  it,  and  leave  only 
a  certain  unknown,  inexplicable  something y  as  the  cause  of 
our  perceptions;  a  notion  so  imperfect,  that  no  skeptic 
will  think  it  worth  while  to  contend  against  it."  Hume, 
An  Enquiry  Concerning  Human  Under  standing  ^  Sec.  XII, 
Pt.  1.  In  other  words,  Hume  admits  that  we  are  all  nat- 
urally realists  but  that  reason  is  unable  to  justify  either 
Natural  Realism  or  representative  realism. 

Hume's  Attack  upon  Mental  Substance. — Berkeley's 
animus  led  him  to  direct  all  his  critical  energy  against  the 
physical  world.  Consequently,  he  was  traditionalistic 
in  his  treatment  of  the  mind.  It  was  in  this  domain  that 
he  left  an  opening  for  the  keen  analysis  of  Hume.  Hume 
was  not  satisfied  to  speak  of  the  self,  soul,  spirit  or  mind 
as  though  these  were  identical  terms  and  easily  understood. 
Berkeley  had  spoken  of  the  self  as  an  object  of  human 
intuition  and  had  distinguished  it  from  the  sensible 
things  perceived.  He  seems  to  have  regarded  it  as  a  sub- 
stance and  the  active  cause  of  changes  in  our  images.  He 
also  seems  to  have  held  that  it  somehow  possessed  what 
is  perceived.  As  a  true  empiricist,  Hume  asked  the 
vital  question,  How  do  we  know  this  self?  Is  it,  like 
Locke's  material  substance,  a  hypothesis?  Or  is  it  pres- 
ent in  experience?  His  conclusion  was  epoch-making  and 
began  that  psychology  without  a  soul  which  has  been 
dominant.  Reflection  on  the  mind-body  problem,  how- 
ever, will  lead  us  to  an  organic  mind,  a  naturalistic 
version  of  Berkeley's  mental  realism. 

Consciousness  Is  a  Flux.^Modern  psychologists  have 
decided  that  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience  is 
constantly  changing.  This  changing  field  of  experience 
they  call  consciousness.    Hume  was  one  of  the  first  to  state 


68  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

this  doctrine  clearly  and  unambiguously  and  with  a  def- 
inite idea  of  its  implications.  It  is  such  a  classic  state- 
ment that  it  deserves  full  quotation  and  interpretation. 
"For  my  part,"  he  writes,  "when  I  enter  most  intimately 
into  what  I  call  myself,  I  always  stumble  on  some  partic- 
ular perception  or  other,  of  heat  or  cold,  light  or  shade, 
love  or  hatred,  pain  or  pleasure.  I  never  can  catch  myself 
at  any  time  without  a  perception,  and  never  can  observe 
any  thing  but  the  perception.  When  my  perceptions  are 
removed  for  any  time,  as  by  sound  sleep;  so  long  am  I  in- 
sensible of  myself,  and  may  truly  be  said  not  to  exist.  .  .  . 
Our  eyes  cannot  turn  in  their  sockets  without  varying  our 
perceptions.  Our  thought  is  still  more  variable  than  our 
sight;  and  all  our  other  senses  and  faculties  contribute 
to  this  change;  nor  is  there  any  single  power  of  the  soul 
which  remains  unalterably  the  same,  perhaps  for  a  mo- 
ment. The  mind  is  a  kind  of  theatre,  where  several  per- 
ceptions successively  make  their  appearance;  pass,  repass, 
glide  away,  and  mingle  in  an  infinite  variety  of  postures 
and  situations.  There  is  properly  no  simplicity  in  it 
at  one  time,  nor  identity  in  different;  whatever  natural 
propension  we  may  have  to  imagine  that  simplicity  and 
identity.  The  comparison  of  the  theatre  must  not  mis- 
lead us.  They  are  the  successive  'perceptions  only,  that  consti- 
tute the  mind;  nor  have  we  the  most  distant  notion  of  the  place, 
where  these  scenes  are  represented,  or  of  the  materials,  of 
which  it  is  composed'^  Hume,  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature, 
Bk.  I,  Part  IV,  Sec.  VI.3 

Hume  is  convinced  that  we  are  confined  to  our  changing 
experiences.  There  is  nothing  permanent  or  substantial 
about  these.  The  mind  is  for  him  but  a  term  for  this  ever- 
changing  flow  of  experiences  to  which  each  individual 
is  confined.     If  we  suppose  that  there  is  a  larger  world 


SKEPTICISM  69 

of  existence  in  which  these  minds  somehow  are,  we  must 
admit  that  we  cannot  experience  this  world-setting  of  our 
minds.  We  cannot  peep  out  in  any  Hteral  sense  to  see 
where  we  are.  We  may  call  this  logical  conclusion  of 
English  empiricism  mental  pluralism.  There  are  many 
minds — why  should  we  allow  ourselves  to  doubt  that.^ — 
but  how  these  minds  are  joined  to  the  rest  of  reality — ^if 
there  be  something  more  inclusive — we  cannot  tell.  Such 
is  Hume's  rugged  and  fearless  skepticism.  He  has  car- 
ried Locke's  representative  realism  with  its  theory  of 
knowledge  to  its  logical  conclusion. 

Hume*s  Rejection  of  Berkeley's  Spiritualism. — It  will 
be  remembered  that  Berkeley  based  his  construction  upon 
certain  premises.  He  assumed  with  Locke  and  Descartes 
that  our  ideas  must  be  caused  or  controlled  by  something 
external.  This  something  must  be  active.  But  the  only 
experience  of  activity  which  we  have  is  that  of  our  own 
minds.  Hence  mind  must  be  assumed  to  be  the  active 
agent.  Our  own  minds  are  obviously  not  powerful  and 
comprehensive  enough  to  account  for  our  orderly  percep- 
tual experiences.  Hence  we  must  postulate  a  supreme 
mind  as  the  controlling  and  active  agent  whose  deeds 
lead  us  to  conceive  of  physical  nature.  Such  is  Berke- 
ley's chain  of  reasoning.  Let  us  examine  Hume's  objec- 
tions. 

We  have  already  noted  that  Berkeley  had  not  sufficiently 
analyzed  the  subjective  side  of  experience.  He  seems  to 
have  taken  it  for  granted  that  he  experienced  a  sense  of 
activity  in  volition  of  an  almost  creative  or  productive 
sort.  It  is  this  that  Hume  denies.  Ideas  arise  in  our 
minds  but  we  do  not  know  why.  The  psychologist  speaks 
of  the  association  of  ideas  and  tries  to  explain  their  com- 
ing and  going  by  association  processes.    But  assuredly  we 


70  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

are  not  aware  of  any  productive  agency  in  our  will  which 
brings  forth  thoughts.  When  thoughts  come,  we  are 
often  enough  surprised  by  them.  "  Volition  is  surely  an 
act  of  the  mind,  with  which  we  are  sufficiently  acquainted. 
Reflect  upon  it.  Consider  it  on  all  sides.  Do  you  find 
anything  in  it  like  this  creative  power,  by  which  it  raises 
from  nothing  a  new  idea,  and  with  a  kind  of  Fiat,  imitates 
the  omnipotence  of  its  Maker,  if  I  may  be  allowed  so  to 
speak,  who  called  forth  into  existence  all  the  various 
scenes  of  nature?  So  far  from  being  conscious  of  this 
energy  in  the  will,  it  requires  a  certain  experience  as  that 
of  which  we  are  possessed,  to  convince  us  that  such  ex- 
traordinary effects  do  ever  result  from  a  simple  act  of  vo- 
lition."   Enquiry,  Sec.  VII,  Pt.  I. 

Thus  Hume  appeals  to  a  keener  analysis  of  experience 
than  Berkeley  had  made  to  refute  the  latter's  superficially 
persuasive  argument.  We  are  ignorant  of  anything  of  the 
nature  of  productive  or  creative  activity  as  much  in  our- 
selves as  in  sensible  nature.  ^ ,  We  are  aware  of  directed 
change  hut  not  of  production.\  Modern  psychology  agrees 
with  Hume's  analysis  although  it  is  more  voluntaristic. 

By  means  of  this  extension  of  analysis,  Hume  showed 
that  Berkeley's  arguments  against  the  existence  of  a 
physical  world  apply  equally  against  the  existence  of  a 
creative  spiritual  source.  "Were  our  ignorance,  therefore, 
a  good  reason  for  rejecting  anything,  we  should  be  led 
into  that  principle  of  denying  all  energy  in  the  Supreme 
Being  as  much  as  in  the  grossest  matter.  We  surely 
comprehend  as  little  the  operations  of  one  as  of  the 
other.  Is  it  more  difficult  to  conceive  that  motion 
may  arise  from  impulse  than  that  it  may  arise  from 
volition?  All  we  know  is  our  profound  ignorance  in 
both  cases." 


SKEPTICISM  71 

Taking  Stock. — Many  thinkers  have  been  too  impa- 
tient to  do  justice  to  Hume's  searching  analysis.  They 
either  have  not  seen  that  it  was  a  necessary  step  or  have 
been  offended  by  his  frank  rejection  of  impossible  posi- 
tions. But  theory  of  knowledge  is  a  science  and  must 
follow  the  facts.  Let  us,  therefore,  ask  ourselves  what 
Hume  proved.  His  very  skepticism  had  its  positive  side 
which  few  thinkers  have  been  capable  of  seeing  because 
they  have  been  attending  to  its  negative  side.  This 
negative  interpretation  was  due  to  the  fact  that  they  could 
perceive  no  way  out.  As  soon  as  such  a  way  opens  up,  an 
entirely  different  setting  can  be  given  to  Hume's  veracious 
skepticism. 

In  the  first  place,  Hume  gives  up  the  substance-quality 
schema  for  both  the  physical  world  and  the  mental.  The 
mind  is  for  him  simply  the  flow  of  the  individual's  field  of 
experience,  his  changing  consciousness.  This  empirical 
mind  is  given  and  is  somehow  experienced  together.  He 
takes  it  for  granted,  moreover,  that  each  individual  is  con- 
fined to  his  own  consciousness.  In  the  second  place,  he 
sees  that,  if  there  are  realities  outside  of  these  minds,  they 
cannot  be  perceived  nor  intuited.  He  is  completely  dis- 
satisfied with  representative  perception  as  a  theory  of 
knowledge,  also,  for  the  reasons  advanced  by  Berkeley. 
So  long  as  we  think  of  sensible  things,  it  is  impossible  to 
separate  the  primary  from  the  secondary  qualities,  and  it 
does  not  seem  meaningful  to  think  of  something  mental 
as  like  something  non-mental.  But  a  deeper  motive  ap- 
pears to  have  lurked  in  the  background.  Our  ideas  do  not 
introduce  us  into  the  dynamic  processes  in  nature.  We 
are  obviously  outsiders  looking  at  shadow  shapes  but 
unable  to  penetrate  into  the  very  process  of  immanent 
change  which,  we  are  yet  convinced,  expresses  the  reality 


72  TPIE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  world.  Even  the  primary  qualities  are  passive  and 
reveal  nothing  of  the  tension  of  creative  activity.  And  the 
only  way  to  account  for  this  externality  of  our  ideas  to  things 
is  to  admit  that  Natural  Realism  has  suggested  a  wrong  ideal 
to  the  human  mind.  If  physical  things  themselves  were 
present  in  the  field  of  experience,  more  of  the  secret  of 
their  powers  and  capacities  should  be  revealed  in  percep- 
tion. For  Natural  Realism,  to  know  is  essentially  to  intuit 
the  thing,  that  is,  to  be  the  thing.  Its  life  and  nature  should 
not  be  hidden  from  us  if  it,  itself,  is  present  for  our  inspec- 
tion. There  is  no  reason  why  this  inspection  should  not 
be  penetrative,  sympathetic,  revelatory,  why  the  thing 
should  not  lose  all  shame  and  present  its  most  hidden 
springs  and  energies.  Such  possible  knowledge  is  the 
knowledge  the  thing  might  be  supposed  to  have  of 
itself. 

The  question  which  Hume  raises  in  our  minds  is  this. 
Has  he  not  shown  once  for  all  that  such  knowledge  as  the 
human  mind  has  does  not  involve  either  the  presence  of 
that  which  is  known  in  the  field  of  experience  or  the  pres- 
ence of  a  substitute  copy?  His  skepticism  is  a  reduction 
to  absurdity  of  this  naive  view  of  knowledge  and  the 
preparation  for  a  more  searching  investigation  into  the 
nature  of  our  actual  knowledge  about  the  physical  world. 
What,  indeed,  is  the  nature  of  human  knowledge?  And 
what  are  its  conditions?  It  is  generally  supposed  that  a 
German  thinker,  Immanuel  Kant,  added  to  the  analysis 
of  experience  which  Hume  had  made  certain  essential  ele- 
ments. For  instance,  Kant  speaks  of  the  categories  as 
essential  forms  of  human  knowledge.  Let  us  see  what  he 
means  by  this  term  and  whether  it  offers  a  clue  to  a  new 
departure. 


^/ 


SKEPTICISM  73 

References 

Hume,   Tjre^we^onJIuman  Naturcy  Selby-Bigge  edition.     An 

Enquiry  ConcerniJig  Human  Understanding. 
Calkins,  The  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy,  chap.  6. 
Hoffdin^,  Histqryi  of  Modern  Philosophy ,  vol.  1. 
Huxley,  Hume. 
Knight,  Hume, 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE  PERIOD  OF  PREPARATION 

Kant  Tries  to  Meet  Hume's  Skepticism. — After  Hume, 
the  main  current  of  philosophy  swings  from  the  British 
Isles  to  Germany.  The  German  philosopher,  Immanuel 
Kant  (1734-1804),  sought  a  way  of  escape  from  the  ap- 
parently negative  conclusions  to  which  Hume  had  been 
led.  I  shall  try  to  give  as  simple  and  clear  a  statement 
as  I  can  of  Kant's  teaching  and  outlook.  Kant  did  not 
refute  Hume,  but  suggested  a  more  adequate  empiricism 
than  Hume's.  The  strange  thing  about  this  empiricism, 
however,  is  that  it  masqueraded  as  a  blend  of  British 
sensationalism  and  Continental  rationalism.  Experience 
is,  for  Kant,  a  combination  of  a  'posteriori  sensations,  due 
to  the  stimulation  of  the  mind  by  an  external  world,  and 
a  priori  forms  inherent  in  the  mind. 

Thus  it  is  generally  acknowledged  that  Kant  stressed 
the  constructive  character  of  the  human  mind.  The  world 
as  we  experience  it  is  not  a  gift  to  our  senses  but  a  very 
complex  piece  of  architecture.  Kant  tries  to  lay  bare  the 
plans  of  this  mental  construction  by  means  of  which  sensa- 
tions are  organized  together  and  made  into  sensible  things 
regarded  as  permanent  and  common  and  independent  of 
the  self.  He  speaks  of  this  active  production  of  the 
distinctions  with  which  we  are  all  familiar  as  due  to  the 
categories,  which  are  asserted  by  him  to  be  expressions 
of  a  Transcendental  Ego. 

Into  the  more  technical  aspects  of  Kant's  analysis  we 

74 


THE  PERIOD  OF  PREPARATION  75 

need  not  enter.  It  has  been  pointed  out  again  and  again 
that  Kant's  statement  of  the  problem  is  preevolutionary. 
He  does  not  regard  the  mind  as  a  growth  but  as  a  creation 
endowed  once  for  all  with  certain  fixed  capacities.  When 
we  remember  that  he  wrote  in  the  eighteenth  century  and 
under  the  influence  of  the  Continental  philosophers  of  the 
seventeenth  century  we  are  not  surprised  at  this  ungenetic 
approach. 

Kant  Stresses  Conceptual  Knowledge. — Hume  had 
tended  to  reduce  all  our  knowledge  to  the  level  of  associa- 
tions. He  did  not  do  justice  to  the  work  of  active  con- 
struction and  organization  which  goes  on  in  our  minds. 
On  the  whole,  he  was  a  sensationalist;  and  this  was  because 
he  was  attacking  the  older  forms  of  rationalism  with  their 
acceptance  of  a  reason  that  did  not  have  a  genetic  relation 
to  immediate  experience.  The  consequence  was  that  he 
did  not  do  justice  to  actual  experience.  Association 
dominates  over  judgment. 

Hence,  in  opposition  to  the  over-simplifying  tendency 
of  sensationalistic  empiricism,  Kant  inaugurated  what  has 
finally  come  to  be  a  more  adequate  empiricism.  He  be- 
gan by  analyzing  mathematical  knowledge  as  an  actual 
possession  to  see  what  it  involved.  He  came  to  the  correct 
conclusion  that  such  knowledge  is  not  a  mere  reproduction 
of  what  is  given  in  perception  but  is  a  genuine  achievement 
in  which  new  truths  are  discovered.  This  result  he  ex- 
pressed technically  by  saying  that  in  mathematics  we 
have  a  priori  synthetic  knowledge.  It  is  a  priori  in  the 
sense  that  it  is  not  based  on  particular  observations,  and 
it  is  synthetic  in  the  sense  that  it  is  not  the  statement 
of  a  mere  analysis  of  concepts  we  already  possess.  We 
must  admit  that  Kant's  protest  had  value  against  the 
psychology  and  logic  of  Hume  but  it  is,  nevertheless,  true 


76  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

that  he  gave  his  own  position  a  mythological  setting  by  re- 
taining the  older  rationalism.  Both  Hume  and  Kant  have 
been  superseded  by  the  more  adequate  analyses  of  modern 
philosophers.  Theory  of  knowledge  is  to-day  based  on 
the  conclusions  of  modern  psychology  and  logic. 

Two  Meanings  of  the  Word  Knowledge. — From  Locke 
to  Hume,  the  British  thinkers  had  concerned  themselves 
with  the  problem  of  the  physical  world  and  the  nature 
and  extent  of  our  knowledge  of  it.  Starting  with  the  ac- 
ceptance of  representative  perception,  they  gradually  were 
convinced  that  we  do  not  possess  this  kind  of  knowledge 
of  the  physical  world.  We  have  seen  that  their  reflections 
culminated  in  the  idealism  of  Berkeley  and  the  skepticism 
of  Hume.  Thus  physical  realism  came  to  an  impasse. 
On  the  whole,  philosophers  were  unwilling  to  relinquish 
their  belief  in  a  physical  world  but  did  not  see  how  they 
could  justify  it  nor  what  the  content  of  their  knowledge 
could  be.  In  Scotland,  there  arose  a  reaction  led  by  Reid 
(1710-1796)  which  sought  to  return  to  common  sense  by 
sheer  force  of  reiteration.  Reid  is  valuable  as  a  proof  of 
the  strength  of  those  realistic  meanings  to  which  we  have 
so  frequently  referred. 

But  knowledge  can  have  another  meaning.  It  is  that 
which  the  human  mind  accepts.  It  is  that  which  is  judged 
to  be  universal  and  necessary.  We  all  pass  judgments  and 
accept  propositions.  The  various  sciences  are,  indeed, 
nothing  but  systems  of  knowledge  in  this  sense.  Data, 
laws,  theories,  hypotheses,  what  are  these  but  examples  of 
knowledge.^  We  may  say,  then,  that  human  knowledge 
consists  of  those  propositions  which  are  tested  and  ac- 
cepted as  true.  That  we  have  such  knowledge  is  an  em- 
pirical fact  which  nobody  doubts.  The  methods  by  which 
it  is  built  up  are  carefully  studied  by  logic. 


THE  PERIOD  OF  PREPARATION  77 

It  is  obvious  that  a  'philosopher  can  devote  his  attention  to 
the  study  of  the  nature  and  conditions  of  actual  human 
knowledge  without  settling  the  question  of  whether  there  is  a 
physical  world  and  whether  we  possess  knowledge  about  it. 
This  second  kind  of  knowledge  can  be  examined  by  the 
mental  sciences  without  regard  to  the  first  meaning  of  the 
term. 

Kant  and  Hume  Skeptical  of  the  First  Kind  of  Knowl- 
edge.— As  a  matter  of  fact  when  it  comes  to  a  question 
of  the  first  kind  of  knowledge,  there  is  little  to  choose 
between  Hume  and  Kant.  "Kant  did  not  try  to  refute, 
as  did  Reid,  the  doctrine,  urged  by  Descartes  and  by  his 
successors,  that  all  those  things  which  the  mind  directly 
perceives  are  to  be  regarded  as  complexes  of  ideas.  On 
the  contrary,  he  accepted  it,  and  has  made  the  words 
'phenomenon'  and  'noumenon'  household  words  in 
philosophy."  Fullerton,  An  Introduction  to  Philosophy^ 
p.  176.  Let  us  glance  at  the  main  outlines  of  his  theory  of 
knowledge. 

Kant  speaks  of  the  world  we  perceive  and  conceive,  the 
sensible  world  and  the  conceptual  world  of  science,  as 
phenomenal.  He  teaches  that  sensible  things  are  products 
of  the  ordering  of  sensations  under  the  mental  forms  of 
space  and  time.  These  spatial  and  temporal  sensation- 
complexes  are  then  solidified  and  organized  in  relation  to 
one  another  by  the  categories  of  substance  and  causality. 
The  result  of  all  this  ordering  and  organizing  of  sensations 
by  the  mind  is  the  objective  world  which  we  actually 
experience  and  ordinarily  take  to  be  independent  of  the 
mind.  But  Kant  admits  that  there  is  a  real  world  which 
controls  our  sensations.  His  position  in  this  regard  is 
essentially  the  same  as  Hume's.  Perhaps  the  only  dif- 
ference between  them  is  that  Hume  was  better  acquainted 


78  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

with  Berkeley's  idealism  and  so  expressed  himself  more 
skeptically  of  this  ghost  of  the  physical  world.  So  far  as 
theory  of  knowledge  is  concerned,  then,  there  is  little 
difference  between  Kant  and  Hume.  Happily,  Kant  has 
expressed  himself  clearly  on  this  point.  "Idealism  con- 
sists in  the  assertion  that  there  are  none  but  thinking  be- 
ings, all  other  things,  which  we  think  are  perceived  in 
intuition,  being  nothing  but  representations  in  the  think- 
ing beings,  to  which  no  object  external  to  them  corresponds 
in  fact.  Whereas  I  say,  that  things  as  objects  of  our 
senses  existing  outside  us  are  given,  but  we  know  nothing 
of  what  they  may  be  in  themselves,  knowing  only  their 
appearances,  i.  e.y  the  representations  which  they  cause 
in  us  by  affecting  our  senses.  Consequently  I  grant  by 
all  means  that  there  are  bodies  without  us,  that  is,  things 
which,  though  quite  unknown  to  us  as  to  what  they  are  in 
themselves,  we  yet  know  by  the  representations  which 
their  influence  on  our  sensibility  procures  us,  and  which 
we  call  bodies,  a  term  signifying  merely  the  appearance  of 
the  thing  which  is  unknown  to  us,  but  not  therefore  less 
actual.  Can  this  be  termed  idealism?  It  is  the  very  con- 
trary."   Kant's  Prolegomena^  Sec.  6,  Remark  2. 

While  Kant's  use  of  terms  is  not  as  accurate  as  could  be 
desired,  it  is  easy  to  make  out  his  meaning.  The  objects 
within  the  field  of  human  experience  are  mental  and  are 
to  be  called  phenomena,  while  the  conditions  of  those 
objects,  which  are  extra-mental,  are  to  be  called  things-in- 
themselves  or  noumena.  The  Kantian  thing-in-itself  is 
that  "unknown,  inexplicable  something,  as  the  cause  of 
our  perceptions^'  of  which  Hume  speaks.  The  phenome- 
non is,  for  Kant,  a  function  of  the  interaction  of  the  mind 
and  this  necessarily  assumed  realm  of  things-in-themselv6s. 
Like  Hume,  he  has  rejected  representative  realism  and  has 


THE  PERIOD  OF  PREPARATION  79 

landed  in  skepticism.  Because  he  does  not  doubt  the 
existence  of  this  realm  outside  of  the  field  of  the  individ- 
ual's experience  but  only  our  possession  of  knowledge  of  it, 
his  position  is  called  agnosticism.  We  are  forced  to  believe 
that  there  is  an  extra-mental  world  but  we  can  never  know 
its  nature. 

Kant's  Doctrine  of  the  Categories. — We  have  already- 
said  that  Kant  began  a  more  adequate  analysis  of  experi- 
ence than  had  been  developed  up  to  his  time.  What  we 
shall  try  to  do  now  is  to  indicate  the  real  contribution  he 
made  and  to  separate  the  drift  of  his  teaching  from  his 
somewhat  confused  statement  of  it.  Hume  did  not  do 
justice  to  the  structural  side  of  experience.  He  was  too 
much  of  a  sensationalist  to  be  a  true  empiricist.  From 
Berkeley  he  had  accepted  the  view  that  we  do  not  possess 
abstract  ideas  but  are  actually  limited  to  'impressions' 
and  their  fainter  reproductions  called  images.  He  seems 
to  have  thought  of  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience 
as  simply  a  cluster  of  such  impressions  and  images. 

Kant  saw  that  this  analysis  was  quite  inadequate. 
Knowledge  involves  very  complex  ideas  somehow  under- 
stood as  wholes.  "Columbus  discovered  America  in 
1492"  is  a  complex  proposition  which  is  yet  grasped  to- 
gether as  a  significant  assertion.  Logic  can  never  admit 
Hume's  atomistic  sensationalism  for  a  moment.  It  is  not 
true  to  experience  as  we  actually  have  it.  Kant  sought 
to  remedy  Hume's  error  by  introducing  another  kind  of 
mental  element  which,  combined  with  sensations  and  im- 
ages, would  account  for  experience  as  it  is.  His  problem 
may  be  called  one  in  structural  psychology.  What  can 
we  add  to  sensations  to  make  percepts,  concepts,  judg- 
ments and  systems  of  scientific  knowledge.?  Kant  taught 
that  the  mind  in  its  own  right  contributes  unsensational 


80  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

elements,  or  forms,  and  combines  these  with  sensations 
in  such  a  way  as  to  give  us  our  actual  experience.  These 
unsensational  elements  he  calls  the  categories. 

The  problem  which  Kant  raised  is,  as  we  have  suggested, 
one  for  psychology  and  logic  to  solve.  Do  we  ever  begin 
with  atomic  sensations?  Are  not  relations  and  meaning^ 
present  in  our  Experience  from  the  first  .^  Modern  psychol- 
ogy answers  "no"  to  the  first  question  and  "yes"  to  the 
second.  Hume  made  a  false  start  and  Kant  was  too  much 
influenced  by  the  old  rationalistic  notion  of  the  reason  as 
a  distinct  faculty  to  make  a  fresh  beginning. 

Percepts  are  experienced  as  unitary  objects  having 
various  distinguishable  aspects.  The  meaning  of  per- 
manence is  infused  into  them  and  so  we  regard  them  as 
things.  Along  with  this  meaning  is  that  of  independence. 
These  meanings  give  the  percept  the  appearance  of  sub- 
stantiality and  together  constitute  what  Kant  calls  the 
category  of  substance.  In  other  words,  percepts  are  prod- 
ucts into  whose  making  we  can  penetrate  somewhat  only 
by  reflection  and  experimental  analysis.  The  psycholo- 
gist thinks  of  the  percept  as  the  reflection  in  consciousness 
of  the  functioning  together  of  a  system  of  neurones  asso- 
ciated together.  Is  the  unity  of  the  percept  an  element 
which  corresponds  to  this  functioning  together.^  At  any 
rate,  Kant,  who  thought  of  it  as  contributed  by  a  rational 
faculty,  calls  it  a  category. 

Perceptual  objects,  again,  appear  in  the  field  of  experi- 
ence as  suggesting  other  objects  with  which  they  have 
been  connected.  The  individual  reflects  upon  the  order 
in  which  his  experiences  come  and  is  led  to  postulate  a 
causal  relation.  This  objective  relation  by  means  of  which 
events  are  combined  into  systems  is  a  further  distinction 
which  must  be  recognized.    It,  too,  Kant  calls  a  category. 


THE  PERIOD  OF  PREPARATION  81 

When,  at  the  present  day,  we  come  to  reflect  upon 
Kant's  demand,  we  see  more  clearly  than  he  did  that  he  is 
demanding  an  adequate  logic  of  science  and  a  psychology 
which  harmonizes  with  it.  This  demand  is  being  met  by 
both  logic  and  psychology,  by  the  latter  perhaps  more 
slowly  than  by  the  former.  Both  of  these  mental  sciences 
acknowledge  the  presence  of  meanings  and  concepts  in 
the  field  of  the  individual's  experience.  Such  is  the  more 
adequate  empiricism  for  which  Kant  almost  unwittingly 
paved  the  way. 

Kant  Thinks  of  the  Categories  as  Subjective. — Sup- 
pose we  take  space,  time,  substantiality,  causality  and 
individuality  as  categories,  that  is,  as  fundamental  charac- 
teristics of  our  organized  knowledge.  Kant  thinks  of  these 
elements  as  subjective  in  a  double  sense.  They  do  not 
arise  in  our  experience  as  meanings  growing  out  of  the 
behavior  of  perceptual  objects,  and  they  are  contributed 
by  an  Ego  which  has  no  apparent  relation  to  the  world 
of  things-in-themselves.  Thus  Kant  has  no  evolutionary, 
genetic  idea  of  the  categories  which  would  permit  of  their 
being  responsible  to  an  objective  control.  On  the  contrary, 
they  are  innate  possessions  of  a  determinate  and  subjective 
understanding. 

For  Kant,  then,  the  categories  are  subjective  in  two 
senses.  They  are  innate  and  they  have  no  significance 
for  the  world  of  things-in-themselves.  Let  us  consider 
the  first  meaning  of  the  term  subjective  first.  The  his- 
torical setting  of  Kant's  teaching  will  make  this  meaning 
clear. 

Wolff,  a  predecessor  of  Kant,  had  taught  that  the  cate- 
gories are  actual  entities  in  a  world  independent  of  the 
mind,  a  view  which  savors  of  Cartesianism.  The  mind 
possesses  concepts  of  these  categories  and  these  concepts 


82  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

are  intuitions  or  representations  of  an  independent  reality. 
We  may  speak  of  this  outlook  as  representative  conception 
or  intuitionalistic  rationalism.  The  idea  of  knowledge 
is  evidently  analogous,  to  say  the  least,  to  representative 
perception.  Wolff's  theory  of  knowledge  is  of  interest 
to  us  because  our  own  view  must  be  contrasted  with  both 
his  and  Kant's.  The  point  is,  that  Kant  makes  an  ad- 
vance upon  Wolff's  representative  conception  that  cor- 
responds to  the  step  taken  by  Berkeley  and  Hume  past 
representative  perception.  Knowledge  cannot  be  a  copy- 
ing of  an  external  reality.  Wolff's  theory  of  knowledge 
can  be  outlined  as  follows : 

World  of  Consciousness        World  of  Reality  Indepen- 
dent    of     Conscious- 
ness. 
Sensations  of  Color 
Sensations  of  Sound,  etc. 
Conceptions  of  Substances     Real  Substances 
Conception  of  Cause  Real  Causality 

Conception  of  Space  Real  Space 

Conception  of  Time,  Real  Time, 

etc.  etc. 

(cf.  Calkins,  The  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy ^  p.  199.) 


Sense 


Thought 


It  is  interesting  to  find  that  Hobbes  (1588-1679)  main- 
tains an  essentially  similar  position.  He  distinguishes 
between  real  and  imaginary  space  and  asserts  that  the 
latter  is  an  effect  in  us  of  the  former.  Based  upon  this 
causal  relation,  he  seems  to  imply  a  cognitive  value  for 
the  imaginary  space.  It  is  a  category  in  the  Wolffian 
sense.  "The  extension  of  a  body  is  the  same  thing  with 
the  magnitude  of  it,  or  that  which  some  call  real  space. 


THE  PERIOD  OF  PREPARATION  83 

But  this  magnitude  does  not  depend  upon  our  cogitation 
as  imaginary  space  doth;  for  this  is  an  effect  of  our  imagi- 
nation, but  magnitude  is  the  cause  of  it;  this  is  an  accident 
of  the  mind,  that  of  a  body  existing  out  of  mind."  Hobbes, 
Concerning  Body,  chap.  VIII,  sec.  4.  And  he  defines  this 
term  accident  for  us  in  the  following  way:  "They  answer 
best  that  define  an  accident  to  be  the  manner  by  which 
any  body  is  conceived;  which  is  all  one  as  if  they  should 
say,  an  accident  is  that  faculty  of  any  body  by  which  it 
works  in  us  a  conception  of  itself."    Ibid.,  sec.  2. 

In  opposition  to  Wolff  and  Hobbes,  Kant  taught  that 
the  categories  exist  only  in  the  mind.  He  did  not  believe 
that  they  could  possibly  have  any  reality  or  significance 
apart  from  human  consciousness.  We  might  paraphrase 
Berkeley's  teaching  and  say  that  Kant's  view  was  that  a 
category  could  be  like  nothing  but  a  category.  Imaginary 
space  cannot  be  like  or  furnish  a  conception  of  a  real  space 
or  magnitude  outside  of  the  mind.  Hence  Kant  drew  again 
the  skeptical  conclusion  already  drawn  by  Hume.  Knowl- 
edge can  be  only  a  presentation  of  constructs  within  ex- 
perience. Knowledge  is  a  knowledge  of  phenomena  within 
experience.  But  if  the  world  of  things-in-themselves  is 
neither  spatial  nor  temporal,  it  would  seem  to  be  nonsense 
to  speak  of  it  as  the  physical  world.  The  only  physical 
world  there  is  for  Kant  is,  therefore,  the  world  of  sensible 
things  as  this  is  developed  and  organized  by  the  physical 
sciences;  and  this  realm  of  objects  obviously  exists  in 
human  experience  only.  While  different  from  the  ob- 
jects of  the  imagination  and  not,  like  these,  under 
the  control  of  our  desires  and  wishes,  it  is  yet  only 
mental. 

We  shall  now  make  use  of  the  more  adequate  empiri- 
cism which  has  grown  up  since  the  days  of  Hume  and 


84  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Kant  in  order  to  find  a  way  out  of  skepticism.  Is  there 
not  another  possible  meaning  for  knowledge  besides  rep- 
resentation? And  if  so,  may  we  not  possess  genuine 
knowledge  of  an  independent  reality  which  can  rightly 
be  called  physical?  Two  investigations  are  necessary 
if  we  are  to  fulfil  this  purpose.  We  must  study  the  field 
of  the  individual's  experience  and  the  distinctions  char- 
acteristic of  it,  and  we  must  analyze  the  reference  and 
character  of  the  knowledge  actually  possessed  by  us.rMay 
it  not  be  that  representative  realism  is  the  expression  of  a 
wrong  interpretation  of  knowledge,  an  interpretation  still 
biased  by  the  assumptions  of  Natural  Realism?  Must 
knowledge  be  considered  the  possession  of  mental  objects 
which  are  like  entities  outside  the  mind?  If  representative 
realism  is  founded  on  a  misconception  of  knowledge,  the 
idealism  of  Berkeley  and  the  agnosticism  of  Hume  and 
Kant  can  be  regarded  as  its  reductio  ad  dbsurdum.  \  As  yet, 
I  can  only  give  the  hint  that  reflection  must  pass  from  the 
attitude  and  habits  associated  vnth  perception  to  the  dis- 
tinctions characteristic  of  judgment  if  it  is  to  gain  the  proper 
notion  of  what  knowledge  is.  I  think  that  it  must  by  now 
be  clear  to  the  student  that  representative  realism  did  not 
take  this  step.  To  know  by  means  of  ideas  which  are 
like  physical  reality  is  only  an  indirect  perception.  For 
this  reason,  the  view  of  knowledge  held  by  representa- 
tive realism  has  usually  been  called  representative  per- 
ception. 

We  shall  now  try  to  avoid  the  psychological  and 
logical  blunders  of  Hume  and  Kant  by  getting  in  touch 
with  the  advances  made  in  these  two  mental  sciences 
since  their  day.  The  result  should  be  a  more  adequate 
empiricism  than  Kant,  with  the  best  of  intentions,  could 
achieve.     We  shall  be  led  to  distinguish  between  the 


THE  PERIOD  OF  PREPARATION  85 

categories,  as  characteristic  features  of  both  percepts 
and  cognitive  ideas,  and  the  mental  capacities  which  con- 
dition the  individual's  consciousness.  Kant  confused 
these  two  things  because  of  his  rationalistic  bias  toward 
innate  ideas  and  his  acceptance  of  a  given  manifold. 

References 

Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  and  Prolegomena. 

Calkins,  The  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy,  chap.  7. 

Hoffding,  History  o£  Modern  Philosophy,  vol.^  2. 

Paulsen,  Kant. 

Prichard,  Kant's  Theory  of  Knowledge. 

Wenley,  Kant  and  His  Philosophical  Revolution. 


/ 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   FIELD   OF   THE   INDIVIDUAL'S 
EXPERIENCE 

From  Natural  Realism  to  Descriptive  Empiricism. — 
In  the  preceding  pages,  our  thinking  has  moved  progress- 
ively from  the  standpoint  of  Natural  Realism  to  what 
may  be  called  descriptive  empiricism.  After  the  break- 
down of  common-sense  realism,  we  passed  to  the  study  of 
certain  typical  thinkers  of  the  past  and  watched  the  deep- 
ening of  the  problem  set  for  our  thought.  More  and  more 
the  conclusion  grew  up  within  us  that  a  critical  knowledge 
of  the  individual's  experience  was  a  pre-condition  of  the 
solution  of  these  problems.  Instead  of  starting  with  a 
hasty  view  of  what  knowledge  must  be,  let  us  try  to  dis- 
cover what  human  knowledge  actually  is  and  how  it  arises. 
Let  us  carefully  examine  the  distinctions  characteristic  of 
experience  and  then  watch  them  develop  under  the  stimu- 
lus of  reflection.  The  brief  study  we  have  made  of  certain 
typical  philosophies,  will  surely  help  us  in  our  effort  to 
carry  through  such  a  critical  study.  Philosophy  must  be 
founded  upon  a  genuine  empiricism. 

/  Both  common  sense  and  science  hold  that  there  is  an  in- 
/dependent,  material  world  and  that  we  have  pretty  direct 
*  knowledge  of  it.  At  the  more  naive  level,  the  belief  is 
that  the  individual  perceives  physical  things  and  that  the 
actual  physical  world  is  thus  open  to  his  inspection. 
Knowing  is  seeing.  "All  unreflective  thought  is  in  a 
certain  sense  sensualistic,  because  it  regards  sense  percep- 

86 


THE  INDIVIDUAL'S  EXPERIENCE  87 

tion  as  the  most  reliable  source  of  knowledge.  The  Greek 
word  oida — I  know,  is  the  perfect  tense  of  the  root  id, 
which  signifies  to  see.  Knowledge,  therefore,  in  the  popu- 
liir  understanding  of  the  Greeks,  was  originally  equivalent 
to  having  seen.  An  interesting  proof  for  this  popular  con- 
ception is  found  in  the  passage  of  Homer's  Iliad,  2,  484ff., 
where  the  poet  appeals  to  the  muses,  who  are  able  to  see 
everything  and  who,  therefore,  know  all  things.  It  is, 
furthermore,  characteristic  of  this  stage  of  thought  to 
identify  the  processes  of  perception  and  reflection,  the 
latter  being  regarded  as  a  species  of  sense  perception." 
Jerusalem,  An  Introduction  to  Philosophy^  p.  89.  At  a 
more  critical  level,  either  something  of  the  nature  of  a 
copy-theory  of  knowledge  is  implicitly  held  or  the  nature 
of  knowledge  is  shoved  into  the  background  by  the  cer- 
iainty  that  we  do  have  knowledge.  That  this  should  be 
the  case  is  very  natural,  and  it  is  very  interesting  to  find 
that  Locke  often  slips  back  into  this  attitude  in  spite  of 
his  evident  desire  to  be  critical.  With  Locke,  there  was 
a  fair  balance  between  the  certainty  that  we  have  knowl- 
edge and  the  curiosity  to  know  exactly  what  knowledge 
is.  With  the  less  speculative  man,  on  the  contrary,  assur- 
ance overpowers  such  tendency  to  analysis  as  may  exist. 

The  critical  examination  of  the  history  of  modern  philos- 
ophy has  led  to  the  following  conclusions:  Reflection  early 
breaks  down  Natural  Realism  and  some  form  of  repre- 
sentative realism  takes  its  place.  Knowledge  is  now  re- 
garded as  the  possession  of  ideas  which  are  like  the  physical 
world.  This  outlook  is  obviously  an  adjustment  to  the 
forced  admission  that  ideas  and  not  physical  things  are 
present  to  inspection.  Only  think  of  ideas  as  like  things 
and  you  need  scarcely  regret  Natural  Realism.  Locke 
pushed  forward  to  selective  representative  realism  under 


88  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  suggestion  of  physics.  Only  certain  aspects  of  our 
ideas  are  really  like  physical  things.  These  are  the  pri- 
mary qualities.  But  further  reflection  (Berkeley,  Hume 
and  Kant)  revealed  that  this  adjustment  is  untenable. 
Can  ideas  be  like  things?  More  and  more  this  view  of  our 
knowledge  of  the  physical  world  was  doubted.  The  result 
was  skepticism  or,  to  use  a  more  modern  term,  agnosticism. 
It  is  true  that  Berkeley  hastily  erected  a  spiritualistic  meta- 
physics to  take  the  place  of  the  deposed  physical  world, 
but  his  hasty  construction  was  set  aside  by  Hume.QBut 
Hume's  skepticism  has  a  positive  as  well  as  a  negative  side. 
This  positive  side  is  the  anticipation  of  what  is  to-day 
called  positivism.  If  we  can  gain  no  knowledge  of  an  inde- 
pendent realm,  does  not  such  a  realm  lose  all  meaning  for 
science?  Must  we  not  consider  the  physical  world,  then, 
as  only  a  name  for  the  objects  which  we  perceive  and  con- 
ceive and  which  we  organize  into  a  system  characterized 
by  empirically  discovered  laws?  Of  only  one  kind  of 
knowledge  can  we  be  certain,  the  knowledge  which  con- 
sists of  the  objects  which  we  apprehend,  and  this  un- 
deniable knowledge  exhausts  the  content  of  both  science 
and  common  sense.  We  called  this  the  second  meaning  of 
knowledge.  All  that  can  be  known,  sensible  things,  facts, 
laws  and  theories,  is  within  experience.  What  we  appre- 
hend and  understand  is  mental.  The  skeptic  will  say: 
"There  may  or  may  not  be  an  independent  physical  world; 
we  may  or  may  not  have  knowledge  of  it;  but  we  can  at 
least  be  certain  of  the  mental  objects  we  apprehend." 
Skepticism  is,  after  all,  a  relative  position.^) 

Whose  Experience? — Hobbes,  Berkeley,  Locke  and 
Hume  did  not  doubt  that  the  individual  is  confined  to  his 
own  field  of  experience  or  to  his  own  consciousness  as  it  is 
usually  called.    You  cannot  share  with  me  in  any  literal 


THE  INDIVIDUAL'S  EXPERIENCE  89 

sense  my  feelings,  percepts,  concepts  and  judgments. 
Your  consciousness  does  not  overlap  mine  as  one  line 
crosses  another  and  so  shares  with  it  a  common  point. 
Each  person  somehow  lives  in  his  own  world  even  though 
he  'communicates'  with  others  and  understands  what 
they  are  thinking  about.  Of  course,  we  have  here  a  gen- 
uine problem  for  reflection.  If  each  of  us  lives  in  his  own 
consciousness,  what  is  communication  and  mutual  under- 
standing? 

Locke  contrasted  the  one  physical  world  with  the  many 
minds  which  know  it  and  which  it  affects.  Berkeley  fol- 
lowed Locke  and  accepted  a  plurality  of  minds.  Hume 
adopted  the  same  position  as  obvious  and  indisputable. 
Unfortunately,  these  thinkers  were  so  engrossed  with  the 
problem  of  the  physical  world  that  they  did  not  see  that 
this  pluralism  of  minds  which  they  accepted  involved  a 
similar  problem.  If  I  am  confined  to  my  own  conscious- 
ness, how  can  I  know  that  you  exist  any  more  than  I  can 
know  that  an  independent  physical  world  exists.?  In  a 
very  real  sense,  you  are  for  me  a  construct  in  my  conscious- 
ness just  as  the  perceived  and  conceived  objects  are  which 
common  sense  takes  to  be  physical  things.  We  must 
conclude  that  these  thinkers  did  not  carry  their  analysis 
to  its  logical  implication  and  so  missed  a  real  clue  to  the 
correct  meaning  of  knowledge. 

Mental  Pluralism  and  Solipsism. — Solipsism  is  a  term 
which  we  shall  meet  with  again  later  and  we  may  as  well 
become  acquainted  with  it  in  the  present  connection.  As 
a  term  in  theory  of  knowledge,  it  means  that  the  individual 
can  know  only  objects  which  are  in  his  personal  field  of 
experience  or  consciousness.  But  if  an  individual  can 
know  only  his  own  personal  mental  objects,  what  right 
has  he  to  assert  that  there  are  other  persons  besides  him- 


90  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

self?  Assertions  must  be  based  on  knowledge.  He  may 
have  faith  that  there  are  other  persons,  but  faith  is  a  dif- 
ferent affair.  Now  the  majority  of  critical  thinkers  to-day 
are  of  the  opinion  that  Hume*s  position  involves  solipsism. 
But  we  all  feel  that  a  position  that  involves  solipsism  is 
imperfect,  that  it  has  not  solved  the  problem  of  knowledge. 
In  fact,  I  am  inclined  to  regard  solipsism  as  one  of  the 
crucial  tests  of  a  theory  of  knowledge.  If  it  leads  to  such 
an  absurdity,  we  must  think  again. 

If  we  cannot  apprehend  an  independent  reality  either 
directly  (Natural  Realism)  or  indirectly  (representative 
realism),  how  can  we  know  anything  outside  of  our  own 
consciousness?  But  other  selves  are  in  the  same  situation 
as  the  physical  world;  for  they  are  by  definition  inde- 
pendent realities.  He  who  has  failed  to  solve  the  problem 
of  knowledge  for  the  one  has  failed  for  the  other.  Knowl- 
edge seems  to  involve  an  impossible  transcendence  of  one's 
own  consciousness.  Can  it  be  denied  that  reflection  faces 
genuine  problems? 

Kant's  Appeal  to  Consciousness-In-General. — The 
British  empiricists  held  to  mental  pluralism  to  the  last 
though  the  rejection  of  representative  realism  logically 
landed  them  in  solipsism.  They  did  not  realize  their 
danger  because  they  were  interested  in  the  problem  of  the 
physical  world  and  in  psychological  analysis.  The  rejec- 
tion of  Natural  Realism  by  John  Locke  is  partly  founded 
on,  and  is  certainly  bound  up  with,  the  physiological  theory 
of  perception  to  which  we  referred  in  an  earlier  chapter 
(Chapter  III).  If  my  ideas  are  caused  by  the  stimulation 
of  my  senses,  they  cannot  be  identical  with  yours  which 
are  functions  of  the  stimulation  of  your  senses,  however 
similar  we  may  suppose  them  to  be.  Both  Berkeley  and 
Hume  presuppose  this  way  of  approach  even  though  they 


THE  INDIVIDUAL'S  EXPERIENCE  91 

reach  conclusions  not  entirely  harmonizable  with  it.  Thus 
Hume  calls  sensations  impressions  and  Berkeley  speaks  of 
the  senses.  We  may  say,  then,  that  the  British  empiricists 
assume  that  each  individual  is  confined  to  his  own  field  of 
experience.  I  analyze  my  consciousness  and  state  what  I 
find  and  expect  that  you  who  analyze  your  own  experience 
will  reach  similar  distinctions. 

But  Kant  made  a  new  departure  which  has  had  vicious 
results.  From  it  has  flowed  what  is  called  objective  idealism, 
which  may  best  be  described  as  an  attempt  to  combine 
realism  with  idealism  by  an  appeal  either  to  a  supreme 
and  all  inclusive  mind  or  to  a  logical  abstraction  called 
consciousness-in-general.  Because  Kant's  departure  from 
the  previous  tradition  in  philosophy  had  such  important 
consequences,  it  is  necessary  to  study  it  in  some  detail. 

Kant  distinguishes  between  what  he  calls  the  tran- 
scendental self  and  another  self  which  he  calls  the  empirical 
self.  The  transcendental  self  is  essentially  a  logical  func- 
tion which  expresses  itself  in  the  categories  to  which  we 
referred  in  the  previous  chapter.  It  is  identical  and  per- 
manent while  the  empirical  self  is  momentary  and  many- 
colored.  This  transcendental  self  is  a  thinking,  active, 
synthetic,  organizing  self  which  lies  in  the  background  and 
builds  up  the  field  of  experience  from  the  manifold  of  pas- 
sive sensations  which  are  presented  to  it.  To  express 
this  theory  of  a  necessary  agent  Kant  often  refers  to  it  as 
the  synthetic  unity  of  apperception.  But  he  goes  even 
farther  than  this.  He  asserts  that  the  transcendental  self 
is  a  universal  self.  Let  us  see  why  he  does  this.  It  must 
be  remembered  that  Kant  sometimes  writes  as  though  he 
were  making  a  descriptive  analysis  of  experience  and 
sometimes  as  though  he  were  developing  theories  to  ac- 
count for  what  is  given  in  experience.    His  main  argument 


92  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

for  the  belief  that  there  is  a  universal  self  is,  however,  as 
follows:  There  are  things  in  space  outside  me  and  I  am 
able  to  contrast  these  things  with  my  private  ideas. 
Kant  insists  that  there  is  a  fundamental  difference  be- 
tween these  two  types  of  objects.  Apparently,  he  assumes 
that  percepts  are  private  ideas  while  phenomenal  objects 
are  common  and  essentially  neutral  objects.  But  both 
of  these  objects  are  mental.  Therefore  we  must  assume 
two  different  kinds  of  selves  to  which  to  attach  them. 
Corresponding  to  the  phenomenal  object  in  space  is  the 
transcendental  self  which  is  a  universal  self.  Correlative 
to  the  percept  is  the  empirical  self.  What  must  we  say 
of  this  construction? 

A  little  reflection  must  convince  one  that  Kant  is  build- 
ing upon  an  unreal  distinction.  We  do  not  perceive  per- 
cepts which  are  non-spatial.  What  the  common-sense 
man  calls  a  physical  thing,  open  to  his  observation,  the 
psychologist  calls  a  percept.  Kant  duplicates  the  im- 
mediate objects  of  apprehension  in  the  field  of  the  in- 
dividual's experience  (consciousness)  and  calls  the  one  a 
personal  idea  and  the  other  an  object  or  phenomenon  out- 
side of  me.  And  this  is  a  tremendous  blunder  which 
vitiates  his  whole  philosophy.  Had  he  read  Hume  a  little 
more  carefully,  he  would  have  become  aware  that  he  was 
guilty  of  what  Hume  calls  the  philosophical  hypothesis, 
that  is,  the  duplication  into  thing  and  percept  of  w^hat  is 
immediately  perceived.  Thus  Kant  duplicates  objects  in 
the  field  of  the  individual's  experience  and  connects  one 
with  the  empirical  self  of  the  individual  and  the  other 
with  a  self  created  for  the  purpose,  a  universal,  tran- 
scendental self.  In  this  way,  he  is  able  to  be  a  realist,  so 
far  as  the  individual  is  concerned,  and  yet  be  an  idealist, 
in  an  abstract  sense,  by  making  the  neutral  object  mental 


THE  INDIVIDUAL'S  EXPERIENCE  93 

and  correlative  to  this  universal  self.  But  as  soon  as  we 
realize  that  there  is  no  need  for  this  duplication,  we  see 
that  his  construction  is  false  and  ungrounded.  Mental 
objects,  whether  dominantly  perceptual  or  conceptual,  exist 
only  in  the  fields  of  experience  of  particular  individuals. 
Kant*s  analysis  is  a  blunder.  We  must  return  to  the  men- 
tal pluralism  of  the  British  thinkers. 

The  Standpoint  of  Descriptive  Empiricism. — Let  me, 
then,  attempt  to  describe  my  field  of  experience  in  the  hope 
that  others  will  discover  this  description  holds  for  their 
fields.  I  shall  endeavor  to  find  what  elements  are  given 
in  my  field  and  how  they  are  arranged.  Such  an  empirical 
description,  which  is  not  in  the  service  of  any  epistemologi- 
cal  theory,  is  the  only  satisfactory  foundation  for  an  episte- 
mology.  But  what  is  this  descriptive  empiricism.?  It  is 
a  description  by  the  individual  of  his  field  of  experience  on 
the  basis  of  an  inspection  deepened  here  and  there  by 
introspection. 

The  Subject-Object  Contrast. — Philosophers  have 
been  accustomed  to  speak  of  a  subject-object  relation  as 
present  in  experience.  We  must  ask  ourselves  whether 
there  is  anything  of  this  nature  given  in  the  field  of  the 
individual's  experience.  When  I  remark  that  I  see  this 
book,  what  exactly  is  given  in  my  experience?  So  far  as  I 
can  make  out,  nothing  but  the  perceptual  object  which  I 
call  the  book  and,  in  contrast  to  it,  a  self-feeling  merging 
with  my  attitude  of  attention  to  the  book.  This  self- 
feeling  merged  with  the  attitude  of  attention  is  called  by 
philosophers  the  subject-self.  Thus  my  present  field  of 
experience  is  a  togetherness  of  elements  in  which  there  is  a 
duahty,  the  perceptual  object  in  spatial  relation  to  my 
body  and  the  feeling  of  attention  centered  in  my  body  and 
surrounded,  as  it  were,  with  my  sense  of  bodily  existence 


94  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

and  attitude.  Such  ideas  as  come  and  go  float  vaguely 
between  these  two  poles  of  my  field  though  they  tend  to 
approach  the  subject-self  more  closely  than  they  do  the 
perceptual  object. 

The  object  pole  of  the  field  is  usually  clearly  given.  We 
are  outward-looking  and  mainly  interested  in  the  things 
which  we  apprehend.  At  this  moment,  the  object  side 
of  my  field  is  clear  and  complex.  I  see  many  objects, 
books,  scattered  sheets  of  paper,  a  typewriter  in  the  fore- 
ground, a  wall  covered  with  light  wall-paper  and  a  pic- 
ture hanging  a  fit  tie  above  in  the  background.  At  the  level 
of  Natural  Realism,  these  apprehended  objects  would 
be  called  physical,  and  for  me  they  are  penetrated  by  these 
realistic  meanings.  But  other  kinds  of  objects  may  also 
be  apprehended.  I  can  think  of  mathematical  objects, 
physical  hypotheses,  ideals  of  conduct,  policies  of  state, 
and  the  gods  of  Greece.  In  all  of  these  cases,  I  am  outward- 
looking  and  inspect  the  more  or  less  changing  pole  of  ob- 
jects known.  And  I  know  now  that  all  these  things  are 
parts  of  my  field  of  experience. 

The  subject  pole  is  less  clearly  given  as  a  rule.  Some- 
times I  am  so  engrossed  in  the  object  side  that  I  forget 
myself,  that  is,  hardly  feel  myself.  The  college  student 
who  witnesses  a  crisis  in  a  foot-ball  game  lives  in  the  visual 
field  of  moving  players.  But,  ordinarily,  I  am  more  or 
less  aware  of  myself  in  both  perception  and  conception. 
What  is  this  self,  and  what  is  the  nature  of  this  awareness? 
So  far  as  I  can  make  out,  it  is  entirely  empirical  and  con- 
sists of  a  more  or  less  conscious  purpose  suffused  with  or- 
ganic sensations  and  with  the  sensations  coming  from  the 
head,  especially  the  eyes  and  forehead.  This  contrasted 
background  over  against  which  the  object  is  set  is  an  at- 
titude which  fluctuates  from  a  sense  of  bodily  presence  to 


THE  INDIVIDUAL'S  EXPERIENCE  95 

the  higher  level  of  plans  and  purposes  experienced  dimly 
as  my  plans  and  purposes.  And  this  me  which  enters  is 
the  self  which  has  grown  up  in  my  body  in  touch  with, 
and  as  qualifying,  this  subject  pole  of  outward-looking  at- 
tention. As  I  become  more  and  more  self-conscious  in  my 
inspection  of  objects,  this  subjective  background  swells 
by  the  intussusception  of  self-elements  which,  though 
within  the  field  of  attention,  accept  the  contrast  of  the 
two  poles  of  experience  and  ally  themselves  with  the  back- 
ground of  attitudes.  It  is  clear  that  descriptive  empiri- 
cism leads  me,  at  least,  to  side  with  Hume  as  against  Berke- 
ley. Hume,  however,  did  not  do  justice  to  the  structure 
of  the  field  of  experience;  he  did  not  realize  the  importance 
of  this  contrast  between  the  two  poles  of  the  field. 

The  Elementary  Unity  of  Togetherness. — The  field  of 
the  individual's  experience,  however  complex,  is  yet  a 
unity.  It  is,  as  it  were,  an  expanse  in  which  many  things 
and  feelings  are  present  together.  They  are  relatively  dis- 
tinct, yet  continuous.  Thus  the  subject-object  contrast 
exists  within  a  more  comprehensive  unity.  It  is  a  differ- 
entiation within  the  field  which  does  not  really  separate 
what  are  contrasted.  It  is  this  fact  of  presence  together 
which  the  contrast  presupposes  and  which  makes  the  one 
pole  really  an  object  and  the  other  pole  really  a  subject. 
Philosophy  has  been  accustomed  to  recognize  this  situa- 
tion of  presence  together  in  contrast  by  the  use  of  the  rather 
ambiguous  term,  relation.  There  is  no  subject  without  an 
object,  it  is  said,  and  there  is  a  subject-object  relation 
between  them.  I  fear  that  this  relation  is  a  fictitious 
entity  if  it  means  more  than  this  presence  together  in  the 
field  of  experience. 

Is  the  Self  Dominant  in  the  Field  of  Experience? — 
Many  of  the  older  philosophers  assumed  that  the  seK  was 


96  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

an  agent  which  dominated  the  field  of  experience.  It  will 
be  remembered  that  this  was  Berkeley's  view.  Ideas 
(objects  in  the  field)  are  satellites  of  the  self.  But  de- 
scriptive empiricism  cannot  assent  to  this  view  which  is 
too  evidently  a  theory  rather  than  a  fact.  The  role  played 
by  the  self  varies  in  different  situations.  In  ordinary 
perception,  the  subject-self  is  only  a  vaguely  felt  presence 
which  can  best  be  described  as  an  attitude  and  the  seat  of 
shifts  in  attention  so  far  as  these  are  voluntary.  In  all 
clear  apprehension,  this  is  the  case.  But  when  problems 
arise  which  demand  reasoning  and  interpretation,  the  face 
of  the  field  of  experience  changes.  Reasoning  and  inter- 
pretation are  processes  which  seem  to  intervene  between 
the  subject-self  and  the  objective  pole.  They  are  processes 
wliich  take  time  and  involve  the  intervention  of  ideas, 
or  thoughts,  which  are  tentative  objects  which  have  a 
function  to  perform  and  therefore  occupy  a  middle  posi- 
tion between  the  subject-self  and  the  object  pole.  The 
self  is  more  conscious  of  a  purpose  at  this  time,  more 
visited  by  bustling  plans  and  feelings,  more  vibrant  to 
the  presence  of  these  ideas  and  suggestions  in  the  middle 
ground  of  the  field.  I  am  reasoning  about  these  things. 
The  subject  pole  reaches  out  farther  into  the  field  and 
the  middle  of  the  field  is  now  a  swift  current  flowing 
between  the  subject-self  and  the  more  stable  realm  of 
objects. 

In  desire,  and  still  more  in  conscious  planning  and  will- 
ing, the  subject-self  acquires  new  emphasis.  There  is  a 
swing  inward  of  the  attention  to  ideas  which  are  thought 
of  as  ways  of  expressing  personal  wishes  and  ideals.  And 
such  wishes,  ideals  and  purposes  arise  tinged  with  the 
feeling  of  possession.  They  are  objects,  but  objects  at- 
tached to  tendencies  which  are  rooted  in  a  tense  back- 


THE  INDIVIDUAL'S  EXPERIENCE  97 

ground  of  vague  feeling  and  attitude,  which  is  the  home  of 
the  subject-self. 

The  conclusion  which  descriptive  empiricism  draws  in 
answer  to  the  question  whether  the  self  is  dominant  in  the 
field  of  experience  is  essentially  negative.  Usually  objects 
are  more  dominant  than  the  self.  At  other  times,  the 
processes  of  reasoning  and  reflection  intervene  and  widen 
the  field.  These  processes  are  often  spoken  of  as  subjec- 
tive processes.  That  term  is  misleading.  At  the  level 
of  Natural  Realism,  they  are  regarded  as  mental  in  con- 
trast t-o  the  objects  perceived.  This  classification  thrusts 
them  nearer  to  the  subject-self  than  they  actually  belong. 
Very  often  in  reasoning  we  live  in  the  things  which  fur- 
nish us  with  the  problem.  Even  in  reasoning  we  may  be 
essentially  outward-looking.  At  still  other  times,  the  sub- 
ject side  of  the  field  of  experience  is  dominant,  though 
practically  never  despotically  so.  Thus  the  field  of  the 
individual's  experience  is  like  a  body  of  water  moved  by 
the  tide.  Now  this,  now  that  is  lifted  into  prominence 
and  then  subsides.  And,  like  the  living  ocean,  it  is  in 
constant  change. 

References 

Alexander,  Aristotelian  Society  Proceedings,  1910-11. 
Bradley,  Appearance  and  Reality,  chap.  9. 
Russell,  TheJProhlems  of  Philosophy,  chajp.  4. 
Dunlap,  Psychological  Review,  1914. 
Fletcher,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  15. 
Moore,  The  Refutation  of  Idealism,  Mind,  vol.  28. 
Sellars,  Critical  Realism,  chaps.  4  and  5. 
Ward,  Art.  Psychology,  Ency,  Britannica. 


CHAPTER  IX 

DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN  THE  FIELD 

Two  Dimensions  of  the  Field. — Descriptive  empiricism 
finds  that  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience  has  two 
dimensions  which  may  be  called  the  coexistential  and  the 
temporal.  In  the  preceding  chapter  we  indicated  a  char- 
acteristic contrast  in  the  coexistential  dimension,  m>., 
that  between  the  subject-self  and  the  objects  which  are 
present  to  it.  At  the  level  of  Natural  Realism,  this  con- 
trast is  interpreted  as  a  distinction  between  the  concrete 
individual  who  perceives  and  the  physical  world  which  is 
perceived.  It  is  obvious  that  both  terms  of  this  contrast 
lend  themselves  to  the  introduction  of  meanings  of  meta- 
physical import.  We  tend  to  think  of  the  objects  we  per- 
ceive as  substantial  and  independent  realities  and  to  con- 
sider the  other  term  of  the  contrast,  the  perceiver,  as  also 
a  substantial  and  independent  reality.  But  we  now  realize 
that  this  is  an  interpretative  development  of  a  distinction 
within  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience.  In  this  in- 
terpretative development  of  the  subject-object  contrast 
within  the  field  of  experience  into  the  outlook  of  Natural 
Realism  we  can  see  the  work  and  growth  of  those  pene- 
trative meanings  which  Kant  called  the  categories.  Yeiy 
often,  Natural  Realism  lends  itself  to  a  more  reflective 
position  called  Natural  Dualism,  the  acceptance  of  two 
hinds  of  reality,  mind  and  the  physical,  which  are  somehoio 
given  together  and  are  yet  clearly  qualitatively  different.  In 
just  such  a  hasty  way  is  both  popular  and  even  scientific 

98 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN  THE  FIELD  99 

philosophy  built  up.  But  the  student  will  now  realize 
that  such  reifications  of  parts  of  the  field  of  the  individ- 
ual's experience,  however  natural  and  however  great  their 
significance  as  demands,  cannot  be  admitted.  Descriptive 
empiricism  calls  a  halt  and  asserts  that  we  must  try  to 
understand  the  distinctions  within  experience  before  we 
go  on  to  either  a  theory  of  knowledge  or  a  metaphysics. 

But  the  field  of  experience  not  only  has  a  coexistential 
structure  but  it  also  has  a  temporal  growth.^  It  is  con- 
stantly changing  as  regards  its  contents.  Just  as  we  are 
convinced  to-day  that  it  is  impossible  to  understand  the 
structure  of  animals  without  some  knowledge  of  their 
history,  so  we  are  becoming  convinced  that  the  field  of 
experience,  its  structure  and  contents,  is  made  clearer  by  a 
genetic  approach.  On  the  whole,  psychology  has  been  of 
the  most  assistance  here.  It  is  now  seen  that  the  objects 
in  the  field  are  constructs,  or  growths,  which  can  be  par- 
tially explained  by  logic  and  psychology.  Of  course, 
logic  and  psychology  cannot  derive  the  material  which  is 
woven  into  these  objects.  They  cannot,  for  instance, 
explain  why  we  see  red  colors  and  taste  sweet  and  sour 
flavors.  But  they  can  trace  the  laws  of  growth  and  con- 
struction in  the  complex  field  the  adult  experiences.  Psy- 
chology speaks  of  the  laws  of  association  by  contiguity 
and  similarity,  while  logic  stresses  abstraction  and  general- 
ization. We  shall  refer  to  this  genetic  study  of  the  field 
of  experience  again  and  again  in  explanation  of  the  dis- 
tinctions characteristic  of  the  coexistential  dimension. 

The  Coexistential  Dimension  Favors  Realism. — We 
have  seen  that  the  coexistential  dimension  is  the  seat  of 

*  The  pragmatists  have  done  yeoman's  service  in  stressing  this  sec- 
ond dimension  of  experience.  Their  epistemologieal  ohtuseness  has  been 
due  to  their  neglect  of  the  first  dimension. 


100  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  contrast  between  the  subject-self  and  the  part  of  the 
field  which  consists  of  objects  apprehended.  At  the  level 
of  common  sense,  this  contrast  is  interpreted  entirely  real- 
istically. I  suppose  that  I  perceive  the  actual  physical 
thing  itself.  And  no  wonder,  for  it  is  the  only  thing  I 
can  apprehend  and  it  is  shot  through  with  realistic  mean- 
ings. Natural  Realism  is  natural;  any  other  attitude  at 
this  level  of  reflection  would  be  surprising.  And  Natural 
Realism  easily  passes  into  Natural  Dualism,  the  accept- 
ance of  two  given  realities  of  quite  different  nature.  Car- 
tesianism  is  mainly  a  rationalistic  refinement  of  Natural 
Dualism. 

In  the  study  of  the  outlook  of  common  sense  in  an  earlier 
chapter,  we  stressed  the  growth  of  realistic  meanings  in 
experience.  It  may  be  of  interest  to  note  that  we  can  find 
the  basis  for  this  structure  and  for  these  meanings  in  our 
instincts  themselves.  Take  fear  for  instance.  Does  it 
not  imply  attention  to  something  which  is  felt  as  other 
than  ourselves?  Thus  the  instincts  involve  a  structure 
of  the  field  which  arises  in  consciousness,  a  tension  of 
organic  reaction  to  the  perceptual  object  which  is  the 
stimulus  to  this  reaction.  Many  writers  have  laid  stress 
upon  the  experience  of  resistance  as  the  foundation  of  a 
sense  of  otherness;  but  I  am  inclined  to  lay  more  stress 
upon  the  necessary  duality  within  experience  which  the 
instincts  involve.  This  genetic  problem  is,  however,  a 
task  for  the  psychologist.  The  philosopher  must  study 
the  field  of  experience  as  it  is  and  then  assist  the  psycholo- 
gist to  explain  it. 

The  Temporal  Dimension  Opposes  Natural  Realism. — 
We  are  aware  of  the  result  of  genetic  processes.  They  come 
to  us  as  things  and  attitudes  given.  It  is  only  closer 
study  that  presents  us  with  glimpses  of  the  processes 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN  THE  l^tEhp     ;     101 

which  have  gone  to  the  making  of  our  perceptual  and  con- 
ceptual objects  and  the  meanings  which  permeate  them. 
But  the  more  we  study  logic  and  psychology,  the  more  we 
gain  insight  into  the  silent  processes  which  weave  our 
world.  This  knowledge,  however,  works  directly  against 
Natural  Realism.  If  what  we  see  are  products  of  processes 
essentially  personal  and  connected  with  human  organisms, 
how  can  they  be  actual  physical  things?  Hence,  genetic 
study  reenforces  the  work  of  reflection  and  helps  to  break 
down  Natural  Realism. 

Things  and  Ideas. — In  an  earher  chapter  (Chap.  2) 
it  was  pointed  out  that  the  outlook  of  common  sense  is 
not  systematic.  The  distinctions  within  experience  are 
more  complex  than  the  form  of  Natural  Realism  which  we 
have  stressed  is  inclined  to  admit.  I  have  found  that 
students  who  come  into  an  introductory  course  in  philos- 
ophy hesitate  between  asserting  that  they  perceive  phys- 
ical things  and  that  they  perceive  ideas  somehow  con- 
nected causally  and  cognitively  with  physical  things. 
There  seems  to  me  no  doubt  that  this  distinction  is  vaguely 
present  and  that  it  can  be  made  to  stand  out  clearly  if 
reflection  is  directed  upon  it.  If  the  physiological  theory 
of  perception  is  accepted,  or  if  the  distinction  between 
the  thing  and  its  appearance  is  run  down,  the  conclusion 
follows  that  ideas  (percepts)  are  apprehended  and  physical 
things  beheved  in.  "I  think  it  is  scarcely  too  much  to  say 
that  the  plain  man  believes  that  he  does  not  directly  per- 
ceive an  external  world,  and  that  he,  at  the  same  time, 
believes  that  he  does  directly  perceive  one.  It  is  quite 
possible  to  believe  contradictory  things,  when  one's 
thought  of  them  is  somewhat  vague,  and  when  one  does 
not  consciously  bring  them  together."  Fullerton,  An 
Introduction  to  Philosophy,  p.  33. 


log  TliE  FSSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

This  distinction  is  developed  pretty  definitely  by  psy- 
chology. Consciousness  comes  to  be  a  term  which  in- 
cludes all  the  objects  which  are  apprehended,  whether 
these  be  perceptual  or  conceptual  in  character,  and  op- 
posed to  this  class  of  objects  is  the  physical  world  as  this 
is  somehow  known  by  the  physical  sciences.  The  psycholo- 
gist does  not  bother  his  head  very  much  over  the  ques- 
tion as  to  how  the  physicist  can  know  a  physical  world 
if  he  cannot  perceive  it.  He  takes  it  for  granted  that  he 
can  and  simply  follows  the  logic  of  his  own  reflections. 
We  may  say,  then,  that  the  distinction  between  consciousness 
and  the  physical  world  is  only  a  reflective  development  of  the 
plain  man*s  distinction  between  ideas  and  things.  Both 
are  inevitable  distinctions  which  press  home  to  the  re- 
flective mind  a  definite  problem.  The  first  distinction 
raises  the  question.  How  can  we  know  that  there  are 
things  and  what  they  are  like  if  we  perceive  only  ideas?  The 
second,  more  developed  distinction  is  the  source  of  a  deeper 
question.  How  can  we  know  the  physical  world,  which 
we  assume,  if  we  are  confined  to  objects  in  consciousness? 
"It  is  evident  that  the  working  adjustment  between 
psychology  and  the  physical  sciences  is  one  that  has  grown 
up  on  the  basis  of  the  contrast-meanings  of  common 
sense  and  been  strengthened  by  the  respective  methodolo- 
gies and  standpoints  of  the  two  groups.  It  is  not  one  that 
has  a  systematic  epistemology  on  which  to  rest."  Sellars, 
Critical  Realism,  pp.  48-99. 

But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  we  do  have  this  dis- 
tinction within  experience.  It  is  an  empirical  distinction 
whose  significance  must  be  interpreted  by  a  wise  and  pa- 
tient philosophy. 

Sense  and  Imagination. — ^The  writings  of  Locke  are 
a  store-house  of  shrewd  distinctions.    He  points  out  that 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN  THE  FIELD  103 

an  idea  from  actual  sensation  and  another  from  memory 
are  very  distinct  experiences.  Ideas  of  memory  and  im- 
agination can  at  pleasure  be  laid  aside.  "But  if  I  turn  my 
eyes  at  noon  towards  the  sun,  I  cannot  avoid  the  ideas 
which  the  light  or  sun  then  produces  in  me.  So  that  there 
is  a  manifest  difference  between  the  ideas  laid  up  in  my 
memory  (over  which,  if  they  were  there  only,  I  should 
have  constantly  the  same  power  to  dispose  of  them,  and 
lay  them  by  at  pleasure),  and  those  which  force  them- 
selves upon  me  and  I  cannot  avoid  having."  Essay,  Bk. 
4,  Ch.  XI,  sec.  5. 

We  are  all  aware  of  this  distinction,  and  there  can  be 
little  doubt,  that  it  plays  some  part  in  the  growth  of  a 
realistic  attitude  toward  the  world  we  perceive.  "To  the 
objector  who  urges  that  the  fire  may  be  all  a  dream,  Locke 
never  tires  of  begging  him  *to  dream  this  answer';  that 
there  is  a  manifest  difference  between  dreaming  of  being 
in  the  fire  and  being  actually  in  it,  and  at  any  rate  the  pain 
of  the  second  experience  makes  the  difference  between  our 
weal  and  woe,  and  determines  us  practically." 

Now  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  reflection  which 
breaks  down  Natural  Realism  teaches  that  we  can  ignore 
this  distinction.  Philosophy  does  not  make  the  foolish 
attempt  to  deny  any  feature  of  the  individual's  experience. 
Because  I  call  the  object  I  see  a  percept,  it  does  not  follow 
that  I  can  have  the  experience  of  walking  through  it. 

A  Thing  and  the  Thought  of  It. — The  distinction  be- 
tween a  thing  and  the  thought  of  it  is  somewhat  different 
from  that  discussed  just  above.  The  first  form  of  the  dis- 
tinction between  a  thing  and  the  thought  of  it  exists 
clearly  at  the  level  of  Natural  Realism.  For  common 
sense,  there  are  two  ways  of  knowing  things,  knowing 
them  immediately  by  perception  and  knowing  them  con- 


104  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ceptually,  or  representatively,  when  they  are  absent.  In 
the  first  ease,  the  things  themselves  are  present  to  in- 
spection; in  the  second  case,  they  are  absent  and  yet 
present  cognitively.  This  presence  in  absence  is  the  pres- 
ence of  an  idea,  thought  or  concept  of  them.  I  apprehend 
an  idea  which  is  taken  as  a  substitute  for  the  thing  so  far 
as  my  cognitive  purpose  is  concerned.  The  thought  or 
concept  has  grown  up  in  my  mind  in  genetic  touch  with 
the  thing  as  I  perceive  it.  For  this  reason,  I  take  it  natu- 
rally as  a  representative  of  and,  therefore,  a  cognitive  sub- 
stitute for  the  thing.  It  is  this  function  of  replacement 
which  is  signified  by  the  preposition  *of.'  It  is  not  the 
thing  but  an  idea  of  the  thing. 

But  even  at  the  level  of  Natural  Realism  the  field  of 
experience  is  not  quite  so  simple  as  this.  When  I  try  to 
make  such  representative  knowledge  clearer  in  regard  to 
its  structure,  I  find  that  I  have  an  accepted  sphere  of 
existent  things  some  of  which  are  qualified  as  not  present 
to  my  apprehension  and,  as  it  were,  between  them  and 
myself,  as  knower,  an  idea,  or  thought,  which  is  qualified 
as  my  thought  of  an  absent,  independent  thing.  The  idea 
means  the  thing  and  this  meaning  qualifies  the  idea — is, 
in  fact,  an  essential  part  of  it. 

It  should  be  noted  that  this  distinction  is  purely  em- 
pirical and  is  characteristic,  at  times,  of  the  field  of  the 
individual's  experience.  Knowledge  of  things  in  their  ab- 
sence  is  a  genuine  contrast  within  experience  based  on  the 
capacity  of  the  mind  to  distinguish  spheres  of  existence.  The 
coexistential  dimension  of  the  field  of  experience  becomes 
more  complex  than  in  perception.  I  can  distinguish  be- 
tween myself  as  knower,  the  idea  which  contains  knowl- 
edge, and  the  realm  of  objects  known.  The  idea  is  con- 
sidered mental  and  yet  as  having  the  function  of  containing 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN  THE  FIELD  105 

knowledge  of  the  reality  it  means.  Thus  I  now  have 
an  idea  of  the  Capitol  at  Washington  and  distinguish  be- 
tween it  and  the  actual  Capitol  which  it  means.  The 
Capitol  is  present,  not  literally,  but  only  in  the  sense  that 
it  is  referred  to  and  meant.  It  is  the  reference  of  the  idea 
and  not  an  apprehended  object.  It  is  not  present  in  the 
field  of  the  individual's  experience  except  as  meant;  and 
we  are  all  inclined  to  hold  that  such  meaning  is  a  mental 
affair. 

Reflection  on  these  Distinctions. — ^AU  these  distinc- 
tions are  more  or  less  clearly  present  at  the  level  of  com- 
mon sense.  We  must  now  ask  ourselves  how  they  can  be 
adjusted  to  each  other  at  a  more  reflective  level.  The  dis- 
tinction between  sense  and  imagination  obviously  requires 
no  marked  adjustment.  The  psychologist  connects  this 
contrast,  however,  with  the  difference  between  peripher- 
ally-aroused and  centrally-aroused  experiences  and  so 
brings  it  into  touch  with  the  physiological  theory  of  per- 
ception. The  contrast  between  things  perceived  and 
my  thought  of  them  when  they  are  absent  also  needs  little 
adjustment.  Things  perceived  must  now  be  called  per- 
cepts and  considered  mental.  Both  elements  of  the  con- 
trast are  now  seen  to  be  mental,  and  the  genetic  relation 
which  enables  the  one  to  be  like  the  other  to  such  a  degree 
becomes  comprehensible.  We  understand  why  the  idea 
can  mean  the  thing.  It  is  the  revival  of  the  percept  in 
another  setting,  and  it  is  this  setting  and  our  reaction 
toward  it  which  qualifies  it  as  an  *  idea  of.' 

At  the  level  of  Natural  Realism,  the  thing  which  I  mean 
and  of  which  my  idea  contains  knowledge  is  continuous 
with  the  things  which  I  now  apprehend.  Thus  the  realm 
of  objects  known  to  which  I  contrast  my  idea  is  the  per- 
ceptible world  of  supposedly  independent  physical  things. 


106  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Thus  University  Hall,  although  I  cannot  at  this  moment 
see  it  and  can  only  have  an  idea  of  it,  is  assigned  to  the 
same  class  of  things  as  those  which  I  perceive  as  I  look  out 
of  the  window  here  on  Prospect  Street.  Thus  I  contrast 
the  spheres  of  existence  of  the  idea  which  means  and  the 
object  which  is  meant.  The  one  is  the  physical  world,  the 
other  belongs  to  the  mental  realm.  This  contrast  is  em- 
pirical and  we  are  all  aware  of  it. 

But  when  this  contrast  meets  the  contrast  between 
things  and  ideas,  as  this  latter  develops  around  the  prob- 
lem raised  by  the  breakdown  of  Natural  Realism,  serious 
reflection  is  demanded.  [^If  we  accept  the  distinction  be- 
tween percepts  and  the  realities,  outside  of  the  field  of  ex- 
perience, which  control  them  or,  in  other  words,  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  sphere  of  consciousness  and  an  unperceiv- 
able  physical  world,  it  would  seem  that  ideas  in  the  cog- 
nitive or  representative  sense  are  only  ideas  of  percepts. 
They  are  ideas  of  percepts  of  (controlled  by)  physical 
things.  They  give  us  knowledge  of  percepts,  and  it  must 
be  remembered  that  they  claim  to  give  us  knowledge  of 
what  we  perceive.  But  it  must  also  be  remembered  that 
common  sense  takes  the  things  perceived,  which  are 
steeped  in  all  the  knowledge  that  can  be  gained  about  them, 
to  be  independent  physical  things.  It  would  seem,  then, 
that  the  idea  of  what  is  perceived  is,  as  regards  its  content, 
very  little  different  from  what  is  really  at  once  perceived 
and  conceived.  Hence,  if  the  percept  is  conditioned — 
though  not  mechanically — by  an  extra-mental  realm, 
the  idea  is  also  controlled.  Can  reflection  advance  be- 
yond this  point?  If  we  cannot  take  the  position  that  con- 
trolled ideas  are  like  that  which  indirectly  controls  them, 
is  there  yet  in  this  control  a  justification  of  the  reference 
to  the  physical  world  of  what  the  human  mind  is  forced 

/ 


DISTINCTIONS  WITHIN  THE  FIELD  107 

to  consider  knowledge?  The  mind  seems  to  be  in  touch 
with  the  physical  world  and  to  reflect  it  actively  in  its 
own  medium.  Perhaps  the  solution  is  that  knowledge  does 
not  imply  anything  of  the  nature  of  a  likeness  between  two 
apprehended  or  potentially  apprehensible  objectsTj  In  that 
case,  the  flaw  in  representative  realism  does  not  lie  in  the 
rejection  of  Natural  Realism  but  in  the  retention  of  an 
external  and  totally  inadequate  view  of  knowledge  really 
based  on  Natural  Realism.  For  Natural  Realism,  knowl- 
edge is  the  apprehension  of  the  reality;  for  representative 
realism  it  is  the  indirect  apprehension  of  the  reality,  either 
an  apprehension  through  likeness  as  with  Locke  or  through 
an  identity  of  essence  as  with  Aristotle  and  his  modern 
follower,  Santayana. 

In  the  next  chapter  we  shall  pass  to  the  standpoint  of  a 
more  critical  realism  by  showing  how  reflection,  working 
hand  in  hand  with  logic,  develops  a  meaning  for  the  first 
kind  of  knowledge  (Chap.  VII)  which  is  able  to  admit 
that  the  physical  world  is  neither  directly  nor  indirectly 
apprehended.  As  a  preparation  for  this  deeper  insight 
into  knowledge,  we  must  note  both  the  character  of  the 
reference  in  knowledge  and  the  nature  of  the  content  of 
critical  knowledge. 

References 

Fletcher,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  23. 
Fullerton,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  4. 
Locke,  Essay,  bk.  4. 

Russell,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  chap.  5. 
Stout,  Aristotelian  Society  Proceedings,  1910-11. 
Sellars,  Critical  Realism,  chap.  5. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   REFLECTIVE   DEVELOPMENT  OF  THESE 
DISTINCTIONS 

What  Is  a  Percept? — There  are  two  ways  of  approach 
to  percepts  and  perception,  viz.,  from  the  side  of  psychology 
and  from  the  side  of  the  logic  of  science.  These  two  ways 
of  approach  are  fairly  distinct  and  should  not  be  confused. 
The  first  way  of  approach  is  genetic  and  analytic;  the 
second  stresses  the  part  played  by  perception  in  the 
achievement  of  knowledge. 

At  the  level  of  Natural  Realism,  the  percept  is  taken  to 
be  an  independent  thing  which  is  perceived.  But  when 
we  study  this  object  of  which  we  are  aware,  we  soon 
realize  that  it  exists  only  within  the  field  of  the  individ- 
ual's experience.  Logic  and  psychology  have  succeeded 
fairly  well  in  determining  the  conditions  of  these  mental 
objects  which  appear  to  us  so  ready-made.  They  are 
growths  whose  history  and  conditions  are  being  more 
clearly  understood  the  more  psychology  is  given  a  biolog- 
ical setting.  *Terception,  being  the  apprehension  or 
awareness  of  an  object,  stands  in  a  determinate,  albeit 
indirectly  determinate,  relation  to  behavior.  If  there  is 
no  one  inevitable  response  to  an  apple,  a  dog,  a  tree,  or  a 
man,  there  is  at  least  a  set  of  alternative  possible  modes 
of  response  within  which  the  actual  response  will  probably 
fall.  Our  customary  and  appropriate  ways  of  treating  an 
apple  are  characteristically  different  from  our  customary 
and  appropriate  ways  of  treating  a  dog  or  a  man.    Just 

108 


REFLECTIVE  DEVELOPMENT  109 

what  particular  response  is  demanded  by  an  object  on  any- 
given  occasion  depends  on  the  situation  of  which  the  object 
is  a  constituent  or  factor.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  just 
this  characteristic  relationship  to  behavior  which  consti- 
tutes the  very  essence  of  objectivity.  A  certain  complex 
of  nervous  excitations,  e.  g.,  the  *  visual  appearance,' 
the  *  smell,'  the  'feel'  of  the  apple,  have  become  organ- 
ized into  a  percept  solely  through  the  fact  that  they  have 
come  to  call  out  a  distinctive  sort  of  behavior,  have 
become  coordinated  into  a  functional  whole.  So  again, 
a  complex  group  of  retinal  excitations  become  organized 
into  a  visual  perception  of  an  apple  because  it  has  come  to 
function  as  a  whole  in  determining  response."  Grace  A. 
de  Laguna,  The  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and 
Scientific  Methods,  vol.  XIII,  no.  23.  But  this  is  not  all. 
There  are  no  fixed  limits  for  the  content  of  this  object. 
All  the  knowledge  that  we  acquire  joins  itself  to  the  per- 
ceptual nucleus  and  deepens  the  content  of  the  object 
we  think  of  ourselves  as  apprehending.  What  it  "does" 
to  other  objects,  its  spatial  relations,  its  properties,  all 
these  elements  of  knowledge  enter  into  the  percept  and 
coalesce  with  it.  But  this  deepening  of  the  content  of  the 
perceptual  thing  does  not  conflict  with  the  spatial  boundary 
with  which  the  percept  begins.  All  of  the  added  knowl- 
edge attaches  itself  to  the  colored,  tangible,  spatial  object 
in  the  field  and  penetrates  it. 

So  soon  as  we  realize  that  the  object  is  a  mental  growth, 
we  are  not  surprised  at  its  capacity  to  absorb  these  more 
conceptual  elements,  the  knowledge  about  the  thing  which 
we  gradually  gain  and  henceforth  read  into  the  content 
of  the  perceptual  object.  Logic  has  taken  up  the  growth 
of  the  percept  at  this  point  and  studied  the  continual  in- 
troduction of  new  elements.     In  perceptual  judgment. 


110  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

we  start  from  a  content  about  which  there  is  no  doubt  and 
add,  or  reject,  new  relations  and  properties  which  suggest 
themselves.  This  process  of  growth  can  go  on  almost 
indefinitely.  But  the  main  point  for  us  to  note  is  that  it 
goes  on  within  the  schema  of  Natural  Realism,  which  is 
only  a  natural  interpretation  of  the  empirical  objectivity 
which  percepts  possess,  until  reflection  forces  a  re-inter- 
pretation. All  of  us  tend  to  live  and  think  within  the 
common  distinctions  which  have  grown  up.  It  would  be 
strange  were  we  not  to  identify  perceptual  objects  with 
parts  of  the  physical  world.  Why.?  Because,  until  re- 
flection arises,  they  are  one  and  the  same  thing  for  us. 

The  Logical  Function  of  Perception. — When  we  enter 
the  realm  of  science,  we  find  another  setting  for  the  term, 
perception.  A  new  demand  has  been  introduced  which 
subordinates  the  common-sense  outlook.  The  preferable 
term  is  observation.  We  are  not  dealing  with  perceived 
things.  Instead,  we  are  seeking /ad  of  observation^  and  the 
demand  which  governs  the  investigator  is  responsibility 
to  such  facts.  The  contrast  between  perception,  in  the 
sense  of  observation  as  furnishing  the  factual  foundation 
of  a  scientific  investigation,  and  perception  as  the  appre- 
hension of  a  physical  thing,  as  it  is  mainly  for  common- 
sense  realism,  can  be  brought  out  in  the  following  way: 
At  the  level  of  Natural  Realism,  I  say  that  I  perceive  a 
red  book.  Redness  is  a  quality  of  the  book  as  a  physical 
thing.  The  scientific  investigator  asserts  that  he  sees  a 
red  color  or  has  a  red  sensation  when  light  waves  are  re- 
flected from  the  surface  of  a  physical  thing  so  far  from  him 
and  in  such  a  direction.  It  should  be  noted  that  all  the 
elements  of  this  fact  are  either  themselves  facts  or  theories 
founded  upon  facts.  The  simplest  fact  is,  that  he  sees  a 
red  color.    But  this  fact  is  enlarged  by  its  connection  with 


REFLECTIVE  DEVELOPMENT  111 

other  facts,  a  source  of  illumination,  absorption  and  re- 
flection, direction  and  distance  of  the  reflector.  Slowly 
and  carefully  these  facts  are  discovered  and  tested  and 
related  to  one  another  and  theories  built  up  to  explain 
them.  When  we  study  the  logic  of  science,  then,  we  are 
forced  to  conclude  that  perception  is  a  term  for  the  oc- 
casion of  these  primary  facts.  And  such  facts  are  judg- 
ments. 

Scientific  Knowledge  an  Achievement. — It  is  impos- 
sible for  us  to  enter  into  the  history  of  any  particular 
science  at  this  time.  What  we  can  do,  however,  is  to 
analyze  the  foundations  of  a  science  like  physics  and  the 
logical  steps  involved  in  its  present  form.  Logic  has  no 
concern  with  the  history  of  a  science  for  its  own  sake  but 
only  so  far  as  it  helps  to  throw  light  upon  the  structure 
of  the  science.  Now  when  we  come  to  analyze  physics, 
we  find  that  its  foundation  consists  of  certain  postulates 
which  have  been  suggested  by  experience  and  confirmed 
by  it,  certain  primary  units  of  measurement  with  their 
corresponding  definitions,  certain  classes  of  empirical 
facts  and  an  established  technique.  Examples  of  such 
postulates  are  the  uniformity  of  nature,  the  relative  con- 
stancy of  standard  units,  the  value  of  the  laws  of  thought, 
etc.  The  majority  of  scientists  also  assume  the  existence 
of  a  non-mental  and  independent  world,  but  this  assump- 
tion, while  natural  and,  I  believe,  justified,  is  not  neces- 
sary for  the  growth  of  the  science.  A  typical  unit  of  meas- 
urement is  the  unit  of  mass,  the  gram.  Other  units  are  the 
centimeter  and  the  second.  These  three  units  are  called 
the  fundamental  units,  and  other  units  expressible  in 
terms  of  them  are  called  derived  units.  Classes  of  empiri- 
cal facts  are  the  phenomena  of  motion,  sound,  light,  heat 
and  electricity. 


112  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

When  we  come  to  analyze  any  system  of  physical  knowl- 
edge, we  find  that  it  consists  of  facts  organized  together 
and  interpreted  in  terms  of  theories  and  hypotheses. 
These  facts  are  not  percepts,  but  propositions  of  an  elementary 
character  for  which  observation  is  an  occasion.  Take  the 
experiments  of  Regnault  on  the  velocity  of  sound.  "  Be- 
tween the  years  1862  and  1866  Regnault  carried  on  an 
exhaustive  series  of  experiments  for  the  determination  of 
the  velocity  of  sound  both  in  the  open  air  and  in  the  water 
and  gas  pipes  of  Paris.  In  his  researches  Regnault  made 
use  of  an  automatic  recording  apparatus,  by  means  of 
which  an  electric  current  was  broken  at  the  instant  of 
firing  the  gun,  and  the  interruption  of  the  current  was 
recorded  upon  a  smoked  paper  carried  upon  the  drum  of  a 
chronograph.  At  the  receiving  station  the  sound  wave 
entered  a  wide  cone,  at  the  smaller  end  of  which  it  im- 
pinged upon  a  thin  rubber  membrane,  and  setting  it  in 
motion  broke  a  second  electric  current,  and  so  completed 
the  record  upon  the  cylinder  of  the  chronograph.  By  this 
means  it  would  seem  that  the  difficulties  of  personal  equa- 
tion were  entirely  obviated,  but  it  was  found  that  the 
membrane  itself  required  time  to  receive  and  record  the 
sound  wave.  The  motion  of  the  air  particles  cannot  be 
imparted  to  the  membrane  instantly,  and  so  a  delay  is 
caused  in  making  the  record,  which  is  not  constant  but 
increases  as  the  sound  grows  more  faint.  Regnault  made 
experiments  to  determine  the  amount  of  this  error,  and 
allowed  for  it  in  his  computations. 

"  In  his  experiments  upon  the  velocity  of  sound  in  tubes, 
Regnault  arrived  at  the  following  conclusions: 

"  (a)  In  cylindrical  pipes  the  intensity  of  the  sound  wave 
decreases  with  the  distance,  and  more  rapidly  in  small 
tubes  than  in  large  ones. 


REFLECTIVE  DEVELOPMENT  113 

"  (b)  The  velocity  of  sound  diminishes  with  the  inten- 
sity.   Loud  sounds  travel  faster  in  tubes  than  faint  ones. 

"  (c)  The  velocity  of  sound  in  pipes  increases  as  the 
diameter  of  the  pipe  increases,  tending  toward  a  limit  in 
very  wide  tubes. 

*'  (d)  The  velocity  is  independent  of  the  pressure,  and 
of  the  mode  of  production  of  the  sounds. 

*'  Regnault  gave  as  the  result  of  his  investigations,  after 
all  corrections  had  been  applied,  the  value  for  a  faint 
sound  in  a  very  wide  tube,  at  0°  C. 

Vo  =  330.6  ,^" 
The  logic  of  such  an  investigation  is  of  more  interest  to  a 
philosopher  than  it  has  usually  been  supposed  to  be.  Is 
it  not  evident  that  the  attitude  is  not  identical  with  that 
of  common  sense,  however  much  the  scientist  speaks  of 
things?  The  data  which  he  establishes  and  on  which  he 
bases  his  conclusions  are  obtained  by  observation  but  they 
are  not  perceptual  things.  In  Inductive  Logic,  the  methods 
of  science  and  the  means  taken  to  avoid  error  are  care- 
fully studied,  but  it  is  seen  that  the  data  are  propositions 
or  elementary  judgments  conditioned  by  observation  of  a 
selective  character  within  a  setting  of  definitions,  methods, 
theories  and  postulates.  That  we  can  achieve  satisfactory 
data,  agreed  upon  by  all,  is  the  prime  condition  of  any  sci- 
ence. But  these  data  must  not  be  regarded  as  percepts. 
That  has  been  the  mistake  of  the  sensationalist  in  philoso- 
phy and,  I  fear,  of  those  philosophers  too  dominated  by 
the  older  British  tradition  of  Locke,  Berkeley  and  Hume. 
Modern  philosophy  must  be  founded  on  logic  as  well  as  on 
psychology.  Or,  better  yet,  it  must  be  founded  on  de- 
scriptive empiricism  interpreted  by  logic  and  psychology. 
It  must  be  granted  that  science  founds  its  conclusions  upon 
facts  and  that  such  facts  are  propositions.    Observation 


114  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

(perception)  is  only  the  occasion  of  the  discovery  of  facts. 
In  other  words,  scientific  facts  cannot  be  reduced  to  sensa- 
tions as  so  many  philosophers  have  supposed. 

But  scientific  data  are  the  foundation  and  the  occasion 
of  the  whole  theoretical  superstructure  which  we  call 
scientific  knowledge.  And  just  as  the  data  are  proposi- 
tions, so  are  the  laws  and  theories  which  organize  and  inter- 
pret them.  But  the  logical  reference  of  these  laws  and 
theories  is  not  downward  to  the  facts  but  onward  to  the 
realm  about  which  the  scientist  is  seeking  to  gain  knowl- 
edge. Such,  at  least,  is  the  distinction  which  naturally 
arises  in  the  mind  of  the  scientist  until  it  is  met  and  chal- 
lenged by  idealism  of  the  Berkeleian  sort  or  by  skepticism. 
The  laws  and  theories  are  supposed  to  refer  to,  and  hold  of 
processes  in  nature  outside  of  consciousness  (the  field  of 
the  individual's  experience). 

We  may  say,  then,  that  science  achieves  systematic 
knowledge  in  terms  of  propositions;  that  these  propositions 
belong  to  two  logical  levels,  fact  and  explanation;  that 
explanations  are  founded  on  facts  and  stimulated  by  them 
but  do  not  simply  refer  back  to  them;  that  the  systematic 
knowledge  so  achieved  is  thought  of  as  holding  for  a  realm 
independent  of  consciousness.  It  is  knowledge  of  the 
second  kind,  but  it  is  also  accepted  as  knowledge  of  the 
first  kind,  that  is,  knowledge  about  an  independent  reality. 

A  Re-statement  of  the  Distinction  Between  Things 
and  Ideas. — In  the  preceding  chapter,  we  saw  that  both 
common  sense  and  science  are  inclined  to  admit  that  we 
perceive  ideas  and  not  things.  While  common  sense 
fluctuates  between  the  two  positions  and,  on  the  whole, 
is  prone  to  accept  Natural  Realism,  science  is  distinctly 
in  favor  of  the  belief  that  we  perceive  ideas  conditioned  by 
an  extra-mental  and  extra-cerebral  realm.    We  noted  that 


REFLECTIVE  DEVELOPMENT  115 

the  physiological  theory  of  perception  is  accepted  by  both 
the  physical  and  the  mental  sciences  and  that  the  result  is 
the  distinction  between  consciousness  and  the  physical 
world.  But  descriptive  empiricism  points  out  that  this  is 
a  distinction  within  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience. 
It  should  be  noted  that  this  distinction  has  a  factual  basis 
and  harmonizes  with  the  arguments  advanced  by  us  in  the 
chapter  entitled  "The  Breakdown  of  Natural  Realism." 
But  this  developed  contrast  between  two  spheres  of  exis- 
tence is  the  condition  of  the  puzzling  problem  of  theory  of 
knowledge,  How  can  the  individual  possess  knowledge 
about  a  realm  outside  of  consciousness  if  he  is  confined 
to  consciousness.'^ 

The  False  vs.  the  Correct  Form  of  this  Question. — 
This  question  is  so  primary  that  we  must  be  certain  that 
we  have  stated  it  correctly  and  have  conceived  the  two 
realms  from  the  proper  standpoint.  As  we  shall  see,  it 
makes  all  the  difference  in  the  world  for  our  conception  of 
knowledge  what  setting  we  start  from. 

Theory  of  knowledge  has  usually  started  from  a  false 
statement  of  the  question,  somewhat  as  follows :  How  can 
we  have  knowledge  of  extra-mental  things  if  we  can  ap- 
prehend only  objects  (ideas)  in  consciousness?  W^hen  we 
examine  this  form  carefully,  we  note  that  the  word  thing 
is  used  for  the  extra-mental  reality.  But  this  term  suggests 
to  the  mind  something  to  he  apprehended  which  yet  cannot 
he  apprehended.  In  other  words,  the  setting  of  the  term 
is  that  of  Natural  Realism.  But  for  us  now,  this  is  only 
another  way  of  saying  that  the  natural  structure  of  the 
coexistential  dimension  of  the  individual's  field  of  experi- 
ence leads  us  to  think  of  knowledge  as  an  apprehension  of 
objects.  Hence,  the  breakdown  of  Natural  Realism  led 
thinkers  like  Locke  to  substitute  the  copy-theory  of  knowl- 


116  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

edge.  The  objects  we  apprehend  are  ideas  but  such  ob- 
jects must  be  like  extra-mental  realities  if  they  are  to  be 
proper  representatives  of  them  and  so  give  us  knowledge 
of  them.  The  important  point  to  bear  in  mind  is  that 
knowledge  is  conceived  as  an  indirect  apprehension  through 
likeness.  Since  we  cannot  apprehend  these  extra-mental 
realities,  the  best  we  can  do  is  to  apprehend  ideas  which 
are  like  them,  and,  so  far  as  they  are  like  them,  these 
ideas  give  us  knowledge  of  them.  Hence,  we  called 
Locke's  position  selective  representative  realism.  Ideas 
are  like  things  as  regards  certain  features,  the  primary 
qualities.  Is  it  not  obvious  that  this  whole  tendency, 
which  has  been  so  imperative  in  past  philosophy,  is  based 
on  a  view  of  knowledge  which  reflects  the  structure  of  the 
field  of  experience.  In  other  words.  Natural  Realism  and  the 
copy-theory  which  grows  from  it  are  natural  illusions.  That 
is  why  they  die  so  hard.  What  we  must  try  to  do  is  to  get 
back  of  these  illusions  and  explain  them  in  the  light  of 
reflection. 

But  if  we  give  up  the  tendency  to  suppose  that  we  ap- 
prehend things  and  begin  with  the  scientist's  use  of  per- 
ception as  an  occasion  for  the  attainment  of  fact,  we  soon 
realize  that  facts  are  judgments  and  not  objects  appre- 
hended. Upon  the  basis  of  these  facts,  systems  of  knowl- 
edge are  achieved  which  are  referred  to  an  extra-mental 
reality  as  containing  knowledge  about  it.  This  way  of 
approach  does  away  with  the  habits  and  outlook  built  up 
around  the  perceptual  constructs  which  are  given  in  the 
field  of  experience;  and  when  it  is  carefully  carried  through 
by  logic,  the  tendency  to  think  of  knowledge  as  a  direct 
or  indirect  apprehension  is  thwarted.  Why  is  this.f^  A 
little  reflection  shows  that  it  is  because  the  setting  of 
common-sense  realism  is  essentially  disregarded. 


/  REFLECTIVE  DEVELOPMENT  117 

'  The  correct  form  of  the  question  is,  then,  as  follows: 
How  can  we  have  knowledge  of  an  extra-mental  realm  if  the 
propositions  which  contain  this  knowledge  exist  only  in  con- 
sciousness? As  soon  as  this  correct  form  is  given,  it  is 
realized  that  there  is  really  no  problem.  W^here  else  should 
knowledge  exist?  But  such  propositions,  while  they  are 
understood  and  so  are  objects  to  which  we  attend,  are  not 
like  the  perceptual  constructs  toward  which  we  adopt  a 
realistic  attitude  at  the  level  of  common  sense.  We  do  not 
think  of  these  propositions  as  things.  V^e  may  put  this 
argument  in  a  more  technical  form  by  saying  that  the 
category  of  thinghood  is  not  applied  to  propositions. 

Let  us  note  further  differences  in  the  logical  situation. 
Perception  is  now  a  means  to  knowledge,  whereas  in  the 
false  setting  perception  is  the  presence  of  a  thing  known. 
But  if  perception  is  merely  a  means  to  knowledge,  the 
propositions  which  are  knowledge  cannot  be  referred  to 
percepts  which  are  present  in  experience  or  to  things  like 
them  outside  of  experience.  In  other  words,  there  is  no 
motive  to  a  copy-theory  of  knowledge.  Knowledge  is 
genuine  knowledge  and  nothing  else.  In  science,  then, 
we  achieve  knowledge  of  a  realm  distinct  from  conscious- 
ness and  this  knowledge  must  not  be  thought  of  as  an  at- 
tempt to  copy  this  realm.  Knowledge  is  not  reducible 
to  likeness  between  constructs  in  experience  and  tilings 
outside  of  experience.  The  setting  of  genuine  knowledge 
must  be  fundamentally  distinguished  from  that  which 
grows  up  around  Natural  Realism.  The  ideas  of  which 
Locke,  Berkeley  and  Hume  speak  are  mental  objects 
having  the  setting  of  Natural  Realism.  That  is  why  they 
put  the  question  wrongly  and  Hume  drew  the  proper 
reductio  ad  ahsurdum  of  skepticism.  The  ideas  of  the  Brit- 
ish empiricists  are  images,  not  propositions. 


118  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Is  the  Distinction  Between  Consciousness  and  a 
Realm  Outside  Justifiable? — Many  philosophers  who 
have  wished  to  avoid  skepticism  and  have  not  seen  the 
solution  just  advanced  have  sought  to  escape  the  diflSculty 
which  Hume  so  frankly  acknowledged  by  denying  the  ne- 
cessity for  the  distinction  between  consciousness  (the  field 
of  the  individual's  experience)  and  a  realm  independent 
of  it.  But  this  distinction  is  not  founded  upon  the  illusory 
side  of  Natural  Realism;  instead,  it  is  founded  upon  those 
very  facts  which  help  to  break  it  down.  Since  we  have 
already  devoted  a  chapter  to  these  facts,  it  is  unneces- 
sary to  reexamine  them  here.  I  can  see,  then,  no  neces- 
sity to  deny  this  fundamental  distinction  between  the 
individual's  consciousness  and  a  realm  outside  of,  yet  con- 
ditioning, it.  What  is  necessary  is  the  relinquishment  of 
any  concept  of  this  extra-mental  realm  which  reflects 
Natural  Realism.  Let  us  hold  to  the  facts  and  follow  their 
lead  doggedly. 

Analysis  of  the  Term  Extra-Mental. — The  philosopher 
has  to  be  on  his  guard  against  all  sorts  of  insidious  impli- 
cations in  his  terms.  It  will  be  remembered  that  we  in- 
sisted that  the  British  philosophers  were  right  in  their  ac- 
ceptance of  mental  pluralism  and  that  Kant  made  a 
vicious  mistake  when  he  constructed  a  logical  self  of  a 
universal  character.  We  must  not  forget  this  conclusion 
when  interpreting  the  contrast  between  the  knower's  con- 
sciousness and  the  extra-mental  realm.  What  each  indivi- 
dual who  reflects  asserts  is,  that  there  is  such  a  transsub- 
jective  realm  outside  of  his  own  mind  as  a  realm  of  per- 
cepts, judgments,  and  feelings.  But  what  should  we  mean 
by  this  metaphorical  term  *  outside '.^^  The  reasons  which 
sustain  the  contrast  should  give  us  the  necessary  clue. 

The  facts  which  lead  to  the  breakdown  of  Natural  Real- 


REFLECTIVE  DEVELOPMENT  119 

ism  indicate  that  percepts  are  not  actually  physical  things 
as  we,  at  first,  suppose  them  to  be.  Now  I  judge  that  the 
term  extra-mental  signifies  just  this,  the  denial  that  any 
element  in  the  field  of  the  individual's  experience  is  iden- 
tical with  any  part  of  this  other  realm.  Along  with  this 
view  goes  a  gradual  development  of  different  meanings  for 
these  two  realms.  The  fundamental  concepts  for  the 
physical  realm  are  developed  already,  in  an  inadequate 
form,  by  common  sense  and  this  development  is  continued 
by  the  physical  sciences.  The  same  is  true  for  conscious- 
ness; only  here  the  deepening  of  the  concepts  applicable 
to  the  mental  is  the  work  of  the  mental  sciences,  especially 
psychology. 

It  will  be  necessary  to  examine  these  contrasted  groups 
of  concepts  more  fully  when  we  come  to  the  mind-body 
problem.  At  present,  the  main  point  to  be  noted  is  that, 
for  theory  of  knowledge,  extra-mental  has  two  meanings, 
first,  not  identical  with  any  element  in  my  consciousness, 
second,  non-mental  in  the  sense  that  the  concepts  applica- 
ble to  consciousness  are  not  applicable  to  this  other  realm 
which  conditions  what  appears  in  consciousness.  But  non- 
mental  must  not  be  construed  into  anti-mental,  the  posi- 
tion that  this  physical  realm  is  alien  to,  and  excludes, 
consciousness.  In  a  later  chapter  we  shall  treat  of  this 
distinction  between  the  non-mental  and  the  anti-mental 
much  more  fully.  The  setting  of  human  knowledge  will 
become  clearer  with  the  solution  of  the  mind-body  prob- 
lem. We  shall  see  that  the  '  knower  *  is  an  organism 
ijpmersed  in,  and  continuous  with,  the  physical  world. 
I^A  Definition  of  Critical  Realism. — The  position  at 
which  we  have  arrived  belongs  to  the  general  class  called 
critical  realism,  although  it  is  a  unique  species  of  that 
class.    It  is  opposed  to  Natural  Realism,  on  the  one  hand, 


120  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

and  to  idealism  and  skepticism,  on  the  other.  While 
Natural  Realism  holds  that  we  apprehend  the  physical 
world,  itself,  in  perception,  critical  realisms  as  a  class  deny 
this.  In  opposition  to  idealism,  critical  realism  asserts 
that  there  is  a  physical  realm  independent  of  conscious- 
ness, while,  in  contrast  to  skepticism,  it  asserts  that  we 
can  have  genuine  knowledge  about  such  a  physical,  non- 
mental  realm.'  A 

\^  But  the  form  of  critical  realism  which  we  have  been 
developing  is  constructed  around  a  view  of  knowledge 
which  differentiates  it  sharply  from  other  forms  of  realism. 
Knowledge  of  this  non-mental,  physical  realm  is  neither 
direct  nor  indirect  apprehension  Instead,  it  consists  of 
propositions  built  up  by  the  human  mind  according  to 
logical  methods  and  held  to  contain  knowledge  of  this 
physical  realm.  Locke's  position  is  a  form  of  critical 
realism  but  it  is  constructed  around  the  assumption  that 
knowledge  of  the  physical  realm  is  an  indirect  apprehen- 
sion. The  position  championed  in  this  book  may  be  called 
a  non-apprehensional  critical  realism.  The  traditional 
critical  realism,  on  the  other  hand,  has  been  opposed  to 
naive  realism  but  has  been  built  up  around  an  impossible 
view  of  scientific  knowledge.    * 

Theory  of  Knowledge  Needs  Logic. — The  charge  that 
modern  philosophy  has  based  itself  too  exclusively  on 
psychology  to  the  disregard  of  logic  is  justified  with  refer- 
ence to  representative  realism.  While  logic  must  not  con- 
flict with  psychology,  the  standpoints  of  the  two  sciences 
are  different.  Of  the  two,  logic  has  the  more  natural  out- 
look, psychology  the  more  artificial.  If  we  want  to  know 
what  knowledge  is,  it  will  be  wiser  to  go  to  modern  logic. 
We  shall  not,  then,  try  to  reduce  facts  to  sensations  nor 
judgments  to  images.     By  approaching  knowledge  from 


REFLECTIVE  DEVELOPMENT  121 

the  side  of  logic  v/ith  its  stress  upon  judgments  and  proposi- 
tions as  the  ultimate  units  of  cognition,  we  shall  the  more 
easily  escape  the  lure  of  Natural  Realism  and  of  its  first 
cousin,  representative  realism.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say 
that  the  failure  of  British  empiricism  to  solve  the  problem 
of  knowledge  was  due  to  lack  of  recognition  given  to  judg- 
ment. In  the  following  chapter,  we  shall  proceed  to  study 
our  actual  knowledge  in  the  light  of  logic. 

References 

Dewey,  How  We  Think y  chap.  8. 
Hobhouse,  Theory  of  Knowledge ^  chap.  11. 
Marvin,  A  First  Book  in  Metaphysics,  chap.  3. 
Mill,  Logic,  bk.  3,  chap.  7. 
Sellars,  Essentials  of  Logic,  chaps.  7  and  17. 


CHAPTER  XI 
THE  REFERENCE  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

Knowledge  Involves  Judgment. — When  we  ask  our- 
selves what  we  mean  by  the  term,  knowledge,  we  soon  find  1 
it  impKes  the  capacity  to  pass  judgments.  "When  I 
say  of  a  certain  person,  *I  know  him,  he  is  an  acquaintance 
of  mine,'  it  means  the  same  as :  '  I  can  give  you  the  name 
of  the  man  who  is  approaching  yonder,  I  know  many 
things  concerning  him,  know  his  business,  his  vocation, 
and  perhaps  also  remember  having  had  this  or  that  ex- 
perience with  him.'  To  say  that  I  know  a  plant,  means: 
I  am  in  position  to  define  the  plant  botanically,  to  give  its 
name,  and  that  I  know  the  place  to  which  scientific  in- 
vestigation has  assigned  it  in  the  classification  of  plants." 
Jerusalem,  An  Introduction  to  Philosophy^  p.  62.  But 
investigation  has  shown  that  even  our  percepts  involve 
a  vast  amount  of  interpretation  and  construction.  The 
psychologist  informs  us  that  what  we  "see"  is  a  function 
of  sense-stimulus  and  past  experience.  Somehow  the 
mind  works  to  the  formation  of  that  which  appears  in  the 
field  of  experience.  The  deeper  experience  is,  the  more 
meaning  and  content  is  there  in  what  is  perceived.  As  we 
pointed  out  in  the  preceding  chapter,  all  of  the  added 
knowledge  attaches  itself  to  the  colored,  tangible,  spatial 
object  in  the  field  and  penetrates  it. 

The  more  the  interpretative  extension  of  the  percept, 
the  greater  is  the  possibility  of  error  and  the  more  are  we 
aware  that  we  are  passing  a  judgment.    "  Take  the  affirma- 

122 


THE  REFERENCE  OF  KNOWLEDGE  123 

tion,  *That  is  a  cab/  assuming  it  to  be  made  from  merely 
hearing  a  sound.  In  this  we  can  much  more  nearly  sepa- 
rate the  datum  or  minimum  of  sense  from  our  enlargement 
or  interpretation  of  it,  and  we  know  that  our  interpreta- 
tion is  liable  to  be  wrong;  that  is  to  say,  the  reality  into 
which  we  ought  to  construe  the  sound  may  be  some  other 
kind  of  vehicle,  and  not  a  cab.  Now  compare  this  with 
the  affirmation,  *That  (which  I  see)  is  a  cab.'  This  judg- 
ment of  sight-perception,  though  its  terms  are  more  in- 
extricably interwoven,  has  just  the  same  elements  in  it  as 
the  judgment  of  sound-perception,  *  That  (which  I  hear) 
is  a  cab.'  In  the  sound-perception  the  structure  is  quite 
plain.  A  particular  complex  quality  in  the  sound  suggests 
as  its  objective  explanation,  what  is  perfectly  distinguish- 
able from  it  in  thought,  the  movement  of  a  cab  on  a  par- 
ticular kind  of  pavement.  The  quality  of  the  sound,  its 
roughness,  loudness,  increase  and  decrease,  all  form  points 
of  connection  with  the  sound  of  a  cab  as  we  know  it,  and 
with  the  speed,  weight,  etc.,  of  such  a  vehicle.  But  it  is 
quite  easy  to  consider  the  sound  in  itself  apart  from  its 
interpretation,  and  we  sometimes  feel  the  interpretation 
to  be  more  immediate,  and  sometimes  more  inferential. 
We  sometimes  say,  *I  hear  a  cab,'  just  as  we  say,  *I  see 
one,'  but  in  case  of  sound  we  more  often  perhaps  say, 
*That  sounds  like — '  such  and  such  a  thing,  which  indicates 
a  doubt,  and  the  beginning  of  conscious  inference."  Bos- 
anquet,  The  Essentials  of  Logic,  pp.  31-2.  Thus  there  are 
different  levels  in  this  mental  construction  of  the  world 
we  apprehend  and  recognize  and  gain  knowledge  about. 
When  we  are  led  to  stress  the  process  of  its  attainment, 
we  point  out  the  continuous  interpretation  which  is  going 
on  in  our  minds.  When  we  are  in  a  less  philosophic  mood, 
we  take  this  achieved  world  as  something  for  granted. 


124  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

something  existent  apart  from  our  minds.  In  other  words, 
we  ordinarily  hve  in  the  attitude  of  Natural  Realism.  The 
field  of  experience  has  a  structure,  and  specific  problems 
of  interpretation  arise  within  and  pre-suppose  that  struc- 
ture. As  I  understand  it,  it  is  the  realm  of  things  and  rela- 
tions taken  for  granted  and  not  now  under  fire  which  is 
what  Bosanquet  calls  "the  reality  into  which  we  ought 
to  construe  the  sound."  Does  this  world  of  things,  con- 
tinuous with  the  house  in  which  I  am,  contain  a  cab  just 
outside  my  window  on  the  street,  or  some  other  vehicle.'^ 

Thus  particular  judgments  have  a  setting  which  has 
gradually  grown  up,  and  this  setting  is  realistic.  The: 
technical  way  of  putting  this  situation  is  somewhat  as 
follows:  "Every  cognition  is  therefore  an  intellectual  ap- 
prehension of  a  given  content,  which  is  itself  distinct  from; 
the  cognition.  Every  cognition,  furthermore,  is  consum- 
mated in  the  form  of  a  judgment,  and  whoever  pronounces 
this  judgment,  in  the  firm  conviction  of  having  attained  a 
cognition,  is  thereby  convinced  at  the  same  time  that  the 
cognized  object,  or  the  cognized  event  really  exists  and  is 
really  constituted  just  as  it  appears  to  be,  independently 
of  the  fact  whether  it  is  cognized  or  not."  Jerusalem, 
Ibid.,  p.  62.  Another  way  of  expressing  this  character- 
istic and  setting  of  judgment  is  as  follows:  "Every  judg- 
ment then  affirms  something  to  be  real,  and  therefore 
reality  to  be  defined,  in  part,  by  that  something*"  Bosan- 
quet, Ibid.,  p.  32. 

Judgment  Defined. — ^There  are  many  definitions  of 
judgment,  varying  slightly  in  their  form  or  their  emphases. 
Two  aspects  of  every  judgment,  however,  stand  out  very 
clearly.  There  is,  first,  the  complex  content  which  is  held 
before  the  mind,  and,  second,  the  attitude  of  belief  or 
acceptance  taken  toward  it.    Let  us  examine  these  two 


THE  REFERENCE  OF  KNOWLEDGE  125 

aspects  of  every  judgment  in  the  light  of  the  reaHstic 
setting  in  which  it  arises.  When  I  say,  "That  was  a  street- 
car," I  find  that  I  have  in  mind  the  perceivable  world  as 
a  background  and  am  concerned  with  the  interpretation 
of  a  sound  which  I  hear  as  somehow  caused  by  a  part  of 
that  w^orld.  The  thing  which  caused  that  sound  was  a 
street-car,  and  a  street-car  is  a  particular  known  thing  in 
this  physical  world  I  perceive.  Is  it  not  obvious  that  the 
setting  of  such  a  perceptual  judgment  is  that  of  Natural 
Realism  .f*  I  simply  think  of  this  physical  world  as  having 
contained  a  street-car,  a  familiar  enough  thing,  in  a  cer- 
tain causal  relation  to  myself.  Thus  the  content  of  my 
judgment  shades  off  into  an  accepted  world  as  soon  as  it  is 
asserted.  Judgment  does  not  break  with  the  distinctions 
characteristic  of  consciousness  as  brought  out  by  descrip- 
tive empiricism  but  implies  them  and  helps  to  develop 
them. 

Logic  Takes  both  Knowledge  and  Reality  for  Granted. 
— When  we  come  to  examine  the  statements  of  logicians, 
we  soon  realize  that  logic  takes  both  knowledge  and  reality 
for  granted.  It  rightly  seems  foolishness  to  the  logician 
for  anyone  to  deny  the  fact  of  knowledge,  and  what  can 
knowledge  be  but  knowledge  of  what  is  real.f^  Do  not  all 
of  us  pass  judgments  about  recognized  realms  of  existence? 
And  are  not  all  of  these  realms  of  existence  recognized 
by  the  mind  to  be  real  and  independent  of  the  act  of  judg- 
ment.? And  in  a  very  real  sense,  of  course,  the  logician 
is  right  in  his  attitude.  But  we  have  advanced  far  enough 
in  theory  of  knowledge  now  to  realize  that  the  reference 
and  nature  of  knowledge  is  a  problem  which  requires 
reflections  and  investigations  of  a  peculiar  sort. 

Every  proposition  has  two  distinguishable  elements, 
the  logical  subject  and  the  logical  predicate  respectively. 


126  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

"That  is  a  street-car,"  when  analyzed,  becomes  "The 
sound  I  hear  is  caused  by  a  street-car,  a  certain  kind  of 
thing  in  the  physical  world,"  or,  more  naively,  "That 
sounding  thing  is  a  street-car."  Let  us  take  the  more 
naive  form  for  analysis.  "That  sounding  thing"  is  the 
logical  subject,  while  "a  street-car"  is  the  logical  predi- 
cate. It  is  evident  that  my  judgment  involves  the  ac- 
ceptance of  the  sound  I  hear  as  a  sign  of  a  thing  in  the 
accepted  physical  world  which  is,  at  this  level,  perceiv- 
able; and  that  I  then  go  on  to  identify  this  thing  with  the 
class  of  things  called  street-cars.  The  setting  of  this  judg- 
ment is  obviously  that  of  Natural  Realism.  I  regard 
sounding  things  and  street-cars  as  realities  which  I  can 
perceive.  In  such  knowledge  and  in  such  judgments  there 
is  no  consciousness  of  an  epistemological  problem.  Episte- 
mological  problems  arise  only  as  the  result  of  reflection 
upon  difficulties  confronting  Natural  Realism.  The  logi- 
cian as  such  is  not  an  epistemologist,  and  he  makes  a  fun- 
damental mistake  when  he  assumes  that  an  analysis  of  the 
form  of  judgments  will  settle  epistemological  problems.^ 

The  Reference  of  Judgment. — We  have  seen  that  the 
setting  for  judgment  is  usually  that  of  Natural  Realism. 
I  cognize,  and  pass  judgment  about,  perceivable  objects. 
I  can  perceive  that  part  of  this  admitted  realm  which  is 
spatially  near  me;  the  rest  of  this  realm  is  thought  of  as 
continuous  with  the  part  under  my  observation  and  the 
same  as  it  would  be  were  I  able  to  perceive  it  all.  When, 
therefore,  I  make  a  judgment  about  any  thing  which  is 
not  under  my  eye,  I  assign  it  to  this  realm  and  then  locate 
it  by  means  of  a  system  of  measurement  and  direction. 

*  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  such  apparently  diverse  thinkers  as 
Dewey,  the  American  pragmatist,  and  Bosanquet,  the  Neo-Hegelian, 
make  this  mistake  in  common. 


THE  REFERENCE  OF  KNOWLEDGE  127 

In  this  way  I  identify  the  object.  "The  Capitol  at  Wash- 
ington,'^ "The  building  at  the  end  of  the  street  on  the  south 
side,''  are  simple  examples  of  this  identification  of  the  ob- 
ject meant  by  its  location.  After  I  have  thus  identified 
the  logical  subject  in  this  fashion,  I  go  on  to  make  the 
desired  statement  about  it  in  the  predicate.  When  the 
judgment  has  once  been  made,  I  cognize  the  object  hence- 
forth in  accordance  with  the  predicate.  The  Capitol  is 
in  front  of  the  Congressional  Library,  is  surmounted  by  a 
dome,  etc.  Such  cognition  is  an  intellectual  apprehension 
of  an  object.  The  structure  of  consciousness  is,  so  far  as  I 
can  make  out,  not  essentially  different  from  what  it  is  in 
perception.  I  conceive  an  object  in  much  the  same  way 
that  I  perceive  it.  Yet  the  content  differs  in  the  two  cases 
and,  in  conception,  I  know  that  the  object  is  not  perceptu- 
ally present. 

But  we  now  realize  that  the  physical  world  cannot  be 
apprehended  either  perceptually  or  conceptually.  We 
must  use  our  words  very  carefully  now.  These  objects 
which  we  perceive  and  conceive  and  which  are  organiza- 
tions of  judgments  are  mental.  We  apprehend  a  mental 
system  permeated  by  meanings  such  as  independence 
and  permanence,  and  developed  and  sustained  by  the 
energy  of  our  own  minds.  At  the  conceptual  level,  no  less 
than  at  the  perceptual  level,  the  structure  of  conscious- 
ness induces  Natural  Realism  and  Natural  Realism  re- 
flects the  structure  of  consciousness,  what  we  have  called 
its  coexistential  dimension.  The  distinction  between  the 
knower  and  the  known  is  basic  for  the  human  conscious- 
ness. In  judgment  at  this  naive  level,  we  can  distinguish 
three  elements,  the  more  inclusive  system  of  objects,  the 
logical  subject,  and  the  logical  predicate.  In  the  judg- 
ment, "This  book  is  red,"  I  can  distinguish,  first  of  all. 


128  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  setting,  or  universe  of  discourse,  to  which  I  assign  the 
book.  It  is  a  physical  thing  and  a  part  of  the  physical 
realm.  Then  comes  the  particular  logical  subject,  this 
book.  Finally,  there  is  the  predicate  which  qualifies 
the  logical  subject.  We  realize  now  that  all  three  of 
these  elements,  because  experienced,  are  mental  and  that 
we  have  been  occupying  the  standpoint  of  Natural 
Realism. 

Reference  for  Critical  Realism. — At  the  reflective  epis- 
temological  level  at  which  we  have  arrived,  three  elements 
must  again  be  distinguished.  The  setting,  or  realm  of 
existence,  now  considered  outside  the  field  of  experience 
and  non-apprehensible,  is  the  physical  world.  This  real, 
non-mental  order  is  not  sustained  by  the  energy  of  our 
thinking  and  is  genuinely  independent  of  our  knowledge,  It 
is  an  acknowledged  realm,  founded  on  a  necessary  distinc- 
tion in  consciousness.  We  may  call  this  acknowledged 
realm  the  reference  of  judgments  at  the  level  of  critical 
realism.  The  logical  subject  of  the  judgment  is  the  second 
element  to  be  distinguished,  while  the  logical  predicate  is 
the  third.  "This  book  is  red"  becomes  "This  part  of  the 
physical  world  controls  in  me  the  sensation  red."  The 
realm  of  existence  is  the  acknowledged  physical  world; 
the  logical  subject  is  the  identification  of  the  part  of  this 
realm  of  which  the  assertion  is  made;  while  the  predicate 
is  what  is  asserted  of  the  identified  part  of  the  acknowl- 
edged realm.  We  may  analyze  a  judgment  at  this  level 
as  follows:  The  physical  world  (reality)  at  the  point  X 
(located  by  an  axis  of  reference  or  by  pointing)  is  known 
in  terms  of  the  predicate,  or  predicates,  Y.  The  physical 
world  is  the  reference,  or  metaphysical  subject,  of  the 
proposition;  the  locating  of  the  particular  part  of  this 
acknowledged  realm  is  the  subject-matter  and  purpose  of 


THE  REFERENCE  OF  KNOWLEDGE  129 

the  logical  subject  and  is  given  in  terms  of  a  socially  ac- 
cepted method  of  identification  and  demarking;  while 
the  particular  assertion  made  about  the  selected  part  of 
the  acknowledged  realm  is  the  predicate.  Thus  a  critical 
judgment,  such  as  those  made  in  science,  is  a  proposition 
referred  to  reality  as  being  knowledge  about  it.  The  propo- 
sitions exist  only  in  consciousness,  but  they  contain  what 
we  are  certain  is  knowledge  about  this  acknowledged 
realm;  or,  put  in  a  different  way,  what  we  refer  to  reality 
is  what  we  mean  by  knowledge. 

Is  Reality  Present  to  Thought? — Let  us  call  this  ac- 
knowledged realm  to  which  critical  judgments  are  referred 
reality.  By  definition,  it  is  distinct  from  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  knower  yet  in  the  same  world  with  this  con- 
sciousness. 

The  problem  before  us  now  is  one  of  analysis  and  defini- 
tion. Is  this  realitj^  present  to  the  consciousness  which 
claims  to  possess  knowledge  of  it  in  the  critical  proposi- 
tions aflSrmed.f'  Obviously  enough,  the  question  is  one  of 
definition.  If  we  regard  knowledge  as  the  presence  of  the 
reality  to  the  mind,  then  reality  is  present  to  the  mind 
which  has  knowledge  of  it  in  accepted  propositions.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  fear  that  mankind  is  prone  to  an 
apprehensional  view  of  knowledge  which  makes  the  realm 
known  literally  an  object  of  inspection,  we  will  deny  that 
reality  is  present  to  thought  in  knowledge.  What  we  must 
hold  firmly  to  is  that  reality  is  known,  that  we  achieve 
propositions  which  are  referred  to  an  acknowledged  realm 
as  containing  knowledge  of  that  realm.  Since  knowledge  is 
a  human  affair,  this  reference  of  actual  propositions,  which 
is  the  meaning  of  knowledge,  cannot  be  denied.  That 
we  have  knowledge  of  reality  cannot  be  doubted;  what 
knowledge  is  and  in  what  sense  it  reveals  reality  is  a  sub- 


130  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ject  for  human  investigation  since  it  is  entirely  unique 
and  we  are  the  sole  possessors. 

Is  Each  Individual  Confined  to  his  Consciousness? — 
As  a  result  of  the  bewilderment  which  followed  the  break- 
down of  both  Natural  and  representative  realism,  it  has 
become  customary  for  philosophers  to  assert  that  it  is  a 
mistake  to  teach  that  the  individual  is  confined  to  his  own 
consciousness.  Hume's  skepticism,  it  is  maintained,  was 
due  to  this  assumption.  This  indictment  has  often  been 
interpreted  as  meaning  that  the  individual  knows  only  his 
own  states  of  consciousness.  But  we  must  be  certain  that 
there  is  no  misunderstanding  here.  The  expression,  states 
of  consciousness,  is  more  a  psychological  than  a  philo- 
sophical one.  In  other  words,  Hume  taught  that  all  ob- 
jects known  are  objects  which  are  present  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  individual.  These  objects  he  called  perceptions. 
But  Hume  could  not  satisfy  himself  that  these  given  ob- 
jects mediated  knowledge  of  an  external  realm.  Why? 
Because  he  was  disillusioned  with  regard  to  representative 
realism  and  could  think  of  no  other  meaning  for  knowledge 
than  the  similarity  of  ideas  to  reality. 

Is  it  not  evident  that  Hume's  skepticism  and  the  be- 
wilderment which  has  overtaken  philosophy  is  not  the 
result  of  his  mental  pluralism  but  of  this  inability  to  solve 
the  problem  of  knowledge?  And  this  inability  was  due, 
not  to  his  lack  of  ability,  but  to  the  undeveloped  state  of 
logic  and  psychology  and  to  the  absence  of  a  faithful 
study  of  the  distinctions  and  structure  characteristic  of 
human  consciousness.  Kant  advanced  farther  than  Hume 
and  introduced  into  philosophy  the  study  of  the  structure 
of  experience.  But  Kant  made  several  sorry  blunders 
which  threw  him  off  the  track  and  was  weak  enough  to 
resort  to  the  illogical  compromise  which  substitutes  for 


THE  REFERENCE  OF  KNOWLEDGE  131 

mental  pluralism  a  consciousness-in-general,  an  Experience 
with  a  capital  E. 

The  present  study  of  the  reference  of  knowledge  enables 
us  to  answer  the  puzzle  contained  in  the  statement  that 
each  individual  is  confined  to  his  own  consciousness.  The 
answer  is,  obviously,  yes  and  no.  He  is  confined  to  his 
own  consciousness  in  the  sense  that  no  realities  except 
elements  of  his  consciousness  can  be  present  in  his  con- 
sciousness. All  the  parts  of  his  field  of  experience  are 
mental.  But  he  is  not  confined  to  his  consciousness  if  this 
assertion  is  intended  to  deny  that  he  possesses  knowledge 
of  what  is  outside  his  consciousness.  Such  propositions 
as  are  accepted  by  him  as  containing  knowledge  of  an 
independent  realm  are,  of  course,  in  his  consciousness. 
The  individual's  consciousness  has  a  structure  and  pos- 
sesses distinctions  which  make  it  capable  of  this  realistic 
reference. 

Being  Distinct  from  Knowledge. — The  acknowledged 
realm  is,  by  its  very  meaning,  distinct  from  the  knowledge 
possessed  by  human  minds  and  referred  to  it  as  a  reference. 
Reality  is  one  thing  and  knowledge  is  another  and,  so  far  as 
we  are  concerned,  a  purely  human  affair.  I  can  gather 
together  all  the  knowledge  about  this  table  as  a  part  of 
the  physical  world  which  I  can  glean  from  physics,  chem- 
istry and  botany,  but  this  systematic  knowledge  is  not  the 
table.  Knowledge  arises  only  when  the  physical  world 
controls  perceptions  in  minds  and  when  these  minds  have 
the  capacity  to  build  up  propositions.  When  we  say  that 
being  is  distinct  from  knowledge,  we  mean  that  the  reality 
which  is  referred  to  and  acknowledged  is  not  the  knowledge 
which  is  referred  to  it,  that  the  metaphysical  subject  is 
separate  from  the  logical  subject  and  the  logical  predicate. 

There  is  no  agnosticism  in  this  position,  for  the  genuine- 


132  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ness  of  knowledge  and  its  empirical  presence  are  not  im- 
pugned. Of  course,  the  reality  known  is  not  compresent 
with  the  knowledge  in  the  mind  which  has  the  knowl^  'ge 
and  is  not  In  any  sense  apprehensible;  but  only  he  who  aoes 
not  understand  the  real  nature  of  knowledge  about  the 
physical  world  can  be  disappointed  at  this  and  regard  it  as 
a  shortcoming.  Only  he  will  speak  of  the  present  position 
as  at  all  agnostic  who  is  still  dominated  by  the  illusion 
nourished  by  Natural  Realism.  I  mean  that  only  he  who 
thinks  that  reality  must  be  apprehended  directly  or  by 
proxy  will  feel  disappointed  in  the  knowledge  which  we 
actually  have. 

We  Want  to  Be  the  Reality  Known. — When  we  come 
to  analyze  our  own  tendencies,  we  soon  realize  that  we 
have  the  desire  of  penetrating  into  the  things  we  perceive 
and  leading,  temporarily  at  least,  their  own  life.  We  want 
to  be  the  things  in  order  to  comprehend  them  more  fully. 
We  regard  them  as  centres  of  activity  which  we  might 
somehow  share  and  comprehend.  The  ideal  of  knowledge 
becomes  for  us  a  haunting  sense  of  possible  identity  with 
the  things.  Our  nature  strains  after  a  sympathy  with  them, 
a  fellow-feeling.  To  know  the  thing  adequately  seems 
to  us  to  involve  being  the  thing  at  the  same  time  that 
we  are  ourselves.  Surely  we  argue  somewhat  as  follows: 
"This  reality  I  perceive  is  independent  of  me  and  must 
therefore  have  a  life  of  its  ow^n  just  as  I  have  mine.  I  feel 
pleasure  and  pain,  joy  and  stress;  I  plan  and  will;  I  dream 
and  think.  But  this  other  thing  is  real  also.  Therefore, 
something  hke  this  conscious  life  of  mine  must  be  in  it." 
This  independent  life  which  is  not  ours  attracts  us  and 
awakens  in  us  the  desire  to  penetrate  to  it  if  possible. 
But  we  know  that  such  penetration  could  be  achieved  only 
by  being  it,  by  living  its  life  for  a  time  at  least  and  then 


THE  REFERENCE  OF  KNOWLEDGE  133 

remembering  it  when  we  became  ourselves  again.  The 
ideal  knowledge  seems  to  us  to  consist  in  this  penetrative 
s^vrnpathy.  What  shall  we  say  of  this  tendency  in 
us?    Is  it  an  illusion? 

I  do  not  think  that  this  tendency  to  penetrate  into  the 
realities  we  acknowledge  around  us  is  irrational.  I  would 
say  that  it  is  a  desire  which  naturally  accompanies  our 
recognition  that  we  are  not  alone  in  the  world.  It  is  the 
tragic  and  necessary  implication  of  our  own  individuality 
in  a  world  which  contains  other  individuals.  Could  we 
be  other  things,  individuality  would  have  no  existence 
and  there  would  not  be  other  things  to  acknowledge  and 
to  brood  over.  But  since  we  cannot  be  other  things,  our 
individuality  sets  limits  which  tantalize  us.  While  we  are 
ourselves  in  a  living,  conscious  way,  we  know  that  other 
realities  have  a  comparable  existence  which  excludes  ours  in 
the  same  way  that  ours  excludes  theirs.    Such  is  the  world. 

Knowledge  our  only  Escape  from  Individuality. — The 
human  consciousness  is  such  that  it  contains  the  subject- 
object  duality.  The  things  we  perceive  are  given  an  ob- 
jectivity in  this  way,  and  we  proceed  further  to  read  into 
them  something  of  the  nature  of  our  own  mind  and  will. 
This  tendency  is  called  animism  and  is  now  known  to  be 
universal  among  primitive  peoples.  Thus  a  dramatic 
sense  of  sympathy  with  other  realities  is  established  by 
reading  into  them  unconsciously  our  idea  of  their  life. 
But  reflection  has  finally  discovered  the  illusory  nature 
of  this  sense  of  penetration.  It  is  known  to  be  a  process 
within  the  individual's  own  consciousness  which  mas- 
querades as  a  penetration  into  another's.  The  student 
can  easily  see  that  such  animism  with  its  sympathy,  or 
Einjuhlungy  is  parallel  with  Natural  Realism.  They  rise 
and  fall  together. 


134  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

But  granted  that  we  cannot  penetrate  into  the  realities 
which  surround  us,  it  still  remains  true  that  we  can  acquire 
knowledge  about  them.  This  critical  knowledge,  which 
critical  realism  admits,  is  in  a  way  an  escape  from  the 
isolation  of  individuality.  It  is,  however,  an  escape  which 
does  not  conflict  with  human  individuality,  for  we  are  con- 
scious organisms  upon  which  the  rest  of  the  world  plays 
and  which  are  able  to  achieve  knowledge  referable  to  this 
world.  Were  not  knowledge  unique,  we  could  use  meta- 
phors and  speak  of  it  as  the  echo  of  the  world  in  our  minds 
or  its  interpretation  in  the  language  of  consciousness. 
But  it  is  better  to  avoid  metaphors  and  to  remember  that 
we  know  reality,  yet  necessarily  know  it  in  terms  of  our 
human  experience.  We  cannot  be  other  realities,  nor  can 
we  penetrate  into  them  by  intuition,  but  we  can  have 
knowledge  about  them.  Yet  we  need  not  deny  that  the 
realities  about  which  we  gain  knowledge  are  far  more  than 
that  knowledge  reveals  just  as  we,  ourselves,  are  more  than 
the  dry  propositions  in  terms  of  which  some  mere  acquaint- 
ance would  portray  us.  A  critical  knowledge  comes  to 
know  its  own  limitations. 

References 

Bergson,  Introduction  to  Metaphysics. 
Bosanquet,  Essentials  of  Logic,  lecture  2. 
Fletcher,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  17. 
Jerusalem,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  third  division. 
Taylor,  Elements  of  Metaphysics,  bk.  2,  chap.  1. 


CHAPTER  XII 
TRADITIONAL  ASSUMPTIONS  AND  ATTITUDES 

Important  Distinctions. — Thus  far  we  have  pursued  the 
poHcy  of  actual  investigation  into  the  concrete  problems 
of  epistemology.  Beginning  with  the  standpoint  of  com- 
mon sense,  we  have  seen  how  reflection  on  the  facts  of  ex- 
perience forces  the  thinker  to  pass  beyond  it  to  a  far  more 
critical  position.  Aided  by  the  successful  analysis,  as  well 
as  by  the  mistakes,  of  past  thinkers,  such  as  Locke, 
Berkeley,  Hume  and  Kant,  we  have  gradually  worked  out 
a  more  adequate  standpoint  which  apparently  does  justice 
to  the  characteristic  distinctions  within  experience  and  to 
the  claim  of  knowledge.  But,  in  carrying  out  this  investi- 
gation, we  have  paid  comparatively  little  attention  to 
certain  historical  distinctions  and  contrasts  which  meet 
the  student  on  every  hand  when  he  does  serious  reading 
in  philosophy.  Having  made  sure  of  a  good  foundation, 
we  can  now  examine  and  evaluate  these  traditional  terms. 

Before  modern  logic  and  psychology  had  reached  their 
present  level  of  development,  assumptions  in  regard  to 
the  origin  of  knowledge  played  a  large  part  in  philosophical 
discussion.  In  other  words,  philosophy  had  no  assured 
foundation  on  which  to  build.  Epistemology,  logic  and 
psychology  were  all  commingled  in  the  most  tantalizing 
way  and  no  one  of  these  disciplines  had  reached  a  maturity 
sufficient  to  aid  the  others  in  establishing  themselves. 
Consequently,  problems  were  raised  which  we  now  see 
to  be  false  because  based  on  false  assumptions.    We  shall 

135 


136  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

examine  these  problems  and  then  go  on  to  show  how  they 
have  been  outgrown. 

The  traditional  assumptions  in  regard  to  what  is  called 
the  origin  of  knowledge  fall  into  three  groups,  rationalismy 
sensationalism  and  aynorism.  The  first  two  of  these  terms 
indicate  a  sharp  contrast,  while  the  third  represents  an 
attempt  at  a  compromise  between  them. 

Rationalism. — Rationalism  may  be  defined  as  the 
doctrine  that  reason,  a  supposedly  innate  faculty,  is  the 
source  of  all  true  knowledge  and,  more  especially,  the  sole 
foundation  and  warrant  of  all  universal  and  necessary 
knowledge. 

Rationalism  arose  in  Greek  philosophy  as  a  result  of  the 
discovery  that  perception  contains  illusions.  Since  there 
was  no  adequate  psychology  of  perception,  the  Greeks 
did  not  realize  the  part  played  by  both  physical  condi- 
tions and  judgment  in  perception  and  leaped  hastily 
to  a  sharp  opposition  between  sense  and  reason.  Sense 
deals  with  the  changing  and  the  illusory,  while  rea- 
son apprehends  the  permanent  and  the  real.  On 
the  whole,  Plato  was  a  rationalist,  for  he  put  into  sharp 
opposition  the  realm  of  ideas  and  the  realm  of  sensory 
appearances.  The  Platonic  ideas  are  changeless  entities 
which  can  be  apprehended  only  by  the  eye  of  the  mind, 
which  is  reason.  Coming  down  to  modern  philosophy, 
we  find  that  practically  all  the  thinkers  of  the  continent 
were  rationalists,  while  the  British  philosophers  were  pre- 
dominantly sensationalists,  or,  at  least,  anti-rationalists. 
Descartes'  philosophy  is  a  very  good  example  of  rational- 
ism. He  appeals  to  what  he  calls  "the  natural  light"  for 
the  fundamental  principles  which  he  is  inclined  to  accept. 
After  he  has  obtained  these  principles,  he  proceeds  more 
geometrico  to  deduce  his  conclusions. 


TRADITIONAL  ASSUMPTIONS  AND  ATTITUDES    137 

When  we  come  to  examine  rationalism  historically  and 
from  the  vantage-point  of  modern  logic  and  psychology, 
hwe  soon  see  that  it  was  based  on  motives  which  accident- 
\ally  supplemented  one  another.  There  can  be  little  doubt 
that  the  dualism  between  the  soul  and  the  body  had  some- 
thing to  do  with  its  development.  Reason  is  the  immortal 
part  which  is  more  or  less  polluted  by  contact  with  the 
body.  Sense  is  the  faculty  for  the  things  of  time  and  of 
this  world,  and  reason  is  the  faculty  for  things  eternal  and 
the  world  beyond.  Another  motive  was  the  apparent 
independence  of  sensation  which  mathematics  possesses. 
Plato  was  an  admirer  of  geometry  and  so  was  Descartes. 
The  clarity  and  deductive  necessity  of  its  conclusions 
made  it  the  ideal  for  knowledge.  The  influence  of  mathe- 
matics was  heightened  by  the  spread  of  the  Copernican 
theory.  This  theory  again  brought  to  the  front  the  con- 
trast between  perception  and  reason,  and  this  contrast 
was  once  more  translated  into  a,  fixed  opposition  between 
two  sources  of  knowledge.  But  these  two  positive  motives 
for  rationalism  were  aided  and  abetted  by  an  inadequate 
logic  which  did  not  appreciate  that  reason  is  only  an  ab- 
straction for  concrete  reasoning  and  did  not  understand 
that  all  human  concepts  grow  out  of  the  level  of  percep- 
tion. These  early  thinkers  had  no  sense  for  genetic  rela- 
tions and  put  faculties  where  we  would  now  put  processes. 

It  is  well  to  bear  in  mind  that  rationalism  has  been  of 
all  shades  and  degrees.  Some  thinkers  have  been  rational- 
ists only  in  regard  to  this  point  or  that,  and  have  admitted 
that  nearly  all  actual  human  knowledge  is  founded  upon 
observation.  But  wherever  there  is  a  tendency  to  seek  a 
source  for  knowledge  in  a  faculty  logically  separable  from 
the  concreter  type  of  experience,  we  may  speak  of  ration- 
alism.    The  old-time  rationalism  has  almost  ceased  to 


138  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

exist,  but  there  are  tantalizing  suggestions  of  something 
akin  to  it  in  the  writings  of  many  contemporary  philoso- 
phers, especially  of  those  for  whom  mathematics  is  the  ideal 
science. 

Sensationalism. — We  may  define  sensationalism  as  the 
doctrine  that  all  knowledge  consists  of  sensations  or  of 
thoughts  reducible  to  sensations.  Hume's  position  is  a 
typical  example  of  sensationalism.  In  the  second  section 
of  the  Enquiry^  he  discusses  the  origin  of  ideas.  But  he 
does  not  assign  ideas  to  a  faculty  as  the  rationalist  does  the 
ideas  of  reason.  Instead,  he  commences  with  an  empirical 
description  of  the  consciousness  of  each  individual  and 
points  out  that  we  are  able  to  distinguish  between  sensa- 
tions (impressions)  and  their  revivals.  "Here  therefore 
we  may  divide  all  the  perceptions  of  the  mind  into  two 
classes  or  species,  which  are  distinguished  by  their  different 
degrees  of  force  and  vivacity.  The  less  forcible  and  lively 
are  commonly  denominated  Thoughts  or  Ideas.'*  It  is 
obvious  that  Hume's  doctrine  is  psychological  rather  than 
epistemological.  The  question  we  must  ask  ourselves  is 
this.  Are  the  propositions  which  contain  our  knowledge 
analyzable  into  images  which  are  in  their  turn  only  re- 
vivals of  sensations?  If  the  psychologists  agree  that  this 
is  the  case,  the  philosopher  is  unlikely  to  say  them  nay. 
However,  psychology  has,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  given  up 
sensationalism.  The  doctrine  does  not  seem  to  do  justice 
to  human  experience. 

Sensationalism  has  often  been  given  an  epistemological 
setting  comparable  to  that  which  characterizes  rationalism. 
It  is  then  asserted  that  sense  is  a  faculty  of  the  mind,  and 
that  from  the  material  thus  obtained  all  the  more  com- 
plicated ideas  and  judgments  are  somehow  developed. 

What  shall  we  say  of  sensationalism?   The  first  criticism 


TRADITIONAL  ASSUMPTIONS  AND  ATTITUDES    139 

must  be  directed  against  the  use  of  the  word  faculty. 
The  senses  are  sense-organs  which  are  stimulated.  That 
the  stimulation  of  sense-organs  is  one  of  the  conditions  of 
our  having  the  sort  of  experience  we  have  cannot  be  denied. 
But  we  have  good  reason  to  believe  that  there  are  other 
conditions.  The  brain  is  tremendously  important.  Be- 
sides, a  condition  of  experience  must  not  be  identified 
with  a  source  of  knowledge.  Knowledge  cannot  be  traced 
to  certain  specific  fountains  whence  it  wells  up.  It  is  an 
achievement  within  consciousness.  We  may  say,  then, 
that  sensationalism  reflects  the  false  outlook  of  ration- 
alism in  its  search  for  a  mechanical  entry  for  knowl- 
edge. Historically,  its  significance  was  its  denial  of  a 
rational  faculty.  It  combated  rationalism  until  psy- 
chology and  logic  attained  adulthood. 

Apriorism. — Apriorism  is  an  attempt  to  reconcile 
rationalism  and  sensationalism.  Kant's  position  is  typical 
of  what  is  technically  called  apriorism.  It  will  be  remem- 
bered that  Kant  seeks  to  account  for  the  knowledge  we 
do  actually  have  by  regarding  it  as  a  resultant  of  the  appli- 
cation of  certain  innate  mental  forms  called  space  and  time 
and  the  categories  to  the  material  contributed  by  sense. 
The  mind  is  for  Kant  a  locus  in  which  certain  operations 
occur  and  produce  human  experience  as  it  actually  is. 
In  other  words,  Kant  endeavors  to  explain  experience  as  a 
manufactured  product  analyzable  into  matter  contributed 
by  the  senses  and  formal  matter  contributed  by  the  mind. 
This  formal  matter  is  applied  to  the  material  given  by 
sense  by  an  act  of  synthesis  referable  to  a  Transcendental 
Ego. 

Kant  hoped  to  achieve  in  this  way  all  that  rationalism 
had  claimed.  He  speaks  of  a  priori  knowledge  and  con- 
trasts it  with  a  posteriori  knowledge. 


140  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

But  the  logic  of  to-day  is  not  aware  of  any  such  distinc- 
tion. Knowledge  is  valid  or  invalid.  A  proposition  is 
only  general  or  it  is  universal.  A  principle  is  a  funda- 
mental postulate  or  it  is  a  tested  generalization.  Thus 
Kant's  machinery  is  of  no  significance  to  logic  and  cannot 
be  tested  by  logic.  Hence  apriorism  is  an  attempt  to 
reconcile  rationalism  and  sensationalism  by  one  who  has 
neither  an  adequate  psychology  nor  an  adequate  logic. 
Its  value  must,  therefore,  be  regarded  as  mainly  historical. 
What  it  did  accomplish  was  the  widespread  admission 
that  both  rationalism  and  sensationalism  were  quite  in- 
adequate. "As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  whole  question  of  the 
sources  of  knowledge  is  not  epistemological  but  psycholog- 
ical, and  must  be  approached  by  psychological  methods. 
The  psychologist  is  interested  to  discover  from  what 
processes  an  universal  proposition  has  developed,  what 
part  of  it  has  been  contributed  by  sense-perception  and 
what  by  thought  or  imagination,  etc.,  etc.  .  .  .  Really, 
therefore,  rationalism,  empiricism  and  criticism,  although 
tradition  allows  them  the  right  of  citizenship  in  the  realm 
of  epistemology,  represent  psychological  theories  or  stand- 
points, and  should  be  banished  from  the  company  of 
epistemological  schools."  Kiilpe,  Introduction  to  Philoso- 
phy^  pp.  185-6.  And  it  is  well  known  that  modern  psy- 
chology does  not  accept  faculties  and  synthetic  egos. 

Empiricism. — Another  term  very  widely  used  is  em- 
piricism. Historically,  the  term  is  associated  with  Locke's 
attack  upon  rationalism.  Locke  denied  that  there  are 
innate  ideas  and  asserted  that  all  the  ideas  we  possess 
arise  naturally  within  experience.  "  Our  observation, 
employed  either  about  external  sensible  objects,  or  about 
the  internal  operations  of  our  minds,  perceived  and  re- 
flected upon  by  ourselves,  is  that  which  supplies  our  under- 


TRADITIONAL  ASSUMPTIONS  AND  ATTITUDES    141 

standings  with  all  the  material  of  (reflective)  thinking. 
These  two  are  the  fountains  of  knowledge,  from  whence 
all  the  ideas  we  have,  or  can  naturally  have,  do  spring." 
Essay,  book  11,  chap.  1.  sec.  2.  Locke's  position  has  been 
much  misunderstood.  It  is  neither  sensationalism  nor 
rationahsm.  "He  did  not  deny  the  truth  or  the  self- 
evidence  of  these  (logical)  principles,  and  he  even  thought 
them  useful  as  a  means  of  avoiding  sophistry  in  contro- 
versy. Still  less  did  he  maintain  that  the  mind  itseK 
though  a  white  paper  to  the  world  of  objects  was  itself 
a  passive  instrument."    Alexander,  Locke,  p.  5Q, 

When  the  term  empiricism  is  used,  we  must  always  ask 
ourselves  what  is  meant  by  it,  how  is  experience  conceived. 
To  define  empiricism  as  a  doctrine  which  tests  every  bit 
of  knowledge  by  an  appeal  to  experience  reveals  the  vague- 
ness of  the  term.  The  tests  of  propositions  are  to  be  found 
in  the  methods  used  in  the  various  fields.  To  say  that  we 
prove  that  all  men  are  mortal  by  experience  does  not  in- 
form us  as  to  the  nature  of  the  proof  used  and  accepted  by 
logic.  We  may  say,  then,  that  the  term  empiricism,  like 
its  contrast-term  rationalism,  is  of  little  significance  to- 
day. These  standpoints  have  been  outgrown.  Episte- 
mology  must  be  founded  on  an  adequate  logic  and  psy- 
chology. 

Attitudes  Toward  Knowledge. — Looking  over  the 
history  of  philosophy,  we  find  certain  recurrent  attitudes 
toward  knowledge.  Chief  of  these  are  dogmatism,  skep- 
ticism, and  criticism.  We  shall,  first  of  all,  point  out  how 
these  terms  have  been  used  and  then  discuss  their  present 
status. 

Dogmatism  is  a  term  taken  over  from  general  expe- 
rience, especially  from  the  field  of  religion,  and  given  cur- 
rency in  philosophy  by  Kant.    We  call  a  man  a  dogmatist 


142  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

who  makes  assertions  without  giving  the  grounds  for  them 
and  without  attempting  to  meet  reasonable  doubts.  Thus 
a  man  who  affirms  his  behefs  very  positively  and  will 
not  listen  to  objections  and  contradictory  facts  is  a  dog- 
matist. From  this  general  application  to  an  uncritical 
and  stubbornly  affirmative  frame  of  mind,  the  term  has 
been  extended  to  the  construction  of  philosophical  sys- 
tems without  a  sufficient  preliminary  examination  of 
the  assumptions  used.  Uncontrolled  speculation  which 
flouts,  or  makes  little  use  of,  evidence  results  in  systems 
which  deserve  the  adjective  dogmatic.  Of  course,  philoso- 
phers are  not  the  only  offenders.  The  various  sciences 
have  often  discovered  in  the  course  of  further  investigation 
that  they  have  been  making  assumptions  of  a  false  or  in- 
adequate character.  We  may  say  that  all  the  sciences 
grow  more  critical  as  they  grow  older.  Dogmatism  is  the 
sign  of  youth  and  of  its  accompanying  lack  of  realization 
of  the  complexity  of  problems.  Philosophy  has  always 
stressed  its  own  history  and  has  therefore  become  increas- 
ingly aware  of  the  arbitrariness  and  naivite  of  many  of  the 
assumptions  of  past  systems.  But  we  must  confess  that 
the  term  dogmatism  is  quite  a  relative  term.  Compared 
with  the  systems  of  to-day  past  systems  were  more  dog- 
matic and  less  critical.  The  systems  of  Descartes,  Spinoza 
and  Wolf  are  examples  of  what  we  would  to-day  consider 
quite  dogmatic  constructions. 

Criticism  is  also  a  term  made  current  by  Kant.  He 
pointed  out  the  defects  of  both  dogmatism  and  extreme 
skepticism  and  advocated  a  thorough  investigation  of  the 
nature  and  conditions  of  knowledge  as  a  preliminary  to 
any  serious  work  of  construction  in  philosophy.  His 
advance  upon  his  predecessors  was,  however,  relative. 
No  true  philosopher  has  ever  been  a  complete  dogmatist. 


TRADITIONAL  ASSUMPTIONS  AND  ATTITUDES    143 

If  we  take  his  term  from  another  angle  as  an  advocacy  of 
theory  of  knowledge  as  a  preliminary  to  metaphysics, 
we  must  point  out  that  John  Locke  stressed  the  need 
of  a  critical  investigation  into  the  nature  of  human  knowl- 
edge. From  the  time  of  Protagoras,  at  least,  no  system 
has  been  without  its  epistemological  setting.  In  the  adop- 
tion of  the  adjective  for  his  own  philosophy,  Kant  was  pass- 
ing himself  a  not  altogether  warranted  compliment.  The 
systems  of  Locke  and  Hume  are  decidedly  critical.  The 
logic  of  philosophical  investigation  is,  so  far  as  I  can  see, 
the  same  as  for  any  investigation.  There  is  no  peculiar 
and  royal  road  to  philosophy.  Historically,  then,  criticism 
must  stand  for  a  growing  stress  upon  the  value  of  theory 
of  knowledge  for  general  philosophy. 

Both  dogmatism  and  criticism  take  the  existence  of 
knowledge  for  granted.  If  we  take  these  terms  in  the 
logical  sense,  they  stand  simply  for  degress  of  criticalness. 
He  who  carefully  investigates  his  assumptions  is  critical; 
he  who  tends  to  take  them  for  granted  is  dogmatic.  This 
difference  of  attitude  is  to  be  found  in  all  the  sciences  and 
is  not  peculiar  to  philosophy.  Taken  in  its  more  technical 
sense,  this  contrast  between  dogmatism  and  criticism  has 
stood  for  a  recognition  of  the  fundamental  importance  of 
theory  of  knowledge  for  philosophy. 

Skepticism  is  likewise  an  ambiguous  term.  We  may 
distinguish  skepticism  as  the  recognition  of  the  value  of  an 
ingredient  of  doubt  in  all  investigation  from  philosophical 
skepticism.  The  first  meaning  is  essentially  identical  with 
the  logical  sense  of  criticism.  Philosophical  skepticism, 
on  the  contrary,  is  a  technical  philosophical  expression. 
While  both  dogmatism  and  criticism  assume  the  existence 
of  knowledge,  philosophical  skepticism  is  a  general  doubt 
of  its  possibility. 


144  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

But  philosophical  skepticism  has  had  various  forms,  rela- 
tive to  the  positions  opposed  and  the  problems  confront- 
ing reflection.  Greek  skepticism  was  directed  mainly 
against  the  belief  that  perception  gives  us  an  intuition  of 
an  independent,  stable  reality.  In  other  words,  it  was 
developed  in  opposition  to  naive  realism.  Later,  it  at- 
tacked dogmatic  rationalism.  The  skeptic  is  a  member  of 
an  opposition  party.  Pyrrho  of  Elis  (circa  300  B.  C), 
Arcesilaus  of  Pitane,  a  leader  of  the  Platonic  Academy, 
Carneades,  and  Sextus  Empiricus  are  a  few  of  the  think- 
ers who  stand  out  in  the  history  of  Greek  skepticism.  The 
main  function  of  all  of  these  thinkers  was  to  attack  dog- 
matic positions  and  to  raise  questions.  In  modern  times, 
Hume  is  usually  singled  out  as  the  chief  exponent  of  skep- 
ticism. But  his  skepticism  was  relative  to  dogmatic 
rationalism.  Otherwise,  it  reflected  the  bewilderment  in 
which  theory  of  knowledge  was. 

Philosophical  skeptics  did  not,  however,  always  content 
themselves  with  attacks  upon  unwarranted  assumptions. 
They  sometimes  allowed  themselves  to  declare  that  man 
cannot  have  knowledge.  But  it  is  obvious  that  such  an 
assertion  involves  a  self-contradiction.  We  cannot  assert 
that  we  cannot  make  assertions  (knowledge)  without  con- 
tradicting ourselves.  In  its  absolute  form,  skepticism 
is  self-destructive.  Thus  reflection  shows  that  we  have  a 
justified  right  to  criticise  particular  theories,  scientific 
or  philosophical,  but  that  we  cannot  assert  that  knowledge 
of  some  kind  is  impossible.  Skepticism  as  a  working 
method  is  one  thing,  and  absolute  philosophical  skep- 
ticism is  quite  another.  The  same  thinker  has  often 
attempted  to  combine  the  two,  but  they  are  really 
distinct. 


TRADITIONAL  ASSUMPTIONS  AND  ATTITUDES    145 

References 

Calkins,  The  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy,  chap.  6. 
Jerusalem,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  third  division. 
Kiilpe,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  sees.  24-5-6. 
Russell,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  chaps.  7  and  8. 
Fullerton,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  15. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

The  Value  of  an  Epistemological  Summary. — Episte- 
mological  positions  have  little  meaning  for  a  person  until 
he  has  some  knowledge  of  epistemological  problems. 
What  meaning  can  idealism  have  to  one  who  has  no  knowl- 
edge of  the  history  of  philosophy  and  no  acquaintance 
with  the  problems  raised  by  reflection?  To  a  beginner  it 
would  seem  the  veriest  nonsense  to  assert  that  the  physical 
world  is  his  idea.  Does  he  not  see  the  firm  and  stable 
world  about  him,  and  does  he  not  know  from  sad  experience 
how  brutally  real  it  is.^  But  the  student  who  has  carefully 
followed  the  steps  of  the  preceding  argument  and  has  done 
some  genuine  thinking  for  himself  is  now  ready  to  compare 
the  main  epistemological  positions  held  by  past  and  con- 
temporary philosophers. 

Such  a  summary  has  the  value  which  system  always  has. 
It  helps  to  define  positions  by  contrast,  and  it  enables  one 
to  run  over  the  various  possibilities  quickly  and  to  see 
them  in  relation  to  one  another  and  the  problems  which 
they  must  satisfy. 

The  Nature  of  Epistemology. — It  is  so  easy  to  mis- 
understand the  nature  of  epistemology  that  it  is  best  to 
be  certain  what,  exactly,  its  task  is.  Epistemology  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  content  of  the  particular  sciences  nor 
can  it  dictate  the  proper  assumptions  which  these  sciences 
ought  to  make.  It  is  a  discipline  along  with  the  other  dis- 
ciplines and  presupposes  the  fact  of  knowledge.    It  is  a 

146 


EPISTEMOLOGICAL  THEORIES  147 

reflective  science  which  develops  within  an  already  com- 
plex experience  and  seeks  to  answer  certain  definite  ques- 
tions about  knowledge  in  the  light  of  the  knowledge  al- 
ready gained  by  the  physical  and  the  mental  sciences.  It 
is  not  logically  prior  to  the  other  sciences,  but,  like  philoso- 
phy as  a  whole,  is  a  reflective  examination  of  their  results 
in  the  attempt  to  answer  specific  questions  about  the 
nature,  development  and  conditions  of  knowledge.  The  more 
we  know  about  nature  and  man,  the  more  able  are  we  to 
answer  the  questions  raised  by  epistemology. 

Idealism. — When  used  as  a  technical  term  in  episte- 
mology, idealism  means  that  everything  known  is  mental 
and  that  nothing  exists  which  is  not  known  or  experienced 
by  some  mind.  Epistemological  idealism  is  of  compara- 
tively modern  date,  having  first  been  clearly  stated  by 
Berkeley,  and  can  be  understood  only  as  a  reaction  against 
representative  realism.  It  seldom  exists  now-a-days  in  its 
pure,  or  logical,  form  and  is  usually  found  as  an  ingredient 
in  more  complex  positions.  The  cause  of  this  lack  of  episte- 
mological clearness  in  many  philosophical  systems  is  the 
unfortunate  tendency  of  thinkers  to  mingle  metaphysics 
and  epistemology  indiscriminately. 

Subjective  idealism  is  the  name  given  to  the  strict  form 
of  epistemological  idealism.  This  form  involves  solipsism. 
The  thinker  bases  his  position  upon  the  discovery  that  all 
the  present  objects  of  his  apprehension  are  only  his  ideas. 
His  perceptual  world  is  composed  of  his  percepts,  and  his 
conceptual  world  of  his  concepts  and  judgments.  Hence 
the  whole  objective  world  which  he  perceives  and  thinks 
is  analyzable  into  objects  which  have  no  existence  apart 
from  his  consciousness.  Even  other  selves,  as  objects 
of  his  thought,  are  mental  contents  built  up  in  his  mind  on 
the  basis  of  his  percepts,  feelings  and  conceptual  inter- 


148  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

pretations.  Sinee  epistemology  must  judge  existence  in 
terms  of  knowledge,  this  fact  means  that  others  do  not, 
so  far  as  we  can  tell,  exist  outside  of  our  own  minds.  Must 
we  not  base  our  judgments  of  existence  upon  our  knowl- 
edge? We  must  conclude,  therefore,  that  others  do  not 
exist  for  us,  as  subjectivists,  outside  of  our  own  conscious- 
ness. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  principle  of  subjective  idealism  is 
that  knowledge  is  confined  to,  and  terminates  upon,  the 
objects  present  in  the  field  of  experience  of  the  individual 
thinker.  Knowledge  is  the  apprehension  of  the  object 
known.  But  no  objects  can  be  so  apprehended  except 
those  in  the  consciousness  of  the  particular  thinker. 
Therefore,  he  can  know  only  the  contents  of  his  own  con- 
sciousness. If  we  grant  the  principle,  the  conclusion  fol- 
lows. We  must,  therefore,  honor  the  logical  courage  of 
men  Hke  Schuppe,  Rehmke  and  v.  Leclair  who  have 
adopted  this  position. 

The  metaphysics  of  solipsism  is  so  apparent  that  it  is 
well  to  note  it  at  this  point.  Strict  subjective  idealism 
must  assert  that  reality  is  mental  and  is  no  larger  than 
the  thinker's  own  consciousness.  This  instance  is  valua- 
ble as  showing  the  dependence  of  metaphysics  upon 
epistemology. 

But  subjective  idealism  usually  takes  the  less  logical 
form  of  mental  'pluralism.  Few  thinkers  have  the  courage 
to  aflSrm  solipsism  and  therefore  content  themselves  with 
the  denial  of  a  physical  world  outside  of  consciousness. 
They  do  not  realize  that  the  epistemological  problem  is  not 
one  of  the  content  of  the  objects  but  of  their  existence 
outside  of  knowledge.  The  distinction  between  physical 
objects  and  *  selves*  is  obviously  a  distinction  between 
objects  within  my  consciousness.    Hence,  if  all  these  ob- 


EPISTEMOLOGICAL  THEORIES  149 

jects  are  mental,  this  contrast  must  be  one  between  two 
species  of  the  mental  in  this  generic  sense.  Therefore, 
the  problem  for  the  mental  pluralist  is  to  prove  that  he 
can  accept  the  epistemological  principle  of  subjective 
idealism  referred  to  above  and  still  hold  to  a  knowledge 
of  other  independent  selves.  If  he  cannot,  and  still  is 
convinced  that  other  selves  exist  and  are  known,  he  should 
reconsider  his  principle.  Most  mental  pluralists,  however, 
seek  to  prove  that  other  selves  existy  rather  than  that  they 
are  known,  by  resorting  either  to  instinct  or  to  the  so-called 
argument  from  analogy.  But  an  existent  which  is  not 
known,  nor  capable  of  being  known,  is  hardly  an  ex- 
istent of  any  significance.  In  other  words,  subjective 
idealism  does  not  do  justice  to  the  reach  our  minds 
empirically  claim  to  have.  Is  it  not  true  that  we 
are  often  inclined  to  believe  that  we  know  others  al- 
most as  well  as  we  know  ourselves  .^^  And  we  think  of  these 
other  individuals  as  quite  outside  of  our  own  conscious- 
ness. But  he  who  would  break  down  subjective  idealism 
must  not  be  satisfied  with  pointing  out  its  apparent  in- 
adequacy to  the  facts  of  experience;  he  must  attack  its 
principle  and  show  that  it  is  dogmatic.  Is  knowledge 
confined  to  the  apprehension  of  objects  in  consciousness? 
The  subjective  idealist  is  right  when  he  asserts  that  we 
can  apprehend  no  other  objects  than  these;  but  is  he  right 
in  his  assumption  that  there  is  no  other  kind  of  knowledge.^ 
Objective  Idealism. — Objective  idealism  is  a  form  of 
idealism  which  arose  after  Kant.  To  the  epistemologist 
it  is  a  baffling  position  because  it  neglects  the  whole  setting 
of  epistemology.  The  reason  for  this  neglect  is  historical. 
Kant  made  the  vicious  mistake  of  postulating  a  universal 
self  to  correspond  to  the  world  of  phenomena.  Phenomena 
are  mental,  yet  not  in  the  consciousness  of  any  particular 


150  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

individual.  But  Kant  was  still  a  realist  of  an  agnostic  type 
because  he  kept  a  faith  in  a  really  extra-mental  realm  of 
things-in-themselves  in  causal  relation  with  mind.  Now 
the  thinkers  who  followed  Kant  simply  developed  this 
consciousness-in-general  which  Kant  had  postulated  and 
dropped  the  thing-in-itself.  The  result  was  objective 
idealism.  In  my  opinion,  then,  objective  idealism  was 
founded  on  two  things,  Kant's  assumption  of  a  universal 
consciousness  and  the  inability  to  solve  the  problem  of 
knowledge,  common  to  Kant  and  Hume.  (Cf.  Chap. 
VII.) 

This  origin  of  objective  idealism  comes  out  clearly  in  the 
customary  definitions  of  it.  The  following  is  typical: 
"  If  on  the  other  hand  it  (idealism)  simply  says  in  general 
terms  that  experience  always  consists  of  ideas,  or  that 
consciousness  is  an  universal  attribute  or  form  of  the  con- 
tents of  knowledge,  without  adding  any  reference  to  a  sub- 
ject to  whom  ideas  and  consciousness  belong,  it  is  objective 
idealism.**  Kulpe,  An  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  p.  194. 
Reality  is  identified  with  experience  without  any  indica- 
tion of  the  possessor  or  possessors  of  this  experience.  The 
objective  idealist  is  convinced  that  "it  is  one  world  that 
we  all  know,  and  of  which  we  are  all  parts.  If  doubt  were 
thrown  on  this,  not  only  metaphysics,  but  all  other  science, 
would  become  an  impossibility — even  the  science  of  psy- 
chology. Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  the  experience  of  each 
of  us  is  emphatically  mine.  There  is  something  in  it  which 
we  can  never  communicate  to  any  other;  and  even  what 
we  do  communicate  can  be  apprehended  by  another  as  it 
is  for  us  only  in  so  far  as  he  learns  to  put  himseK  in  our 
place.  This  leads  us  to  note  that  the  experience  of  each 
of  us,  even  when  we  consider  it  without  special  reference  to 
any  one  else,  has  a  subjective  and  an  objective  aspect. 


EPISTEMOLOGICAL  THEORIES  151 

We  are  aware  of  a  world  presented  to  us,  which  seems 
somehow  independent  of  our  individual  apprehension; 
and  we  are  aware,  at  the  same  time,  that  it  is  presented  to 
us.'*  Mackenzie,  Outlines  of  Metaphysics,  pp.  17-8.  Is 
it  not  obvious  that  objective  idealism  represents  a  com- 
promise between  realism  and  idealism  in  which  realism 
gains  the  acknowledgment  that  subjective  idealism  is 
inadequate  while  idealism  is  placated  by  the  use  of  ex- 
perience as  a  blanket-term?  The  epistemological  problem 
is  not  solved  but  is  simply  ignored. 

Realism. — The  defining  characteristic  of  realism  is  the 
acknowledgment  of  realities  not  dependent  for  their  exist- 
ence upon  the  minds  which  know  them.  Epistemological 
realism  is  a  very  old  doctrine,  and  there  have  been  many 
dominant  forms  of  it  in  the  centuries  of  speculation.  Of 
recent  years,  there  has  been  an  efflorescence  of  realism  in 
which  new  forms  have  been  developed.  It  will  be  neces- 
sary to  classify  and  define  the  various  kinds  of  realism 
very  carefully.  This  task  is  made  more  difficult  by  the 
different  views  of  knowledge  entertained.  The  key  to 
any  species  of  realism  is  the  particular  meaning  assigned 
to  knowledge.  The  following  is  about  as  satisfactory  a 
classification  as  can  be  worked  out: 

Realisms 

Apprehensional  Non-apprehensional 

Presentative    Representative 

Let  us  now  explain  these  terms  and  offer  typical  positions 
as  examples. 

The  older  types  of  realism  fall  into  the  two  kinds  of 
apprehensional  realism.  Locke's  epistemology  is  a  char- 
acteristic  example   of   representative   realism.      On   the 


152  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

other  hand,  Reid  did  his  best  to  develop  and  maintain  a 
presentative  form  of  realism.  The  neo-realism  of  a  group 
of  younger  American  thinkers  also  falls  into  this  class. 
The  position  stressed  in  the  present  book  is  non-apprehen- 
sional  realism. 

According  to  presentative  realism,  the  individual 
knower  has  an  immediate  apprehension  of  the  independent 
reality  known.  Beid  and  Hamilton  (1788-1856)  cham- 
pioned this  view  of  knowledge.  These  thinkers  believed 
in  an  external  physical  world  and  held  that  knowledge  is 
a  perception  of  this  world  conditioned  by  the  interaction 
of  percipient  and  object  known.  Hence  knowledge  is  the 
presence  of  the  physical  thing  to  the  subject-self.  Reid 
asserted  that  philosophers  had  made  a  fundamental  mis- 
take in  assuming  that  "all  the  objects  of  knowledge  are 
ideas."  Unfortunately,  Reid  and  Hamilton  differed  in 
regard  to  the  nature  of  this  directly  apprehended  object, 
Hamilton  maintaining  that  it  is  some  quality  of  the  or- 
ganism of  the  percipient  and  Reid  that  it  is  an  extra- 
organic  thing. 

It  will  be  apparent  that  presentative  realism  is  essen- 
tially a  defense  of  Natural  Realism. 

When  the  attitude  of  presentative  realism  is  taken 
toward  objects  other  than  those  of  sense-perception,  we 
have  what  may  be  called  rationalistic  presentative  realism. 
Thus  Bertrand  Russell  and  G.  E.  Moore,  two  contempo- 
rary English  thinkers,  hold  that  we  apprehend  all  sorts  of 
conceptual  objects  and  that  these  objects  are  independent 
of  the  mind  knowing  them.  A  similar  view  is  championed 
by  the  new  realists  of  America. 

The  American  form  of  neo-realism  is  called  by  its  ad- 
vocates epistemological  monism.  It  is  an  attempt  to  re- 
state traditional  presentative  realism  in  such  a  way  as 


EPISTEMOLOGICAL  THEORIES  153 

to  leave  out  the  apprehending  subject-self,  the  conscious- 
ness or  awareness  of  the  object.  It  is  a  present ative  realism 
so  modified  as  to  leave  out  the  apprehending  mind  as  a 
separate  entity.  While  both  Reid  and  Locke  contrast 
mind  and  the  realities  known  as  distinct  realms,  the 
American  neo-realists  think  of  consciousness  as  simply  a 
term  for  a  relation  into  which  realities  may  enter  without 
suffering  any  change.  Thus  the  characteristic  point  of 
departure  is  a  revolutionary  re-definition  of  consciousness. 
The  following  quotation  will  make  this  attempt  clearer: 
"A  content  becomes  consciousness  by  becoming  related 
in  a  certain  way.  In  what  way.^  By  becoming  the  object 
to  which  an  organism  reacts.  Thus  my  hat  is  part  of  my 
consciousness,  or  as  we  ordinarily  say,  I  perceive  my  hat, 
if  its  color,  shape,  and  other  properties  control  my  reac- 
tion, for  example,  lead  to  my  picking  it  up  and  placing  it 
upon  my  head.  *Two  plus  two  equals  four*  is  one  of  my 
thoughts,  provided  this  relationship  between  the  number 
two  and  itself  controls  my  conduct  and  leads  me  to  put 
two  two  cent  stamps  on  a  letter  requiring  four  cents 
postage.  But  the  hat  out  of  such  a  relationship  is  not  con- 
sciousness; nor  is  the  proposition  *two  plus  two  equals 
four.' "    Marvin,  A  First  Book  in  Metaphysics,  p.  261. 

This  position  can  only  be  regarded  as  a  remarkable 
tour  deforce.  The  essential  objection  to  it  is  that  it  ignores 
the  r6le  played  by  the  sense-organs  and  the  distinction 
between  a  physical  thing  and  its  appearances.  It  is  open  to 
all  the  objections  we  urged  against  Natural  Realism.  We 
have  identified  consciousness  with  the  whole  changing 
field  of  the  individual's  experience  just  as  does  the  neo- 
realist  but  we  have  denied  that  the  objects  there  present 
can  exist  independently.  They  are  for  us  only  mental. 
In  this  we  agreed  with  Locke,  Descartes  and  Berkeley. 


154  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  position  under  discussion  must  be  admired  as  a  bold 
attempt  to  save  presentative  realism. 

We  are  already  familiar  with  representative  realism. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  Locke  maintained  that  ideas 
(mental  objects)  are  in  part  like  the  primary  qualities 
of  matter.  We  called  this  position  selective  representative 
realism.  The  secondary  qualities  like  color  and  smell 
are  regarded  as  purely  mental.  Knowledge  is  held  to  be  an 
indirect  apprehension,  an  apprehension  of  a  mental  sub- 
stitute, caused  by  the  physical  world,  which  is  cognitively 
just  as  good  as  the  physical  world  because  like  it.  The 
essential  objections  to  it  have  already  been  considered. 
It  is  a  copy  view  of  knowledge.  Aside  from  the  other  ob- 
jections urged,  it  assumes  that  the  mental  effect  is  like 
the  extra-organic  physical  cause,  a  theory  which  has  little 
for  it  and  much  against  it.  The  extra-organic  cause  is 
only  a  discharging  agency  for  very  complex  cerebral  proc- 
esses. The  analogy  with  wax  impressed  by  a  stamp  has 
no  applicability. 

Non-apprehensional  realism  should  need  little  explana- 
tion by  now.  It  is  an  epistemological  dualism  and  holds 
that  knowledge  consists  of  propositions  built  up  within 
consciousness  and  referred  to  an  acknowledged  realm  out- 
side of  consciousness.  At  least,  this  is  the  case  for  knowl- 
edge of  the  physical  world.  Knowledge  is  knowledge 
and  not  a  copying  of  reality.  While  the  champions  of 
neo-realism  have  tried  to  re-construct  presentative  real- 
ism, the  present  writer  has  tried  to  do  the  same  for  repre- 
sentative realism.  But  with  this  difference.  He  has 
realized  that  the  view  of  knowledge  which  has  underlain 
realism  up  to  the  present  has  been  moulded  upon  the  out- 
look of  Natural  Realism.  Knowledge  has  uniformly 
been  thought  of  in  realistic  circles  as  a  direct  or  indirect 


EPISTEMOLOGICAL  THEORIES  155 

apprehension  of  an  object.  This  tendency,  which  bears 
witness  to  the  continued  influence  of  Natural  Realism, 
must  be  resisted.  Knowledge  is  an  affair  of  judgment 
and  of  the  reference  of  judgment.  It  is  to  the  credit  of 
the  objective  idealists  that  they  have  recognized  this  fact. 
We  may  say,  then,  that  non-apprehensional  realism  is 
representative  realism  reconstructed  in  the  light  of  modern 
logic  and  psychology.  We  have  called  it  an  epistemological 
dualism  because  the  mind  which  has  these  propositions  is 
distinct  from  the  realities  known.  But  epistemological  dual- 
ism must  not  be  confused  with  metaphysical  dualism,  which 
asserts  that  the  universe  contains  two  kinds  of  reality. 

Gnostic  vs.  Agnostic  Realism. — In  a  preceding  chapter, 
we  discussed  skepticism  and  showed  how  philosophical 
skepticism  contradicts  itself.  Now,  in  contrast  to  skep- 
ticism, idealism  and  the  forms  of  realism  we  have  just 
examined  are  gnostic,  that  is,  they  assert  that  reality  can 
be  known.  The  age-old  struggle  between  complex  forms 
of  realism  and  idealism,  however,  led  to  the  rise  of  semi- 
skeptical  positions  which  deny  that  ultimate  reality  is 
known,  while  admitting  that  phenomena  (mental  objects, 
reality  as  it  appears  to  man)  are  present  to  the  mind. 
According  to  the  emphasis,  these  positions  are  called  posi- 
tivism and  agnosticism.  When  men  are  exhorted  to  con- 
cern themselves  exclusively  with  science  and  not  to  befool 
themselves  with  questions  about  a  transcendent  reality 
back  of  phenomena,  the  positivist  is  speaking.  Thus  the 
positivist  is  a  phenomenalist.  When  the  existence  of  a 
transcendent  reality  is  acknowledged  but  it  is  sadly  as- 
serted that  man  can  know  nothing  about  it,  that  it  is 
unknowable,  we  have  agnosticism.  Auguste  Comte  is 
the  typical  modern  representative  of  positivism  or  phe- 
nomenalism, and  Herbert  Spencer  of  agnosticism. 


156  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

References 

Fletcher,  An  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chaps.  9,  10,  11,  and  12. 
Fullerton,  An  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  13. 
Jerusalem,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  third  division. 
Marvin,  A  l^irst  Book  in  Metaphysics,  chaps.  16  and  17. 
McGilvary,  The  Relation  of  Consciousness  and  Object  in  Sense- 
Perception,  Philos.  Review,  1908. 
Sellars,  Critical  Realism,  Preface. 
Taylor,  Elements  of  Metaphysics,  bk.  2,  chap.  1. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

Knowledge  and  Truth, — Having  waded  through  the 
main  difficulties  which  confront  epistemology,  or  a  rea- 
soned theory  of  human  knowledge  and  its  place  in  reality, 
we  are  now  in  a  position  to  take  up  a  problem  which  im- 
merses us  in  new  difficulties  of  a  more  specific  character. 
The  problem  of  truth  logically  succeeds  the  problem  of 
knowledge,  yet  is  of  a  nature  both  to  test  the  epistemologi- 
cal  conclusions  arrived  at  and  to  deepen  our  understand- 
ing of  them.  In  a  previous  chapter,  I  pointed  out  that 
solipsism  is  an  acid  test  of  a  theory  of  knowledge.  The 
same  may  be  said  of  the  problem  of  truth. 

That  there  is  a  very  intimate  connection  between  our 
ideas  of  truth  and  knowledge  comes  out  clearly  in  the  fact 
that  the  expression  "true  knowledge"  is  felt  to  be  a  tautol- 
ogy. It  is  like  speaking  of  a  round  circle.  Many  thinkers 
have  disregarded  this  connection  and  have  rashly  discussed 
the  nature  of  truth  without  a  prior  examination  of  the 
nature  of  knowledge.  The  result  has  been  controversies 
more  or  less  barren  of  value  and  rather  disheartening  in 
their  effect.  It  has  seemed  to  the  general  public  that 
Pilate's  question  was  merely  being  reechoed  by  philosophy 
in  a  helpless  fashion.  Yet,  in  spite  of  appearances  there 
has  been  a  genuine  advance  along  these  lines.  New  points 
of  view  have  grown  up  which  have  cast  light  back  upon 
theory  of  knowledge  and  have  related  its  problems  to 
the  setting  furnished  by  biology  and  psychology.     What 

157 


158  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

is  called  pragmatism  has  been  especially  active  along  these 
lines.  But  the  period  of  new  suggestions  and  of  new 
angles  of  vision  is  about  over  and  the  field  is  ripe  for  a 
systematic  formulation  of  the  meaning  and  criteria  of 
truth. 

The  Meaning  of  Knowledge. — We  must  get  clearly  in 
mind  the  exact  type  of  knowledge  which  is  connected  with 
truth.  As  long  ago  as  Aristotle,  it  was  seen  that  truth 
and  error  are  relative  to  judgment.  Sense-presentations 
and  feelings  are  neither  true  nor  false,  they  are  simply 
experiences.  But  wherever,  and  to  the  extent  that,  there 
are  interpretations  and  associations,  the  possibility  of  error 
enters.  Assertions,  implicit  or  explicit,  involve  a  risk  of 
mistake  while  all  non-assertive  experiences  are  free  from 
this  danger.  '*  In  the  actual  felt  toothache  knowing  and 
being  are  not  only  inseparable — they  are  indistinguishable. 
If,  however,  I  think  of  my  toothache  as  part  of  an  inde- 
pendent order  of  reality,  my  knowledge  of  it  may  be  true 
or  false.  I  am  then  thinking  of  it  as  the  effect  of  an  exposed 
nerve,  or  of  an  abscess  or  of  an  inflammation — as  some- 
thing, that  is  to  say,  that  is  conditioned  independently  of 
my  consciousness  and  that  will  cease  to  exist  when  the 
conditions  are  altered."  Carr,  The  Problem  of  Truth,  p.  18. 
It  has  been  customary  to  speak  of  non-assertive  experi- 
ences as  feeling.  All  of  the  field  of  experience  that  is  merely 
enjoyed  as  present,  emotions,  felt  attitudes,  wishes,  ques- 
tions, mere  thoughts,  simply  exist  and  are  neither  true 
nor  false.  Because  we  have  experienced  content  here, 
content  which  may  be  very  rich  and  complex,  we  may 
speak  of  it  as  knowledge;  but  it  is  not  assertive  knowledge. 
For  our  present  purposes,  there  is  no  need  to  be  over- 
subtle  and  study  border-land  cases.  We  can  be  satisfied 
with  the  distinction  between  explicit  assertions  and  felt 


TRUTH  AND  ERROR  159 

presence.  In  the  one  class  of  experiences  there  is  a  dis- 
tinct claim  to  knowledge;  in  the  other  merely  a  felt  pres- 
ence which  is  sufficient  to  itself  and  intent  on  its  own 
existence  and  movement.  Is  it  not  true  that  we  are  more 
often  willing  and  dreaming  and  enjoying  and  acting  than 
passing  judgments? 

The  question  of  truth  has,  then,  to  do  with  that  type 
of  knov/ledge  which  we  speak  of  as  beliefs,  assertions,  in- 
terpretations, propositions,  judgments.  In  all  such  ex- 
periences there  is  a  sense  of  dualism.  We  are  more  or  less 
aware  that  what  we  are  judging  about  is  independent  of  our 
judgments.  The  content  of  our  claimed  knowledge  is  not 
identical  with  what  is  referred  to,  or  intended,  in  the 
judgmental  experience.  Only  a  little  reflection  makes 
us  distinguish  between  the  mental  content  or  idea-object 
which  claims  to  be  knowledge  and  that  about  which  it  is 
knowledge.  Thus  I  may  pass  the  judgment  that  the  Dec- 
laration of  Independence  was  not  signed  on  the  Fourth 
of  July  as  ordinarily  supposed;  but  I  am  aware  that  this 
understood  assertion  is  not  that  event  which  I  designate 
the  signing  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  The  one 
object  is  thought  of  as  a  present  element  in  my  mind,  ex- 
istent only  there;  the  other  object  is  thought  of  as  an  event 
never  present  in  my  mind  and  happening  in  the  United 
States  long  before  I  was  born.  The  understood  assertion 
is  admitted  to  be  a  mental  object  and  so  far  existent. 
But  we  are  not  primarily  concerned  with  its  existence  but 
with  the  claim  and  reference  attached  to  it  as  an  integral 
part  of  the  total  experience.  All  assertive  knowledge,  when 
made  explicit,  involves  this  complex  type  of  experience 
and  can  so  be  distinguished  from  those  other  phases  of 
consciousness  which  are  present  to  the  same  degree  but 
have  no  such  characteristic. 


160  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Three  Common  Theories  of  Truth.— For  some  time, 
three  theories  of  truth  have  held  the  field  of  philosophical 
favor  and  have  fought  for  supremacy  among  themselves. 
These  theories  are  closely  connected  with  epistemological 
outlooks  and  their  adherents  have  probably  had  this  as- 
pect of  the  question,  important  as  it  is,  too  much  in  mind. 
To  get  an  adequate  notion  of  truth,  we  must  combine  the 
epistemological  problem  with  an  investigation  of  the  actual 
tests  applied  to  assertions  in  the  various  fields  of  science. 
Of  late,  reflection  has  swung  in  this  direction  and  bids 
fair  to  achieve  a  clearer  and  concreter  notion  of  what 
truth  means  to  human  beings. 

The  three  dominant  theories  of  truth  are  the  correspond- 
ence theory,  the  coherence  theory  and  the  pragmatist 
theory.  The  first  is  a  realist  interpretation  of  that  dualism 
which  seems  so  characteristic  of  assertive  knowledge; 
the  second  is  a  manifestation  of  idealism;  and  the  third 
swings  vaguely  between  idealism  and  realism.  Let  us 
try  to  get  these  theories  definitely  before  our  minds. 

The  Correspondence  Theory. — The  original  form  of 
the  correspondence  theory  starts,  as  we  have  indicated, 
from  the  dualism  seemingly  characteristic  of  the  claim 
to  knowledge  made  in  assertive  experiences.  These  ex- 
periences are  usually  spoken  of  as  ideas  or  beliefs,  and  it  is 
said  that  truth  is  a  property  of  certain  of  these  ideas.  It 
means  their  agreement  with  the  reality  to  which  they  refer. 
Falsity  or  error,  on  the  other  hand,  means  their  disagree- 
ment with  this  selected  independent  reality. 

But  this  preliminary  statement  is  accepted  by  all.  Cer- 
tainly, truth  involves  agreement  of  some  sort  with  reality. 
The  reflective  problem  of  truth  arises  only  when  there  is 
the  attempt  to  define  the  nature  of  this  agreement.  The 
correspondence  theory  is  just  such  an  attempt. 


TRUTH  AND  ERROR  161 

The  first,  and  naive,  form  is  the  position  that  the  idea 
is  a  copy  of  reahty.  If  this  reahty  be  regarded  as  a  non- 
mental  and  imperceptible  reality,  we  have  represent- 
ative realism  of  the  Lockian  form.  To  this  type  of  the 
correspondence  theory,  there  are  two  main  objections 
which  have  generally  been  regarded  as  conclusive.  First, 
the  idea  is  thought  of  as  an  image  which  can  be  like  an- 
other object;  second,  the  reality  is  by  hypothesis  unat- 
tainable, so  that  it  is  impossible  to  compare  idea  and 
reality  to  see  whether  they  agree  in  this  sensuous  way. 
Let  us  examine  these  objections. 

We  have  seen  that  the  mental  object  which  is  commonly 
spoken  of  as  an  idea  is  an  assertion  or  judgment.  But  an 
assertion  is  not  an  image,  it  is  something  understood, 
a  meaning.  The  psychologist  may  try  to  break  it  down 
into  a  grouping  of  images  for  his  analytic  purposes  but 
it  is  certainly  not  experienced  as  a  definite  sensuous  ob- 
ject which  can  be  compared  point  by  point  with  another 
object  of  like  kind.  It  seems  quite  clear,  then,  that 
this  naive  theory  of  correspondence  has  been  misled  by 
the  actual  representative  relation  between  idea  and  per- 
cept in  human  experience.  This  first  criticism  carries 
us  naturally  to  the  second.  Even  were  our  ideas  potenti- 
ally comparable  in  this  presentative  fashion  with  reality, 
say  as  a  photograph  is  potentially  comparable  with  the 
individual  whose  photograph  it  is,  the  unfortunate  fact 
is  that  reality  is  not  attainable.  The  absurdity  of  the  no- 
tion is  seen  when  we  reflect  that,  even  were  it  a  fact  that 
realities  outside  of  consciousness  produce  copies  of  them- 
selves in  our  minds,  we  could  never  know  that  this  was  the 
case.  By  hypothesis,  we  can  apprehend  only  the  copies. 
There  could  be  no  test  for  our  faith.  And  there  is  much  in 
our  experience  which  suggests  that  effects  are  not  like 


162  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

causes.  The  force  of  these  objections  is  so  great  that  this 
naive  theory  of  correspondence  has  no  standing  in  philos- 
ophy. 

The  correspondence  theory  has  other  possibiHties  but 
these  depend  upon  a  more  adequate  idea  of  knowledge. 
One  form,  which  is  usually  called  the  logical  theory  of 
truth,  goes  with  a  presentative  realism  and  an  atomistic 
metaphysics.  "The  theory  is  best  described  as  pluralistic 
realism.  It  is  the  view  that  the  universe  consists  of  or  is 
composed  of  an  aggregate  of  an  infinite  number  of  entities. 
Some  of  these  have  a  place  in  the  space  and  time  series, 
and  these  exist.  Some,  on  the  other  hand,  are  possibili- 
ties which  have  not  and  may  never  have  any  actual  exist- 
ence. Entities  that  have  their  place  in  the  perceptual 
order  of  experience  exist,  or  have  existed,  or  will  exist; 
but  entities  that  are  concepts,  such  as  goodness,  beauty, 
truth,  or  that  are  abstract  symbols  like  numbers,  geo- 
metrical figures,  pure  forms  do  not  exist,  but  are  none  the 
less  just  as  real  as  the  entities  that  do  exist.  These  en- 
tities are  the  subject-matter  of  our  judgments,  and  know- 
ing is  discovering  the  relations  in  which  they  stand  to  one 
another.  The  whole  significance  of  this  view  lies  in  the 
doctrine  that  relations  are  external  to  the  entities  that  are 
related — they  do  not  enter  into  and  form  part  of  the  nature 
of  the  entities."  Carr,  The  Problem  of  Truth,  pp.  24-5. 
It  will  be  apparent  to  the  student  that  this  position  is  a 
form  of  presentative  realism.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is 
neo-realism. 

The  Coherence  Theory. — ^The  inability  of  realists  to 
achieve  a  satisfactory  correspondence  theory  encouraged 
idealists  to  develop  a  theory  of  truth  which  would  fit  into 
their  view  of  reality.  A  very  important  school  of  modern 
idealists  teaches  that,  while  all  actual  experience  is  only 


TRUTH  AND  ERROR  163 

a  fragmentary  part  of  a  complete  whole  and  so  more  or 
less  appearance,  we  do  have  a  veritable  criterion  of  reality 
in  the  principle  of  self-consistency.  The  real  is  the  co- 
herent and  harmonious.  Only  the  whole  comes  up  to  this 
ideal  and  is  genuinely  real.  This  whole  is  usually  called 
the  Absolute,  and  is  thought  to  be  of  the  nature  of  human 
experience,  only  not  fragmentary  and  broken  and  full  of 
internal  contradictions. 

But,  it  will  be  said,  this  is  a  theory  of  reality,  not  of 
truth.  That  is  so,  but  a  theory  of  truth  is  deduced  from 
this  outlook.  It  is  absurd  to  assume  an  external  reality 
to  which  ideas  must  correspond.  Ergo,  truth  must  be  an 
internal  characteristic  of  ideas  themselves,  and  this  must 
be  their  consistency.  Truth  is  but  another  name  for  the 
ideal  of  logical  consistency.  The  more  complete  and  in- 
ternally coherent  a  system  of  propositions  is,  the  more  it 
approaches  this  ideal  a^nd  the  more  truth  there  is  in  the 
system.  Truth  is  an  ideal  which  is  never  completely  real- 
ized. Every  system  of  ideas  is  at  once  truth  and  error. 
There  are  two  sides  or  directions  of  all  thinking. 

The  prime  objection  to  this  theory  is  epistemological. 
It  stands  and  falls  with  idealism.  A  second  objection  is 
that  it  ignores  too  much  the  specific  claim  to  knowledge  of, 
and  reference  to,  a  particular  part  of  reality  characteristic 
of  particular  assertions.  It  prefers  to  discuss  such  general 
contrasts  as  appearance  and  reality.  I  cannot  help  feeling 
that  this  disregard  of  the  specific  and  refuge  in  the  general 
is  connected  with  the  fact  that  modern  idealism  is  really 
founded  on  the  inability  of  Hume  and  Kant  to  solve  the 
problem  of  knowledge.  An  independent  physical  world  is 
an  unknowable  and  therefore  does  not  exist.  Hence,  we 
are  forced  to  acknowledge  only  experience.  But  human 
experience  is  not  self-sufficient  enough  to  be  all  of  reality. 


164  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  consequence  is  that  the  dualism  of  knowledge  ap- 
pears in  the  form  of  the  contrast  between  the  part  and 
the  whole. 

On  the  purely  logical  side,  there  are  two  objections  to 
the  coherence  theory.  There  is  the  formal  objection  that 
the  proof  of  the  criterion,  self-consistency,  cannot  be 
founded  on  itself;  and  there  is  the  other  objection  that 
more  than  one  system  of  beliefs  may  be  internally  coherent. 
Thus,  in  scientific  investigations,  it  often  happens  that 
rival  hypotheses  compete  for  acceptance  and  that  the 
final  decision  between  them  is  made,  not  on  the  basis 
of  their  relative  internal  perfections,  but  on  that  of  their 
agreement  with  the  facts.  And  this  last  criticism  brings 
us  naturally  to  pragmatism  which  has  in  large  measure 
been  an  attack  upon  the  point  of  view  of  absolutism  and  a 
demand  for  specific,  human  tests  and  meanings  for  truth. 

Pragmatism, — Pragmatism  is  a  name  for  a  tendency 
in  contemporary  philosophy  which  seeks  to  link  truth 
with  what  is  useful  and  serviceable  in  human  experience. 
Because  it  is  a  tendency  it  is  hard  to  define.  Its  opponents 
often  do  it  injustice  while  its  advocates  do  it  more  than 
justice.  Like  all  new  movements  it  has  a  negative,  or 
critical,  side  and  a  positive  side.  In  the  space  at  our  dis- 
posal, all  we  can  try  to  do  is  to  show  its  general  drift, 
chief  doctrines  and  obvious  assumptions. 

First,  a  word  about  its  history.  In  1878,  Mr.  Charles  S. 
Peirce  wrote  an  article  for  the  Popular  Science  Monthy  in 
which  he  proposed  a  test  for  ideas :  "  Consider  what  effects, 
which  might  conceivably  have  practical  bearings,  we  con- 
ceive the  object  of  our  conception  to  have.  Then,  our 
conception  of  these  effects  is  the  whole  of  our  conception 
of  the  object."  This  article  attracted  little  attention  for 
nearly  twenty  years  when  it  was  at  last  referred  to  by 


TRUTH  AND  ERROR  165 

William  James  and  woven  into  his  criticism  of  what  he 
considered  to  be  a  disregard  of  concrete  human  life  in 
both  science  and  philosophy.  James's  gift  as  a  writer  and 
his  standing  as  a  suggestive  thinker  soon  made  the  term 
pragmatism  widely  known  both  in  America  and  in  Europe. 
Before  long,  it  was  the  subject  of  hot  debate  in  which  it 
was  bitterly  attacked  and  vigorously  defended.  From  an 
attitude,  it  became  a  fairly  definite  body  of  doctrine  ar- 
ranged around  a  theory  of  truth  as  its  point  of  departure. 
Its  most  distinguished  advocate  in  America  to-day,  now 
that  James  is  dead,  is  Professor  John  Dewey;  in  England, 
Dr.  F.  C.  S.  Schiller.  On  the  continent,  there  are  move- 
ments sympathetic  with  it  but  none  which  are  strictly 
identical. 

The  critical  side  of  pragmatism  is  an  attack  upon  what 
it  variously  calls  absolutism  and  intellectualism.  There 
can  be  no  purely  formal  and  logically  internal  criterion  of 
truth.  There  must  be  a  practical,  empirically  applicable, 
external,  largely  non-logical  criterion  of  truth.  In  con- 
trast to  absolutism,  pragmatism  stresses  the  value  and 
essential  self-sufficiency  of  human  experience.  What  we 
are  concerned  with,  first  and  foremost,  is  human  life,  hu- 
man problems,  human  points  of  view,  and  human  situa- 
tions. Extra-human  reality  can  take  care  of  itself.  In 
contrast  with  intellectualism,  it  stresses  tests  of  ajioii- 
logical  kind  such  as  satisfactoriness,  utility,  workableness. 
Such  tests  it  considers  not  so  much  anti-logical  as  super- 
logical.  Logic  must  be  so  interpreted  as  to  be  seen  in  its 
proper  setting  in  relation  to  purpose,  feeling  and  habit. 
Logic  has  been  too  abstract  and  formal  to  be  true  to 
human  experience  as  it  is.  In  so  stating  pragmatism,  I 
am  ridding  it  of  those  extreme  expressions  which  have 
done  it  harm. 


166  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  drift  of  pragmatism  is  quite  obviously  toward  a 
biological  approach  to  the  interpretation  of  truth,  knowl- 
edge and  consciousness.  Professor  Dewey  and  his  associ- 
ates in  America,  and  Mach,  Jerusalem  and  Simmel  in  Eu- 
rope have  developed  this  lead.  On  the  other  hand,  those 
who  have  had  a  mystical  bias,  like  James,  have  concerned 
themselves  with  the  denial  of  clear-cut,  objective,  scientific 
tests  for  many  ideas,  especially  those  connected  with  reli- 
gion. The  anti-scientific  phase  of  pragmatism  is  in  this 
branch.  Probably  this  phase  is  most  usually  associated 
with  James's  famous  essay.  The  Will  to  Believe, 

The  pragmatist  is  an  idealist  rather  than  a  realist  In  so 
far  as  he  seems  to  admit  that  we  do  not  know  a  reality 
independent  of  our  minds.  On  the  whole ^  he  subordinates 
the  idea  of  knowledge  to  that  of  truth.  The  workableness  of 
ideas  verifies  them  or  makes  them  true;  it  does  not  make 
them  cases  of  knowledge.  Historically,  we  can  under- 
stand this  subordination  of  knowledge  to  truth,  for  most 
of  the  pragmatists  are  of  the  idealistic  tradition.  In 
America,  it  was  largely  a  revolt  against  objective  idealism 
of  absolutistic  tendencies. 

But,  as  idealists,  pragmatists  had  no  hope  of  re-inter- 
preting the  correspondence  theory  of  truth.  And,  as  anti- 
intellectualists,  they  felt  the  inadequacy  of  the  coherence 
theory.  What  was  left  to  them  but  the  sort  of  theory  they 
did  actually  develop?  ''True  ideas y^  writes  James,  ''are 
those  that  we  can  assimilate,  validate,  corroborate  and  verify. 
False  ideas  are  those  that  we  cannot.  That  is  the  practical 
difference  it  makes  to  us  to  have  true  ideas;  that,  therefore, 
is  the  meaning  of  truth,  for  it  is  all  that  truth  is  known  as.'* 
James,  Pragmatism^  p.  201.  The  criticism  which  I  passed 
upon  this  interpretation  of  truth  in  my  Logic  is  as  follows : 
"It  will  be  noticed  that  the  meaning  of  being  an  actual 


TRUTH  AND  ERROR  167 

case  of  knowledge,  which  is  a  part  of  the  content  and  set- 
ting of  every  assertion,  is  omitted.  This  aspect,  in  our 
opinion,  is  fundamental.  The  logician  who  understands 
his  science  does  not  deny  the  empirical  character  of  the 
criteria  of  trueness,  but  he  does  assert  that  the  claim  of  an 
idea  to  be  knowledge  is  also  essential."  Sellars,  The 
Essentials  of  Logic,  p.  304. 

Just  one  more  point  must  be  touched  upon.  The  ma- 
jority of  pragmatists  teach  that  truth  is  a  changing  thing. 
Ideas  are  made  true  by  their  utility.  New  conditions 
demand  new  ideas  and  so  old  truths  become  untrue  and 
new  ideas  mount  the  rostrum  in  their  place.  Pragmatists 
have  not  enough  guarded  against  a  natural  misinterpreta- 
tion. The  position  seems  to  land  us  in  a  mere  changing 
flux  of  ideas  which  are  like  the  favorites  of  a  court,  now 
smiled  upon  and  now  frowned  upon.  The  more  sane 
pragmatists  have  pointed  out  that  the  criteria  are  quite 
objective  and  not  at  all  capricious.  Dewey  has  especially 
stressed  the  biological  setting  and  has  striven  to  be  con- 
sidered a  naive  realist.  But  I  must  leave  many  interesting 
points  untouched  and  pass  to  the  theory  which  I  wish  to 
associate  with  non-apprehensional  realism. 

Truth  as  a  Cognitive  Value. — It  will  be  remembered 
that  we  insisted  on  the  logical  priority  of  the  idea  of  knowl- 
edge to  that  of  truth.  And  were  knowledge  always  knowl- 
edge, we  would  not  have  had  the  term  truth  at  all.  Much 
that  claims  to  be  knowledge  and  has  had  its  claim  ac- 
cepted turns  out  not  to  be  knowledge.  For  instance,  the 
Ptolemaic  theory  of  the  solar  system  was  long  believed  in 
and  held  to  be  knowledge  about  the  physical  world;  to- 
day, we  have  completely  discarded  it  and  affirm  the  Coper- 
nican  view.  It  is  this  occurrence  of  mistakes,  this  actual 
experience  that  knowledge  is  not  always  knowledge,  that 


168  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

developed  the  reflective  values  or  meanings  which  we  call 
truth  and  error.  Truth,  or  trueness,  is  a  confirmatory 
value  which  we  attach  to  assertions  about  which  we  no  longer 
have  any  doubt.  As  a  confirmatory  value,  it  presupposes 
the  experience  of  mistake  and  the  rise  of  the  attitude 
of  doubt.  Its  contrast  term  is  error  or  falsity.  Mistake 
is  an  experience;  it  is  the  giving  up  of  a  belief  for  reasons 
which  are  regarded  as  satisfactory.  Falsity,  or  erroneous- 
ness,  is  the  negative  value  which  we  attach  to  an  idea 
doubt  of  which  has  been  confirmed.  Thus  trueness  and 
erroneousness  are  contrasted  cognitive  values.  How  easily 
puzzles  are  solved  when  once  an  adequate  philosophical 
position  has  been  achieved! 

The  Criteria  of  Truth. — A  study  of  scientific  method 
soon  convinces  the  philosopher  that  the  actual  criteria 
of  truth  are  consistency  and  agreement  with  the  facts. 
Such  is  the  final  status  of  an  accepted  proposition.  It  must 
be  self -consistent  and  cover  the  facts.  These  facts  are 
either  elementary  propositions  which  rest  upon  perception 
and  about  which  no  doubt  arises  or  complex  propositions 
which  have  already  been  sufficiently  tested.  The  process 
of  verification  which  precedes  the  attachment  of  cognitive 
value  may  be  spoken  of  as  the  convergence  of  evidence. 
*'  Verification  involves  responsibility  to  fact,  freedom  from 
self-contradiction,  and  a  flexible  harmony  with  other 
accepted  theories  which  have  passed  through  similar 
tests.  The  criteria  of  truth  are  not  external  but  internal. 
It  is  absurd  to  look  for  some  touchstone  which  can  be 
applied  in  a  mechanical  fashion  to  propositions  claiming 
truth."  The  flaw  in  the  correspondence  type  of  realism  is 
this  appeal  to  an  unattainable  external  standard.  Both 
absolutist  and  pragmatist  build  upon  the  recognition  of 
this  flaw. 


TRUTH  AND  ERROR  169 

How  Non-Apprehensional  Realism  Avoids  the  Copy 
View. — I  presume  that  the  student  has  already  seen  how 
non-apprehensional  reaHsm  avoids  the  shipwreck  which 
has  overtaken  representative  realism.  Since  truth  is  only 
a  confirmatory  value  attached  to  assertions  admitting  their 
claim  to  be  cases  of  knowledge,  the  criteria  of  truth  are 
purely  empirical  and  experiential.  Truth  is  not  a  cor- 
respondence with  an  external  reality  at  all.  But,  it  will 
be  said,  this  only  pushes  the  problem  one  step  further 
back  to  knowledge.  Certainly;  but  we  have  shown  that 
knowledge  is  an  irreducible  meaning  characteristic  of  our 
ideas.  Knowledge  is  not  an  agreement  with  reality  or  a 
correspondence  with  reality;  it  is  simply  knowledge. 
Human  propositions  do  claim  to  be  knowledge,  to  give 
information  about  reality.  Truth  is  simply  the  confirma- 
tion of  this  claim  after  doubt,  potential  or  actual,  and  the 
application  of  tests.  Assertions  do  not  correspond  to 
facts  but  agree  with  them  and  cover  them.  And  both  the 
propositions  and  the  facts  are  mental. 

But,  if  this  is  knowledge,  what  is  ignorance?  Quite 
evidently,  it  is  a  relative  lack  of  knowledge.  A  sense  of 
ignorance  accompanies  problems  which  are  not  solved 
and  fields  which  are  not  completely  explored.  He  who 
has  no  knowledge  at  all  of  a  subject  cannot  even  be  aware 
of  his  ignorance  because  the  subject  would  not  exist  for 
him. 

Knowledge  Is  a  Utility. — Those  pragmatists  who  have 
approached  philosophy  from  the  biological  angle  have 
proclaimed  that  consciousness,  itself,  is  a  utility.  Adopting 
the  standpoint  of  Darwinism,  they  have  suggested  that  it 
arose  and  evolved  from  stage  to  stage  because  of  its  value 
to  the  organism  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  It  performs 
a  function.    Perhaps  we  need  go  no  further  than  to  main- 


170  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

tain  that  consciousness  has  utility  and  leave  the  question  of 
origin.  It  sounds  somewhat  far-fetched  to  assert  that  a 
need  causes  a  thing  to  arise.  Yet  a  need  may  lead  to  the 
development  of  any  feature  which  is  in  existence.  Now  it 
is  being  pretty  generally  granted  that  knowledge  is  power. 
It  follows  that  the  ability  to  acquire  knowledge  is  of  value 
to  the  organism.  Civilization  is  itself  a  sufficient  com- 
mentary on,  and  confirmation  of,  this  conclusion. 

References 

Bode,  An  Outline  of  Logic,  chaps.  12  and  15. 

Carr,  The  Problem  of  Truth. 

Dewey,  Studies  in  Logical  Theory. 

James,  Pragmatism;  The  Meaning  of  Truth. 

Jerusalem,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  third  division. 

Joachim,  The  Nature  of  Truth. 

Marvin,  A  First  Book  in  Metaphysics,  chap.  9. 

Russell,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  chaps.  12  and  IS. 

Sellars,  Critical  Realism,  chap.  10. 


CHAPTER  XV 

MATERIALISM  AND  SPIRITUALISM 

Epistemology  and  Metaphysics. — Historically,  meta- 
physics preceded  epistemology.  The  early  Greek  thinkers 
had  worked  out  an  elementary  ontology  long  before  they 
achieved  anything  which  deserves  the  name  of  theory  of 
knowledge.  "Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  senses  and  hu- 
man reflection  are  first  directed  to  the  objective  world  to 
which  we  must  adapt  ourselves  in  order  to  live,  the  latter 
inquiry  arose  historically  earlier  than  the  problem  of 
knowledge.  Man  begins  to  reflect  on  himself  much  later 
than  upon  things.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  problem 
concerning  the  nature  of  being  has  meaning  and  interest 
for  those  who  have  not  yet  risen  above  the  plane  of  naive 
realism  in  the  theory  of  knowledge."  Jerusalem,  An  In- 
troduction to  Philosophy f  p.  135.  Much  of  metaphysics 
has,  therefore,  been  founded  on  an  implicit  and  uncritical 
epistemology.  This  fact  partly  accounts  for  the  inade- 
quacies of  much  of  past  speculation.  Another  reason  is, 
of  course,  the  lack  of  tested  scientific  knowledge  at  the 
service  of  philosophy.  It  will  be  remembered  that  modern 
philosophy  seeks  to  round  out  and  develop  the  contribu- 
tions of  the  special  sciences  into  a  consistent  view  of  the 
world.  The  less  the  information  derivable  from  science, 
the  more  uncontrolled  speculation  enters.  Such  specula- 
tion is  just  as  much  false  science  as  it  is  false  philosophy. 
The  human  mind  hates  a  vacuum  and  wants  to  have  some 
idea  of  the  world.   For  these  reasons,  metaphysics  has  only 

171 


172  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

too  often  been  the  genial  reflection  of  able  men  who  had 
no  adequate  foundation  on  which  to  build.  We  must 
not  be  surprised  to  find  sharp  contrasts  which  seem  to  us 
unreal  and  outgrown. 

Logically,  epistemology  precedes  metaphysics  though  it 
does  not  precede  science.  It  makes  a  deal  of  difference  in 
our  interpretation  of  the  world  whether  we  are  idealists 
or  realists  in  our  epistemology.  In  the  preceding  chapter, 
we  pointed  out  that  the  metaphysics  of  subjective  idealism 
is  obviously  mentalism.  If  I  can  know  only  what  I  appre- 
hend and  I  apprehend  only  objects  in  my  consciousness, 
it  follows  that  reality  must  be  for  me  only  my  conscious- 
ness. This  example  illustrates  the  point  we  have  just 
made,  that  a  thinker's  metaphysics,  or  theory  of  reality, 
is  closely  connected  with  his  theory  of  knowledge.  It  is 
not  too  much  to  say  that  the  philosophy  of  the  last  two 
hundred  years  has  been  built  around  the  recognition  of  this 
fact. 

But  when  we  take  the  relation  between  these  two 
philosophical  disciplines  in  a  more  genetic  way,  we  soon 
realize  that  there  is  an  interaction  between  them.  If  the 
metaphysics  which  follows  from  a  given  epistemology  is 
obviously  inadequate,  it  often  leads  the  persistent  thinker 
to  reexamine  his  epistemology  to  see  whether  he  can  dis- 
cover some  flaw  or  unnecessary  assumption  in  it.  The 
marked  contemporary  reaction  against  idealism  is  a  sign 
of  the  feeling  that  an  idealistic  metaphysics  does  not  enable 
reflection  to  cover  and  organize  the  facts  of  science  in  a 
significant  way. 

Materialism  and  Spiritualism. — We  shall  now  proceed 
to  examine  two  types  of  metaphysical  monism  which  have 
engaged  the  attention  of  the  world  for  centuries.  Every 
one  has  heard  of  materialism,  and  there  are  few  who  have 


MATERIALISM  AND  SPIRITUALISM  173 

not  heard  of  its  opposite,  spiritualism.  We  speak  of  these 
positions  as  monistic  because  they  teach  that  reality  is  com- 
posed of  one  type  of  stuff,  appearances  to  the  contrary  not- 
withstanding. For  materialism,  this  one  primordial  stuff 
is  matter;  for  spiritualism,  it  is  mind  or  immaterial  spirit. 
We  shall  see  that  these  two  sharply  opposed  monisms  are 
naive  and  dogmatic.  Their  epistemological  foundations 
are  inadequate. 

Materialism. — Naive  materialism  is  an  ontological  posi- 
tion which  teaches  that  consciousness  is  reducible  to  matter. 
Matter  is  reality,  and  consciousness  must  be  attached  to  it 
in  some  fashion.  Materialism  is  monistic  because  it  main- 
tains that  reality  is  of  one  kind  and  that  any  apparent 
dualism  must  be  capable  of  reduction.  There  is  no  doubt 
in  the  mind  of  the  materialist  that  matter  is  pretty  directly 
known.  He  often  seems  to  think  that  it  is  perceived  and 
open  to  inspection  so  that  its  very  vitals  are  exposed  to 
view.  Materialism  is,  then,  an  abbreviation  for  material- 
istic monism.^ 

For  even  a  fair  understanding  of  materialism,  a  glance 
at  its  history  is  necessary.  The  general  purpose  and  out- 
look back  of  metaphysical  materialism  will  be  found  its 
valuable  feature,  something  to  be  reckoned  with  even  after 
a  critical  epistemology  has  undermined  the  naive  ontology 
connected  with  it.  The  student  will  soon  realize  that 
materialism  has  been  a  sign  of  a  naturalistic  view  of  things 
and  a  protest  against  supernaturalism.  Much  of  the  bitter, 
and  often  unfair,  opposition  it  has  met  with  has  been  due 
to  this  controversial  direction  of  its  speculations. 

The  early  Greek  thinkers  were  monistic  and  essentially 

^  The  following  exposition  stresses  difficulties.  The  content  and 
plausibility  of  materialism  changes  with  the  advance  of  science.  The 
older  views  of  matter  have  been  discarded. 


174  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

materialistic.  We  must  remember,  however,  that  they 
had  no  clear-cut  conceptual  idea  of  matter  at  first.  The 
atomism  of  Democritus  was  about  the  first  definite  ex- 
pression of  a  conscious  materialism.  He  taught  that  the 
universe  consists  of  atoms  and  empty  space.  These  atoms 
differ  from  one  another  in  size,  shape  and  position  but  are, 
in  other  respects,  homogeneous.  Changes  in  things  are  due 
to  the  motions  of  these  elementary  particles  which  collide 
and  combine  in  various  ways.  Thus  far  we  have  a  philoso- 
phy of  nature  similar  to  what  would  to-day  be  called  me- 
chanical atomism.  But  where  is  there  place  for  mind  in 
such  a  world  .^  Democritus  meets  the  difficulty  by  assert- 
ing that  *mind,'  also,  is  composed  of  atoms,  the  smallest, 
roundest  and  most  mobile  that  there  are.  What,  however, 
did  he  mean  by  mind,  and  what  was  the  relation  of  this 
atomic  mind  to  the  actual  sensations  and  thoughts  which 
people  hsive?  To  these  necessary  questions,  his  answer 
is  uncertain.  It  is  probable  that  he  did  not  distinguish 
clearly  between  the  corporeal  and  the  incorporeal  and 
vaguely  thought  of  consciousness  as  a  part  of  the  nature 
of  these  mobile  atoms. 

The  Englishman  Thomas  Hobbes  was  the  first  noted 
modern  materialist  He  taught  that  sensations  and  ideas 
are  the  reactions  of  the  inward  parts  of  the  body  to  the 
stimuli  coming  from  without.  Thus  he  tends  to  identify 
consciousness  with  motion.  In  the  eighteenth  century, 
naive  materialism  reached  its  height  in  France.  The 
physician  La  Mettrie  (L'homme  machine,  1748)  endows 
matter  with  the  capacity  of  acquiring  motor  force  and  sen- 
sation. The  mind  has  its  seat  in  the  body  and  is  extended 
and  material.  Essentially  the  same  views  find  expression 
in  Holbach's  Systdme  de  la  nature  (1770).  His  chief  pur- 
pose is  to  combat  all  forms  of  supernaturalism.     *'Mind 


MATERIALISM  AND  SPIRITUALISM  175 

is  simply  body  regarded  under  the  aspect  of  certain  func- 
tions or  powers." 

Toward  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  material- 
ism again  came  to  the  front  owing  to  the  decay  of  the  ro- 
mantic idealism  of  Hegel,  Fichte  and  Schelling  and  the 
discovery  of  new  facts  about  the  dependence  of  the  mind 
upon  the  body.  Unfortunately,  these  new  advocates  of 
materialism  were  untrained  in  philosophy  and  psychology 
and  made  the  most  absurd  statements  in  a  very  dogmatic 
fashion.  Vogt's  Kohlerglauhe  und  Wissenschaft  (1855), 
Moleschott's  Der  Kreislauf  des  Lebens  and  Biichner's 
Kraft  und  Stoff  are  the  chief  works  of  this  materialistic 
movement.  None  of  them  are  very  satisfactory,  but  they 
do  issue  a  challenge  to  philosophy  to  meet  the  facts  of  the 
mind-body  relation  without  hedging.  When  Vogt  as- 
serts that  the  brain  secretes  thought  as  the  liver  secretes 
bile,  it  is  easy  to  point  out  the  difference  between  the  two 
cases  and  to  set  aside  all  talk  of  secretion  as  meaningless; 
yet  the  close  connection  between  consciousness  and  the 
brain  is  indicated  by  a  very  large  number  of  undeniable 
facts. 

There  are  three  forms  which  naive  materialism  takes, 
the  attributive^  the  causal  and  the  equative.  Attributive 
materialism  makes  mind  (consciousness)  an  attribute  of 
matter;  the  causal  makes  it  an  effect  of  matter;  and  the 
equative  makes  it  identical  with  matter.  Let  us  look  at 
these  forms  very  briefly. 

Attributive  materialism  forgets  that  it  Is  merely  using 
an  expression  as  an  explanation.  If  matter  is  so  con- 
ceived as  to  exclude  consciousness  from  its  nature,  it  is 
meaningless  to  attach  it  externally  by  calling  it  an  attri- 
bute. How  are  attributes  related  to  the  substance  of 
which  they  are  attributes?    Do  they  reveal  the  nature  of 


176  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

that  substance,  or  are  they  something  external?  Such 
questions  as  these  remain  on  the  metaphysical  side,  while, 
on  the  epistemological  side,  we  cannot  help  feeling  sur- 
prised by  the  naive  assumption  that  we  know  matter  in  a 
direct  and  essentially  intuitive  way.  Materialism  is 
naive  and  dogmatic  philosophically  because  it  has  no 
mastery  of  fundamental  concepts  and  no  conception  of 
theory  of  knowledge.    It  is  a  faith  more  than  a  philosophy. 

Causal  materialism  is  confronted  by  similar  objections. 
To  say  that  consciousness  is  an  ej^ect  of  matter  or  that 
matter  produces  consciousness  is  less  intelligible  than  it 
sounds.  Here,  again,  the  materialist  shows  his  ignorance 
of  fundamental  concepts.  What  is  a  cause?  Does  one 
thing  produce  another?  Since  Hume's  time,  philosophers 
have  been  well  agreed  that  a  cause  and  effect  relation  is 
essentially  temporal  and  gives  us  no  insight  into  any 
creative  production.  If  matter  is  alien  to  consciousness, 
as  the  materialist  usually  assumes,  the  rise  of  conscious- 
ness from  it  is  the  worst  sort  of  mystery.  It  is,  moreover, 
not  even  a  fact  since  no  human  being  has  seen  matter 
produce  consciousness  out  of  itself.  Why?  Because  no 
human  being  has  ever  perceived  matter.  Matter  is  an  ab- 
stract concept  which  needs  analysis  of  a  searching  kind. 
Causal  materialism  does  not  contain  enough  philosophical 
analysis  to  deserve  the  name  of  an  ontology.  When  all 
is  said,  that  must  remain  the  chief  objection  to  it. 

Equative  materialism  is  obviously  a  tour  de  force  which 
comes  perilously  near  self-contradiction.  If  the  material- 
ist claims  to  have  a  clear  concept  of  matter,  he  must  ask 
himself  whether  his  concept  of  consciousness  is  the  same 
in  its  content.  If  he  does  not  have  a  clear  concept  of  mat- 
ter, materialism  is  merely  a  term  for  a  vague  sort  of  natu- 
ralism.   The  materialist  cannot  escape  this  dilemma.    To 


MATERIALISM  AND  SPIRITUALISM  177 

assert  that  consciousness  is  motion  or  energy  is  nonsense. 
It  is  like  saying  that  black  is  hard.  Yet  those  who  have 
taken  the  first  horn  of  the  dilemma  have  been  forced  to 
make  analogous  assertions. 

The  examination  of  materialism  has  been  interesting  in 
itself  because  every  one  desires  to  know  what  materialism 
is  and  what  objections  philosophers  raise  against  it.  But 
it  has  also  been  valuable  as  a  clear  illustration  of  the  point 
made  in  the  first  section  of  this  chapter,  viz.,  that  episte- 
mology  logically  precedes  metaphysics.  The  philosophical 
weakness  of  naive  materialism  is  twofold :  it  has  neither  a 
systematic  epistemology  nor  a  well-analyzed  ontology.  And 
the  reason  for  the  second  element  of  weakness  can  be 
traced  to  the  first.  Had  these  scientists  taken  philosophy 
seriously  enough  to  construct  a  reflective  theory  of  knowl- 
edge, they  would  probably  have  shown  more  metaphysical 
depth.  What  we  can  excuse  to  Democritus  who  lived 
at  the  beginning  of  science  and  philosophy,  we  cannot 
excuse  to  an  educated  man  of  to-day.  No  one  claims  to 
be  capable  of  being  a  physicist  or  a  chemist  without  years 
of  severe  training:  why  should  they  think  themselves  ca- 
pable of  becoming  philosophers  without  a  similar  training  .^^ 
But  we  must  temper  our  blame  with  this  praise,  ma- 
terialism has  always  stood  for  a  frank  recognition  of  the 
facts  of  human  life.  It  has  done  this  sometimes  brutally 
and  crudely,  yet  it  has  done  it.  The  materialist  has  nearly 
always  been  courageous  and  intellectually  honest. 

Spiritualism. — Spiritualism  is  the  antithesis  of  ma- 
terialism. It  may  be  defined  as  the  doctrine  which  main- 
tains that  all  existence  is  mental  or  spiritual.  The  spirit- 
ualist is  not  always  careful  to  define  what  he  means  by 
spirit  and  mind,  usually  being  contented  with  the  negative 
explanation  that  he  means  what  is  not  material.    Of  recent 


178  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

years,  however,  there  has  been  a  decided  drift  toward  a 
more  empirical  conception  of  spirit.  Spirit  is  conscious- 
ness; or  it  is  conserving  and  creative  memory  which  reveals 
itself  in  consciousness.  The  main  thesis  of  spiritualism 
is  that  the  apparently  material  world  is  the  symbol  of 
realities  like  the  more  mental  aspects  of  ourselves. 

Spiritualism  has  had  various  forms,  differing  funda- 
mentally among  each  other.  Hence,  it  is  a  difficult  task 
to  give  the  gist  of  it  and  summarize  the  objections  which 
are  usually  urged  against  it.  During  the  Middle  Ages,  the 
prevailing  ontology  was  dualistic  for  it  accepted  a  material 
world  (created)  and  a  hierarchy  of  spirits.  Probably 
Leibnitz  was  the  first  thorough-going  spiritualist.  Be- 
ginning with  the  conception  of  substance  as  that  which 
exists  'per  se,  he  added  the  further  premise  that  only  that 
which  has  the  power  of  action  can  exist.  But,  he  main- 
tained, matter  is  passive  since  extension  is  its  essence 
(Descartes).  Therefore,  reality  must  be  immaterial  and 
unextended.  The  system  of  Leibnitz  in  all  of  its  brilliancy 
is  an  example  of  deductive  ontology.  The  premises  must 
be  granted  before  the  conclusion  follows. 

But  would  not  the  modern  thinker  hesitate  before  ac- 
cepting the  further  interpretations  with  which  Leibnitz 
loads  his  dynamic  conception  of  reality?  Are  we  so  certain 
to-day  that  only  mind  can  be  active?  Indeed,  is  not  the 
inclination  the  other  way,  so  that  consciousness  is  often 
thought  of  as  passive  and  ineffective.'^  Again,  would  the 
thinker  trained  in  modem  science  so  easily  admit  the  Car- 
tesian conception  of  matter  as  mere  passive  extension?  Yet 
Leibnitz's  argument  demands  this  as  its  opponent  position. 

One  of  the  chief  objections  the  modern  thinker  has  to  the 
systems  of  men  like  Descartes,  Spinoza  and  Leibnitz 
is  the  lack  of  an  epistemological  foundation  for  their  on- 


MATERIALISM  AND  SPIRITUALISM  179 

tological  theories.  Of  course,  there  is  an  epistemology, 
but  it  is  impHcit  and  relatively  uncritical.  Their  favorite 
procedure  was  to  begin  with  definitions  and  deduce  con- 
clusions from  insufficiently  tested  contrasts.  Can  we  not 
expect  better  results  in  the  long  run  from  a  more  inductive 
mode  of  reflection?  Philosophy  must  endeavor  to  find  out 
what  knowledge  is  and  how  it  is  referred  and  what  funda- 
mental concepts  are  discoverable  in  it. 

Let  us  examine  the  system  of  a  contemporary  spiritual- 
ist, Wilhelm  Wundt.  He  argues,  much  as  we  have  done, 
that  the  contrast  between  the  physical  and  the  psychical 
is  one  which  grows  up  within  experience.  The  physical 
sciences  develop  the  one  term  of  the  contrast  and  arrive 
at  the  atom  as  the  ultimate  physical  unit,  while  psychology 
investigates  the  other  term  and  reaches  the  assumption 
of  an  ultimate  qualitative  unit  called  will.  The  meta- 
physician must  somehow  harmonize  these  two  units.  The 
hypothesis  which,  according  to  Wundt,  does  this  most 
satisfactorily  is  the  assumption  of  a  will-atom  as  the  pri- 
mary element  of  reality. 

As  Hofifding  points  out  (Modern  Philosophers^  pp.  29- 
31),  Wundt  really  argues  much  as  Leibnitz  did.  "The 
world  must  be  cogitated  either  as  material  or  else  as  spirit- 
ual unity.  We  can  no  other.  Wundt's  choice  is  not  doubt- 
ful. The  only  activity  immediately  given  is,  and  remains  for 
us,  our  will."  It  will  be  remembered  that  both  Berkeley 
and  Leibnitz  used  these  principles  as  their  premises  also. 
But  let  us  examine  these  premises.  What  is  the  material 
world  but  the  world  we  gain  knowledge  about  in  the  phys- 
ical sciences.'^  Is  it  so  certain  that  this  world,  while  not  sim- 
ply composed  of  consciousness,  excludes  consciousness?  In 
other  words,  is  this  harsh  antithesis  with  which  all  these 
thinkers  begin,  a  justifiable  one  epistemologically?    We 


180  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

shall  examine  this  assumption  pretty  thoroughly  in  the 
succeeding  chapters.  The  second  assumption,  also,  needs 
overhauling.  What  is  this  "will"  of  which  Wundt  so 
confidently  speaks?  When  we  come  to  his  psychology,  we 
find  that  Wundt  "does  not  even  reckon  will  among  the 
elements  of  consciousness.  He  treats  the  phenomena  of 
will  as  the  most  composite  and  special  forms  of  conscious 
life,  and  numbers  only  sensations  and  feelings  among  the 
psychical  elements."  Hoffding,  p.  19.  Kiilpe,  at  one  time 
Wundt's  pupil,  decides  that  "no  one  of  the  elementary 
processes  of  our  mental  life  can  be  regarded  as  *  primary' 
in  any  absolute  and  exclusive  sense."  Introduction  to 
Philosophyy  p.  181.  Thus  it  cannot  be  denied — and 
I  think  that  practically  all  psychologists  would  back  me 
up  in  this  statement — that  Wundt's  metaphysical  hypothe- 
sis of  a  qualitative  will-atom  as  the  primary  element  of 
reality  has  slight  connection  with  the  facts  of  psychology. 
There  also  remains  the  further  question,  what  content  we 
must  give  to  the  fundamental  concept  of  activity.  Ac- 
tivity is  a  category.  Can  it  be  used  by  both  the  physical 
and  the  mental  sciences?  Or  is  it  confined,  as  Berkeley, 
Leibnitz  and  Wundt  assume,  to  the  mental  sciences? 
These  last  questions  should  make  the  student  realize 
the  intimate  connection  between  philosophy  and  the 
sciences.  A  philosophy  which  refuses  to  subject  itself  to  a 
cold  and  exhaustive  analysis  of  the  fundamental  ideas 
and  setting  of  the  sciences  is  not  continuous  with  science. 

Two  Types  of  Spiritualism. — It  is  possible  to  distin- 
guish two  types  of  spiritualism  which  may  be  designated 
realistic  spiritualism  and  idealistic  spiritualism  respectively. 
Historically,  Leibnitz,  Renouvier,  Ward,  Paulsen  and 
Wundt  may  be  classed  as  realistic  spiritualists,  while  the 
objective  idealists  and  mental  pluralists  may  be  classed 


MATERIALISM  AND  SPIRITUALISM  181 

as  idealistic  spiritualists.  Unfortunately,  the  epistemologi- 
cal  foundation  is  not  always  clearly  enough  indicated  nor 
logically  followed  out,  so  that  the  ontology  of  certain 
known  thinkers  can  only  be  spoken  of  as  spiritualistic. 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  the  objective  idealist  persuades 
himself  that  all  existence  is  mental  or  of  the  nature  of 
sentient  experience.  His  ontology  flows  from  his  episte- 
mology.  Mr.  F.  H.  Bradley  is  a  good  representative  of  a 
pretty  empirical  type  of  objective  idealism.  His  chief 
argument  in  favor  of  spiritualism  boils  down  to  the  ar- 
gument from  content:  "Find  any  piece  of  existence,  take 
up  anything  that  any  one  could  possibly  call  a  fact,  or 
could  in  any  sense  assert  to  have  being,  and  then  judge  if 
it  does  not  consist  in  sentient  experience."  Appearance 
and  Reality,  p.  145.  But  the  non-apprehensional  realist 
admits  that  everything  that  is  apprehended  is  mental. 
The  more  formal  objective  idealists  connect  with  the  Kan- 
tian and  Hegelian  tradition. 

Modern  realistic  spiritualism  is  taking  more  and  more 
the  form  of  what  is  called  panpsychism.  There  is  a  real 
world  independent  of  the  individual  knower;  but  this 
world  as  perceived  or  as  conceived  is  only  a  phenomenal 
world;  the  real  world  is  of  the  nature  of  consciousness 
which  is  the  only  kind  of  reality  we  have  direct  acquaint- 
ance with.  The  panpsychist  is  a  phenomenalist  who 
rejects  solipsism  and,  by  means  of  the  argument  from  an- 
alogy, convinces  himself  that  the  more  inclusive  reality 
must  be  mental.  A  surprisingly  large  number  of  psycholo- 
gists have  been  drawn  in  this  direction. 

We  must  leave  it  to  the  historian  of  philosophy  to  pre- 
sent and  analyze  the  many  variations  of  spiritualism. 
Human  ingenuity  and  mental  keenness  of  the  highest 
grade  have  been  at  work  constructing  systems  of  the  most 


182  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

abstract  and  subtle  kind.    But  no  system  is  stronger  than 
its  premises. 

References 

Biichner,  Force  and  Matter. 

FuUerton,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  14. 

Hobbes,  Works,  Molesworth  ed.  or  Selections  by  Calkins. 

Jerusalem,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  Fourth  Division. 

Kiilpe,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  3. 

Lange,  History  of  Materialism. 

Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy. 

Strong,  Why  the  Mind  Has  a  Body,  chaps.  8  and  10. 

Taylor,  Elements  of  Metaphysics,  bk.  2,  chap.  1, 

Ward,  Realm  of  Ends,  chap.  1. 

Windelband,  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophic, 


CHAPTER  XVI 
DUALISM  AND  CRITICAL  NATURALISM 

Natural  Dualism. — In  the  preceding  chapter,  we 
examined  two  characteristic  forms  of  monism,  materialism 
and  spiritualism.  These  are  clear-cut  and  unambiguous 
positions  which  seek  to  reduce  the  world  to  one  funda- 
mental kind  of  reality.  Materialism  and  spiritualism  are 
simple  and  emphatic  ontologies  which  claim  a  pretty  di- 
rect insight  into  the  very  stuff  of  reality.  The  mate- 
rialist proclaims  that  reality  is  matter  and  that  there 
can  be  no  doubt  at  all  about  the  nature  of  matter.  The 
spirituahst,  or  mentalist,  is  equally  certain  that  all  re- 
ality is  mental  and  that  everyone  knows  what  the  mental 
is.  After  carefully  examining  their  respective  claims,  we 
became  convinced  that  both  ontologies  were  too  naive. 
Neither  is  founded  on  a  satisfactory  epistemology  and 
neither  does  justice  to  the  distinctions  characteristic  of 
experience.  In  a  very  real  sense,  each  establishes  itself 
but  does  not  disprove  its  opponent.  There  is  a  measure 
of  truth  in  materialism,  yet  there  is  also  a  measure  of 
truth  in  mentalism.  Evidently,  these  simplified  monisms 
are  overhasty  constructions  which  will  not  stand  critical 
inspection. 

Reflection  on  the  inadequacy  of  materialism  and  spirit- 
ualism has  led  many  thinkers  of  late  to  champion  dualism 
as  at  least  a  more  valid  starting-point  for  metaphysics. 
It  is  held  that  both  physical  things  and  minds  are  revealed 
in  experience  and  that  these  two  classes  of  phenomena  are 

X83 


184  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

obviously  different  from  each  other  and  equally  ultimate. 
A  couple  of  quotations  will  make  this  rejection  of  material- 
ism and  spiritualism  in  favor  of  both  matter  and  mind 
somewhat  clearer. 

"The  plain  man  finds  himself  in  a  world  of  physical 
things  and  of  minds,  and  it  seems  to  him  that  his  experi- 
ence testifies  directly  to  the  existence  of  both.  This 
means  that  the  things  of  which  he  has  experience  appear 
to  belong  to  two  distinct  classes."  Fullerton,  An  Intro- 
duction to  Philosophy,  p.  202.  Thus  Fullerton  maintains 
that  physical  things  and  mental  facts  are  both  given  in 
experience  and  are  clearly  distinguishable  from  each  other. 
It  is  absurd  to  try  to  reduce  the  one  class  to  the  other. 

A  more  moderate  statement  of  the  position  of  the  natural 
dualist  is  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Sidgwick.  Natural 
dualism  is  for  him  the  position  of  common  sense.  *'  For 
there  is  this  advantage  in  putting  questions  from  the  point 
of  view  of  Common  Sense:  that  it  is,  in  some  degree,  in 
the  minds  of  us  all,  even  of  the  metaphysicians  whose 
conclusions  are  most  opposed  to  it — such  as  the  extreme 
Sensationalist  or  Idealist.  It  is  the  view  with  which  we  all 
start  when  we  begin  to  philosophize.  ...  In  saying  this 
I  do  not  mean  to  affirm — as  some  who  have  maintained 
Natural  Dualism  as  a  philosophical  conclusion  have  af- 
firmed— that  Natural  Dualism  is  involved  in  the  original 
presentation  of  the  objects  of  experience  to  the  experienc- 
ing mind.  All  I  affirm  is  that  we  find  it  in  our  ordinary 
thought  when  we  begin  to  reflect  on  it,  nor  can  we  by  the 
utmost  effort  of  memory  recall  a  time  when  we  did  not 
explicitly  hold  it.  If  the  behef  in  an  external  material 
world  existing  as  we  know  it  independently  of  our  knowing 
it — so  that  our  knowledge  of  it  does  not  affect  its  exist- 
ence— if  this  belief  is  the  result  of  inference  from  data 


DUALISM  AND  CRITICAL  NATURALISM       185 

given  originally  as  merely  mental  fact,  this  process  of  in- 
ference preceded  the  stage  of  conscious  reflection.  I  ought 
further  to  explain  that  in  speaking  of  Common  Sense  I 
do  not  mean  entirely  unscientific  Common  Sense,  but  the 
Common  Sense  of  educated  persons  rectified  by  a  general 
acquaintance  with  the  results  and  methods  of  physical 
science."  Sidgwick,  Philosophy y  Its  Scope  and  Relations , 
pp.  42-3. 

When  we  come  to  examine  the  writings  of  these  dualists 
with  care,  we  soon  find  that  their  epistemology  is  very 
similar  to  that  of  Natural  Realism.  They  are  either  pre- 
sentative  or  representative  realists  or  a  vague  mixture  of 
both.  Here,  again,  we  find  that  ontology  is  founded  on 
epistemology.  The  dualist's  quarrel  with  the  materialist 
is  not  so  much  in  regard  to  the  conception  of  matter  as 
in  regard  to  the  standing  of  mind.  Both  assume  that  the 
physical  world  is  an  object  of  knowledge,  but  the  dualist 
asserts  that  the  mental  realm  is  equally  real  and  irreduci- 
ble. In  opposition  to  the  spiritualist,  he  maintains  that 
the  physical  world  is  known  and  known  to  be  different 
from  mind. 

What  Are  Mind  and  Matter? — One  of  the  unsatis- 
factory features  of  materialism,  spiritualism,  and  dualism 
is  the  glib  way  in  which  the  terms  "mind"  and  "matter" 
are  employed.  Surely  the  reader  has  already  been  asking 
himself  what  is  meant  by  these  terms.  Let  us  see  whether 
we  can  make  out. 

According  to  Sidgwick,  there  is  a  general  recognition 
that  psychical  changes  are,  as  objects  of  experience,  al- 
together distinct  from  the  nervous  changes  that  accom- 
pany them.  "Since  Descartes,  philosophical  thought  has 
found  no  difficulty  in  distinguishing  the  thinking,  feeling, 
willing  thing  that  each  one  of  us  is  conscious  of  being, 


186  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

from  the  complex  aggregate  of  extended  solid  ^particles  which 
each  of  us  calls  his  body.*'  Ibid.,  pp.  52-3.  Obviously, 
matter  is  simply  a  term  for  the  material  world  as  this  is 
conceived  in  science  as  extended,  dynamic,  conserved. 
"Our  mental  states  exist  in  time,  have  duration;  the  ob- 
jects of  nature  all  have  length,  breadth,  and  thickness, 
as  well  as  duration."  Marvin,  An  Introduction  to  Phi- 
losophy, p.  209.  Consciousness  is  the  unextended,  that 
which  exists  only  in  time,  that  which  we  feel  immediately. 
Such  is  the  contrast  which  the  dualist  has  in  mind. 

Why  Mind  and  Matter  are  Held  to  Be  Distinct. — The 
dualist  asserts  that  mind  and  matter  are  clearly  and  ob- 
viously distinct.  Why  is  he  so  certain  of  this  disparate- 
ness? As  our  quotations  have  shown,  he  seldom  gives  ex- 
plicit reasons  but,  instead,  treats  the  distinctness  of  the 
two  realities  as  evident  and  undeniable.  But  a  study 
of  dualistic  literature  soon  reveals  the  motives  at  work. 
We  shall  content  ourselves  with  pointing  out  three  of  the 
more  important  ones.  First,  the  dualist  starts  from  the 
position  we  have  called  Natural  Dualism,  which  is  closely 
connected  with  Natural  Realism.  An  examination  of  the 
development  of  Natural  Dualism  by  science  convinces 
him  that  the  distinction  between  the  physical  world  and 
the  realm  of  knowing  and  feeling  minds  is  genuine  and 
ultimate.  Second,  the  inability  of  past  thinkers  to  achieve 
a  clear  and  satisfactory  monism  of  an  intelligible  sort 
makes  him  skeptical  of  all  attempts  to  overcome  and  tran- 
scend the  apparently  given  contrast  between  the  physical 
and  the  mental.  Third,  the  categories  which  apply  to 
consciousness  are  certainly  widely  different  in  many  re- 
spects from  those  which  apply  to  the  physical  world  as 
known  by  the  physical  sciences.  Let  us  look  at  these 
dualistic  motives  a  little  more  closely. 


DUALISM  AND  CRITICAL  NATURALISM       187 

The  dualist  is,  as  we  have  suggested,  a  presentative  or  a 
representative  realist.  When  he  is  a  presentative  realist, 
he  believes  that  the  material  world  is  given  as  an  object 
to  mind  just  as  immediately  as  the  mental  realm  itself 
is.  Physical  objects  can,  therefore,  be  inspected  and  are 
seen  to  be  different  from  the  acts  of  consciousness,  the 
feelings,  motions  and  volitions  which  are  set  over  against 
them  on  the  subjective  side.  The  distinctness  of  these  two 
realms  is  a  datum  of  comparison  as  well  founded  as  the 
fact  that  black  is  not  white.  The  representative  realist 
is  faced  by  greater  epistemological  difficulties  because  his 
position  is  not  so  naive  and  gives  greater  play  to  critical 
reflection;  but  he,  also,  is  convinced  that  he  knows  the 
physical  world  as  well  as  the  mental  realm  and  therefore 
is  aware  that  they  are  different.  It  must  be  remembered 
that  the  representative  realist  believes  that  he  apprehends 
the  material  world,  even  though  indirectly  through  a 
revelatory  idea.  As  for  the  presentative  realist,  both 
kinds  of  realities  are  objects  open  to  inspection.  How, 
then,  can  there  be  any  mistake? 

It  may  be  well  to  stress  the  fact  that,  for  the  form  of 
realism  which  we  have  favored,  the  physical  world  is  not 
apprehended  either  directly  or  by  means  of  mental  sub- 
stitutes, while  mental  objects  are.  Hence  non-apprehen- 
sional  realism  holds  that  the  comparison  upon  which  the 
other  forms  of  realism  depend  for  their  assurance  of  dual- 
ism cannot  be  instituted  except  by  a  mistake  which  takes 
mental  objects  to  be  physical  realities.  So  much  for  this 
foundation  of  dualism. 

The  inability  of  past  thinkers  to  achieve  a  satisfactory 
monism  must  also  be  regarded  as  a  motive  at  work  re- 
enforcing  a  contemporary  drift  toward  dualism.  The  old 
speculative  attempts  at  a  transcendental  union  of  mind  and 


188  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

matter  in  the  bosom  of  an  absolute  substance  have  lost 
their  savor  in  the  more  empirical  atmosphere  of  the  pres- 
ent, while  efforts  to  prove  that  the  distinction  between 
the  physical  and  the  psychical  is  only  a  contrast  within 
experience  have  not  met  with  success.  The  most  suggest- 
ive approach  along  this  line  is  that  made  by  Ernst  Mach. 
It  has,  however,  pretty  obvious  faults  which  have  pre- 
vented its  general  acceptance.  The  consequence  of  this 
failure  of  monism  has  been  an  increased  respect  for  Natural 
Dualism. 

The  physical  sciences  have  developed  a  set  of  categories, 
or  fundamental  concepts,  which  differ  markedly  from 
those  developed  by  psychology.  The  physical  world  as 
known  by  the  physical  sciences  is  spatially  measurable, 
massive  and  dynamic.  Its  changes  are  changes  of  position 
and  of  the  distribution  and  form  of  the  energy  involved. 
Since  the  knowledge  achieved  is  of  this  character,  the 
scientist  naturally  conceives  the  world  in  terms  of  these 
concepts.  It  is  a  spatial,  massive  and  energy-containing 
world.  Moreover,  it  is  a  substantial  and  conserved  world 
which  neither  increases  nor  decreases  in  quantity. 

Psychology,  on  the  other  hand,  has  long  been  moving 
in  the  contrary  direction.  The  psychical  is  intermittent, 
non-massive,  and  essentially  a  temporal  process.  Psychol- 
ogy has  its  own  data,  and  this  is  its  view  of  its  subject- 
matter. 

The  consequence  of  this  contrast  between  the  funda- 
mental concepts  of  the  two  types  of  science  has  been  a 
deepening  of  the  dualism  with  which  common  sense  starts. 
What  hope  is  there  of  a  monism  when  every  advance  seems 
to  confirm  Natural  Dualism?  The  suggestion  made  by 
Wilhelm  Ostwald  that  consciousness  is  a  form  of  energy 
has  been  rejected  by  the  majority  of  thinkers  as  a  merely 


DUALISM  AND  CRITICAL  NATURALISM       189 

verbal  solution  at  the  best  and,  at  the  worst,  an  illogical 
extension  of  the  concept  of  energy  from  its  physical  mean- 
ing, where  it  is  a  quantity,  to  consciousness  which  is  not  a 
quantity. 

The  Setting  of  Physical  Science. — Since  the  important 
consciousness-body  problem  reflects  Natural  Dualism  and 
its  developed  form,  scientific  dualism,  it  may  be  well  to 
get  to  the  foundation  of  these  dualisms  as  completely  as 
possible.  We  have  pointed  out  that  the  standpoint  of 
Natural  Realism  is  closely  connected  with  Natural  Dual- 
ism. I  see  this  book  and  take  it  to  be  an  independent 
thing  whose  very  nature  is  open  to  inspection.  I  don't 
see  what  I  call  consciousness  either  in  it  or  about  it.  At 
this  level,  consciousness  is  thought  of  as  an  inner  sphere 
somehow  in  the  background  and  related  to  my  body.  All 
the  material  for  a  dualism  is  present  in  this  outlook. 
Now  the  physical  scientist  works  in  and  from  this  setting. 
His  atoms  are  like  the  things  perceived  in  this  regard. 
They  are  known,  yet  are  quite  external  to  the  knowing  and 
all  that  is  concerned  with  the  knowing.  This  outlook  is 
strengthened  by  the  fact  pointed  out  above  that  his  data 
and  theories  fall  into  categories  like  space,  mass,  energy 
and  motion  which  differ  from  those  into  which  the  data 
of  psychology  fall.  The  result  is  that  the  physical  sciences 
conceive  the  physical  world  in  terms  of  their  knowledge 
and,  encouraged  by  the  setting  of  Natural  Dualism,  as- 
sume that  their  knowledge  exhausts  the  nature  of  the  phys- 
ical world. 

The  Setting  of  Psychology. — Psychology  is  a  special 
science  like  any  other  special  science  so  far  as  its  setting 
goes.  Hence,  the  psychologist,  also,  begins  with  the  out- 
look of  Natural  Realism  and  Natural  Dualism;  only  he  is 
concerned  with  the  inner  sphere  of  experience  which  the 


190  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

physical  scientist  disregards.  His  study  of  this  inner  realm 
leads  him  to  develop  the  categories  referred  to  above. 
Moreover,  he  is  confronted  with  the  apparent  connection 
of  consciousness  with  the  body,  a  fact  which  physics  and 
chemistry  can  ignore.  He  is  convinced  that  the  stream  of 
consciousness  is  somehow  related  to  the  brain.  Yet,  be- 
cause extension  is  a  fundamental  category  of  the  physical 
realm,  lack  of  it  is  judged  a  feature  of  consciousness.  We 
feel  certain  that  we  cannot  lay  hold  of  another's  conscious- 
ness and  pick  it  to  pieces  as  we  can  a  physical  thing.  Con- 
sciousness is  intangible  and  cannot  be  buffeted  about  like 
a  ball.  It  cannot  be  measured  by  superposing  a  yard- 
stick upon  it.  It  must  be  located  somehow  in  the  head, 
in  one  of  the  physical  things  rather  than  among  them. 
These  conclusions  probably  give  a  large  share  of  its  mean- 
ing to  the  statement,  made  by  both  psychologists  and 
philosophers,  that  consciousness  is  unextended. 

Is  This  Contrast  Justified? — We  have  helped  the 
dualist  to  work  out  the  contrast  between  consciousness 
and  the  physical  realm.  It  is  the  validity  of  this  antithesis 
which  he  upholds  against  the  materialist  who  wishes  to 
belittle  consciousness  and  the  spiritualist  who  desires  to  do 
away  with  the  physical.  But  it  will  be  remembered  that 
in  a  preceding  chapter  (Chap.  IX)  we  had  already  dis- 
covered this  contrast  as  one  which  inevitably  develops 
within  the  individual's  experience.  The  question  which 
now  arises  is  that  of  its  significance  for  ontology.  If  my 
consciousness  is  distinguishable  from  the  acknowledged 
realm  of  the  physical  about  which  I  can  gain  knowledge, 
must  it  be  regarded  as  alien  to  it?  Does  this  distinction  in- 
volve a  dualism  of  two  kinds  of  realities?  The  dualist  holds 
that  it  does.  We,  on  the  contrary,  admit  that  the  con- 
trast between  the  knower's  consciousness  and  the  physical 


DUALISM  AND  CRITICAL  NATURALISM       191 

develops  naturally  and  stands  out  as  a  significant  epis- 
temological  contrast  but  regard  the  quick  leap  to  an 
ontological  dualism  as  unjustified.  The  question  before 
us  is  this,  Can  we  acknowledge  this  contrast  and  yet  so 
interpret  it  as  to  avoid  dualism? 

Cartesian  Dualism. — The  logic  of  dualism  comes  out 
very  clearly  in  its  Cartesian  form.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  Descartes  taught  that  the  essence  of  the  physical 
world  is  extension,  while  the  essence  of  the  world  of  thought 
is  thinking.  In  other  words,  Descartes  formulated  a 
dualism  of  two  substances,  alien  to  each  other,  whose  re- 
spective essences  were  revealed  in  extension  and  thinking. 
Extension  and  thinking  are  supposed  to  give  insight  into 
the  very  depths  of  these  two  substances  or  realities.  Think- 
ing reality  is  not  extended,  and  extended  reality  does  not 
think.  But  this  formulation  is  very  a  priori  and  dia- 
lectical. What  should  we  mean  by  essence?  When  we 
say  that  the  physical  world  is  extended,  does  this  mean 
any  more  than  that  it  is  measurable  and  that  its  parts 
exclude  each  other  dynamically?  And  this  is  surely  knowl- 
edge about  the  physical  world,  but  just  as  surely  no  such 
mysterious  revelation  of  the  stuff  of  the  corporeal  world 
as  Descartes  assumed.  But  when  we  examine  dualism, 
we  always  find  that  it  assumes  that  we  have  such  knowl- 
edge of  the  physical  world  as  to  convince  us  that  con- 
sciousness must  be  excluded  from  it.  The  outlook  of  appre- 
hensional  realisms  is  never  far  from  dualism.  The  dualist 
just  knows  that  the  physical  is  entirely  different  in  its 
very  stuff  from  consciousness  so  that  they  can  no  more  mix 
than  oil  and  water  can. 

We  do  not  Apprehend  the  Physical  World. — Let  us 
recall  that  we  came  to  the  epistemological  conclusion  that 
we  cannot  apprehend  the  physical  world  either  directly 


192  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

or  representatively  but  can  obtain  knowledge  about  it  in 
terms  of  propositions.  Now  it  is  easy  to  see  that  dualism 
is  founded  upon  the  assumption  that  we  do  possess  ap- 
prehensional  knowledge  of  the  physical  and  so  know  by 
comparison  with  the  mental  that  the  two  are  different. 
But  since  we  hold  that  consciousness  is  the  only  reality 
whose  very  stuff  is  given  and  tliat  we  have  only  knowledge 
about  the  physical  world,  this  comparison  is  not  open. 
Dualism,  in  other  words,  is  founded  on  a  false  episte- 
mology. 

But  even  though  we  do  not  apprehend  the  physical 
world,  may  it  not  be  that  the  knowledge  about  it  which  the 
physical  sciences  have  achieved  contradicts  consciousness? 
Can  that  which  is  extended  and  dynamic  and  conserved 
contain  consciousness?  I  must  confess  that  I  see  no  con- 
tradiction. Let  it  be  remembered  that  we  are  not  saying 
that  consciousness  is  co-extensive  with  the  physical  world 
nor  that  consciousness  is  a  revelation  of  the  whole  nature 
of  the  physical  world.  All  we  are  maintaining  is  that  con- 
sciousness can  be  regarded  as  part  of  the  nature  of  the 
physical  world  without  any  conflict  with  the  truth  of  the 
judgments  which  the  physical  sciences  pass  upon  nature. 
If  so,  there  is  no  reason  to  assert  a  dualism  with  the  phys- 
ical as  one  term  and  consciousness  as  the  other.  The 
physical  and  the  mental  sciences  supplement  each  other. 

A  Monistic  Interpretation  of  the  Distinction  between 
Consciousness  and  the  Physical  World. — But  this  denial 
that  there  is  either  an  epistemological  or  a  scientific  reason 
to  assert  that  consciousness  is  alien  to  the  physical  w^orld 
leaves  us  with  the  problem  of  interpreting  the  empirical 
distinction  between  consciousness  and  the  physical  world 
upon  which  the  dualist  builds  so  heavily  because  of  his 
false  epistemology.     Yet  a  little  reflection  shows  us  a 


DUALISM  AND  CRITICAL  NATURALISM       193 

natural  interpretation.  Looking  back  at  the  motives  for 
the  distinction,  we  realize  that  an  important  one  was  the 
distinction  between  things  and  ideas.  We  saw  how  re- 
flection developed  this  contrast  into  that  between  an  ac- 
knowledged and  known  realm  conditioning  consciousness 
and  consciousness  itself.  Consciousness  is  experienced 
while  this  controlling  realm  is  only  known.  When  we 
are  thinking  about  this  acknowledged  realm  in  terms  of  the 
knowledge  secured  by  the  physical  sciences,  we  arrive  at 
the  contrast  between  consciousness  and  the  physical 
which  we  indicated  a  few  pages  ago  and  which  we  now 
see  involves  no  ontological  dualism. 

Critical  Naturalism. — The  ontological  position  at 
which  we  have  arrived  as  a  result  of  the  progressive  criti- 
cism of  materialism,  spiritualism  and  dualism  in  the  light 
of  non-apprehensional  realism  can  be  called  critical  natural- 
ism. Materialism  is  an  attempt  to  secure  naturalism  which 
fails  because  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  theory  of  knowledge 
on  which  it  is  based.  It  cannot  do  justice  to  the  distinc- 
tions characteristic  of  experience.  Dualism  attempts  to 
do  justice  to  the  distinctions  of  experience  but  misinter- 
prets them  as  a  consequence  of  the  belief  that  the  distinc- 
tion between  consciousness  and  the  physical  world  con- 
sists of  the  presentation  of  two  kinds  of  reality.  This 
misinterpretation  is  the  result  of  apprehensional  realism. 
Spiritualism,  on  the  other  hand,  is  just  as  one-sided  as 
materialism  but  seeks  to  justify  this  one-sidedness  by  an 
appeal  to  idealism. 

The  truth  of  critical  naturalism  rests  upon  the  truth 
of  the  theory  of  knowledge  which  it  presupposes.  The 
foundation  of  that  has  already  been  suflSciently  given  and 
need  not  be  repeated.  But  the  manner  in  which  it  leads 
to  an  ontology  which  meets  all  the  problems  with  such 


194  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ease  and  simplicity  must  certainly  be  regarded  as  an 
additional  argument  in  its  favor.  As  we  suggested  at  the 
opening  of  the  preceding  chapter,  a  satisfactory  meta- 
physics must  be  regarded  as  a  verification  of  an  epistemol- 
ogy,  just  as  an  unsatisfactory  one  must  be  considered  a 
reason  for  reexamination.  The  crucial  test  of  critical 
naturalism  will  come  in  the  consciousness-body  problem. 
But  we  must  first  gain  a  clearer  idea  of  a  few  basic 
categories.  To  this  end,  we  shall  now  pass  to  a  study  of 
space,  time  and  substance. 

References 

Fullerton,  An  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  14. 

Mach,  The  Analysis  of  the  Sensations. 

Ostwald,  Vorlesungen  uher  Naturphilosophie. 

Sellars,  Critical  Realism,  chap.  2. 

Sidgwick,  Philosophy,  Its  Scope  and  Relations,  lecture  3. 

Smith,  Studies  in  the  Cartesian  Philosophy,  chap.  3. 

Ward,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  vol.  2. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE  WORLD   AS  KNOWN  BY  THE   PHYSICAL 
SCIENCES:    SPACE 

About  the  Categories. — It  has  become  customary  for 
philosophers  to  speak  of  fundamental  features  of  the  world 
as  known  as  categories.  Thus  we  think  of  nature  as  spatial 
and  in  time,  of  things  as  having  position  and  size,  of  sub- 
stances as  possessing  properties,  of  events  as  caused.  Such 
fundamental  predicates  which  recur  in  scientific  knowledge 
are  called  categories.  They  are  not  things  or  events  but 
general  characteristics  of  things  and  events  as  these  are 
known.  We  ask  how  large  a  thing  is,  when  it  happened, 
how  long  a  process  took  to  occur,  how  it  is  related  to  other 
things,  what  its  structure  and  pro'perties  are.  These  gen- 
eral headings  for  investigation  about  the  world  under 
which  we  can  catalogue  our  knowledge  and  in  terms  of 
which  we  think  of  reality  are  of  obvious  importance  for 
metaphysics.  Much  of  its  task,  in  fact,  consists  in  the 
attempt  to  analyze  and  understand  the  full  import  of  these 
primary  terms  of  our  knowledge  about  the  world.  They 
furnish  the  framework  which  specific  information  helps 
to  fill  out.  It  is  with  these  basic  concepts,  or  headings, 
which  are  omnipresent  in  science,  but  seldom  investigated, 
that  the  philosopher  is  concerned. 

Space  a  Category  of  the  Physical  Sciences. — In  our 
examination  of  the  distinction  between  the  physical  world 
and  consciousness,  we  discovered  that  spatiality  is  a 
fundamental  characteristic  of  the  physical  world  as  known 

195 


196  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

by  the  physical  sciences.  In  fact,  we  saw  that  it  is  custom- 
ary to  use  it  as  a  defining  attribute.  The  physical  is  spatial 
or  in  space.  We  must  conclude,  then,  that  space  is  a 
category  essential  to  our  knowledge  of  nature. 

But  we  cannot  let  the  matter  rest  there  and  take  it  for 
granted  that  we  know  adequately  without  severe  reflec- 
tion what  we  mean  by  space.  Is  space  a  receptacle  into 
which  physical  things  are  put?  Or  is  it  an  attribute  some- 
how attached  to  the  physical  world  .f^  Is  space,  as  Des- 
cartes thought,  a  revelation  of  the  essence  of  the  physical  .'^ 
Such  questions  as  these  arise  for  consideration  and  begin 
the  demand  that  we  analyze  this  category  to  see  what  it 
implies. 

Five  Kinds  of  Space. — Strange  as  it  may  seem  to  the 
reader,  there  are  at  least  five  distinguishable  kinds  of  space. 
These  are :  sensational  space,  perceptual  space,  conceptual 
space,  abstract  mathematical  space,  and,  finally,  space 
as  a  category  of  physical  science.  Those  who  have  not 
realized  that  there  are  these  different  kinds  are  prone  to 
raise  questions  which  are  relevant  to  one  kind  and  apply 
the  answers  to  the  other  kinds.  The  result  of  this  confusion 
has  been  disastrous. 

Sensational  Space. — It  is  the  task  of  the  psychologist 
to  discover  the  various  factors  whose  genetic  synthesis 
leads  to  the  perceptual  level  at  which  we  all  live.  As- 
suredly, the  abilitj^  to  distinguish  position,  order  and 
distance  is  largely  the  function  of  the  inter-play  of  elements 
in  which  the  experience  of  movement  seems  to  be  pre- 
dominant. Much  of  the  vital  meaning  of  spatial  relations 
is  due  to  the  judgment  of  the  extent  and  direction  of  the 
movements  which  interpret  them.  But  laboratory  analy- 
sis has  shown  that  the  various  senses  have  primitive 
spatial    experiences    which    are    qualitatively    different. 


THE  WORLD  AND  PHYSICAL  SCIENCES       197 

Visual  space  is  not  the  same  as  tactual  space.  Yet  the 
mind  always  works  out  a  satisfactory  correspondence  be- 
tween them.  We  can  see  the  sharp  corner  that  we  feel 
and  so  merge  vision  and  touch.  An  instance  of  a  region 
for  which  no  such  satisfactory  correspondence  has  been 
established  is  the  cavity  of  the  mouth.  "The  interior  of 
one's  mouth-cavity  feels  larger  when  explored  by  the 
tongue  than  when  looked  at.  The  crater  of  a  newly  ex- 
tracted tooth,  and  the  movements  of  a  loose  tooth  in  its 
socket  feel  quite  monstrous."  Here  we  are  nearer  an 
undeveloped  spatial  experience.  It  is  obvious  that  we 
have  to  do  with  consciousness.  Sensational  space  exists 
only  in  consciousness. 

Perceptual  Space. — This  normal  space  arises  at  a  level 
at  which  the  synthesis  of  the  various  sources  of  experi- 
ence has  been  pushed  a  long  way.  Visual  and  tactual 
space  have  been  brought  together  so  intimately  that 
we  pass  from  the  one  to  the  other  without  any  sense  of 
break. 

But  the  perceptual  level  is  likewise  the  level  of  things 
and  their  qualities;  it  is  the  stage  of  Natural  Realism.  As 
we  should  expect,  perceptual  space  reflects  the  outlook 
of  common  sense  and  appears  in  the  completest  harmony 
with  "things."  Things  are  extended,  they  have  positions, 
they  are  at  certain  distances  and  directions  from  one 
another.  The  whole  perceptual  field  arises  together  and 
what  we  have  called  perceptual  space  is  just  an  aspect 
or  form  of  it.  But  we  must  conclude  that  this  space  is 
inseparable  from  the  perceptual  things  of  which  it  is  an 
essential  ingredient.  The  breakdown  of  Natural  Realism 
has  its  import  for  perceptual  space  just  as  it  has  for  per- 
ceptual things.  Neither  can  exist  apart  from  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  individual  percipient. 


198  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Conceptual  Space. — The  development  of  our  space- 
experience  continues,  and  space  becomes  more  and  more 
conceptual  in  character.  Perceptual  space  is  the  synthe- 
sis of  motor,  tactual  and  visual  factors,  while  conceptual 
space  is  the  result  of  the  tendency  of  various  instances  of 
perceptual  space  to  add  themselves  together  and  give  the 
representation  of  a  continuous  world  spread  out  equally 
in  every  direction.  The  individual  perceives  only  a  por- 
tion of  this  continuous  world  at  any  one  time  but  assumes 
and  conceives  the  rest.  This  conceived  realm  is  the  phys- 
ical world  at  the  level  of  Natural  Realism.  We  admit 
that  we  see  only  the  part  under  our  eyes  but  know  that 
there  is  a  wider  domain  like  the  part  we  see.  Thus  we 
must  regard  this  conceptual  space  as  the  form  of  the  con- 
ceived world  of  Natural  Realism.  The  physical  world  is 
still  regarded  as  something  capable  of  being  apprehended. 
Things  are  spatial  and  in  space  just  as  they  are  red  and 
heavy.  The  vague  consciousness  of  this  larger,  more  in- 
clusive realm  floats  in  our  minds  while  any  part  of  it  is  being 
perceived.  How  does  this  conception  and  belief  arise? 
"Different  impressions  on  the  same  sense-organ  do  inter- 
fere with  each  other's  perception  and  cannot  well  be  at- 
tended to  at  once.  Hence,  we  do  not  locate  them  in  each 
other's  spaces,  but  arrange  them  in  a  serial  order  of  ex- 
teriority, each  alongside  of  the  rest,  in  a  space  larger  than 
that  which  any  sensation  brings.  This  larger  space  is, 
however,  an  object  of  conception  rather  than  of  direct 
intuition,  and  bears  all  the  marks  of  being  constructed 
piecemeal  by  the  mind."  James,  Principles  of  Psychology, 
Vol.  II,  p.  185. 

This  conceptual  space,  also,  is  inseparable  from  the 
physical  world  as  conceived  at  the  level  of  Natural  Real- 
ism.   It  is  apprehended  by  the  mind's  eye  and  is  the  form 


THE  WORLD  AND  PHYSICAL  SCIENCES       199 

and  essential  feature  of  the  accepted  physical  realm. 
There  is,  moreover,  no  limit,  so  far  as  common  sense  and 
science  can  see,  to  the  process  of  extension.  Astronomy 
tells  its  marvels  of  constellations  beyond  constellations  in 
pathless  space,  and  the  mind  grows  weary  in  continuing 
a  process  of  addition  to  which  there  seems  to  be  no  neces- 
sary end.  Yet  it  is  important  to  note  that  space  is  always 
intertwined  with  bodies  just  as  it  is  for  the  physical  realm 
before  our  eyes.  Space  is  still  the  form  and  part  of  the  con- 
tent of  the  apprehended  world.  It  is  not  a  receptaculum 
into  which  things  are  somehow  put  bid  a  distinguishable 
aspect  of  the  apprehended  world. 

Mathematical  Space. — The  position  we  shall  adopt 
and  defend  is  that  mathematical  space  is  a  construction 
made  by  the  human  mind  working  upon  normal  concept- 
ual space  under  the  guidance  of  mathematical  interests. 
We  do  not  infer  mathematical  space  in  some  mysterious 
way  but  create  it  out  of  conceptual  space  by  abstraction 
and  idealization.  We  disregard  any  aspect  of  the  sensible 
world  but  its  extension.  We  learn  to  abstract  from  the 
things  of  which  conceptual  space  is  the  form  and  part  of 
the  content.  In  this  way,  we  obtain  the  concept  of  an 
empty  space  which  is  homogeneous  in  all  directions.  There 
can  be  little  doubt  that  this  process  of  abstractive  construc- 
tion is  aided  by  the  fact  that  bodies  change  their  relations 
without  changing  their  forms.  This  experience  of  rigid 
bodies  which  move  from  place  enables  the  mind  to  advance 
to  the  conception  of  space  as  such. 

Mathematical  space  is  an  apprehended  object  ancl,  as 
such,  exists  only  for  the  minds  which  apprehend  it.  We 
must  conclude  that  it  does  not  exist  outside  of  conscious- 
ness. But  since  this  is  true  for  the  sensible  and  phenomenal 
world  of  things  which  we  apprehend,  it  must  not  be  re- 


200  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

garded  as  at  all  derogating  from  the  value  of  mathemat- 
ical objects.  Their  mental  character  does  not  affect  their 
content  or  the  truth  of  the  propositions  which  are  demon- 
strated about  them  with  such  care. 

Is  Space  Infinite  and  Infinitely  Divisible? — We  as- 
serted that  questions  are  often  asked  of  one  kind  of  space 
which  are  meaningless  when  applied  to  other  kinds.  The 
question  of  infinity  is  an  instance  of  this.  Sensational 
space  is  not  infinite,  nor  is  perceptual  space  with  its  given 
horizon.  When  we  ask  whether  conceptual  space  is  infinite, 
we  usually  mean  to  enquire  whether  the  physical  world  is 
infinite;  for  concrete,  conceptual  space  is  only  the  form  of 
the  visible  world.  We  shall  again  ask  the  question  of  in- 
finity when  we  come  to  the  category,  which  concerns  a  part 
of  our  knowledge  about  the  real  physical  world.  At 
present,  we  are  enquiring  whether  mathematical  space  is 
infinite. 

I  see  no  reason  why  the  philosopher  should  not  agree 
with  the  mathematican  who  asserts  that  mathematical 
space  is  continuous  and  potentially  infinite.  When  a 
mathematician  speaks  of  an  infinite  number  of  points  be- 
tween any  two  positions  on  a  straight  line,  he  means  that 
this  portion  is  a  continuum.  In  a  continuum,  there  is  no 
next  position,  but  always  one  between  and  so  on  indefi- 
nitely. But  is  mathematical  space  infinite  in  extent? 
Certainly  no  apprehended  space  is  infinite.  But  if  we  can 
think  of  no  natural  limits  to  space,  we  can  conceive  it 
as  extensible  beyond  any  given  limits.  In  fact,  thought 
is  not  able  to  place  a  limit  to  the  possible  relations  and  ar- 
rangements of  mathematical  objects. 

Space  as  a  Category. — To  be  cognitively  objective,  a 
category  must  be  an  essential  element  in  the  framework 
of  knowledge.    If  space  is  such  a  category,  we  have  the 


THE  WORLD  AND  PHYSICAL  SCIENCES       201 

right  to  speak  of  the  physical  world  as  spatial.  But  we 
must  be  very  careful  to  avoid  an  apprehensional  view  of 
the  world.  We  must  simply  ask  ourselves  what  is  known 
about  the  physical  world  under  the  heading  of  space. 

The  physical  world  is  known  as  measurable  and  ordered 
in  a  side-by-side  fashion.  Thus  the  more  we  know  about 
the  constitution  and  dynamic  relations  of  the  physical 
world,  the  more  we  know  about  the  world  as  spatial.  To 
assert  that  nature  is  spatial  does  not  mean  that  nature  is 
in  a  semi-reality  called  space  or  that  mathematical  space 
is  an  attribute  of  the  physical  world,  but  simply  that  our 
knowledge  contains  measurement  in  terms  of  units,  that 
things  exclude  one  another  and  are  ordered  in  their  rela- 
tive positions.  Such  knowledge  is  preliminary  and  needs 
filling  out,  yet  it  is  true  as  far  as  it  goes.  It  is  readily 
seen,  however,  that,  far  from  giving  us  a  vision  of  the  es- 
sence of  nature,  it  only  furnishes  the  framework  for  the 
investigations  of  the  more  empirical  sciences  like  chemistry 
and  biology. 

Is  the  Physical  World  Finite? — One  of  the  puzzles  of 
metaphysics  has  been  the  question  of  the  finiteness  or  in- 
finity of  the  physical  world.  Kant  made  this  problem  one 
basis  for  his  conclusion  that  nature  is  purely  mental  and 
has  no  existence  apart  from  the  knowing  mind.  But  we 
are  realists  and  believe  in  an  independent,  acknowledged 
realm  about  which  we  possess  knowledge.  What,  then, 
must  be  our  own  conclusion  in  regard  to  this  age-old  ques- 
tion? We  would  put  it  in  the  following  way:  If  the  terms 
finite  and  infinite  are  contradictory  adjectives  referable  to 
the  physical  world,  no  a  priori  reasoning  can  decide  for 
one  adjective  as  against  the  other.  Physical  science, 
alone,  is  potentially  able  to  settle  the  question,  and  the 
day  has  not  come  when  this  question  can  be  empirically 


202  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

settled.  I  would,  however,  like  to  call  attention  to  cer- 
tain points. 

The  principle  of  the  conservation  of  energy  does  not 
by  itself  point  in  either  direction.  The  second  law  of 
thermo-dynamics  sets  a  problem  for  the  course  of  nature, 
but  does  not  inform  us  whether  nature  avoids  it  by  being 
infinite  or  by  being  able  to  reverse  the  process.  The  truth 
is  that  these  principles  are  more  intimately  bound  up  with 
the  category  of  time  than  with  space.  They  are  concerned 
with  processes  of  change  in  nature. 

If  nature  be  finite,  this  fact  does  not  mean  that  it  must 
have  a  smooth  boundary  beyond  which  electrons  could 
not  dash.  The  boundary  must  needs  be  dynamic  and  set 
hy  nature  rather  than  to  nature.  If  gravitation  have  sig- 
nificance for  the  minutest  parts  of  nature,  its  internal  pull 
will  determine  the  "flaming  boundaries"  of  the  world. 
Beyond  will  be  the  *void,'  which  is  perfectly  thinkable 
though  not  a  reality.  I  mean  that  the  void  is  a  proposition 
and  not  a  thing.  It  is  an  abbreviation  for  the  negative 
proposition  that  none  of  the  things  we  regard  as  real  are 
present.  But,  it  will  be  said,  can  we  not  ask  the  question. 
What  lies  beyond?  Certainly  we  can.  And  the  void  is  the 
denial  that  anything  lies  beyond. 

A  finite  universe  is  therefore  quite  thinkable.  Is  the 
same  true  of  an  infinite  uni verse. f^  I  must  confess  that  my 
feeling  is  that  the  adjectives  finite  and  infinite  apply  as 
contrasts  to  processes  of  measuring  and  numbering  rather 
than  to  that  which  is  measured  and  numbered.  If  so, 
the  universe  must  have  a  determinate  size  at  any  one 
time,  which  may  yet  be  so  great  that  it  is  practically  im- 
measurable. 

Kant  held  that  the  reason  is  obliged  to  hold,  at  one  and 
the  same  time,  that  nature  is  both  finite  and  infinite  and 


THE  WORLD  AND  PHYSICAL  SCIENCES       203 

that  it  is  therefore  the  victim  of  an  unconquerable  an- 
tinomy. The  majority  of  modern  thinkers  are  coming  to 
deny  the  existence  of  such  an  antinomy.  The  world  is 
either  finite  or  infinite,  and  the  human  mind  has  a  vaHd 
choice  of  one  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other. 

Is  Consciousness  Extended? — Consciousness  is  not  a 
spatial  part  of  the  physical  world.  In  other  words,  it  is 
not  a  physical  thing  measurable  in  terms  of  a  super- 
posable  standard.  This  means  that  it  is  not  an  entity 
which  can  exist  along-side-of  what  we  can  handle  and  enter 
into  dynamic  relations  with  it.  In  ordinary  language,  it 
does  not  occupy  space.  Or,  to  put  it  more  exactly,  it 
can  never  be  the  sole  occupant  of  space.  Consciousness  is 
the  only  part  of  reality  we  experience.  The  physical  sci- 
ences, on  the  other  hand,  give  us  knowledge  about  reality, 
though  this  knowledge  does  not  exhaust  reality,  as  Descartes 
assumed  and  as  too  many  thinkers  have  taken  for  granted. 

Reflection  has  convinced  us  that  consciousness  is  in 
the  brain  since  it  cannot  be  along-side-of  it  in  any  realiz- 
able sense.  But  that  which  is  really  in  the  brain  as  a  part 
of  its  nature  must  be  spatial.  The  situation  is,  of  course, 
unique  just  as  the  consciousness-body  relation  is.  Con- 
sciousness is  not  a  thing  in  the  brain  as  a  pea  is  in  its  shell 
for  it  is  not  that  sort  of  a  reality.  To  be  substantial  is  to 
be  the  whole  of  reality  in  any  one  place,  and  consciousness 
is  not  substantial  in  that  sense.  *'  Evidently,  it  is  not  in 
the  physical  as  one  physical  thing  is  in  another,  and  so  to 
conceive  its  presence  in  the  brain  properly,  we  must  re- 
vise our  unduly  limited  notion  of  what  *  being  in  a  thing* 
may  mean." 

Consciousness  is  experienced  as  a  continuum;  and  we 
must  hold  that  this  changing  continuum,  which  is  the 
changing  field  of  the  individual's  experience,  penetrates 


204  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

that  part  of  the  cortex  which  is  functionally  active  at  any- 
one time.  Yet  consciousness  is  the  only  part  of  the  content 
of  the  cortex  which  is  given.  In  it  we  are  consciously  real- 
ity and  it  is,  moreover,  the  only  part  of  reality  that  we  con- 
sciously are.  Its  setting,  or  that  in  which  it  is  immersed, 
can  be  known  about  only  by  means  of  propositions  present 
in  itself.  Hence,  the  statement  that  consciousness  is 
extended  is  inferential  knowledge  about  it  due  to  knowl- 
edge about  the  substantial  reality,  the  brain,  in  which  it 
arises  and  plays  its  role.  Such  inferential  knowledge  about 
consciousness  must  not,  however,  conflict  with  conscious- 
ness itself  as  given.  But,  rightly  interpreted,  it  does  not 
do  so  since  it  only  informs  us  where  consciousness  is  and 
makes  no  assertion  about  any  empirical  feature  of  con- 
sciousness which  conflicts  with  consciousness  as  it  is  given. 
But  the  presence  of  consciousness  in  the  cortex,  contin- 
uum as  it  is,  gives  us  an  insight  into  the  brain  which  is  of 
immense  importance.  The  brain,  itself,  must  be  a  functional 
continuum  and  the  old,  external  atomism  a  myth.  And  we 
realize  now,  as  Descartes  did  not,  that  space  is  but  a 
preliminary  category  which  needs  filling  out  by  all  the 
knowledge  about  the  structure,  organization,  and  modes  of 
activity  of  different  parts  of  reality  that  we  can  gain. 

References 

Couturat,  Vinfini  Maihematique,  pt.  2,  bk.  4,  chap.  4. 

Fletcher,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  31. 

FuUerton,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  6. 

James,  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  2. 

Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  Transcendental  Dialectic. 

Mach,  Space  and  Geometry. 

Russell,  Principles  of  Mathematics,  vol.  1. 

Sellars,  Critical  Realism,  chap.  9. 

Taylor,  Elements  of  Metaphysics,  bk.  3,  chap.  4. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 
TIME 

About  Time. — No  category  has  had  more  apparent 
contradictions  and  difficulties  connected  with  it  than  has 
time.  Poets  have  united  in  making  it  one  of  the  chief 
mysteries  of  the  world.  As  one  writer  has  phrased  it: 
"All  things  live  in  time  and  it  lives  in  nothing;  all  things 
die  in  time  and  death  is  not  able  to  attain  it."  But  may 
it  not  be  that  it  is  this  mystical  tendency  to  make  a  thing 
out  of  time  that  leads  thought  into  difficulties.'^  Let  us 
examine  time  concretely,  much  as  we  did  space,  to  see 
what  it  really  is. 

Three  Kinds  of  Time. — For  our  purposes  it  will  be 
sufficient  briefly  to  discuss  three  kinds  of  time,  perceptual 
time,  mathematical  time,  and  time  as  a  category.  Per- 
ceptual time  is  the  experience  which  serves  as  the  founda- 
tion for  the  conceptual  time  of  mathematics,  while  time 
as  a  category  of  the  physical  sciences  concerns  the  kind 
of  knowledge  about  nature  which  can  be  classed  as  tem- 
poral. 

Perceptual,  or  Personal,  Time. — The  elementary  ex- 
perience which  is  at  the  foundation  of  what  we  roughly 
call  time  is  the  immediate  sense  of  change.  When  we 
listen  to  a  factory  whistle,  we  note  its  rise  and  fall,  its 
variation  in  intensity,  its  increase  or  decrease  in  shrill- 
ness. Such  apprehension  of  change  in  ourselves  and  our 
surroundings  is  a  universal  and  constant  experience. 

But  the  sense  of  change  is  only  one  of  the  elements 
205 


206  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

which  reflection  can  distinguish  in  perceptual  time.  Just 
as  important  is  the  feehng  of  duration  or  lapse  of  time. 
All  persons  have  the  ability  to  estimate  the  duration  of  a 
process  or  activity  to  which  they  have  been  attending. 
It  is  the  task  of  the  psychologist  to  explain  the  conditions 
of  this  sensing  and  estimation  of  duration.  The  probabil- 
ity is  that  it  is  connected  with  certain  rhythmical  aspects 
of  consciousness  and  with  what  may  be  called  the  cumu- 
lative effect  of  attention.  "When  we  are  listening  to  a 
sound,  our  experience  is  different  at  the  end  of  one  minute 
from  what  it  is  at  the  end  of  two  minutes,  although  the 
sound  itself  may  not  have  altered  in  quality."  Stout, 
Manual  of  Psychology,  p.  386.  Thus  there  is  a  qualita- 
tive difference  in  consciousness  from  moment  to  moment 
which  adds  a  differentia  to  the  sense  of  change  and  com- 
plicates it. 

In  personal  time,  then,  we  have  the  sense  of  change  and 
the  feeling  of  duration.  This  sense  of  the  lapse  of  time 
fits  in  with  the  feehng  of  duration  as  its  complement. 
But  along  with  the  sense  of  change,  there  is  usually  present 
an  apprehension  of  the  order  of  the  changes.  A  precedes  B. 
The  visit  of  the  postman  usually  occurs  before  dinner. 
This  relation  of  sequence  between  events  is  the  character- 
istic order  which  distinguishes  time  from  space.  In  space, 
we  have  objects  which  are  in  the  order  of  co-existence  and 
the  relation  of  a  measurable  externality;  in  time,  we  note 
that  one  event  precedes  another.  I  went  to  class  an  hour 
ago;  I  then  went  down  to  the  bank;  and  I  am  now  sitting 
at  my  desk  writing.  Thus  I  can  distinguish  my  actions 
and  relate  them  in  a  characteristic  order. 

Within  personal  time,  we  can  contrast  the  *now'  with 
the  *just  past'  and  the  *not  yet.'  This  empirical  present, 
which  is  sometimes  called  the  *  specious  present,'  is  not  an 


TIME  207 

indivisible  instant  of  time  but  a  span  of  considerable 
length.  In  other  words,  perceptual  experience  knows 
nothing  of  instants  of  a  mathematical  sort.  We  do  have 
the  experience  of  order  in  change,  of  this  event  as  preced- 
ing that.  Two  successive  notes  of  music  may  be  sounding 
in  my  ear  at  the  same  time  and  yet  be  experienced  as  suc- 
cessive. But  memory  and  expectation  raise  this  contrast 
into  one  between  the  order  of  complex  events  which  can 
only  be  conceived.  The  stability  and  scope  of  our  time- 
meanings,  the  past,  the  present  and  the  future,  depend 
upon  the  supplementation  of  perceptual  time  by  memory 
and  expectation  with  the  mental  objects  which  go  with 
them.  The  range  of  experience  outstrips  what  can  be 
given  in  perception  and  the  mind  can  swing  from  past 
to  future  through  an  orderly  series  of  events.  But  even 
this  developed  time-experience  has  a  direction,  is  never 
empty  and  has  the  uniqueness  of  the  consciousness  of 
which  it  is  an  aspect.  Consciousness  is  not  in  time;  it  is 
temporal. 

Perceptual  time,  which  is  essentially  private,  shades 
into  common  time.  What  should  be  noted  is  the  gradual 
infusion  of  a  spatial  framework  due  to  the  needs  arising 
from  interpersonal  intercourse.  Yet  we  must  not  jump 
to  the  conclusion  that  such  intercourse  is  alone  responsible 
for  this  introduction  of  spatial  standards.  Direct  esti- 
mations of  duration  are  soon  found  to  be  too  dependent 
upon  what  are  called  subjective  factors,  such  as  hope  and 
fear,  to  be  trustworthy.  Hence  the  individual  finds  it 
natural  to  resort  to  orderly  changes  in  perceived  things. 
It  is,  therefore,  in  the  attempt  to  get  beyond  the  purely 
personal  character  of  time-estimation  that  resort  is  had 
to  movements  which  correspond  to  temporal  order  and 
harmonize  with  the  sense  of  duration. 


208  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Thus  time  gradually  got  its  clues  and  standards  from 
the  perceived  world.  The  result  was  a  commonly  ac- 
cepted chronology.  The  hourly,  daily  and  yearly  move- 
ments of  the  sun  were  adopted  as  events  to  which  to  refer 
all  other  changes.  To  identify  the  standardized  common 
time  of  the  clock  with  subjective  time  is  to  commit  a  pro- 
found error.  The  one  is  an  exactly  measurable  order;  the 
other  consists  in  the  recognition  of  change  and  a  sense  of 
duration.  "  Shakespeare  tells  us  that  time  travels  *in  di- 
vers paces  with  divers  persons*;  Newton  tells  us  that  time 
moves  at  a  constant  rate.  Shakespeare's  time  is  evidently 
subjective  time,  and  Newton's  objective  time."  Stout, 
Manual  of  Psychology,  p.  498.  But  this  commonly  ac- 
cepted time  is  only  an  order  in  movement;  it  is  not  a 
thing  by  itself.  As  soon  as  we  reflect  concretely,  we  see 
that  there  is  no  mystery  about  it. 

Mathematical  Time. — Common  time  very  easily  links 
itself  with  mathematical  space  to  become  mathematical 
time,  infinitely  divisible  and  infinite  in  extent.  Let  us 
observe  how  this  is  done.  Thomas  Hobbes  has  expressed 
the  transference  so  clearly  and  yet  so  naively  that  I  can- 
not do  better  than  quote  his  words.  "As  a  body  leaves 
a  phantasm  of  its  magnitude  in  the  mind,  so  also  a  moved 
body  leaves  a  phantasm  of  its  motion,  namely,  an  idea  of 
that  body  passing  out  of  one  space  into  another  by  con- 
tinual succession.  And  this  idea,  or  phantasm,  is  that 
which  I  call  time.  And  yet,  when  I  say  time  is  a  phan- 
tasm of  motion,  I  do  not  say  this  is  suflBcient  to  define 
it  by;  for  this  word  time  comprehends  the  notion  of  a 
body  inasmuch  as  it  is  first  here  and  then  there.  Where- 
fore a  complete  definition  of  time  is  such  as  this,  time  is  the 
phantasm  of  before  and  after  in  motion.^'  Movements  are  best 
represented  symbolically  by  a  line  with  a  direction >; 


TIME  209 

in  such  a  symbol  there  is  a  quaHtative  as  well  a  quan- 
titative aspect.  Spatial  direction  is  replaced  by  the 
idea  of  temporal  order.  The  line  then  symbolizes  dura- 
tion and  succession.  Thus  a  finite  portion  of  linear  space 
measures  duration,  while  positions  on  it,  apprehended  to- 
gether and  yet  thought  of  as  successive,  represent  temporal 
order.  Mathematical  time  uses  space  as  its  foundation 
and  superposes  upon  this  a  different  order,  that  of  suc- 
cession in  place  of  co-existence. 

A  word  of  warning  at  this  point  may  be  wise.  We  saw 
that  to  think  of  perceptual  space  as  really  mathematical 
space  disguised  is  to  lay  oneself  open  to  all  sorts  of  false 
problems.  Moreover,  we  convinced  ourselves  that  mathe- 
matical space  and  mathematical  objects  do  not  exist  out- 
side of  consciousness.  In  the  same  way,  to  seek  to  reduce 
personal  time  to  mathematical  time  is  to  sin  against  ge- 
netic facts  and  to  forget  that  mathematical  time  is  an  ab- 
stract construction.  Yet  when  we  are  not  critical  enough, 
we  are  soon  ridden  by  mathematical  time  and  look  for 
temporal  points  or  moments  in  our  actual  flow  of  conscious- 
ness. All  time  is  then  conceived  by  us  as  infinitely  divi- 
sible, infinite  in  extent,  homogeneous  and  empty.  I  need 
not  emphasize  again  what  a  mistake  such  a  belief  would  be. 

Time  as  a  Category  of  Scientific  Knowledge. — We 
can  now  push  forward  to  the  investigation  of  the  objective 
validity  of  time  as  a  category  in  scientific  knowledge. 
To  what  characteristic  of  the  physical  world  does  it  cor- 
respond? What  kind  of  knowledge  does  it  cover?  We 
shall  see  in  this  case,  even  more  clearly  than  in  that  of 
space,  that  knowledge  is  not  an  intuition  of  reality  but 
knowledge  about  it. 

Scientific  time  is  a  measurable  quantity  as  well  as  an 
order  of  succession.     Some  process — ^preferably  a  move- 


210  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ment — ^is  taken  as  a  standard  and  other  processes  are  re- 
ferred to  this  as  a  unit.  If  two  processes  begin  and  end 
together,  they  are  said  to  occupy  the  same  time.  Let  us 
take  an  example  to  make  this  correspondence  clearer. 
Suppose  that  we  wish  to  know  how  long  a  certain  chemi- 
cal process  takes  to  occur.  We  note  the  positions  of  the 
hands  of  a  clock  at  the  moment  the  chemicals  are  put  to- 
gether and  also  when  the  reaction  ceases.  This  method 
means  that  we  seek  to  measure  the  one  process  in  terms  of 
the  other.  This  correspondence  which  is  at  the  basis  of 
the  scientific  measurement  of  the  temporal  aspect  of  nature 
is  for  temporal  knowledge  what  superposition  of  things 
is  for  the  spatial  knowledge  of  nature.  In  both  cases,  we 
obtain  knowledge  in  terms  of  ratios  and  not  in  terms  of 
apprehensions  of  absolute  dimensions.  Science  selects 
some  standard  process  like  the  rotation  of  the  earth  and 
adheres  to  it  so  long  as  it  can  relate  other  processes  to  it. 
"  Thus  astronomers  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
earth  as  a  clock  is  losing  at  the  rate  of  8.3  seconds  per 
century  and  they  have  given  up  the  earth  as  their  time- 
keeper and  substituted  for  the  sideral  time  t  a  certain 
function  T  =  (f)  {{),  slightly  diiffering  from  f,  as  their  new 
*  kinetic  time. ' "   Silberstein,  The  Theory  of  Relativity,  ch.  1. 

The  universality  of  scientific  time  follows  from  the  single- 
ness of  the  standard  process  to  which  all  other  processes 
are  referred.  When  we  say  that  the  whole  world  is  in 
one  timey  we  only  mean  that  all  processes  are  potentially 
referable  to  this  selected  standard  process.  Thus  the  one- 
ness of  time  for  nature  is  expressive  of  the  fact  that  all  the 
processes  in  nature  can  be  brought  into  relation  with  a 
unit  and  ratios  estabhshed. 

An  interesting  result  now  stares  us  in  the  face.  The 
unity  of  scientific  time  is  really  connected  with  the  spatial 


TIME  211 

unity  of  the  world.  In  other  words,  science  deals  with 
processes  which  are  localizable  with  reference  to  each 
other  just  as  it  concerns  itseK  with  things  which  are 
directly  or  indirectly  superposable.  The  spatial  and  tem- 
poral characteristics  of  nature  as  science  studies  them  and 
really  understands  them  are  thus  most  intimately  inter- 
twined. 

But  while  scientific  time  is  the  measurement  of  the 
various  processes  in  nature  by  reference  to  a  standard 
process,  it  retains  the  idea  of  order  which  is  character- 
istic of  personal  time.  And  it  is  this  ordier  which  differ- 
entiates it  from  space.  Yet  we  can  conceive  of  the  phys- 
ical world  as  inert,  changeless  and  motionless;  for  such  a 
world  time  would  have  no  meaning.  But  our  world  is 
different;  it  is  a  world  in  which  changes  occur  and  move- 
ments repeat  themselves.  How  fundamental  these  changes 
are  must  be  determined  by  investigation. 

Science  relates  events  to  one  another  by  means  of  a 
chronology.  It  is  knowledge  about  nature  that  an  eclipse 
occurred  in  the  sixth  century  B.  C.  It  is  also  knowledge 
that  Columbus  discovered  America  in  1492.  Such  knowl- 
edge is,  obviously,  a  knowledge  about  what  no  longer 
exists,  but  it  is  knowledge  nevertheless,  a  fact  that  shows 
that  scientific  knowledge  is  not  an  apprehension.  Is  not 
knowledge  about  the  past  knowledge  of  what  no  longer 
exists?  So  soon  as  we  remember  that  knowledge  consists 
of  propositions  in  the  human  mind,  the  non-existence  of 
the  past  offers  no  difficulties. 

Change  the  Objective  Basis  of  Scientific  Time.— But 
what  is  in  the  temporal  order  in  nature.^  The  answer  is 
clear.  Real  time  is  change  or,  to  put  it  the  other  way 
around,  change  as  cognitively  conceived  always  involves 
an  order  of  succession.    But  the  identification  of  real  time 


212  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

with  change  does  not  settle  all  our  diflSculties.  How  shall 
we  conceive  change?  Does  change  involve  an  order  in 
nature  or  only  in  our  valid  knowledge  about  nature? 
Knowledge  about  nature  is  not  the  same  as  an  apprehen- 
sion of  nature,  and  we  have  the  right  to  expect  a  diver- 
gence between  the  form  of  knowledge  and  reality.  Let 
me  illustrate  what  I  mean.  The  scientist  furnishes  us  with 
knowledge  about  motion  by  describing  the  path  traversed 
and  the  time-rate  of  the  motion.  But  the  moving  body 
does  not  carry  its  path  with  it.  Only  man  with  his  memory 
is  able  to  connect  a  past  position  with  a  present  position; 
the  moving  body  has  no  such  coordinating  memory.  Thus 
we  see  that  knowledge  about  a  motion  is  not  the  same 
as  the  actual  motion.  Paradoxical  as  it  may  seem  at 
first  glance,  we  must  say,  then,  that  in  nature  there  is  no 
temporal  order  of  co-existent  events  but  that  nature  pro- 
duces events  in  an  orderly  sequence  and  man  arranges  and 
dates  them.  Nature  changes,  and  man  orders  these  chan- 
ges as  known  into  past,  present,  and  future.  But  the 
nature  which  changes  is  spatial.  If  we  are  not  afraid  of  a 
metaphor,  we  may  say  that  the  "present"  of  nature  is  the 
reality  of  the  things  of  which  it  is  composed.  The  physical 
world  is  spatial  and  the  physical  world  changes.  Spatial 
order  and  temporal  order  do  not  exclude  each  other. 
Instead  of  nature  being  in  time^  time  (change)  is  in  nature. 

Had  the  World  a  Beginning? — For  the  sake  of  com- 
pleteness, let  us  consider  a  couple  of  characteristic  prob- 
lems usually  brought  up  for  consideration  in  this  con- 
nection. Had  the  physical  universe  a  beginning  in  time? 
If  real  time  is  change  in  nature,  the  universe  could  not 
have  had  a  beginning  in  time.  If  it  had  a  beginning,  that 
would  be  because  it  was  created.  But  there  is  no  necessity 
in  the  time  category  itseK  to  postulate  a  beginning.    The 


TIME  213 

student  will  realize  the  truth  of  this  conclusion  when  he 
remembers  that  he  does  not  ask  himself  whether  God  had 
an  origin  in  time.  Were  we  to  conclude  that  the  physical 
universe  had  no  origin,  no  contradiction  of  the  concept 
of  time  would  be  involved.  Theoretically,  our  chronology 
could  be  extended  from  the  present  into  the  past  indef- 
initely. 

The  second  problem,  Is  the  physical  universe  eternal? 
can  be  dismissed  in  a  few  words  since  it  is  on  all  fours  with 
the  first.  The  empirical  data  are  entirely  in  favor  of  the 
principle  of  conservation.  But  if  the  universe  is  a  spatial 
system  as  I  have  attempted  to  show,  what  holds  of  systems 
within  it  holds  of  the  universe  entire.  Hence,  the  more 
data  in  favor  of  conservation  science  secures,  the  more  it 
urges  on  us  the  view  that  nature  is  eternal. 

Conclusions. — In  our  analysis  of  space,  we  were  led 
to  hold  that  space  presents  itself  to  us  in  a  preliminary 
form  which  requires  for  its  filling  out  all  the  knowledge 
science  can  gain  of  the  constitution  and  internal  mode  of 
working  of  the  physical  world.  To  know  that  the  world 
is  spatial  is  to  know  comparatively  little  about  it,  true 
as  that  little  may  be.  To  magnify  space  into  a  penetra- 
tive vision  into  the  very  web  and  woof  of  nature  was  Des- 
cartes' mistake.  Space  and  time  are  preliminary  cate- 
gories which  are  connected  with  measurement  and  order, 
and  they  find  their  development  and  completion  in  the 
more  special  ones  which  are  related  to  them  as  the  features 
of  a  finished  picture  are  to  the  first  rough  sketch.  While 
space  blossoms  out  with  the  increase  of  scientific  knowl- 
edge into  the  categories  of  dynamic  internal  relation  and 
organization,  time  passes  over  into  the  categories  of  change 
and  causality.  As  we  continue  our  analysis  of  nature  as 
known  to  us,  we  realize,  ever  more  penetratingly,  that 


214  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

space  and  time,  coexistence  and  change,  are  inseparable 
categories.  Reality  is  spatial,  and  this  spatial  reality 
changes. 

Consciousness  and  Time. — Everyone  acknowledges 
that  the  category  of  time  applies  to  consciousness  as  natu- 
rally as  to  the  physical  world.  Consciousness  is  so  ob- 
viously a  temporal  process  in  which  change  is  a  striking 
feature.  Thus  the  difficulty  of  establishing  a  harmony  be- 
tween the  categories  of  the  physical  sciences  and  those  of 
the  mental  sciences  does  not  arise  here  in  the  acute  form 
that  it  did  for  space.  Yet  a  couple  of  points  need 
attention. 

In  consciousness  we  are  witnesses  of  a  genuine  change 
in  reality.  Each  experience  that  arises  is  new,  and  each 
experience  which  dies  out  and  is  supplanted  by  another 
lapses  from  existence.  But  in  the  knowledge  about  the 
physical  world  which  the  sciences  gain,  there  can  be  no 
such  presence  at  the  heart  of  reality.  The  category  of 
time  implies  change,  but  this  change  is  set  over  against  the 
substantial  conservation  of  physical  systems.  The  result 
has  been  that  many  attempts  have  been  made  to  hold 
that  change  is  unreal  or  else  only  the  shifting  of  positions 
on  the  part  of  unchangeable  atoms.  That  is,  the  natural 
tendency  in  the  physical  sciences  is  to  stereotype  change 
and  reduce  it  to  a  minimum.  In  contrast  to  this  attitude 
of  the  physical  sciences,  psychology  has  been  forced  to 
stress  the  element  of  change  and  to  admit  its  ultimacy. 
Consciousness  is  not  a  conserved  reality  and  is  not  there- 
fore a  substantial  reality.  Yet  this  contrasting  applica- 
tion of  the  category  of  time  in  the  two  systems  of  science 
involves  no  genuine  conflict.  Rather  does  it  harmonize 
with  the  conclusion  we  reached  in  the  preceding  chapter, 
that  consciousness  is  in  the  brain  in  a  unique  way. 


TIME  215 

References 

Bergson,  Time  and  Free  Will. 

Fletcher,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  32. 

Fullerton,  Introduction  to  Philosophy ,  chap.  7. 

Lovejoy,  *'The  Place  of  the  Time  Problem  in  Contemporary 

Philosophy,"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  etc.,  1910. 
Taylor,  Elements  of  Metaphysics,  bk.  3,  chap.  4. 
Stout,  Manual  of  Psychology »  bk.  4,  chap.  6. 


CHAPTER  XIX 
SUBSTANCE  AND  SUBSTANTIALITY 

The  Physical  World  Consists  of  Things. — Common 
sense  does  not  begin  with  any  subtle  stuff  called  matter 
but  with  things.  The  physical  world  is  a  spatial  complex 
of  things  having  determinate,  though  often  changing,  po- 
sitions and  excluding  one  another.  Some  of  these  things 
are  more  clearly  marked  out  than  are  others.  Living 
things,  especially,  seem  to  be  things  for  nature  itself; 
they  have  definite  outlines  and  act  more  as  a  whole  than 
do  other  things.  But  this  contrast  is,  after  all,  only  a 
relative  one  from  the  present  point  of  view.  The  main 
fact  to  be  emphasized  is  that  the  physical  world  is,  at  first, 
as  it  appears,  a  variegated  panorama  of  heterogeneous  things. 
To  speak  of  matter  at  this  stage  is,  therefore,  misleading. 
The  material  world  of  common  sense  is  not  a  world  com- 
posed of  matter  but  a  world  of  concrete  physical  things. 
It  is  the  world  as  perceived.  Yet  I  do  not  doubt  that  the 
pervasive  influence  of  Natural  Dualism,  heightened  by 
science,  makes  itself  felt  to-day.  The  physical  world  is 
what  I  see  out  there  in  contrast  to  what  I  feel  and  will 
in  here.  It  is  this  dualistic  antithesis,  as  much  as  anything 
which  we  ordinarily  have  in  mind  when  we  speak  of  the 
physical  world  as  material. 

The  More  Abstract  Idea  of  Matter. — The  more  ab- 
stract idea  of  matter  was  the  creation  of  philosophy  and 
science  working  sometimes  along  the  same  lines,  sometimes 
along  different  lines.    Very  early  the  attempt  was  made  to 

216 


SUBSTANCE  AND  SUBSTANTIALITY  217 

reduce  the  perceptible  heterogeneity  of  things  to  homo- 
geneity. Some  of  these  attempts  were  extremely  daring 
although  not  well  thought  out.  Thus  Thales  proclaimed 
that  all  things  are  water.  But  how  can  this  asserted  homo- 
geneity be  reconciled  with  the  given  heterogeneity  of 
things?  To  say  that  these  are  states  or  forms  of  water 
leaves  us  with  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  forms  to  the 
one  stuff  which  is  more  fundamental.  Are  these  forms 
penetrative  changes  of  the  one  stuff?  Or  are  they  more  of 
the  nature  of  appearances?  Such  questions  were  not 
faced  at  first.  Then  came  the  atomists  with  a  more  so- 
phisticated solution  of  the  relation  of  given  heterogeneity 
with  actual  homogeneity,  a  solution  which  still  enthralls 
the  human  mind.  The  atomists  were  eleatics,  that  is, 
they  did  not  believe  in  the  reality  of  change.  They  were 
forced  to  make  a  slight  concession  to  perceptible  fact, 
but  they  made  it  a  compromise  in  which  nearly  all  of  eleati- 
cism  was  retained.  Atoms  are  homogeneous  and  change- 
less; it  is  only  their  spatial  positions  which  vary.  The  re- 
lations between  atoms  are  external  and  do  not  affect  the 
nature  of  these  particles  at  all.  I  think  that  the  student 
will  realize  that  this  solution  has  had  a  perennial  appeal 
and  appears  in  a  hardly  veiled  form  in  what  is  called  the 
mechanical  theory  of  the  universe.  Even  the  less  doctrin- 
aire scientist  thinks  of  electrons  and  atoms  as  less  affected 
by  change  than  are  the  spatial  relations  into  which  they 
enter.  Later  we  shall  enquire  why  this  is;  just  now  we 
must  accept  it  as  an  actual  tendency. 

Along  with  the  view  that  the  physical  world  is  composed 
of  changeless  particles,  went  the  distinction  between  ap- 
pearance and  reality.  The  real  material  world  consists 
of  homogeneous  elements  which  are  known  by  means  of  a 
conceptual  intuition.    In  the  case  of  eleatic  atomism,  we 


218  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

may  rightly  say  that  the  metaphysics  determined  the 
epistemology  rather  than  the  reverse.  And,  as  we  have 
pointed  out  so  often,  the  inevitable  result  is  bad  meta- 
physics and  bad  epistemology,  however  subtle  and  at- 
tractive. The  atomists  developed  their  ontology  and 
drew  the  conclusion  that,  since  these  atoms  could  not  be 
perceived,  they  must  be  directly  known  by  reason.  We 
must  think  of  such  a  reason  as  a  power  of  apprehending 
realities  which  cannot  be  present  to  sense.  We  may  call 
such  a  position  a  rationalistic  translation  of  Natural  Realism. 
Knowledge  is  apprehension,  yet  not  by  sense,  which  is 
deceptive,  but  by  a  more  penetrative  power  of  cognition. 
To  know  the  real  world  is  the  function  of  reason.  Or,  to 
put  it  more  correctly,  since  we  apprehend  the  real  world, 
there  must  be  a  rational  faculty  different  from,  and  cog- 
nitively  more  adequate  than,  sense.  This  situation  gives 
us  a  new  clue  to  the  vicious  traditional  contrast  between 
sense  and  reason.  From  this  angle,  it  is  not  a  distinction 
founded  on  psychology  and  logic  but  upon  a  deduction 
from  a  metaphysical  position. 

Now  the  atomist  knew  his  world  as  consisting  of  un- 
changing, homogeneous  particles  the  relative  positions 
of  which  in  the  void  alone  change.  But  the  problem  of 
accounting  in  some  measure  for  the  perceptual  world 
remained.  Only  two  factors  for  the  purposes  of  such  an 
explanation  were  at  hand,  the  real  physical  world  and  the 
percipient  with  his  faculty  of  sense.  On  the  side  of  the 
real  world,  the  differences  which  could  be  connected 
with  the  qualitative  heterogeneity  of  the  perceptual  world 
of  things  were  the  number  of  elements  in  a  complex  and 
their  relative  positions;  on  the  side  of  the  percipient  the 
important  fact  was  the  distorting  nature  of  sense.  The 
obvious  deduction  was  that  the  only  change  in  the  real 


SUBSTANCE  AND  SUBSTANTIALITY  219 

world  was  a  change  of  position  of  particles  in  a  complex 
and  that  such  a  change  was  correlated  with  a  change  of 
appearance  in  the  perceptual  thing,  the  faculty  of  sense 
remaining  distortive  in  a  sort  of  lawful  way.  We  may 
summarize  the  outlook  in  the  following  terms:  atoms  and 
a  void;  external  relations  which  are  only  positions,  not 
genuine  relations;  objective  change  only  a  change  of  posi- 
tion; a  distorting  faculty  of  sense;  heterogeneous  percep- 
tual things. 

Accompanying  the  distinction  between  atoms  and 
things  of  sense  was  the  separation  of  the  primary  from  the 
secondary  qualities.  This  separation  has  often  been  mis- 
understood. The  primary  qualities  are,  of  course,  exten- 
sion, shape,  and  impenetrability;  the  secondary,  color, 
flavor  and  odor,  etc.  Both  lists  have  varied  somewhat 
from  time  to  time.  For  eleatic  rationalism,  these  primary 
qualities  are  only  distinguishable  aspects  of  atoms  as  ap- 
prehended by  reason.  The  atom  is  not  something  which 
possesses  them;  the  atom  is  apprehended  as  extended, 
hard,  figured  and  mobile.  Such  is  matter  for  this  strict 
form  of  realistic  rationalism.  It  is  a  homogeneous  stuff 
intuited  as  having  these  aspects. 

What,  then,  are  the  secondary  qualities?  They  are  as- 
pects of  perceptual  things,  of  things  seen  by  sense  instead 
of  by  reason.  Since  the  causal,  or  physiological,  theory 
of  sensation  is  usually  held,  these  secondary  qualities  are 
often  spoken  of  as  mental  effects  in  the  percipient,  a  phrase 
which  raises  the  whole  mind-body  problem.  But  if  the 
secondary  qualities  are  effects,  what  are  the  primary 
qualities?  Obviously,  it  is  held  that  rational  apprehen- 
sion is  a  mystery;  it  is  an  unaccountable  embrace  of  re- 
ality by  the  mind,  to  use  the  phrase  of  a  distinguished 
American  thinker.     But  perceptual  things,  also,  have  pri- 


220  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

mary  qualities  or  something  very  like  primary  qualities. 
The  primary  qualities  seem  to  be  somehow  common  to 
sense  and  reason.  This  fact  suggests  that  sense  does  not 
altogether  distort  or  that  it  is  not  so  sharply  different 
from  reason  as  at  first  supposed,  suggestions  which  have 
caused  much  controversy  in  rationalistic  circles. 

Descartes  and  Locke. — For  Descartes,  matter  is  sub- 
stance and  its  whole  essence  and  defining  attribute  is 
extension.  "Matter  alone  has  substantial  reality,  space 
being  *by  a  distinction  of  reason*  conceived  as  its  attri- 
bute." Smith,  Studies  in  the  Cartesian  hilosophy,  p.  66. 
Descartes  taught  that  matter  is  transparent  to  our  minds 
and  is  exhaustively  known  in  conception.  Hence,  it  is 
known  to  be  alien  to  mind.  His  position  is  scientific 
realism  though  there  is  nearly  always  a  little  more  ag- 
nosticism in  scientific  realism  than  in  Cartesianism.  I 
am  sure  that  modern  scientists  doubt  that  their  knowledge 
exhausts  matter.  But  there  is  an  interesting  difference 
between  Descartes  and  the  atomlsts.  The  atomists  ad- 
mitted a  void  and  believed  in  discontinuity.  In  other 
words,  atoms  had  position  but  no  real  connections.  Des- 
cartes denied  a  void  and  believed  in  continuity.  We  shall 
have  occasion  to  discuss  this  difference  in  the  light  of 
modern  science. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  John  Locke  attacked  ration- 
alism and  broke  down  the  distinction  between  sense  and 
reason.  But  he  desired  to  reconcile  his  view  with  Newto- 
nian mechanics.  Hence  he  adopted  a  position  which  may 
rightly  be  called  representative  perception.  The  primary 
qualities  of  perceptual  things  are  copies  of  the  primary 
properties  of  a  material  substance.  This  substance  which 
underlies  and  supports  the  primary  properties  is  an  un- 
knowable.    The  agnosticism  which  ancient  rationalism 


SUBSTANCE  AND  SUBSTANTIALITY  «21 

avoided  appears  in  Locke  in  an  extreme  form.  As  we 
pointed  out  a  little  while  ago,  it  was  this  unknowable 
matter  which  Berkeley  destroyed  by  his  arguments. 

Empirical  Things  and  Their  Attributes. — When  logical 
distinctions  lead  into  blind  alleys,  it  is  always  best  to  re- 
turn to  experience  and  try  to  make  a  new  analysis.  Let 
us  see  whether  we  can  give  another  setting  to  substance. 

Man  perceives  things  as  complex  while  yet  somehow 
one.  An  apple,  for  instance  has  a  certain  size,  a  certain 
shape,  a  characteristic  odor,  a  definite  weight,  etc.  It  is 
one  apple,  and  this  one  apple  has  various  qualities  which 
can  be  sensed  at  different  times  according  to  the  sense- 
organ  that  is  stimulated.  We  apprehend  the  object  as 
one  while  we  note  and  refer  to  it  one  quality  after  another. 
It  is  this  empirical  fact  of  oneness  and  complexity  which 
has  given  rise,  through  a  misinterpretation,  to  the  dis- 
tinction between  a  possessing  substance  and  the  properties 
possessed.  But  the  actual  fact  is  that  common  sense 
thinks  of  the  concrete  thing  as  the  subject  of  the  proper- 
ties. And  this  concrete  thing  is  not  something  unknow- 
able back  of  the  properties.  It  is  not  something  in  any 
way  opposed  to  the  qualities.  It  is  evident  that  we  must 
ask  ourselves  what  we  mean  by  things. 

Empirical  things  are  what  we  perceive.  They  are^  there- 
fore, all  those  aspects  which  we  can  distinguish.  But  these 
apprehended  objects  are  thought  of  as  independent  of  our- 
selves, permanent,  having  a  life,  as  it  were,  of  their  own, 
and  the  seat  of  powers  of  various  sorts.  At  the  level  of 
Natural  Realism,  these  meanings  are  combined  pretty  suc- 
cessfully with  the  objects  perceived,  the  result  being  a 
thing.  Certain  striking  aspects  of  perceived  objects  unite 
intimately  with  these  meanings.  Physical  things  are 
spatial  and  massive  and  centres  of  energy. 


222  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  more,  then,  that  we  know  about  the  properties  of 
things,  the  more  we  know  about  the  things.  They  are 
revealed  in  their  qualities  and  properties.  Common  sense 
is  not  agnostic  though  it  is  inclined  to  admit  that  there  is 
much  more  to  a  thing  than  what  is  actually  revealed  to 
human  beings.  Things  are  substantial  but  they  do  not 
consist  of  an  unknowable  core  somehow  possessing  attri- 
butes. On  the  contrary,  I  cannot  help  feeling  that  they  are 
conceived  largely  in  terms  of  our  own  life  as  visible  centres 
of  agency  whose  depths  are  yet  hidden  from  us.  It  is 
only  as  science  advances  toward  a  facile  mechanicalism 
that  the  mysterious  depths  are  lost  sight  of  and  the  whole 
nature  of  the  thing  is  seen  as  a  shifting  of  conceptually 
apprehended  aspects.  But  if  we  reduce  the  thing  to  these 
aspects,  as  does  rationalistic  realism,  all  source  of  agency 
is  removed  as  Berkeley  pointed  out.  The  physical  world 
becomes  dead  and  inert  to  the  intellect,  and  the  philosophi- 
cal consequence  has  always  been  either  dualism  or  a  re- 
action in  favor  of  spiritualism.  I  mean  that  science  has 
sometimes  led  to  a  surface  view  of  nature  because  it  has 
persuaded  itself  that  it  has  exhausted  nature,  whereas  it 
has  only  gained  the  sort  of  knowledge  about  nature  that 
physical  science  can  achieve.  But  the  identification  of 
nature  with  abstract  conceptual  systems  has  been  the 
failing  of  rationalistic  realism  from  the  beginning. 

But  if  man  is  a  genuine  part  of  nature,  nature  must  be 
a  much  more  complex,  rich  and  profoundly  real  thing 
than  we  have  sometimes  supposed.  If  man  has  evolved 
from  nature,  his  presence  casts  light  back  upon  it.  It 
must  be  the  sort  of  thing  that  could  produce  him.  It  must 
be  kin  to  him.  It  is  apparent  that  evolutionary  natural- 
ism is  far  removed  from  Cartesian  rationalism  with  its 
belief  that  mathematics  lights  up  nature  and  exhausts  it. 


SUBSTANCE  AND  SUBSTANTIALITY  223 

Knowledge-About  vs.  Being. — Let  us  now  apply  our 
theory  of  knowledge  to  the  age-old  question  of  matter  and 
substance.  We  have  decided  that  there  is  no  justification 
for  Locke's  unknowable  substance  lying  back  of,  and  pos- 
sessing, primary  qualities  which  are  like  our  ideas.  In 
like  manner,  we  have  rejected  the  matter  of  apprehensional 
rationalism.  We  do  not  apprehend  reality  but  only  gain 
knowledge  about  it.  Being  is  one  thing,  and  knowledge  is 
quite  another  and  a  human  affair.  And  he  who  confuses 
being  and  knowledge  and  does  not  realize  their  funda- 
mental difference  is  apt  to  be  led  into  all  sorts  of  unreal 
diflficulties.  But  all  apprehensional  realisms  are  almost 
sure  to  do  this,  for  the  content  of  knowledge  is  for  them  the 
actual  independent  world  or  being.  We,  however,  have 
realized  that  knowledge  is  other  than  being,  though  genu- 
ine knowledge  and  as  revelatory  of  being  as  knowledge 
can  be.  Our  conclusion,  then,  must  be  that  being  is  matter 
and  substance.  It  is  matter,  not  as  a  passive  homogeneous 
stuff  that  can  be  apprehended  by  the  mental  eye,  but  as 
reality;  it  is  substance,  not  as  an  unknowable  possessor  of 
knowable  attributes,  but  as  the  metaphysical  subject  to 
which  all  tested  knowledge  is  referable. 

We  have  sometimes  dealt  rather  harshly  with  objective 
idealism  on  the  epistemological  side.  It  gives  us  pleasure, 
therefore,  to  point  out  that  modern  objective  idealism  has 
usually  insisted  upon  the  distinction  between  human 
knowledge  and  reality.  It  has  never  taken  the  mechanical 
view  of  the  world  as  seriously  as  rationalistic  realism  has. 
It  has  usually  refused  to  identify  any  pet  conceptual 
scheme  with  reality.  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  more 
than  inclined  to  refuse  to  take  scientific  knowledge  seri- 
ously as  knowledge  about  reality.  It  has  been  anti- 
scientific  in  its  metaphysics. 


224  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Nature  Is  Substantial. — We  have  learned  to  use  nature, 
matter,  reality  and  the  physical  world  as  synonymous. 
When  we  assert  that  nature  is  substantial,  we  mean  that 
it  is  permanent,  independent  of  anything  else,  and  self- 
existent.    In  other  words,  we  think  of  it  as  reality. 

We  have  already  seen  that  reality  is  known  as  extended 
and  as  containing  change.  But  we  realize  that  these  two 
categories  form  only  the  framework  of  the  more  detailed 
knowledge  which  the  sciences  achieve.  The  task  of  the 
philosopher  is  to  study  this  detailed  knowledge  to  discover 
what  nature  is  known  as  at  the  level  the  sciences  have  now 
attained.  He  must  call  all  the  sciences  to  counsel,  the 
exact  sciences,  the  biological  sciences  and  the  mental 
sciences.  All  tell  us  about  reality  and  their  informations 
should  not  conflict.  It  is  his  function  to  see  how  they  can 
be  harmonized  by  means  of  a  comprehensive  view  of  the 
world.  Thus  our  position  can  be  described  as  a  naturalistic 
monism  based  on  a  non-apprehensional  theory  of  knowl- 
edge. 

Properties  Express  Knowledge  About  Nature. — The 
vast  majority  of  the  properties  of  things  are  statements 
of  what  a  thing  conditions  or  does  under  definite  circum- 
stances which  are  supposedly  reproducible.  They  are 
what  Locke  called  'powers.'  This  behavior  rests  on  the 
nature  of  the  thing  as  well  as  on  the  total  conditions  and 
is  therefore  an  index  of  its  nature.  But  we  must  not  think 
of  this  nature  as  something  divisible  into  entities  called 
properties.  Properties  are  'propositions  formulated  in  a 
human  way  and  referred  to  things  as  containing  knowledge 
about  them.  Science  can  never  offer  us  literal  aspects 
of  the  physical  world.  The  habits  and  prejudices  founded 
on  Natural  Realism  and  rationalistic  realism  with  their 
apprehensional  views  of  knowledge  have  prevented  phi- 


SUBSTANCE  AND  SUBSTANTIALITY  225 

losophy  from  understanding  the  actual  knowledge  gained 
by  science. 

Let  us  interpret  the  *  secondary  '  qualities  of  perceptual 
things  in  this  way.  The  color  we  see  is  a  function  of  the 
nature  of  the  light  which  strikes  the  eye  and  of  the  cerebral 
system.  It  gives  us  knowledge  about  both  in  their  rela- 
tion to  one  another.  When  we  trace  the  light  farther  back 
to  the  reflecting  body,  we  secure  knowledge  about  its  differ- 
ential action  to  light  vibrations.  Taste,  odor  and  sound 
can  be  treated  in  the  same  way  as  sources  of  knowledge 
about  things  and  about  the  organism. 

The  so-called  primary  qualities  of  perceptual  objects 
must  be  interpreted  in  exactly  the  same  way.  The  size 
of  an  object  as  perceived  is  a  function  of  the  physical  thing, 
its  distance  from  the  perceiving  organism,  and  the  part  of 
the  organism  involved.  The  same  analysis  holds  of  weight. 
None  of  these  features  of  the  perceptual  thing  must  be 
naively  objectified.  Berkeley  was  right  here  as  in  so  much 
else. 

Constant  Properties. — It  will  be  better  for  us  to  discard 
the  expression,  primary  qualities,  and  adopt  the  term 
constant  properties.  There  are  certain  classes  of  judgments 
which  can  always  be  made  of  bodies  and  which,  therefore, 
give  the  defining  concept  of  the  physical  world  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  physical  sciences.  A  body  always  has 
mass  although  it  is  not  always  chemically  active;  it  always 
has  volume  although  it  is  not  always  optically  active; 
it  always  has  some  internal  structure  although  it  may  not 
be  doing  work.  These  constant  properties  give  us  a  gen- 
eral knowledge  always  referable  to  reality.  In  constrast  to 
these,  the  other  properties  may  be  spoken  of  as  "powers." 
Powers  are  expectations  based  on  knowledge  whose  con- 
ditions are  not  always  present.    Constant  properties  need 


226  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

no  conditions  for  their  realization.  Thus  we  obtain 
genuine  knowledge  about  the  real  size  of  a  physical  thing 
by  means  of  measurement.  What  is  obtained  is  a  ratio  in 
terms  of  some  unit.  Such  a  ratio  is  obviously  not  an  in- 
herent quality,  not  an  apprehensible  feature,  but  knowl- 
edge-about.  Let  us  examine  mass  because  this  is  so  evi- 
dently not  a  perceivable  aspect. 

When  impact  experiments  upon  bodies  were  made, 
it  was  found  that  the  change  of  velocity  of  one  body  had  a 
constant  relation  to  the  change  of  velocity  of  a  second 
body.  In  his  interesting  little  book,  The  Constitution  of 
Matter,  Professor  Ames  writes  as  follows:  "So  here  in  the 
case  of  these  impact  experiments,  let  us  call  the  change 
in  the  velocity  of  one  body  by  the  symbol  ci,  and  that  in 
the  velocity  of  the  other  C2,  and  remembering  that  their 

Ci 

ratio  ^  is  always  the  same  for  the  same  two  bodies,  we 
can  give  arbitrarily  a  number  mi  to  the  first  body  and  then 
define  the  corresponding  number  for  the  second  body  to 
be  given  by  a  number  m2  such  that 

Ci 

m2  =  mi^2 

This  gives  us,  then,  a  definite  number  for  the  second  body. 
Let  us  see  what  property  of  the  body  this  number  measures. 
It  is  evident  from  the  definition  that,  if  the  change  in  the 
motion  of  the  second  body  is  small,  the  value  of  m  is  large, 
and  vice  versa;  so  that  the  size  of  m  corresponds  to  the 
opposition  offered  by  the  body  to  having  its  motion 
changed;  this  property  is  what  we  think  of  when  we  speak 
of  the  'quantity  of  matter'  in  a  body,  and  it  was  called 
by  Newton  its  *mass.'"  It  is  evident  that  mass  is  knowl- 
edge about  matter.  Could  anything  harmonize  better 
than  this  does  with  our  theory  of  knowledge? 


SUBSTANCE  AND  SUBSTANTIALITY  227 

Matter  for  Physics. — Matter  for  physics  is  matter  as 
known  by  physics.  The  other  natural  sciences  should  be 
able  to  gain  further  knowledge  about  matter,  but,  of 
course,  their  additional  knowledge  should  not  conflict 
with  this  basic  preliminary  knowledge.  Unfortunately, 
too  many  thinkers  have  gone  to  the  extreme  of  maintain- 
ing that  any  further  knowledge  should  be  reducible  to 
the  world  as  known  by  physics.  Such  an  extreme  is,  in 
effect,  the  materialistic  view  of  the  world. 

In  a  recent  book  an  eminent  physical  chemist  asserts 
that  there  are,  for  modern  science,  three  fundamentals, 
mass,  energy  and  electricity.  The  problem  is  how  to 
harmonize  our  knowledge  of  nature  along  these  three  lines 
so  as  to  see  them  somehow  together.  Recent  investi- 
gations seem  in  a  fair  way  to  lead  to  an  explanation  of 
mass  in  terms  of  electricity.  Electricity  would,  if  this 
attempt  succeeds,  be  the  elemental  stuff  which,  organized 
together,  makes  the  physical  world  at  its  various  evolu- 
tionary levels.  But  this  stuff  is  not  inert  or  passive  as 
was  the  conception  of  matter  for  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries.  It  is  through  and  through  dynamic 
and  each  particle  has  an  infinite  sphere  of  influence.  It 
is  possible  to  regard  real  space  or  the  physical  world  as  the 
dynamic  continuity  of  electricity.  But  what  is  electricity.'^ 
We  can't  perceive  it.  We  can  only  gain  knowledge  about 
it  by  the  way  it  acts.  Here,  again,  science  is  coming,  in  its 
own  way,  to  a  non-apprehensional  realism,  as  against  the 
intuitive  realism  which  dominated  it  for  so  long.  Could 
a  philosophy  desire  a  better  confirmation  of  its  epistemo- 
logical  speculations? 

What  Is  Energy? — ^A  changeless  world  would  be  a 
world  in  which  no  work  was  done  in  and  by  physical 
systems.     This  fact  leads  one  to  connect  energy  with 


£28  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

real  time  or  change  in  nature.  Energy,  like  mass,  is  a 
quantity  which  gives  knowledge  about  matter.  We  must 
always  remember  that  the  energy  of  which  science  speaks 
is  properly  a  measurable  quantity  and  not  a  stuff  which  is 
intuited.  If  electricity  is  the  physical  name  for  matter, 
then  energy  and  mass  are  terms  which  refer  to  definite 
forms  of  knowledge  about  it.  Both  are  properties  of  mat- 
ter and  not  matter  itself.  We  should  not  follow  the  lead 
of  Ostwald  and  make  energy  an  ontological  term,  a  sort 
of  primary  stuff  which  has  various  forms.  That  would  be 
a  return  to  the  vague  epistemology  and  metaphysics  of 
Thales. 

References 

Ames,  The  Constitution  of  Matter. 

Locke,  Essay  on  the  Human  Understanding. 

Marvin,  A  First  Book  in  Metaphysics,  chap.  15. 

Ostwald,  Vorlesungen  uher  Naturphilosophie. 

Sellars,  Critical  Realism,  chaps.  2  and  9. 

Soddy,  Radioactivity. 

Thompson,  Art.  "Matter"  in  Ency.  Britannica. 

Weber,  History  of  Philosophy. 


CHAPTER  XX 

MIND,  SOUL  AND  CONSCIOUSNESS 

The  Nature  of  Mind  a  Problem. — We  should  not  be 
surprised  by  now  to  discover  that  terms  very  freely  used 
have  around  them  fringes  of  vagueness.  These  terms 
indicate  distinctions  which  are  valid  and  necessary  but 
have  not  been  thought  through  systematically.  Thus  we 
have  just  seen  that  people  speak  of  matter  and  the  material 
without  having  much  more  in  their  thoughts  than  the 
conviction  that  they  can  see  physical  things  and  that  these 
occupy  space  and  are  in  causal  relations  among  one 
another.  But  we  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
objects  we  perceive  are  really  mental  contents  which  have 
no  existence  outside  of  the  consciousness  of  the  percipient. 
Reflection,  guided  by  science,  disrupted  Natural  Realism 
and  led  step  by  step  to  the  view  that  we  can  know  the 
physical  world  only  in  terms  of  propositions.  It  follows 
that  we  cannot  apprehend  the  stuff  of  nature  and  that 
even  such  an  ideal  is  meaningless.  It  is  evident  that  such 
a  conclusion  modifies  greatly  the  meaning  of  the  terra 
matter.  No  longer  does  it  have  the  stiff  externality  that 
it  once  had.  While  not  ceasing  to  be  matter,  it  has  ceased 
to  be  material  in  the  old  dualistic  sense  as  something  seen 
to  be  opposed  to  mind.  For  us,  matter  is  fuller  of  content 
than  ever,  fuller  of  potentiality  and  depth,  less  abstract 
even  though  not  perceptual.  It  has  often  been  maintained 
that  a  critical  realism  strips  nature  of  many  qualities  and 
makes  it  barer  than  it  is  for  naive  realism.   Apprehensional 

229 


230  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

realisms  do  have  this  consequence  as  they  become  more 
critical,  but  not  so  with  non-apprehensional  realism.  We 
are  bringing  nature  nearer  to  our  human  nature  even 
though  we  strip  it  of  such  gauds  as  color  and  perfume. 
We  must  no  longer  think  of  nature  merely  in  terms  of  our 
senses.    Our  senses  are  only  instruments. 

We  shall  see  that  a  parallel  development  for  the  term 
mind  has  slowly  been  taking  place.  At  first,  mind  was 
thought  of  as  almost  a  perceptible  reality,  not  so  very 
different  from  empirical  things.  It  took  a  long  time  to 
pass  from  this  external  mind,  or  soul,  to  a  more  adequate 
sense  of  the  processes  of  willing  and  feeling  and  thinking 
which  make  up  the  psychical  life  of  man.  The  interesting 
historical  fact  is  that,  as  man  deepened  his  concept  of 
himself,  he  withdrew  from  nature  and  established  a  dual- 
ism. Religion  has  had  something  to  do  with  this  but  a 
mis-interpretation  of  science  has  also  been  to  blame. 
With  the  advent  of  the  theory  of  evolution,  there  has, 
however,  been  a  swing  in  the  opposite  direction.  Phi- 
losophy is  now  seeking  to  bring  mind  and  nature  together 
in  a  critical  way. 

Primitive  Notions  of  Mind. — Primitive  man  conceived 
the  mind  almost  materially.  He  thought  of  it  as  a  thing 
among  other  things,  distinguishable  from  them  only  by 
its  subtlety.  He  gave  it  substantiality  in  its  own  right. 
"The  belief  most  widely  current  among  the  peoples  of 
lower  culture  is  that  each  man  consists,  not  only  of  the 
body  which  is  constantly  present  among  his  fellows,  but 
also  of  a  shadowy  vapour-like  duplicate  of  his  body;  this 
shadow-like  image,  the  animating  principle  of  the  living 
organism,  is  thought  to  be  capable  of  leaving  the  body,  of 
transporting  itself  rapidly,  if  not  instantaneously,  from 
place  to  place,  and  of  manifesting  in  those  places  all  or 


MIND,  SOUL  AND  CONSCIOUSNESS  231 

most  of  the  powers  that  it  exerts  in  the  body  during 
waking  life.  Sleep  is  regarded  as  due  to  its  temporary- 
withdrawal  from  the  body;  trance,  coma,  and  other  serious 
illness,  as  due  to  longer  absence;  and  death  is  thought  to 
imply  its  final  departure  to  some  distant  place."  Mc- 
Dougall,  Body  and  Mindy  p.  1.  Here  we  have  a  full- 
fledged  dualism.  The  soul  is  just  as  substantial  as  the 
body  though  different  from  it. 

The  primary  idea  of  our  primitive  ancestors  was  that  of 
a  ghost-soul  or  semi-material  spirit  which  possessed,  or 
was  the  seat  of,  various  powers.  So  far  as  mind  was  used 
as  a  term  for  thinking  and  willing,  it  was  thought  of  as 
somehow  connected  with  this  ghost-soul.  Of  course,  this 
assignment  was  no  genuine  explanation  but  it  passed  for 
one  at  this  level.  Early  man  sought  to  find  a  thing  which 
was  like  physical  things  and  yet  different  from  them  in  order 
to  make  it  the  source  and  foundation  of  his  own  peculiar 
powers  and  capacities.  He  felt  that  only  things  are  real 
and  substantial  enough  to  account  for  actions  and  changes. 
It  was  the  same  motive  that  made  scientists  a  few  genera- 
tions ago  speak  of  a  magnetic  fluid  and  of  heat  as  a  caloric 
substance. 

"Two  things  seem  chiefly  to  have  determined  the  form 
of  the  primitive  belief  as  to  the  substance  of  the  ghost- 
soul,  namely,  the  shadow  and  the  breath.  Each  man's 
shadow  is  an  impalpable  something  which  has  a  certain 
likeness  to  the  man,  and  which  accompanies  him  when 
actively  employed,  but  which  disappears  when  he  lies  down 
in  sleep  or  death.  And  the  breath  that  comes  and  goes 
from  his  nostrils  seems  bound  up  with  his  life,  and  dis- 
appears at  death.  And  language  clearly  shows  the  impor- 
tant part  played  by  the  ideas  of  the  shadow  and  of  the 
breath  in  such  words  as  manes  and  shade,  spirit,  spiritus^ 


232  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

anima,  animus,  pneuma,  and  in  similar  words  of  many  other 
languages."    Ibid.,  p.  3. 

This  semi-material  spirit  which  was  conceived  as  the 
seat  of  life  and  of  consciousness  was  modelled  upon  the 
shadow,  the  breath  and  the  experiences  had  in  dreams. 
We  must  remember  that  early  man  had  no  scientific  ex- 
planations of  these  phenomena  as  we  have  them  to-day. 
He  did  not  know  that  shadow  was  due  to  the  interception 
of  light,  that  breath  is  air  and  water- vapor,  that  dreams 
are  centrally-aroused  experiences.  He  thought  that  the 
dead  actually  spoke  to  him  while  he  was  asleep  and  that 
his  soul  travelled  away  from  the  body  when  he  dreamed  of 
going  hunting  or  of  visiting  his  friends.  Professor  Tylor, 
a  famous  anthropologist,  has  summarized  his  investiga- 
tions of  primitive  views  of  the  ghost-soul  in  the  following 
w^ords:  "It  is  a  thin,  unsubstantial  human  image,  in  its 
nature  a  sort  of  vapour,  film,  or  shadow;  the  cause  of  life 
and  thought  in  the  individual  it  animates;  independently 
possessing  the  personal  consciousness  and  volition  of  its 
corporeal  owner,  past  or  present;  capable  of  leaving  the 
body  far  behind,  to  flash  swiftly  from  place  to  place; 
mostly  impalpable  and  invisible,  yet  also  manifesting 
physical  power,  and  especially  appearing  to  men  waking  or 
asleep  as  a  phantasm  separate  from  the  body  of  which  it 
bears  the  likeness;  continuing  to  exist  and  appear  to  men 
after  the  death  of  that  body;  able  to  enter  into,  and  pos- 
sess, and  act  in  the  bodies  of  other  men,  of  animals,  and 
even  things."  Tylor,  Primitive  Culture,  third  edition,  vol. 
1,  p.  429.  It  is  obvious  that  modern  spiritism  is  not  so 
very  far  removed  from  this  primitive  outlook.  Do  we  not 
hear  of  people  photographing  spirits?  Do  not  spirits  rap 
upon  the  walls  of  houses  and  upon  tables,  and  take  up  their 
residence  in  the  bodies  of  mediums.^    Much  of  what  we 


MIND,  SOUL  AND  CONSCIOUSNESS  233 

call  superstition  to-day  is  the  survival  of  this  primitive 
theory. 

Mind  in  Ancient  Philosophy. — Thus  far  we  have  used 
the  terms  mind  and  soul  almost  interchangeably.  Our 
excuse  must  be  the  historical  one  that  for  a  long  time  they 
were  so  used.  Even  the  Greek  and  Roman  philosophers 
hardly  distinguish  between  the  two.  "Thus,  Anaximenes 
of  Miletus,  who  lived  in  the  sixth  century  before  Christ, 
says  that  *our  sotCil,  which  is  air,  rules  us.'*  A  little  later, 
Heracleitus,  a  man  much  admired  for  the  depth  of  his 
reflections,  maintains  that  the  soul  is  a  fiery  vapor, 
evidently  identifying  it  with  the  warm  breath  of  the  living 
creature.  In  the  fifth  century  B.  C,  Anaxagoras,  who 
accounts  for  the  ordering  of  the  elements  into  a  system  of 
things  by  referring  to  the  activity  of  Mind  or  Reason, 
calls  mind  *the  finest  of  things,*  and  it  seems  clear  that  he 
did  not  conceive  of  it  as  very  different  in  nature  from  the 
other  elements  which  enter  into  the  constitution  of  the 
world. 

"Democritus  of  Abdera  (between  460  and  360  B.  C), 
that  great  investigator  of  nature  and  brilliant  writer, 
developed  a  materialistic  doctrine  that  admits  the  exist- 
ence of  nothing  save  atoms  and  empty  space.  He  con- 
ceived the  soul  to  consist  of  fine,  smooth,  round  atoms, 
which  are  also  atoms  of  fire.  These  atoms  are  distributed 
through  the  whole  body,  but  function  differently  in  differ- 
ent places — in  the  brain  they  give  us  thought,  in  the  heart, 
anger,  and  in  the  liver,  desire.  Life  lasts  just  so  long  as 
we  breathe  out  such  atoms."  Fullerton,  An  Introduction 
to  Philosophy^  pp.  101-2. 

But  it  was  not  these  early  thinkers  only  who  thought  of 
the  mind  materially  as  being  fire  atoms  or  some  such 
spatial  thing.     The  Epicureans  and  Stoics  were  just  as 


234  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

materialistic  in  their  thinking.  "To  the  Epicureans  life 
is  mere  juxtaposition  of  atoms,  which  accident  has  com- 
bined, and  some  other  gust  of  accident  will  part;  to  the 
Stoics  every  form  of  being  is  an  expression  of  the  cosmic 
power,  an  energy  correlated  to  all  other  manifestations  of 
energy,  among  which  it  takes  place."  Kendall,  Marcus 
Aurelius  Antoninus  to  Himself,  Introduction,  p.  53.  In 
the  Stoic  system  we  have  a  vague  dynamic  materialism. 

Plato's  view  of  the  soul  reflects  his  metaphysics.  He 
was  a  rationalist  and  held  that  the  mind  apprehends 
"  ideas"  which  are  eternal  and  immutable.  These  ideas  are 
more  like  concepts  than  like  perceived  things.  Thus  there 
emerges  in  Plato  a  rationalistic  dualism  between  the 
changing  things  of  space  and  the  real,  or  intelligible,  world 
of  ideas.  The  soul  partakes  of  this  intelligible,  non-spatial 
world  opposed  to  matter.  As  a  result  of  Plato's  dualism, 
there  arose  the  conception  of  immaterial  realities,  and 
these  immaterial  realities  were  often  given  dynamic  powers 
to  operate  within  the  material  realm.  But  does  this  not 
make  them  material?  How  can  we  get  the  soul  and  the 
body  together  if  they  are  entirely  alien  to  one  another.^ 
Is  not  Plato  only  hypostatizing  mental  objects  which  exist 
in  consciousness?  That  is  the  conclusion  to  which  we  have 
come.  He  is  thinking  the  soul  in  terms  of  conceptual 
objects  instead  of  in  terms  of  perceptual  objects. 

Aristotle  saw  the  diflficulties  confronting  Plato's  dualism 
and  did  his  best  to  avoid  them.  The  consequence  is  that 
he  combines  soul  and  body,  form  and  matter,  together  so 
intimately  that  they  seem  inseparable  aspects  of  one 
thing.  Some  of  his  peripatetic  successors  dropped  back 
into  materialism. 

Under  the  influence  of  mystical,  religious  motives  the 
soul  gradually  becomes  more  and  more  non-spatial  and 


MIND,  SOUL  AND  CONSCIOUSNESS  235 

intangible.  The  words  used  are  negative  and  abstract. 
It  is  generally  supposed  that  Plotinus  was  the  first  to  de- 
scribe the  soul  as  an  immaterial  substance.  But  this 
immaterial  substance  must  somehow  be  brought  into  re- 
lation with  the  physical  body.  In  his  effort  to  bring  the 
non-spatial  into  touch  with  the  spatial,  Plotinus  resorts 
to  expressions  which  violate  all  our  conceptions  of  spatial 
relations.  "Thus  the  soul  is  present  not  only  in  the  indi- 
vidual parts  of  the  body,  but  in  the  whole  body,  and  pres- 
ent everywhere  in  its  entirety,  not  divided  among  the 
different  parts  of  the  body;  it  is  entirely  in  the  whole  body, 
and  entirely  in  every  part."  When  we  examine  this  teach- 
ing closely,  we  see  that  Plotinus  is  trying  to  get  the  soul 
and  the  body  together  without  materializing  the  soul. 
"  What  he  tried  to  do  is  clear,  and  it  seems  equally  clear 
that  he  had  good  reason  for  trying  to  do  it.  But  it  appears 
to  us  now  that  what  he  actually  did  was  to  make  of  the 
mind  or  soul  a  something  very  like  an  inconsistent  bit  of 
matter,  that  is  something  in  space,  and  yet  not  exactly  in 
space,  a  something  that  can  be  in  two  places  at  once,  a 
logical  monstrosity.  That  his  doctrine  did  not  meet  with 
instant  rejection  was  due  to  the  fact,  already  alluded  to, 
that  our  experience  of  the  mind  is  something  rather  dim 
and  elusive.  It  is  not  easy  for  a  man  to  say  what  it  is,  and, 
hence,  it  is  not  easy  for  a  man  to  .say  what  it  is  not." 
Fullerton,  An  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  p.  104. 

Mind  in  Modem  Philosophy. — We  find  the  problem 
which  puzzled  Plotinus  still  occupying  the  attention  of 
philosophers  in  the  seventeenth  century.  Descartes  de- 
fines mind  as  thinking  substance  and  contrasts  it  with 
matter  as  extended  substance,  and  he,  also,  is  compelled 
to  contradict  himself  when  he  brings  the  two  together  in 
the  brain.   He  is  more  literal  than  Plotinus  and  locates  the 


236  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

soul  in  the  pineal  gland.  There  it  sits  and  controls  the 
movements  of  the  animal  spirits  of  the  brain.  But  a  mo- 
ment's reflection  convinces  us  that  the  soul  must  be  in 
space  and  spatial  if  it  is  to  have  a  definite  location.  Need- 
less to  say,  Descartes*  solution  secured  few  followers. 

But  the  notion  of  a  substance,  that  is,  the  thought  of 
something  permanent  and  seK-identical  which  underlies 
mental  and  physical  qualities  and  possesses  them  in  some 
mysterious  way,  was  criticised  by  John  Locke  and  rejected 
by  both  Berkeley  and  Hume.  John  Locke  admitted  the 
possibility  of  materialism.  He  writes:  "It  is  not  much 
more  remote  from  our  comprehension  to  conceive  this 
than  to  conceive  that  God  should  superadd  to  matter 
another  substance  with  a  faculty  of  thinking;  since  we 
know  not  in  what  thinking  consists  nor  to  what  sort  of 
substances  the  first  eternal  thinking  Being  has  been  pleased 
to  give  that  power."  In  other  words,  Locke  realized  that 
an  underlying  substance  is  an  unknowable  and  saw  that 
one  such  unknowable  substance  is  much  the  same  as 
another.  I  cannot  forbear  quoting  another  passage  from 
Locke  which  shows  his  vigorous  common  sense  along  with 
his  bewilderment.  "Every  one  finds  in  himself,  that  his 
soul  can  think,  will,  and  operate  on  his  body,  in  the  place 
where  that  is;  but  cannot  operate  on  a  body,  or  in  a  place 
an  hundred  miles  distant  from  it.  Nobody  can  imagine 
that  his  soul  can  think  or  move  a  body  at  Oxford,  whilst 
he  is  at  London;  and  cannot  but  know  that,  being  united 
to  his  body,  it  constantly  changes  place  all  the  whole 
journey  between  Oxford  and  London,  as  the  coach  or  horse 
does  that  carries  him."  Essay,  Bk.  11,  Chap.  XXIII, 
sec.  20. 

Consciousness  Displaces  Soul. — ^The  student  of  philos- 
ophy and  psychology  is  always  impressed  by  the  recent. 


MIND,  SOUL  AND  CONSCIOUSNESS  237 

rapid  displacement  of  the  soul  by  consciousness.  It  will 
be  remembered  that  Hume,  rejecting  both  an  unknowable 
material  substance  and  an  unknowable  immaterial  sub- 
stance, proclaimed  that  we  experience  only  our  percep- 
tions. In  the  nineteenth  century  there  arose  what  has 
aptly  been  called  a  psychology  without  a  soul.  Rational 
psychology  had  much  to  say  of  the  soul,  mostly  in  Pla- 
tonic terms,  but  empirical  psychology  concerned  itself 
with  states  of  consciousness  and  their  relation  to  the  ner- 
vous system.  The  soul-body  relation  of  previous  philos- 
ophy was  in  a  fair  way  to  become  a  consciousness-brain 
relation.  The  term  soul  has  largely  been  left  to  theology 
and  to  popular  verbal  thinking.  William  James  put  the 
logic  of  the  situation  very  well  in  his  Hibbert  Lectures: 
"Yet  it  is  not  for  idle  or  fantastical  reasons  that  the  no- 
tion of  the  substantial  soul,  so  freely  used  by  common 
men  and  the  more  popular  philosophies,  has  fallen  upon 
such  evil  days,  and  has  no  prestige  in  the  eyes  of  critical 
thinkers.  It  only  shares  the  fate  of  other  unrepresentable 
substances  and  principles.  They  are  without  exception 
all  so  barren  that  to  sincere  inquirers  they  appear  as  little 
more  than  names  masquerading — Wo  die  begriffe  fehlen 
da  stellt  ein  wort  zur  rechten  zeit  sich  ein.  You  see  no 
deeper  into  the  fact  that  a  hundred  sensations  get  com- 
pounded or  known  together  by  thinking  that  a  'soul'  does 
the  compounding  than  you  see  into  a  man's  living  eighty 
years  by  thinking  of  him  as  an  octogenarian,  or  into  our 
having  five  fingers  by  calling  us  pentadactyls.  Souls 
have  worn  out  both  themselves  and  their  welcome,  that 
is  the  plain  truth."    A  Pluralistic  Universe,  pp.  209-10. 

We  can  understand  now  why  the  term  mind  has  always 
been  so  vague  and  indefinite.  For  a  long  time,  it  was  used 
as  essentially  synonymous  with  soul  and  spirit.     It  was 


238  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

regarded  as  a  thing  which  was  in  many  ways  like  the  things 
seen  about  us  yet  different  from  them  because  more  subtle 
and  less  perceptible.  The  soul  could  enter  or  leave  the 
body  and  was  the  seat  and  source  of  will  and  thought. 
The  evolution  of  the  idea  of  the  soul  for  a  long  time  did  not 
consist  in  a  criticism  of  this  outlook  but  only  in  a  de- 
materializing  of  the  content  of  the  ghost-soul,  making  it, 
on  the  one  hand,  more  an  unknowable  and,  on  the  other, 
more  closely  associated  with  mental  processes.  It  was,  in 
fact,  not  until  the  rise  of  modern  philosophy  with  its  criti- 
cism of  both  Natural  Realism  and  unknowable  substances 
that  the  very  assumptions  of  the  older  view  were  chal- 
lenged. The  rise  of  psychology  and  the  growth  of  physiol- 
ogy completed  this  re-orientation.  Soul  drops  out  of 
philosophy  and  is  replaced  by  the  terms  mind  and  conscious- 
ness. And  of  these  two,  consciousness  has,  until  recently, 
had  the  more  definite  meaning. 

Mind  and  Consciousness. — ^As  we  shall  see  in  the  next 
chapter,  consciousness  and  mind  were  used  as  practically 
synonymous  terms  during  the  reign  of  introspective  psy- 
chology. Yet  there  were  many  who  felt  a  secret  dissatis- 
faction with  such  an  identification.  The  mind  and  the 
self  seem  to  be  something  more  continuous  than  conscious- 
ness. Is  consciousness  self-sufficient  enough  to  answer  the 
demands  put  upon  it.f*  It  comes  and  goes,  increases  when 
we  awaken  in  the  morning,  decreases  when  we  sleep  at 
night,  vanishes  under  an  anaesthetic  or  under  a  stunning 
blow  on  the  head.  In  short,  is  consciousness  able  to  absorb 
all  the  meaning  of  the  term  mind.^  We  speak  of  a  man's 
personality.  Do  we  mean  his  consciousness?  We  say  that 
an  individual  has  certain  mental  and  moral  traits.  Do 
we  identify  these  with  his  consciousness?  We  remark  that 
a  student  has  a  good  mind  and  brilliant  natural  capacities. 


MIND,  SOUL  AND  CONSCIOUSNESS  239 

Do  we  mean  to  refer  simply  to  his  consciousness?  We  say 
that  his  present  ideas  are  determined  by  his  past  experi- 
ence. How  does  this  past  experience  exist?  Modern 
eugenics  considers  mental  and  temperamental  charac- 
teristics inheritable.  In  what  form  is  this  inheritance 
transmitted?  In  all  of  these  cases,  we  know  that  we  are 
dealing  with  something  revealed  in  consciousness  and 
closely  connected  with  it  and  yet  with  something  which 
indicates  a  larger  setting  than  consciousness.  To  secure 
an  answer  to  these  questions,  we  shall  now  turn  to  modern 
biology  and  psychology  and  examine  their  data  and  con- 
cepts in  the  light  of  our  epistemology  and  metaphysics. 
Mind  may  turn  out  to  be  a  category  referable  to  the  or- 
ganic level  of  nature  and  as  objective  as  any  other.  It 
may  correspond  to  observable  types  of  response  and  to  the 
types  of  control  and  activity  implied  by  them.  In  this 
case,  mind  is  knowledge  about  organic  bodies  supple- 
mentary to  that  gained  by  the  other  sciences  but  no  less 
genuine. 

References 

Hume,  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  pt.  4. 
FuUerton,  An  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  chap.  8. 
James,  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  lecture  5. 
McDougall,  Body  and  Mind. 
Tylor,  Primitive  Culture, 


CHAPTER  XXI 
REFLECTIONS  ON  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  Subject-Matter  of  Psychology. — We  naturally  turn 
to  psychology  for  information  about  consciousness  and 
mind.  If  this  science  cannot  define  its  terms  and  state  its 
subject-matter,  the  task  laid  upon  the  philosopher  would 
seem  to  be  harder  than  he  can  accomplish.  Philosophy 
and  science  must  cooperate  if  man  is  to  secure  a  fairly 
satisfactory  solution  of  general  problems.  At  present,  we 
want  to  know  what  the  methods  and  results  of  psychology 
are  as  a  natural  science  giving  knowledge  about  the  world 
we  live  in.  If  these  are  definite,  we  can  go  on  to  interpret 
them  in  the  light  of  the  epistemology  we  have  worked  out. 

Classic  psychology  was  built  up  around  the  method  of 
introspection  and  had  no  doubt  that  the  reality  to  which 
the  knowledge  so  achieved  was  referable  was  *  conscious- 
ness.' But  of  late,  with  the  rise  of  comparative  psychology 
and  the  closer  alignment  of  psychology  with  biology,  this 
assurance  has  been  departing.  "There  is  evidence  at 
present  of  a  pronounced  disposition  to  pause  for  a  con- 
sideration of  fundamentals.  What  is  psychology  anyway, 
— what  is  its  subject-matter  and  what  are  its  methods.? 
The  stock  definition  that  it  is  concerned  with  *  the  descrip- 
tion and  explanation  of  states  of  consciousness  as  such,' 
states  of  consciousness  being  something  which  everybody 
knows  and  nobody  can  define,  has  fallen  or  is  falling  into 
disrepute."  Bode,  "Psychology  as  a  Science  of  Behavior," 
Psychological    Review,    1914.       Objective   psychology    or 

240 


REFLECTIONS  ON  PSYCHOLOGY  241 

psychology  as  a  natural  science,  it  is  said,  studies  behavior, 
and  behavior  is  something  observable.  The  reactions  of 
the  white  rat  which  goes  through  a  specially  prepared 
labyrinth  are  data  which  are  open  to  all  in  exactly  the 
same  way  that  the  reactions  of  chemicals  in  a  test-tube 
are.  The  older  psychology  was  less  concerned  with  be- 
havior and  more  with  the  characteristics  of  mental  proc- 
esses and  their  conditions  as  determined  by  introspection. 
The  demand  facing  the  modern  psychologist  is  to  do  jus- 
tice to  all  the  investigations  which  can  properly  come  under 
his  science  and  to  work  out  a  point  of  view  which  harmon- 
izes them. 

Orthodox  Psychology. — Let  us  begin  with  a  typical 
orthodox  definition  of  psychology.  "Psychology  may  be 
defined  as  the  science  of  mental  processes.  Each  of  the 
three  terms  included  in  the  definition  requires  a  brief 
explanation.  A  process  is  any  object  of  scientific  knowl- 
edge which  is  not  a  *  thing.'  A  *  thing*  is  permanent,  rel- 
atively unchanging,  definitely  marked  off  from  other 
things.  A  process  is,  by  etymology,  a  *  moving  forward.* 
It  is  a  becoming  something^ — a  continuous  operation,  a 
progressive  change,  which  the  scientific  observer  can 
trace  throughout  its  course.  ...  A  mental  process  is  a 
process  in  the  origination  and  continuance  of  which  we 
are  ourselves  necessarily  concerned, — a  process  the  nature 
of  which  is  determined  by  the  constitution  and  functions 
of  an  organism,  an  organized  individual.  ...  A  science 
is  a  sum  of  knowledge  classified  and  arranged  under  cer- 
tain general  rules  and  comprehensive  laws;  it  is  coherent 
and  unified  knowledge.'*  Titchener,  An  Outline  of  Psy- 
chology, pp.  7-8.  Thus  there  has  been  general  agreement 
among  psychologists  that  the  reality  their  science  is  con- 
cerned with  is  the  consciousness  of  particular  individuals. 


242  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

"Mental  facts,  or  facts  of  consciousness,  constitute  the 
field  of  psychology."  Angell,  Psychology,  p.  1.  Its  facts 
must  have  reference  to  the  experiences  of  individuals. 
Thus  consciousness  has  become  a  term  for  the  changing 
field  of  the  individual's  experience,  and  this  field  is  admit- 
tedly complex  and  differentiated.  We  have  learned  to 
distinguish  percepts,  concepts,  judgments,  pleasures  and 
pains,  memories,  imagination,  volition,  reasoning,  degrees 
of  attention,  etc.  These  are  distinguishable,  or  logical, 
parts  of  consciousness  and  are  carefully  studied  by  the 
psychologist.  It  is  obvious  that  the  theory  of  knowledge 
at  which  we  have  arrived  confirms  this  view  of  conscious- 
ness. For  us,  the  individual  is  confined  to  his  conscious- 
ness and  his  knowledge,  which  he  refers  to  a  realm  outside 
of  his  consciousness  in  the  case  of  the  physical  sciences, 
exists  as  propositions  in  his  consciousness. 

The  Purpose  of  the  Psychologist. — If  the  whole  of  the 
individual's  experience  is  in  some  sense  the  subject-matter 
of  psychology,  the  question  still  arises.  What  is  the  purpose 
of  the  psychologist?  What  does  he  want  to  know?  It  is 
fairly  obvious  that  he  does  not  want  to  know  what  a  par- 
ticular individual  knows  or  remembers  or  perceives  or 
feels.  His  explanations  "consist  chiefly  in  showing  (1) 
how  complex  psychical  conditions  are  made  up  of  simple 
ones,  (2)  how  the  various  psychical  groups  which  he  has 
analyzed  grow  and  develop,  and  finally  (3a)  how  these 
various  conscious  processes  are  connected  with  physio- 
logical activities,  and  (3b)  with  objects  or  events  in  the 
social  and  physical  world  constituting  the  environment." 
Angell,  Psychology,  p.  3. 

An  examination  of  the  topics  taken  up  in  a  typical 
treatise  on  psychology  will  make  this  purpose  clearer. 
First  of  all,  perceptions  are  analyzed  into  sensations,  which 


REFLECTIONS  ON  PSYCHOLOGY  243 

are  distinguishable  presentations.  These  sensations  are 
studied  and  connected  with  the  stimulation  of  the  sense- 
organs.  He  finds  that  "there  are  but  forty  or  fifty  differ- 
ent sorts  of  nerve  ends  from  which  all  the  varieties  of  our 
conscious  qualities  are  derived."  Pillsbury,  Essentials 
of  Psychology,  p.  98.  He  then  goes  on  to  study  the  varying 
intensities  of  these  sensations  and  to  determine  as  nearly 
as  he  can  the  conditions  of  this  variation.  Again,  the  psy- 
chologist discovers  that  selection  or  control  is  a  striking 
fact  of  consciousness.  "A  man  is  not  absolutely  under 
the  domination  of  habit,  of  external  stimulation,  or  of  the 
habitual  elements  in  the  thinking  processes,  but  can  decide 
for  himseK,  within  limits,  what  he  shall  hear  or  see,  what 
he  shall  think  or  what  he  shall  do."  Ibid.,  p.  105.  Real- 
izing the  significance  of  this  fact,  the  psychologist  proceeds 
to  investigate  the  internal  and  the  external  conditions  of 
consciousness.  What  control  does  intensity  of  stimulation 
exert?  What  part  is  played  by  purpose,  education,  past 
experience,  heredity.^  Next,  the  psychologist  investigates 
the  part  played  by  retention  and  association  in  the  indi- 
vidual's mental  life.  How  are  ideas  remembered,  and  why 
does  one  idea  bring  another  in  its  wake? 

These  are  but  a  few  of  the  topics  discussed  by  psychol- 
ogy, but  they  are  ample  to  bring  out  the  purpose  of  the 
psychologist.  We  do  have  experiences  of  various  kinds. 
The  psychologist  does  not  impugn  them  nor  doubt  their 
worth  and  significance.  What  he  wants  to  know  is  their 
general  conditions.  He  wants  to  be  able  to  analyze  them 
into  elements  and  study  the  laws  of  the  rise  of  our  experi- 
ences and  the  processes  involved.  For  instance,  a  scientist 
passes  a  judgment,  say,  that  the  sun  is  so  many  million 
miles  away  from  the  earth.  The  psychologist  is  not  con- 
cerned with  the  truth  or  falsity  of  that  judgment  but  with 


244  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

its  conditions  as  a  mental  content  in  the  mind  of  some  in- 
dividual. What  processes  are  necessary  before  a  judgment 
can  be  passed?  What  do  concepts  develop  from?  Could 
we  have  them  without  retention  and  association,  without 
selective  purpose  and  analysis?  How  are  all  these  condi- 
tions related  to  the  brain  and  to  the  environment?  Such 
questions  are  real  though  they  have  no  direct  concern  for 
astronomy.  I  mean  that  the  truth  of  an  astronomical 
proposition  is  unaffected  by  them.  A  false  judgment  has 
essentially  the  same  general  mental  conditions  as  a  true  one. 
A  Current  Paradox. — Both  Titchener  and  James  Ward 
(Art.  "Psychology"  in  Encyclopedia  Britannica)  sug- 
gest that  psychology  has  to  do  with  the  same  experience 
that  the  other  sciences  are  concerned  with.  "It  is  the 
same  experience  all  through;  physics  and  psychology  deal 
with  the  same  stuff,  the  same  material;  the  sciences  are 
separated  simply — and  sufficiently — by  their  point  of 
view."  Titchener,  A  Text-book  of  Psychology,  Chap. 
1.  "  Paradoxical  though  it  may  be,  we  must  then  conclude 
that  psychology  cannot  be  defined  by  reference  to  a 
special  subject-matter  as  such  concrete  sciences,  for  ex- 
ample, as  mineralogy  and  botany  can  be;  and,  since  it 
deals  in  some  sort  with  the  whole  of  experience,  it  is  ob-* 
viously  not  an  abstract  science  in  any  ordinary  sense  of 
that  term.  To  be  characterized  at  all,  therefore,  apart 
from  metaphysical  assumptions,  it  must  be  characterized 
by  the  standpoint  from  which  this  experience  is  viewed. 
It  is  by  way  of  expressing  this  that  widely  different  schools 
of  psychology  define  it  as  subjective,  all  other  positive 
sciences  being  distinguished  as  objective."  Ward,  Ency, 
Brit.,  p.  548,  eleventh  ed.  But  this  contrast  between 
psychology  as  subjective  and  the  other  sciences  as  objec- 
tive is  misleading.     One  science  must  be  as  objective  as 


REFLECTIONS  ON  PSYCHOLOGY  245 

another.  The  epistemology  at  which  we  have  arrived 
enables  us  to  settle  this  problem  clearly  and  definitely. 
All  data,  laws  and  theories  are  within  consciousness;  but 
the  various  physical  sciences  divide  among  themselves 
those  data  which  are  referable  to  the  physical  world  as 
furnishing  the  foundation  of  our  knowledge  about  it,  while 
psychology  obtains  its  data  by  examining  the  various 
phases  of  consciousness  with  a  view  to  determining  their 
constitution,  conditions  and  genesis.  Consciousness  is 
the  seat  and  source  of  all  knowledge,  but  it  is  the  realm 
to  which  psychological  knowledge  is  referred,  while  the 
physical  world  which  can  never  be  apprehended  is  the 
realm  to  which  the  knowledge  gained  by  the  physical 
sciences  is  referred.  It  is  this  view  that  Ward  and  Titch- 
ener  are  trying  to  express.  All  sciences  are  objective, 
psychology  as  much  as  physics.  All  sciences  exist  only 
in  the  minds  of  human  individuals.  But  the  realms  to 
which  the  physical  sciences  and  psychology  refer  their 
knowledge  are  different.  Consciousness  is  not  peculiar 
and  esoteric;  it  is  the  only  reality  we  experience  in  contrast 
to  having  knowledge  about.  In  orthodox  psychology,  we 
have  knowledge  about  that  which  we  experience;  in  the 
other  sciences,  we  have  knowledge  about  that  which  we 
do  not  apprehend. 

Psychology  as  the  Study  of  Behavior. — "Psychology 
as  the  behaviorist  views  it  is  a  purely  objective  experi- 
mental branch  of  natural  science.  Its  theoretical  goal  is 
the  prediction  and  control  of  behavior.  Introspection 
forms  no  essential  part  of  its  methods,  nor  is  the  scientific 
value  of  its  data  dependent  upon  the  readiness  with  which 
they  lend  themselves  to  interpretation  in  terms  of  con- 
sciousness. The  behaviorist  attempts  to  get  a  unitary 
scheme  of  animal  response.     He  recognizes  no  dividing 


246  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

line  between  man  and  brute.  The  behavior  of  man,  with 
all  of  its  refinement  and  complexity,  forms  only  a  part  of 
his  total  field  of  investigation."  Watson,  Behavior,  p.  1. 
That  much  knowledge  of  this  sort  can  be  gained  cannot 
be  denied.  It  is,  moreover,  real  knowledge  about  the  or- 
ganism studied  and  holds  in  lar^  measure  of  the  species. 
But  the  behaviorist  studies  responses,  and  in  human  beings 
these  are  often  long  delayed.  The  importance  of  what  goes 
on  inside  the  organism  increases  with  these  delayed  re- 
sponses. The  objective  psychologist  is  obliged  to  call 
them  implicit  behavior. 

The  Value  of  Behaviorism. — Objective  psychology 
developed  in  comparative  work  upon  animals.  "Ob- 
jective methods  are  essential  to  genetic  investigation. 
The  proto-esthesia  of  amoeba  is  radically  different  from 
any  human  experience.  To  interpret  amoeba's  activity 
in  terms  of  human  consciousness  throws  no  light  on  either 
consciousness  or  behavior.  On  the  other  hand,  the  study 
of  amoeba's  behavior  throws  considerable  light  on  the  be- 
havior of  higher  organisms,  as  Jennings  and  Loeb  have 
shown.  An  examination  of  the  gradual  evolution  of  trop- 
isms,  reflexes,  instincts,  intelligent  action,  and  rational 
volition  enables  us  to  understand  far  better  than  before 
the  meaning  of  human  acts  and  consciousness."  Warren, 
Psychological  Review,  1914,  p.  96. 

An  Inclusive  Definition  of  Psychology. — ^The  problem 
which  confronts  psychology  to-day  is  as  follows:  Can 
traditional  psychology  and  behaviorism  be  combined  into 
one  science  or  do  they  constitute  two  separate  sciences? 
All  knowledge  is  objective  and  gives  knowledge  about 
reality.  The  task  before  us,  then,  is  to  interpret  the  two 
systems  of  knowledge  as  knowledge  about  the  organism. 
Is  it  not  knowledge  about  the  organism  as  functioning.'^ 


REFLECTIONS  ON  PSYCHOLOGY  247 

Yes;  but  this  term  is  too  broad.  Digestion  is  a  function 
of  the  organism,  and  so  is  the  circulation  of  the  blood.  It 
is  rather  the  functioning  which  involves  the  nervous  sys- 
tem in  its  higher  centres.  We  may  define  psychology  as 
the  science  of  behavior  and  its  control.  But  what  is  this 
control?  Shall  we  call  it  the  brain  or  the  mind?  We 
really  have  three  terms  to  bring  together,  brain,  mind  and 
consciousness.  How  can  this  be  done?  First  of  all,  we 
must  understand  our  terms.  If  we  take  the  brain  to  be  the 
reality  in  which  the  control  is  to  be  located,  mind  to  be  the 
type  of  control  and  consciousness  something  which  is 
inseparable  from  mind  and  throws  light  upon  it,  we  can 
think  of  the  control,  as  at  once  brain,  mind  and  conscious- 
ness. And  so  it  must  remain  until  the  brain — mind — con- 
sciousness problem  is  solved. 

Psychology  is  not  justified  in  proclaiming  itseK  the 
science  of  behavior.  It  is  simply  one  of  the  sciences  of 
behavior.  "  The  question  for  general  biology  is  whether 
the  behavior  is,  as  a  matter  of  observation,  adapted  to  the 
environing  circumstances  on  the  occasion  of  its  first  oc- 
currence, or  is  brought  into  closer  relation  to  these  cir- 
cumstances by  acquired  accommodation.  The  question  for 
physiology  is  whether  the  behavior  is  due  to  certain  in- 
herited connexions  among  the  neurones  of  the  central 
nervous  system,  or  is  due  to  connexions  which  have  been 
established  in  the  course  of  the  individual  life.  Both 
general  biologist  and  physiologist  may  ignore  the  question 
whether  certain  psychological  relationships  are  also  pres- 
ent; but  only  because  they  do  not  fall  within  their  special 
■field  of  study.''  Morgan,  Instinct  and  Experience,  pp. 
88-9. 

It  follows  that  there  is  no  conflict  between  biology  and 
psychology.     Biology  is  continuous  with  psychology  so 


248  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

far  as  behavior  is  concerned;  and  introspective  psychology 
simply  supplements  behaviorism  without  contradicting  its 
conclusions  in  the  least.  The  methods  of  biology  do  not 
exhaust  all  we  can  know  about  an  organism. 

What  Is  Mind? — Objective  psychology  gains  knowl- 
edge about  that  which  controls  the  behavior  of  the  organ- 
ism. Let  us  call  this  control  "mind."  So  defined,  mind  is 
the  relatively  permanent  organization  of  instincts,  tenden- 
cies, habits,  and  capacities  which  enable  the  animal  to 
act  as  a  whole  to  stimuli.  The  behaviorist  points  out  that 
this  internal  control  evolves,  that  an  ant  is  incapable  of 
doing  the  things  that  a  rat  can,  and  that  a  human  being 
behaves  in  a  far  more  plastic  and  *  intelligent'  way  than 
do  the  lower  animals.  Hence,  mind  is  a  fact  which  physi- 
cal science  is  forced  to  recognize. 

But  orthodox  psychology  also  gains  information  about 
mind,  about  that  which  controls  behavior.  It  teaches 
that  past  experience  helps  to  determine  what  we  now 
perceive  and  what  we  do.  It  lays  stress  upon  the  instinc- 
tive foundation  and  looks  upon  the  mind  as  something 
growing  and  developing  as  the  organism  functions.  The 
psychologist  cannot  understand  what  is  given  in  conscious- 
ness at  various  times  without  assuming  that  permanent 
powers  and  capacities  exist  which  condition  consciousness 
and  are  modified  by  it.  This  evolving  background  is  the 
mind.  But  it  is  evident  that  this  necessary  hypothesis  is 
identical  with  the  hypothesis  which  objective  psychology 
is  forced  to  construct  to  explain  its  data. 

The  conclusion  to  which  psychologists  are  coming  is  that 
mind  is  more  than  consciousness.  "  Consciousness,  as 
appears  from  our  previous  account,  is  a  name  for  a  state, 
an  act,  or  a  condition,  in  short  for  something  temporary. 
...  It  will  suffice  us  for  the  moment  that  we  give  the 


REFLECTIONS  ON  PSYCHOLOGY  M9 

name  of  Mind  to  the  permanent  unity  of  which  we  con- 
ceive any  given  act  of  consciousness  to  be  the  temporary 
condition,  act  or  state.  .  .  .  Conscious  and  unconscious 
operations  then  may  be  legitimately  grouped  together, 
and  without  prejudgment  as  to  their  ultimate  nature  the 
sum  of  them  may  be  called  Mind.  Mind  then  appears  as 
that  which  has  consciousness  in  its  foreground  while  in 
the  background  it  is  the  theatre  of  energies,  of  interactions, 
of  stresses  and  strains,  the  play  of  which  goes  to  determine 
the  character  of  the  scene  by  which  the  foreground  is 
filled."  Hobhouse,  Development  and  Purpose,  pp.  20-1, 
passim.  Essentially  the  same  view  is  championed  by  Mc- 
Dougall.  He  writes:  "The  stream  of  consciousness  is  in 
part  determined  by  influences  coming  from  outside,  which 
we  call  sense-impressions;  but,  when  we  take  these  fully 
into  account,  the  course  of  the  stream  of  consciousness 
remains  still  unexplained;  that  is  to  say,  its  course  is  not 
wholly  determined  by  the  two  factors,  consciousness  it- 
self and  the  sense-stimuli  or  sense-impressions.  It  is 
determined  in  a  very  important  and,  in  fact,  vastly  pre- 
dominant degree  by  some  other  real  condition  or  condi- 
tions, which  we  commonly  call  the  structure  or  consti- 
tution of  the  individual  mind."  McDougall,  Body  and 
Mind,  p.  165. 

Consciousness  and  Mind. — Let  us  try  to  get  our 
concepts  of  consciousness  and  mind  as  distinct  as  possible. 
Consciousness  is  a  stream.  It  is  continually  changing. 
This  moment  I  have  one  set  of  feelings  and  ideas;  the  next 
moment  I  may  be  thinking  of  something  quite  different. 
It  is  an  exaggeration  to  speak  of  consciousness  as  a  flux, 
but  it  is  certainly  none  to  call  it  a  process.  Moreover, 
this  process  is  intermittent.  In  deep  sleep  or  a  swoon,  it 
is  practically  non-existent.    For  these  reasons,  I  have  de- 


250  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

cided  to  classify  consciousness  as  a  variant.  It  is  constantly 
changing  and  not  directly  conserved. 

But  consciousness  is  somehow  indirectly  conserved. 
The  student  gains  by  his  reflections  and  observations. 
Knowledge  is  a  growth,  and  we  always  know  more  than 
we  are  aware  of  at  any  one  time.  A  well-stored  mind  is 
no  metaphor.  Consciousness  seems  to  sink  back  into  the 
mind  and  leave  a  deposit.  Each  pulse  of  consciousness 
may  be  likened  to  those  coral  insects  which,  dying,  build 
up  the  reef  upon  which  they  have  lived.  Memory  is,  of 
course,  the  most  overt  proof  of  this  positive  modification 
of  the  mind.^ 

The  mind  which  has  expressed  itself  in  the  consciousness 
of  to-day  is  different  from  the  mind  of  yesterday.  This 
functioning  has  changed  it.  Such  change  is  a  deepening 
of  its  content.  It  is  obvious  that  we  must  not  have  a  nega- 
tive conception  of  the  mind  as  simply  an  abstract  system 
of  naked  potentialities.  The  mind  is  real  and  concrete 
and  complex  beyond  imagination.  While  psychology  gives 
us  knowledge  about  it,  it  must  not  be  identified  with  this 
abstract  knowledge.  If  the  mind  is  a  potentiality  so  far 
as  consciousness  is  concerned,  in  itseK  it  is  a  veritable 
reality.  It  is  the  setting,  source  and  condition  of  con- 
sciousness. 

Because  consciousness  is  the  only  reality  we  can  experi- 
ence or  apprehend,  we  are  prone  to  make  a  dualism  be- 
tween consciousness  and  its  setting.  Consciousness  is  a 
peculiar  part  of  the  mind.  It  is  unique  just  as  the  mind  is. 
But  what  we  must  not  do  is  to  try  to  apprehend  both,  de- 
cide that  they  are  different  in  texture,  and  despair  of  com- 

*  What  is  often  called  the  subconscious  and  the  unconscious  is  mind 
in  contrast  to  consciousness.  Bergson's  'memory'  and  Freud's  'wish' 
enter  here. 


REFLECTIONS  ON  PSYCHOLOGY  251 

bining  them  into  one  apprehensible  object.  As  we  have 
pointed  out,  consciousness  is  the  only  part  of  reality  we 
can  apprehend.  Hence  our  problem  is  to  conceive  con- 
sciousness as  a  change  in  a  more  inclusive  reality  about 
which  we  can  gain  knowledge.  When  we  call  the  inclusive 
reality  within  which  consciousness  appears  intermittently, 
mind,  and  speak  of  it  as  unconscious,  we  are  only  re-stating 
this  acknowledged  situation.  The  greater  part  of  mind  is 
the  source  and  seat  of  consciousness  and  is  therefore  un- 
conscious. But  the  very  conception  of  the  relationship 
precludes  dualism. 

References 

Angell,  Psychology,  chap.  1. 

Bergson,  Matter  and  Memory  and  Creative  Evolution. 

Bode,  Psychological  Review,  1914. 

Freud,  The  Interpretation  of  Dreams. 

Hobhouse,  Mind  in  Evolution  and  Development  and  Purpose, 

McDougall,  Body  and  Mind. 

Morgan,  Instinct  and  Experience. 

Pillsbury,  Essentials  of  Psychology,  chap.  1. 

Titchener,  An  Outline  of  Psychology,  chap.  1. 

Ward,  "  Psychology,"  Ency.  Britannica. 

Warren,  Psychological  Review,  1914. 

Watson,  Behavior,  chap.  1. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  MIND  AND   BODY 

The  Mind-Body  Problem. — The  last  two  chapters 
have  been  of  the  nature  of  a  preparation  for  the  discussion 
of  the  mind-body  problem.  What  is  the  nature  of  this 
problem?  It  arises  from  a  fact  and  a  theory.  The  fact  is 
that  our  minds  and  consciousnesses  are  clearly  very  in- 
timately connected  with  our  bodies;  the  theory  is  that  we 
know  that  all  physical  bodies  are  alien  to  mind.  In  other 
words,  reflective  thought  has  been  pulled  in  two  different 
directions  at  the  same  time  and  has  been  unable  to  work 
out  a  harmonious  view.  The  physical  sciences  have  as- 
sumed that  they  alone  had  the  physical  world  for  their 
object  and  they  have  naturally  concluded  that  the  physical 
world  must  be  conceived  only  in  terms  of  the  information 
they  have  acquired.  The  consequence  has  been  the  exist- 
ence of  a  dualism.  Mind  and  consciousness  are  real,  yet 
immaterial.  The  physical  world  is  real,  yet  material.  The 
mind-body  problem  has  consisted  in  the  attempt  to  relate 
two  such  antithetical  realities.  That  they  are  actually 
related  has  always  seemed  undeniable — at  least  the  denial 
of  a  relation  has  been  the  counsel  of  despair.  But  how 
to  conceive  the  relationship  has  been  the  crucial  point  of 
metaphysics.  There  have  been  many  tentative  solutions 
of  the  problem  but  none  that  have  satisfied  any  large 
number  of  thinkers.  Yet  both  because  of  its  intrinsic 
interest  and  significance  and  because  of  the  fact  that  it 
brings  both  theory  of  knowledge  and  metaphysics  to  a  f o- 

252 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  MIND  AND  BODY    253 

cus,  a  full  discussion  of  it  is  desirable  even  in  an  introduc- 
tory text. 

Solutions  Offered. — We  can  easily  make  a  preliminary 
classification  of  theories  about  the  mind-body  relation  into 
dualistic  and  monistic.  Dualistic  theories  accept  the  dis- 
tinction between  mind  and  body  as  corresponding  to 
an  existential  division  in  \^ality  itself.  The  mind  is  one 
kind  of  reality  and  the  physical  world  is  quite  another 
kind.  Monistic  theories  are  endeavors  to  avoid  this  dual- 
ism. The  basis  of  their  arguments  is  the  belief  that  the 
distinction  is  due  to  the  human  point  of  view  which  con- 
ceptually severs  what  is  actually  a  unity.  There  is  not  a 
mind  and  a  body  but  only  one  complex  existent  which  the 
knowing  mind  apprehends  from  different  points  of  view 
and  so  doubles.  Naturally,  monistic  theories  to  be 
complete  must  have  a  theory  of  knowledge  which  explains 
this  tendency  to  conceive  one  reality  as  twcL.different 
kinds  of  reality.  Adequate  theories  must  interpret  illu- 
sions much  as  the  Copernican  view  of  the  solar  system 
enables  us  to  understand  why  we  see  things  in  a  Ptolemaic 
way. 

Dualistic  Theories. — Dualistic  theories  divide  around 
the  question  whether  or  not  a  causal  relation  exists  be- 
tween mind  and  body.  There  are  three  main  dualistic 
theories,  although  there  are  many  varieties  of  these  three. 
Since  our  purpose  is  to  gain  a  clear  idea  of  the  mind-body 
problem,  we  shall  not  consider  unessential  variations. 

Interactionism  holds  that  mind  and  the  physical  world 
interact  causally.  Thus  interactionism  accepts  two  reali- 
ties of  equal  rank,  mind  and  body,  and  declares  that 
experience  indicates  a  causal  relation  between  them. 
The  advocates  of  this  position  always  maintain  that  it 
covers  the  facts  more  naturally  than  any  other  dualistic 


254  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

hypothesis.  In  sensation,  it  is  quite  apparent  that  the 
stimulation  of  the  body  affects  the  mind,  while  in  volition 
the  reverse  is  just  as  obviously  the  case. 

Parallelism  is  the  denial  of  interactionism.  The  parallel- 
ist  refuses  to  regard  physical  and  mental  events  as  parts 
of  one  order  of  causes  and  effects.  So  impressed  is  he  with 
the  difference  between  the  mental  and  the  physical  that  he 
finds  it  impossible  to  conceive  of  interaction  between  them. 
Hence,  he  is  led  to  hold  that  both  orders  are  self-sufficient 
and  independent  even  though  they  accompany  each  other 
so  assiduously. 

Epiphenomenalism  may  best  be  described  as  a  material- 
istic form  of  parallelism.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  wavers 
between  parallelism  and  a  one-sided  causal  view.  The 
drift  of  the  position  is  the  emphasis  upon  the  importance 
of  the  body  as  against  the  mind.  The  mind  is  only  a  shadow 
accompanying  causal  changes  in  the  brain. 

Interactionism. — While  the  acceptance  of  a  causal 
relation  between  mind  and  body  is  the  defining  character- 
istic of  interactionism,  we  must  not  ignore  the  fact  that 
some  interactionists  conceive  of  the  mind  and  of  this  re- 
lation more  crudely  than  do  others.  The  mind  was  first 
looked  upon  as  a  ghost-soul  of  a  fairly  material  texture. 
The  interaction  of  mind  and  body  was  not  far  different, 
then,  from  the  interaction  of  two  physical  things.  Also, 
when  the  mind  was  thought  of  as  composed  of  fire-atoms, 
there  was  no  theoretical  difficulty.  But  as  the  mind  was 
more  and  more  de-materialized  and  extruded  from  space, 
difficulties  multiplied.  How  can  that  which  is  not  in  space 
influence  and  be  influenced  by  that  which  is  in  space  .^^ 
Does  interaction  involve  a  meeting  or  coming  together? 
Descartes  put  the  soul  in  the  pineal  gland  even  though 
he   considered   the  soul    unextended.     But   no   modern 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  MIND  AND  BODY  ^55 

thinker  has  the  temerity  to  contradict  himself  in  such  a 
fashion. 

Let  us  examine  a  contemporary  exposition  of  interac- 
tionism  which  is  subtle  enough  to  avoid  all  the  grosser 
errors  of  early  expositions  of  this  view.  Dr.  McDougall, 
an  eminent  psychologist,  writes  as  follows:  "In  a  similar 
way  we  may  describe  a  soul  as  a  sum  of  enduring  capacities 
for  thoughts,  feelings,  and  efforts  of  determinate  kinds. 
Since  the  word  substance  retains  the  flavour  of  so  many 
controversial  doctrines,  we  shall  do  well  to  avoid  it  as  the 
name  for  any  such  sum  of  enduring  capacities,  and  to  use 
instead  the  word  thing  or  being.  We  may  then  describe 
a  soul  as  a  being  that  possesses,  or  is,  the  sum  of  definite 
capacities  for  psychical  activity  and  psycho-physical 
interaction,  of  which  the  most  fundamental  are  (1)  the 
capacity  of  producing,  in  response  to  certain  physical 
stimuli  (the  sensory  processes  of  the  brain),  the  whole 
range  of  sensation  qualities  in  their  whole  range  of  in- 
tensities; (2)  the  capacity  of  responding  to  certain  sensa- 
tion-complexes with  the  production  of  meanings,  as,  for 
example,  spatial  meanings;  (3)  the  capacity  of  responding 
to  these  sensations  and  these  meanings  with  feeling  and 
conation  or  effort,  under  the  spur  of  which  further  mean- 
ings may  be  brought  to  consciousness  in  accordance  with 
the  laws  of  reproduction  of  similars  and  of  reasoning;  (4) 
the  capacity  of  reacting  upon  the  brain-processes  to  modify 
their  course  in  a  way  which  we  cannot  clearly  define,  but 
which  we  may  provisionally  conceive  as  a  process  of  guid- 
ance by  which  streams  of  nervous  energy  may  be  concen- 
trated in  a  way  that  antagonizes  the  tendency  ^  of  all  physi- 
cal energy  to  dissipation  and  degradation."     Body  and 

^  I  am  skeptical  of  this  principle  if  taken  as  more  than  one  tendency 
among  others. 


^^56  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Mind,  p.  365.  What  are  the  chief  objections  to  such  a 
type  of  interactionism? 

The  objection  which  science  has  usually  expressed  is 
that  interactionism  involves  a  denial  of  the  continuity 
of  the  physical  world.  The  brain-event  acts  upon  the 
soul  and  so  energy  disappears  from  the  physical  system 
into  the  spiritual  world.  But  such  a  breach  of  continuity 
cannot  be  conceived  by  the  physical  scientist;  it  would 
be  for  him  as  much  of  a  miracle  as  the  introduction  of  new 
energy  into  the  physical  system  from  outside.  The  quan- 
titative form  of  the  principle  of  causality  as  used  by  the 
physical  sciences  is  the  equivalence  of  cause  and  effect, 
that  is,  of  the  amount  of  energy,  kinetic  and  potential,  in 
a  physical  system  at  different  times.  Interactionism  thus 
conflicts  with  the  fundamental  postulate  of  science  that 
nature  is  a  self-sufficient  and  inclusive  system.  We  must, 
however,  frankly  admit  that  this  objection,  although  a 
strong  one  which  puts  the  burden  of  proof  upon  inter- 
actionism, is  not  final. 

Another  objection  calls  attention  to  the  mystery  in- 
volved in  the  presence  of  the  soul  with  the  body  if  their 
relation  is  so  external.  Whence  comes  the  soul.^  Why  is 
it  influenced  only  by  brain-states  and  not  by  other  physical 
changes?  Do  souls  evolve  step  by  step  with  the  brain  in 
the  animal  series?  Facing  these  questions,  interactionists 
feel  themselves  compelled  to  construct  a  speculative  meta- 
physics in  which  the  soul  controls  evolution.  Bergson's 
speculations  in  Creative  Evolution  are  veiy  interesting  in 
this  connection. 

A  third  objection  is  that  this  conception  plays  fast  and 
loose  with  the  category  of  causality.  Causality  involves 
a  system  of  co-existent  things  which  are  in  an  internal  proc- 
ess of  change.     Such  a  system  is  spatial.     But  how  can 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  MIND  AND  BODY    257 

the  soul  form  one  system  with  the  body  if  it  is  distinct  from 
the  body?  I  fear  that  interactionism  drops  back  to  the 
popular  view  of  causation  as  the  stark  production  of  some- 
thing in  a  patient  by  an  agent.  But  we  must  remember 
that  action  involves  reaction.  Moreover,  is  external 
causation  able  to  account  for  the  selective  control  of  be- 
havior.^ Consciousness  does  not  know  the  brain  as  the 
pianist  knows  the  key-board. 

The  fourth  objection  to  interactionism  is  epistemologi- 
cal.  Does  it  not  assume  that  we  know  enough  about  the 
brain  to  know  that  it  cannot  be  the  soul?  Yet  the  soul  is 
described  as  only  a  sum  of  enduring  capacities  for  thoughts, 
feelings,  and  efforts  of  determinate  kinds!  We  must  also 
note  that  it  is  the  dead-level,  mechanical  view  of  the  brain 
that  leads  the  modern  psychologist  to  flirt  with  interac- 
tionism. McDougall  admits  this  in  so  many  words:  "And 
it  is  just  because  we  have  found  that  mental  and  vital 
processes  cannot  be  completely  described  and  explained 
in  terms  of  mechanism  that  we  are  compelled  to  believe 
in  the  co-operation  of  some  non-mechanical,  teleological 
factor,  and  to  adopt  the  hypothesis  of  the  soul.'*  Ibid., 
p.  364. 

While  we  cannot  be  said  to  have  disproved  interaction- 
ism, we  have  shown  that  there  are  decided  objections  to  it. 
Our  hope  must  be  that  a  more  satisfactory  hypothesis 
can  be  offered. 

Parallelism. — Parallelism  is  the  denial  of  a  causal 
relation  between  mind  and  body.  But  it  accompanies 
this  denial  with  the  acceptance  of  dualism. 

Metaphysical  parallelism  corresponds  to  the  interac- 
tionism which  we  have  just  examined  in  being  an  ultimate 
theory  instead  of  a  statement  of  empirical  conclusions. 
As  such,  it  goes  back  to  the  Cartesian  school.    It  appears 


258  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

in  its  purest  form  in  Occasionalism.  The  Occasionalists 
held  that  mind  and  matter  are  so  alien  to  each  other  that 
it  is  impossible  to  think  of  them  as  causally  interactive. 
The  correspondence  between  their  changes  must  therefore 
be  accounted  for  by  the  mediatory  activity  of  Deity  for 
whom  changes  in  the  one  are  signs  of  changes  to  be  pro- 
duced in  the  other.  Now,  modern  science  so  far  as  it 
leans  toward  parallelism  is  influenced  by  those  arguments 
against  interactionism  which  have  to  do  with  the  conser- 
vation of  energy  and  the  causal  self-sufficiency  of  nature. 
It  is  negative  rather  than  positive,  and  is  satisfied  with 
excluding  mind.  The  simplest  form  of  such  negative, 
dualistic  parallelism  is  to  be  found  in  the  position  that 
consciousness  is  the  constant  concomitant  of  the  activity 
of  the  brain,  that  for  every  psychosis  there  is  a  correspond- 
ing neurosis.  For  dualistic  parallelism,  such  concomitance 
is  ultimate  and  inexplicable. 

There  are  two  main  objections  to  dualistic  parallelism. 
The  first  is  that  this  constant  concomitance  is  a  mystery 
that  passes  understanding.  If  there  be  no  existential 
relation  between  them,  why  should  the  one  be  accompanied 
by  the  other  .^  The  mystery' becomes  still  greater  when  we 
realize  that  there  is  a  harmony  between  ideas  in  the  mind 
and  the  behavior  of  the  organism.  The  idea  of  moving 
my  arm  precedes  the  movement  of  that  organ  and  not  that 
of  my  head.  The  second  objection  to  parallelism  concerns 
the  point  in  which  interactionism  is  strongest.  Can  we 
understand  human  behavior  in  terms  of  purely  mechanical 
causality?  Do  not  meanings  and  plans  so  pervade  conduct 
that  it  is  inexplicable  without  them? 

Empirical  parallelism  is  simply  another  term  for  the 
empirical  law  of  psycho-neural  correlation.  Investigation 
seems  to  show  that  every  pulse  of  consciousness  is  ac- 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  MIND  AND  BODY    259 

companied  by  a  brain-event.  While  metaphysical  parallel- 
ism is  dominated  by  spatial  imagery,  empirical  parallelism 
is  purely  temporal  in  character.  It  would  probably  be 
best  to  drop  the  diagrammatic  term  parallelism  and  to 
speak  of  temporal  correlation.  While  certain  psychologists 
— Wundt,  McDougall,  and  Bergson,  for  example— have 
denied  the  completeness  of  this  correlation,  they  have  done 
so  in  consequence  of  theories  rather  than  in  consequence 
of  definite  facts,  and  their  position  is  not  generally  sec- 
onded by  psychologists.  We  shall,  therefore,  take  psycho- 
neural  correlation  as  part  of  our  knowledge  about  the 
organism. 

Epiphenomenalism.— Parallelism  readily  lapses  into 
epiphenomenalism.  Since,  for  the  physical  scientist,  the 
body  is  the  more  seK-sufficient  system,  it  overshadows 
the  intermittent  stream  of  consciousness  that  is  correlated 
with  it.  The  inevitable  tendency  is  to  think  of  conscious- 
ness as  a  by-product  of  brain  changes.  The  epiphenome- 
nalist  usually  satisfies  himself,  however,  with  the  declara- 
tion that  the  body  is  an  automaton  and  that  its  behavior 
is  uncontrolled  by  what  goes  on  in  consciousness.  The 
chief  article  of  his  creed  is  that  the  physical  world  is  a 
closed  causal  system. 

In  its  desire  for  naturalism,  physical  science  has  almost 
made  naturalism  impossible.  Mechanical  rationalism  has 
gradually  induced  materialism  and  epiphenomenalism, 
which  is  only  a  shame-faced  materialism.  While  earlier 
naturalistic  thinkers  were  willing  to  accept  two  sub- 
stantial realities,  mind  and  matter,  later  thinkers  tended 
more  and  more  to  monism.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that 
the  theory  of  evolution  with  its  naturalistic  way  of  handling 
man  has  aided  this  monistic  development.  But  physical 
science  in  its  drift  toward  monism  found  itself  shipwrecked 


mo  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

on  the  reef  of  materialism.  It  was  unable  to  re-interpret 
the  physical  world  in  such  a  way  as  to  find  a  place  for  mind 
in  it.  The  original  dualism  could  not  be  overcome  in  any 
real  way.  Naive  materialism  is  unable  to  do  justice  to 
the  fact  of  consciousness,  for  it  is  nonsense  to  say  that  the 
motion  of  atoms  is  consciousness.  Epiphenomenalism  is 
the  attempt  to  occupy  a  compromise  between  parallelism 
and  materialism;  and,  as  in  all  such  verbal  compromises, 
it  is  either  parallelism  or  materialism  according  to  the 
outlook  of  the  interpreter. 

Epiphenomenalism  is  usually  spoken  of  as  involving 
a  one-sided  causal  relation  between  consciousness  and  the 
body.  The  brain  controls  consciousness,  but  consciousness 
does  not  control  the  brain.  It  would  be  better  to  stress 
the  materialistic  aspect  of  the  doctrine  and  to  describe  it 
as  involving  the  production  of  consciousness  by  a  brain 
which  is  by  hypothesis  alien  to  mind.  The  truth  is  that 
both  materialism  and  epiphenomenalism  are  offshoots 
from  Natural  Realism;  that  is  they  begin  with  a  *  natural 
dualism'  and  seek  to  obtain  a  monism  by  reducing  the 
other  term  to  the  physical.  Instead  of  re-interpreting 
both  terms  of  this  natural  dualism'  in  the  light  of  a  more 
adequate  epistemology,  they  adopt  the  uncritical  method 
of  accepting  their  terms  and  then  seeking  to  reduce  one  to 
the  other.    The  preferred  term  is,  of  course,  the  brain. 

To  one  who  accepts  a  dead-level,  merely  quantitative 
view  of  nature,  the  difference  between  the  brain  and  other 
physical  things  is  only  one  of  complexity.  Hence,  unless 
some  reason  can  be  given  why  consciousness  should  be 
correlated  with  complexity,  the  correlation  is  simply  a 
brute  fact.  But  the  intellect  can  see  no  necessary  connec- 
tion between  complexity  and  consciousness  any  more 
than  between  motion  and  consciousness.     It  is  evident 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  MIND  AND  BODY    261 

that  we  must  go  deeper  into  both  epistemology  and  meta- 
physics before  we  can  solve  the  mind-body  problem. 

Monistic  Theories. — All  monistic  theories  deny  that 
there  is  a  causal  relation  between  mind  and  body  because 
they  do  not  regard  these  as  two  existentially  distinct 
things. 

We  shall  discuss  three  types  of  monistic  solution  of  the 
relation  between  mind  and  body.  All  three  are  bound  up 
with  epistemology  and  metaphysics  and  will  therefore 
furnish  the  material  for  a  review.  We  shall  call  the  first 
theory  psychical  monism,  the  second  the  double-aspect 
theory,  the  third,  the  unity  theory. 

Psychical  Monism. — Psychical  monism  is  a  deduction 
from  spiritualism,  which,  it  will  be  remembered,  is  itself 
a  deduction  from  idealism.  If  all  reality  is  spiritual  or 
mental,  the  reality  of  the  body  must  conform  to  this  one 
universal  kind  of  reality.  The  spiritualist  asserts  that 
what  the  dualist  calls  the  body  and  regards  as  distinct 
from  mind  is  only  a  perceptual  or  conceptual  symbol  of 
a  part  of  a  spiritual  universe.  Changes  in  the  physical 
world  as  perceived  events  are  only  changes  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  some  mind,  and  changes  in  the  physical  world 
as  conceived  by  the  scientist  are  likewise  only  changes  in 
the  knowing  mind.  But  these  perceived  and  conceived 
changes  are  signs  of  real  events  in  the  one  universe  which  is 
immaterial  in  its  texture  and  stuff. 

This  metaphysical  solution  of  the  mind-body  problem 
turns  around  the  reduction  of  the  dualism  characteristic 
of  both  popular  and  scientific  thought.  But,  so  far  as  the 
body  of  a  person  is  more  than  his  mind  although  not  differ- 
ent from  it,  a  somewhat  similar  problem  remains.  Some 
spiritualists  maintain  that  the  brain  is  practically  a  mech- 
anism played  upon  by  the  mind.     Such  thinkers  would 


262  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

appear  to  teach  that  there  are  grades  of  spiritual  tension 
in  reality  and  that  the  physical  world  represents  a  lower 
level  of  spiritual  activity.  In  this  way,  they  avoid  the 
traditional  dualism  of  substance  and  substitute  a  qualita- 
tive duality  between  spirit  and  matter.  Bergson,  for  ex- 
ample, holds  that  matter  is  the  degradation  of  spirit  and 
takes  the  form  of  space,  while  pure  spirit  is  activity  and 
exists  in  time.  Such  antitheses  are  striking,  but  have  not 
yet  been  carried  out  successfully.  Practically,  Bergson's 
position  approaches  interactionism.  The  brain  is  the  in- 
strument of  the  mind. 

Panpsychism  offers  a  simpler  form  of  psychical  monism. 
The  brain  is  the  symbol  of  consciousness.  If  personal 
consciousness  is  not  enough,  the  panpsychist  simply  postu- 
lates more  consciousness.  The  essential  premise  is  episte- 
mological.  As  a  phenomenalist,  he  teaches  that  con- 
sciousness is  the  very  stuff  of  reality.  There  are  many 
questions,  however,  upon  which  panpsychists  are  not 
settled.  Is  consciousness  atomic  in  its  structure?  Are 
there  evolutionary  levels  of  consciousness?  But  so  far 
as  the  usual  form  of  the  mind-body  problem  is  concerned, 
panpsychists  are  agreed  that  their  position  shows  that  it 
is  a  false  problem.  Mind  and  body  do  not  interact  causally 
or  run  parallel  because  body  is  only  the  symbol  of  mind 
and  not  itself  a  reality.  But  the  frohlems  suggested  by 
science  are  not  furthered  by  panpsychism. 

The  Double-Aspect  Theory. — There  have  been  many 
formulations  of  the  double-aspect  view.  One  of  the  clear- 
est of  the  older  statements  is  that  of  Hoffding.  "If  it  is 
contrary  to  the  doctrine  of  the  persistence  of  physical 
energy  to  suppose  a  transition  from  the  one  province  to 
the  other,  and  if,  nevertheless,  the  two  provinces  exist 
in  our  experience  as  distinct,  then  the  two  sets  of  phe- 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  MIND  AND  BODY    263 

nomena  must  be  unfolded  simultaneously,  each  according 
to  its  laws,  so  that  for  every  phenomenon  in  the  world  of 
consciousness  there  is  a  corresponding  phenomenon  in 
the  world  of  matter,  and  conversely  (so  far  as  there  is 
reason  to  suppose  that  conscious  life  is  correlated  with 
material  phenomena).  The  parallels  already  drawn  point 
directly  to  such  a  relation;  it  would  be  an  amazing  acci- 
dent, if,  while  the  characteristic  marks  repeated  themselves 
in  this  way,  there  were  not  at  the  foundation  an  inner 
connection.  Both  the  parallelism  and  the  proportionality 
between  the  activity  of  consciousness  and  cerebral  activity 
point  to  an  identity  at  bottom.  The  difference  which  remains 
in  spite  of  the  points  of  agreement  compels  us  to  suppose 
that  one  and  the  same  principle  has  found  its  expression  in  a 
double  form.  We  have  no  right  to  take  mind  and  body  for 
two  beings  or  substances  in  reciprocal  interaction.  We 
are,  on  the  contrary,  impelled  to  conceive  the  material 
interaction  between  the  elements  composing  the  brain  and 
nervous  system  as  an  outer  form  of  the  inner  ideal  unity 
of  consciousness.  What  we  in  our  inner  experience  become 
conscious  of  as  thought,  feeling,  and  resolution,  is  thus 
represented  in  the  material  world  by  certain  material 
processes  of  the  brain,  which  as  such  are  subject  to  the  law 
of  the  persistence  of  energy,  although  this  law  cannot  be 
applied  to  the  relation  between  cerebral  and  conscious 
processes.  It  is  as  though  the  same  thing  were  said  in 
two  languages."  Hoffding,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  pp. 
64-5.    Let  us  examine  this  formulation. 

The  weak  point  of  the  double-aspect  theory  is  its  unde- 
fined use  of  the  terms  outer  and  inner.  These  words  de- 
note spatial  differences  ordinarily  but  they  are  given  a 
metaphorical  significance  in  this  excerpt.  Is  there  an  inner 
aspect  for  reality  itseK?     Or  is  this  distinction  purely 


264  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

relative  to  two  methods  of  knowledge?  Again,  what  is 
meant  by  a  principle  expressing  itself  in  a  double  form? 
These  questions  have  never  been  clearly  answered  by  the 
advocates  of  the  double-aspect  theory. 

Recently  a  psychologist  has  attempted  to  offer  an  em- 
pirical analogy  for  the  double-aspect  view.  The  outer 
aspect,  the  brain,  is  to  the  inner  aspect,  consciousness,  as 
surface  is  to  mass.  "In  the  surface-mass  relation  one  as- 
pect of  the  change  is  perceived  by  the  eye,  the  other  aspect 
by  the  muscle  sense.  Similarly,  in  the  neuroconscious 
relation  one  aspect  is  objective — it  is  perceived  from  with- 
out; the  other  aspect  is  subjective — it  is  the  conscious 
experience  of  the  living  organism  itself.  .  .  .  Changes  of 
surface  and  changes  of  mass  do  not  influence  one  another, 
neither  are  they  independent.  Just  so  the  monodualist 
(the  holder  of  the  double-aspect  theory)  regards  the  ac- 
tivity of  consciousness  and  the  activity  of  the  nervous 
system  as  neither  causally  related  nor  parallel.  They 
constitute  one  single  process,  observable  in  two  ways." 
H.  C.  Warren,  Psychological  Review y  1914. 

The  aim  of  the  monodualist,  as  Professor  Warren  rather 
quaintly  describes  his  position,  is  commendable.  But 
what  does  he  understand  by  the  phrase,  "  observable  in 
two  ways"?  It  savors  of  naive  realism  so  far  as  the  ner- 
vous system  is  concerned.  But  we  have  seen  good  reason 
to  hold  that  we  can  gain  knowledge  about  the  nervous 
system  but  can  perceive  only  our  percepts  which  are  in 
consciousness.  Following  up  this  criticism,  we  are  led  to 
pass  to  the  unity  theory.  This  theory  does  justice  to  the 
aims  of  the  double-aspect  theory  while  founding  itself 
upon  a  more  adequate  theory  of  knowledge. 

The  Unity  Theory. — The  unity  theory  holds  that 
consciousness  is  a  part  of  the  nature  of  the  brain  when  it 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  MIND  AND  BODY    2Q5 

is  functioning.  In  other  words,  the  traditional  dualism 
is  a  product  of  a  mistaken  outlook.  The  problem  is  not 
to  get  two  things  together  but  to  account  for  the  doubling 
in  the  human  mind  of  the  one  seamless  reality. 

The  first  alteration  which  must  be  made  in  the  double- 
aspect  theory  is  the  substitution  of  the  term  knowledge 
for  observe  or  perceive.  The  physical  sciences  give 
knowledge  about  the  world  and  this  knowledge  involves  a 
conceptual  framework  which  we  have  called  the  categories. 
We  may  speak  of  these  as  the  categories  of  the  physical 
sciences.  Knowledge  is  within  consciousness,  but  that 
about  which  the  physical  sciences  give  knowledge  is  not 
within  consciousness.  It  is  reality  to  which  this  knowledge 
is  referred  by  thought.  Consciousness,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  something  experienced;  it  is  the  changing  field  of  the 
individual's  experience.  Such  consciousness  is  real,  but 
is  it  the  whole  of  reality?  Obviously  not,  for  the  knowledge 
gained  in  the  physical  sciences  does  not  fit  it.  Must  we 
not  conclude,  therefore,  that  the  same  reality  about 
which  we  gain  knowledge  in  the  physical  sciences  contains 
consciousness?  We  are  now  able  to  give  a  non-metaphori- 
cal interpretation  of  what  the  advocates  of  the  double- 
aspect  theory  have  really  meant  by  the  outer  aspect.  It 
is  reality  as  known  by  means  of  the  physical  sciences,  while 
the  inner  aspect  is  consciousness  as  admittedly  real.  Un- 
fortunately, an  adequate  theory  of  knowledge  is  necessary 
before  one  can  really  state  and  solve  such  problems  as 
these. 

What  Is  the  Mind? — We  must  hold,  therefore,  that 
mind  is  a  term  for  that  which  controls  responses.  But 
that  which  controls  responses  expresses  itseK  in  and  so  is 
revealed,  to  that  extent,  by  consciousness.  Putting  the 
results  of  introspective  and  objective  psychology  together 


^66  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

as  both  giving  knowledge  about  mind,  we  are  driven  to  the 
conclusion  that  mind  is  not  a  thing  apart  from  the  organ- 
ism but  only  a  selective  term  for  those  inherited  capacities 
of  the  organism  which  are  developed  and  filled  out  by  its 
functional  activities.  Thus  knowledge  about  mind  is 
knowledge  about  the  organism  and  should  not  conflict 
with  the  knowledge  contributed  by  the  other  sciences. 
The  organism  is  a  much  more  wonderful  thing  than  we 
have  sometimes  supposed.  It  is  almost  unthinkably 
complex,  highly  organized,  self -regulating  and  plastic. 

But  the  knowledge  about  the  organism  which  we  sum 
up  under  the  term  mind  must  not  be  identified  with  the 
reality  to  which  it  is  referred.  When  we  speak  of  mental 
habits,  capacities,  past  experience,  training,  etc.,  we  must 
not  forget  that  reality  is  not  a  capacity  merely  nor  some- 
thing past  but  an  actual  existent.  If  we  follow  the  guid- 
ance of  modern  knowledge,  we  must  conclude  that  the 
brain  is  the  existent  to  which  this  knowledge  must  be 
referred.  But  if  so,  the  brain  must  be  thought  of  in  the 
light  of  all  available  knowledge  about  it.  The  knowledge 
contributed  by  psychology  must  no  more  be  ignored  than 
that  contributed  by  the  physical  sciences.  By  so  combin- 
ing all  of  our  knowledge,  we  can  gain  some  idea  of  the 
richness  of  content  of  the  brain.  But  we  are  now  far  from 
identifying  the  brain  with  any  perceptually  or  conceptu- 
ally apprehended  object.  It  is  within  the  brain,  so  under- 
stood, that  we,  as  conscious  creatures,  live  and  have  our 
being,  our  senses  being  instruments  of  communication 
with  the  world  outside. 

References 

Bergson,  Matter  and  Memory. 

Fullerton,  An  Introduction  to  Philosophyy  chap.  9. 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  MIND  AND  BODY    267 

Hoffding,  Outlines  of  Psychology. 
McDougall,  Body  and  Mind,  chaps.  12  and  26. 
Sellars,  Critical  Realism,  chap.  9. 
Strong,  Why  the  Mind  Has  a  Body. 
Warren,  Psychological  Review,  1914. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

PURPOSE  AND  MECHANISM 

The  Presence  of  Sharp  Contrasts. — Both  science  and 
philosophy  have  been  replete  with  sharp  contrasts  such  as 
Hving  matter  and  lifeless  matter,  the  material  and  the 
immaterial,  mechanism  and  purpose.  These  harsh  antith- 
eses have  puzzled  reflective  thought,  for  they  have  been 
the  sign  of  discontinuities  and  threatened  dualisms.  If 
living  matter  is  so  different  from  lifeless  matter,  how  do 
they  both  happen  to  be  in  one  universe?  And  if  life  is 
something  entirely  new  appearing  only  at  a  certain  stage 
in  the  history  of  the  earth,  whence  did  it  come?  Again, 
if  the  material  world  is  distinct  from  the  immaterial,  why 
do  they  accompany  one  another  so  assiduously  in  the 
psycho-physical  organism?  At  one  time,  such  problems 
did  not  greatly  trouble  the  human  mind  for  the  assump- 
tions in  which  it  worked  were  dualistic.  The  student  will 
remember  that  Descartes  accepted  the  traditional  division 
of  reality  into  two  substances  without  hesitation.  But 
both  science  and  philosophy  have  been  working  toward 
a  monistic,  naturalistic  outlook.  Nature  is  somehow  one 
and  is  the  mother  of  all  things.  The  result  has  been  an 
increasing  dislike  for  discontinuities  and  dualisms  and  a 
growing  desire  to  overcome  the  traditional  antitheses  by 
more  adequate  and  plastic  analyses.  In  the  last  chapter, 
we  have  been  the  witnesses  of  a  recent  attempt  to  explain 
away  the  contrast  between  mind  and  body  as  due  to 
a  mistaken  interpretation  of  the  difference  between  the 


PURPOSE  AND  MECHANISM  269 

knowledge  gained  by  the  physical  sciences  and  the  ac- 
tual consciousness  of  the  individual.  Let  us  now  follow 
up  this  approach  with  a  discussion  of  the  age-old  contrast 
between  mechanism  and  purpose. 

The  Mechanical  View  of  the  World. — ^The  reflective 
distinction  between  the  mechanical  view  of  the  world  and 
the  teleological,  or  purposive,  view  arose  among  the  Greeks 
and  has  continued  ever  since  as  a  clash  between  two 
outlooks.  But  during  the  intervening  years  both  terms 
of  this  contrast  have  changed  and  taken  a  new  setting  and 
new  implications.  What  we  must  try  to  do  is  to  get  as 
clear  ideas  as  possible  of  mechanism  and  purpose  and  to 
see  whether  it  is  not  feasible  to  harmonize  them  in  the  light 
of  an  evolutionary  interpretation  of  the  world. 

It  is  often  illuminating  to  approach  the  more  complex 
problems  of  the  present  historically.  Let  us,  therefore, 
discover  what  the  mechanical  theory  of  nature  meant  for 
its  first  advocates. 

The  atomists  were  mechanists,  that  is,  they  held  that 
all  changes  are  only  re-configurations  of  the  primary  ele- 
ments which  compose  the  world.  In  short,  all  changes  are 
motions.  Such  motions  were  judged  to  be  explicable  in 
terms  of  the  motions  just  preceding.  The  logical  conclu- 
sion drawn  was  that  the  laws  of  motion  were  the  laws  of 
all  causal  change. 

The  atomists  were  materialists.  But  materialism  was 
boldly  challenged  by  Plato  and  his  school.  Matter  for 
Plato  is  the  unreal.  Only  ideas,  which  are  non-spatial 
and  eternal,  are  real;  and  these  ideas  are  creative  energies 
which  mould  the  sensible  world.  Thus  in  contrast  to  De- 
mocritus,  Plato  is  a  teleologist.  The  world  is  controlled 
by  intelligent  plans  and  purposes.  Ideas  are  of  the  nature 
of  final  causes  which  operate  upon  the  world  and  give  it 


270  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

significance  and  order.  The  realm  of  ideas  is  rational  and 
purposive,  while  the  domain  of  matter  is  governed  by  blind 
necessity. 

When  we  examine  this  contrast,  we  realize  that  neces- 
sity is  identified  with  the  efficient  causality  characteristic 
of  atomistic  realism  of  the  Democritean  type.  It  is  blind 
necessity  because  there  is  no  foresight  of  what  is  to  occur. 
What  occurs  must  occur,  and  there  is  no  anticipation  of 
consequences.  The  future  is  uncontrolled  by  anything 
analogous,  in  the  least,  to  reasoning.  I  think  that  we  must 
admit  that  this  description  does  hold  for  the  strict  mechan- 
ical view  of  the  world.  But  I  also  think  that  we  must 
qualify  the  usual  identification  of  efficient  causality  with 
the  sort  of  change  characteristic  of  mechanism.  There 
may  be  other  types  of  efficient  causality. 

It  behooves  us,  therefore,  to  gain  a  clear  idea  of  the 
mechanical  ideal.  In  mechanics,  science  seeks  to  analyze 
a  system  of  particles  in  motion  and  trace  its  transition  into 
the  state  which  follows.  The  laws  of  transition  are  the 
laws  of  motion  as  these  have  been  determined  by  the  study 
of  such  systems.  It  is  urged  by  mathematicians  "that, 
ultimately,  the  whole  history  of  a  system  of  material  par- 
ticles is  describable  in  terms  of  their  masses  and  spatial 
relations  .  .  .  and  that  in  order  to  predict  the  future  or 
reconstruct  the  past  of  any  material  system,  all  we  need 
to  know  is  the  geometrical  configuration  of  its  particles  in 
any  two  moments  of  time."  T.  Percy  Nunn,  "Animism 
and  the  Doctrine  of  Energy,"  Proceedings  Aristotelian 
Society,  1911-12. 

As  we  shall  point  out  in  a  succeeding  section,  this  mathe- 
matical outlook  is  an  abstract  scheme  of  a  conceptual 
nature.  It  is  doubtful  whether  it  actually  corresponds  to 
any  physical  process.     It  seems  to  recognize  matter  as 


PURPOSE  AND  MECHANISM  271 

only  a  quantity  of  inertia  whereas  the  physicist,  even, 
asserts  properties  other  than  inertia  of  his  world.  But 
the  atomism  of  Democritus — and  we  may  say  of  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries — corresponded 
pretty  closely  to  the  mathematical  constructions  of  par- 
ticles in  changing  positions.  These  passive  atoms  are 
helpless  units  which  change  their  position  much  as  a  ball 
seems  to  do  when  it  is  struck.  In  such  a  world,  there  is 
neither  chance  nor  purpose.  But  modern  physics  has 
begun  to  realize  the  fact  that  this  scheme  is  external  and 
descriptive  and  leaves  the  processes  unexplained.  Are  the 
data  of  mathematics,  particles  and  positions,  equal  to 
physical  reality? 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  while  some  philosophers 
are  satisfied  to  interpret  the  physical  world  in  terms  of 
this  outlook,  others  are  very  skeptical.  And  the  same 
difference  of  opinion  prevails  among  scientists  themselves. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  its  fascination  is  more 
due  to  its  ideal  simplicity  than  to  its  empirical  verifica- 
tion. 

The  Teleological  View  of  the  World.— The  teleological 
view  of  the  world  laid  stress  upon  motive  and  design. 
In  its  popular  form,  it  expressed  the  belief  that  things 
were  created  for  a  purpose  and  that  their  structure  re- 
vealed design.  And  such  design  imphed  a  designer  whose 
creations  they  were.  We  may  call  this  outlook  external 
teleology.  It  was  the  common  faith  that  animals  and 
plants  were  made  for  man's  sustenance  and  that  the  human 
organism  could  not  be  accounted  for  in  all  its  marvelous 
intricacy  apart  from  the  agency  of  some  supreme  intelli- 
gence. That  such  a  self -perpetuating  complex  of  interact- 
ing organs  could  have  come  about  without  design  seemed 
to  the  majority  to  be  unbelievable.     The  body,  it  was 


9m  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

said,  could  not  be  the  work  of  chance,  meaning  by  chance 
without  a  controlling  purpose. 

The  essential  motives  of  this  popular  view  found  tech- 
nical philosophical  expression  in  the  philosophy  of  Aris- 
totle. Following  Plato,  Aristotle  taught  that  forms  or 
ideas  controlled  the  material  world.  These  forms  exerted 
their  influence,  not  as  efficient  causes  interacting  with  other 
things,  but  as  final  causes  or  guiding  ideals.  The  material 
world  is  so  constituted  that  it  yearns  after  the  perfection 
which  the  ideal  realm  portrays.  During  the  Middle  Ages, 
this  Aristotelian  view  held  sway,  and  it  was  not  until 
the  rise  of  modern  astronomy,  mathematics  and  physics 
that  the  idea  of  efficient  causality  gained  the  upper- 
hand. 

The  weakness  of  the  Aristotelian  theory  was  its  inability 
to  be  tested  by  observation  and  experiment.  Final  causes 
are  by  hypothesis  intangible.  To  explain  a  bodily  process 
by  final  causes  was  soon  seen  to  be  a  merely  verbal  affair. 
Harvey's  explanation  of  the  circulation  of  the  blood  made 
a  tremendous  impression  because  of  its  concreteness  and 
verifiability.  The  bolder  spirits  soon  whispered  that  final 
causes  were  purely  imaginary  causes.  Descartes  was  one 
of  the  first  to  declare  that  bodies  are  mechanisms,  that  is, 
machines.  Of  course,  physiology  was  not  advanced  far 
enough  to  make  this  declaration  more  than  a  principle  of 
investigation. 

It  remained  for  Darwin  to  give  the  death-blow  to  the 
hypothesis  of  design,  whether  external  and  creative  or 
internal  and  guiding.  Cannot  all  these  admirable  adapta- 
tions be  explained  as  the  result  of  their  survival  value? 
"Darwin's  greatest  claim  to  fame  lies  in  his  discovery  of 
a  new  scientific  canon.  Before  his  time  the  only  alterna- 
tives for  explaining  progress  were  'design'  and  *  chance.' 


PURPOSE  AND  MECHANISM  273 

He  pointed  out  an  intermediate  alternative  in  'natural 
selection.*  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  biologists  have  re- 
cently shown  a  tendency  to  minimize  its  importance. 
For  while  Darwin's  description  of  the  process  may  re- 
quire revision,  the  canon  itself  underlies  the  whole  struc- 
ture of  modern  evolution.  Without  it  we  are  thrown  back 
on  a  magic  of  chance  or  a  mystery  of  entelechy.  Up  to 
the  present,  at  least,  no  biologist  has  discovered  a  sub- 
stitute for  'natural  selection.*"  Warren,  Journal  of 
Philosophy y  Psychology  and  Scientific  Methods ,  1916. 
As  McDougall  points  out,  the  Neo-Darwinian  school  hold 
that  "the  last  ground  for  the  recognition  of  any  teleologi- 
cal  factor  in  the  biological  realm  has  been  washed  away 
for  ever  by  the  Darwinian  principles." 

The  Present  Situation. — As  in  so  many  other  things, 
the  present  in  science  is  one  of  critical  reflection.  Detailed 
research  in  the  various  special  sciences  has  corrected  the 
tendency  to  over-simplify  nature.  At  the  same  time,  more 
effort  is  being  made  to  analyze  concepts  and  to  state  their 
limitations.  At  no  time  have  philosophy  and  science  been 
more  critical  of  assumptions.  The  result  has  been  both 
a  greater  variety  of  opinion  and  a  lessening  of  dogmatism. 
Two  tendencies  are  marked  enough  to  merit  discussion 
in  this  connection.  They  are  the  revival  of  vitalism  and 
the  criticism  of  mathematical  rationalism. 

The  Criticism  of  Mathematical  Rationalism. — For- 
Descartes,  the  physical  world  was,  by  definition,  identical 
with  space.  Hence,  it  was  logical  to  assume  that  mathe- 
matics could  exhaust  its  nature.  Such  an  outlook  deserves 
the  descriptive  term  mathematical  rationalism.  But  even 
mathematicians  have  begun  to  point  out  that  mechanics 
deals  in  large  measure  with  ideal  constructions.  If  we  once 
grant  that  nature  corresponds  to  these  constructions,  we 


274  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

must  admit  that  all  changes  are  mechanical.  But  what 
right  have  we  to  assert  such  a  correspondence?  The 
actual  laws  of  nature  in  physics,  chemistry  and  biology 
must  be  discovered  largely  by  induction.  "And  therefore 
the  test  of  the  validity  of  an  ideal  construction  is  whether 
it  can  be  applied  in  such  a  way  as  to  enable  us  to  interpret 
observable  phenomena.  Now  observable  phenomena  have 
a  way  of  being  so  terribly  complex  that  in  a  thousand 
cases  we  do  not  know  whether  the  necessary  conclusions 
within  a  mechanical  scheme,  as  such,  are  applicable  to  the 
observable  routine  of  phenomena.  We  often  know  little 
or  nothing  about  the  particles  or  their  positions.  We 
cannot  get  any  mechanical  snap-shots."  Morgan,  Instinct 
and  Experience,  p.  254.  The  only  conclusion  we  can  draw 
from  a  study  of  the  various  autonomous  physical  sciences 
is  that  mathematical  rationalism  is  very  far  from  proved. 
It  is  really  a  seductive  metaphysical  theory. 

A  wiser  form  of  the  mathematical  interpretation  of 
the  world  is  not  identical  with  the  sole  validity  of  the 
laws  of  mechanics  as  a  special  science.  It  points  out, 
instead,  that  science  seeks  to  discover  quantities  wherever 
it  can  and  to  work  out  relations  between  these  quantities. 
But  from  the  fact  that  such  quantities  are  always  obtain- 
able, even  in  psychology,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  method 
of  change  in  the  system  investigated  is  mechanical.  Since 
we  have  concluded  that  the  real  world  is  spatial,  temporal 
and  massive,  we  are  not  surprised  to  find  quantity  in  all 
the  sciences  that  deal  with  it.  And  wherever  there  is 
quantity,  mathematics  is  applicable.  In  other  words, 
ivhatever  the  mode  of  change  in  a  physical  system,  science 
would  be  able  to  find  quantities.  Hence,  the  discovery  of 
quantities  does  not  prove  that  the  mode  of  change  corresponds 
to  the  laws  of  mechanics. 


PURPOSE  AND  MECHANISM  275 

The  Ambiguity  of  the  Mechanical  View.— There  can 
be  little  doubt  that  the  phrase,  the  mechanical  view,  is 
ambiguous.  For  some  thinkers,  it  means  an  orderly  view 
and  not  much  more.  Still  others  have  dropped  the  phrase 
and  speak  of  a  mechanistic  view.  Many  thinkers,  again, 
have  given  up  both  of  these  phrases  and  champion  a 
physico-chemical  view.  Judging  from  the  context,  they 
are  opposing  the  introduction  into  nature  of  mysterious, 
non-physical  forces  or  entelechies  which  are,  by  definition, 
not  subject  to  scientific  tests.  This  struggle  for  monism 
and  continuity  as  against  dualism  and  discontinuity  has 
of  recent  years  come  to  a  head  in  biology  in  the  contro- 
versy between  vitalist  and  mechanist.  Unfortunately, 
there  has  been  a  discouraging  lack  of  definition  on  the  part 
of  mechanists  and  vitalists  alike.  It  is  often  impossible  to 
tell  just  exactly  what  is  meant  by  mechanism  and  vitalism. 
Are  these  two  terms  to  be  taken  as  reciprocally  exclusive  and 
as  jointly  exhaustive  of  the  possible  types  of  theory  about 
organic  processes?  (Cf.  Lovejoy,  Science,  1911,  p.  76.)  A 
deeper  study  has  begun  to  show  that  the  physico-chemical 
standpoint  is  not  necessarily  the  same  as  the  kinematical. 

The  physical  world  at  the  inorganic  level,  even,  shows 
creative  synthesis  and  logical  discontinuity.  Let  me  explain 
these  terms.  By  creative  synthesis  is  meant  the  posses- 
sion by  a  whole  of  qualities  not  possessed  by  the  parts,  that 
is,  these  qualities  cannot  be  derived  additively  from  those 
of  the  parts.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Radl,  a  German 
biologist,  defines  his  brand  of  vitalism  as  "the  idea  that 
new  methods  of  action  arise  when  new  combinations  occur, 
taken  in  connection  with  the  view  that  new  combinations 
are  found  in  living  things."  The  notion  of  logical  dis- 
continuity is  the  logical  statement  of  this  empirical  gen- 
eralization.   It  asserts  the  undeducibility  of  chemical  laws 


276  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

from  physical  laws  and  of  biological  laws  from  chemical 
laws.  Each  science  is  autonomous  and  not  simply  an 
imperfect  form  of  a  more  abstract  and  fundamental  sci- 
ence. It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  such  logi- 
cal discontinuity  does  not  involve  dualism  or  pluralism 
in  nature  but  something  of  the  nature  of  evolutionary 
change  or  levels  of  development.  If  we  accept  such  crea- 
tive synthesis  in  nature,  mechanism  versus  vitalism  is  not 
a  correct  dichotomous  division. 

The  Revival  of  Vitalism. — One  of  the  noteworthy 
features  of  recent  biological  literature  has  been  the  revival 
of  vitalism.  In  the  large,  we  may  define  vitalism  from  two 
angles.  As  a  positive  doctrine  in  its  radical  form,  it  is  an 
appeal  to  an  agency  of  a  non-physical  kind  for  the  explana- 
tion of  living  processes.  In  its  more  critical  and  less  posi- 
tive form,  it  is  a  protest  against  a  too  facile  and  vague 
mechanical  view  such,  for  instance,  as  that  represented 
by  Jacques  Loeb. 

Investigation  has  shown  the  tremendous  complexity  of 
animal  forms.  When  Descartes  spoke  of  animals  as  ma- 
chines, he  seems  to  have  meant  his  expression  in  a  pretty 
literal  way.  But  few  biologists  to-day  would  feel  that  the 
analogy  between  human-made  machines  and  organisms 
is  an  adequate  one.  The  differences  are  greater  than  the 
likenesses,  and  it  is  to  that  extent  a  false  and  misleading 
analogy.  Several  writers,  among  them  Dr.  Hans  Driesch, 
have  undertaken  to  demonstrate  the  inadequacy  of  this 
comparison.  Identifying  the  anti-vitalistic  view  with  the 
belief  that  the  organism  is  a  very  complex  machine,  they 
hope  to  prove  vitalism  in  this  way.  But,  as  we  have  tried 
to  indicate,  they  must  first  satisfy  the  thinker  that  the 
machine-view,  which  is  a  form  of  mechanicalism  of  the 
extreme  sort,  is  the  only  alternative. 


PURPOSE  AND  MECHANISM  277 

When  we  come  to  the  more  positive  side  of  the  new  vital- 
ism of  a  duaHstic  tendency,  we  find  ourselves  in  meta- 
physics. Dr.  Driesch  appeals  to  a  non-physical  agent, 
that  is,  to  something  alien  to  the  physical  world.  It  is  not 
in  space  but  acts  into  space.  It  is  not  in  the  material  or- 
ganism but  only  'manifests'  itself  in  this  material.  But 
the  student  will  recall  that  we  have  more  than  suggested 
that  even  consciousness  is  in  the  organism.  It  would  seem, 
then,  that  Dr.  Driesch's  vitalism  has,  for  its  counterpart, 
an  inadequate  view  of  the  physical  world.  His  dualism 
would  seem  to  us  an  expression  of  a  false  theory  of  knowl- 
edge and  of  a  consequently  false  metaphysics.  No  one 
who  reads  Dr.  Driesch's  exhaustive  work.  Philosophy 
and  Science  of  the  Organism,  can  fail  to  note  the  Kantian 
element  in  its  argument. 

The  demand  with  which  vitalism  on  both  its  positive 
and  its  critical  side  confronts  us,  then,  is  whether  a  more 
adequate  philosophy  of  nature  can  be  developed,  a  philos- 
ophy which  takes  evolution  seriously. 

Are  There  Levels  of  Causality? — We  suggested  a 
while  ago  that  the  mistake  characteristic  of  the  ancient 
contrast  between  efficient  and  final  causation  was  the 
assumption  that  there  can  be  only  one  type  of  efficient 
causality,  viz. — the  mechanical.  But  if  we  admit  creative 
synthesis,  it  seems  to  follow  that  we  must  also  admit 
something  of  the  nature  of  organization  in  nature.  And  if 
we  analyze  the  category  of  organization,  it  is  seen  to  imply 
what  may  be  called  the  presence  of  internal  relations  in 
nature.  The  particles  of  which  mechanics  speaks  have 
only  positions  and  do  not  have  genuine  relations.  They 
are  not  bound  together  dynamically  and  from  within. 
Such  terms  as  attraction  and  repulsion  and  chemical 
affinity  and  the  saturation  of  valency  can  have  no  meaning 


278  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

for  mechanics.  But  reflection  upon  the  data  of  physics 
and  chemistry  convinces  one  that  these  terms  are  inti- 
mately associated  with  the  existence  and  possibihty  of 
creative  synthesis  and  organization. 

But  surely  we  must  admit  that  an  organized  system 
which  is  bound  together  by  internal  relations  into  some- 
thing of  the  nature  of  a  unity  has  a  tendency  to  react  as  a 
whole  to  the  stimuli  acting  upon  it  from  outside.  Hence 
we  must  infer  the  possibility  of  differential  reaction  in 
nature  as  a  function  of  organization.  Such  differential 
reaction  does  not  conflict  with  the  idea  of  efficient  causality 
but  simply  involves  the  admission  that  there  are,  as  it 
were,  levels  of  efficient  causality. 

Now  many  recent  experiments  in  biology,  including  those 
of  Driesch,  seem  to  teach  that  the  organism  is  just  such  a 
highly  organized  system  which  reacts  in  a  differential  way 
to  stimuli.  Even  the  egg  has  a  capacity  of  regulating  its 
development  after  disturbing  factors  are  introduced,  which 
is  comparable  to  the  ability  of  a  man  to  reach  the  same 
goal  in  different  ways. 

But  the  solution  of  the  mind-body  problem  which  we 
have  advanced  enables  us  to  affirm  the  reality  of  the  high 
level  of  efficient  causality  which  we  find  in  human  behavior. 
The  control  which  such  behavior  implies  is  essentially 
non-mechanical  and  can  be  understood  only  as  the  expres- 
sion of  internal  relations  and  system.  If,  as  we  have 
taught,  the  science  of  behavior  gives  genuine  knowledge 
about  nature,  it  indicates  in  no  uncertain  way  the  exist- 
ence of  creative  synthesis  and  the  rise  of  levels  of  causality. 
Here  we  have  true^  or  critical,  anthropomorphism. 

Efficient  Causality  and  Purpose. — The  only  purposes 
we  are  directly  acquainted  with  are  our  own.  Can  we  show 
that  they  are  effective  in  the  control  of  human  behavior 


PURPOSE  AND  MECHANISM  279 

and  so  harmonizable  with  efficient  causality?  We  are 
trying  to  get  on  the  inside  of  this  high  level  of  causality 
and,  at  the  same  time  demonstrate  that  there  is  no  conflict 
with  our  knowledge  about  nature. 

We  may  define  a  purpose  as  a  plan  about  the  future 
which  is  assented  to.  A  developed  plan  always  contains 
a  series  of  subordinate  plans  which  are  called  the  means. 
When  the  means  are  successfully  realized,  the  anticipated 
result  is  experienced  as  a  present  fact.  The  plan  concerns 
the  future,  and  is  an  attempt  to  make  this  future  of  a  cer- 
tain kind.  We  must  always  remember  that  the  plan  is  a 
present  fact  and  that  the  future  it  has  in  mind  is  something 
thought  of  as  conditioned  by  the  present.  It  differs  from 
a  mere  prediction  because  it  is  a  factor  which  seeks  to 
bring  about  that  which  it  hopefully  anticipates.  When 
the  later  experience  accords  with  the  purpose,  the  latter 
is  said  to  be  fulfilled. 

From  the  standpoint  of  psychology,  the  plan  is  an  in- 
ternal stimulus  which  controls  the  behavior  of  the  organ- 
ism in  such  a  way  that  this  correspondence  between  fore- 
thought and  later  experience  ensues.  We  soon  learn  that 
this  correspondence  necessitates  the  adoption  of  the  right 
means,  which  adoption  depends  upon  past  experience  and 
reasoning.  Thus  capacity  of  a  high  synthetic  grade  is 
called  into  action. 

Now  so  far  as  introspection  goes,  the  series  of  ideas  re- 
lated as  end  and  means  precede  the  overt  behavior  of  the 
organism.  What  further  occurs  in  the  organism  is  hidden 
from  view  and  can  only  be  inferred  in  terms  of  knowledge 
about  the  organism.  But  in  the  preceding  chapter  we  have 
argued  that  consciousness  is  in  the  brain  as  a  part  of  its 
nature  when  functioning.  The  existential  relations  of  the 
idea  in  the  brain,  as  a  physical  reality  which  has  reached 


280  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  mental  level,  are  internal  and  so  intimate  that  the 
uniqueness  of  the  idea  is  a  sign  of  the  uniqueness  of  the 
brain-event  of  which  it  is  an  expression  and  part.  The 
dominance  of  this  brain-event  leads  to  the  sequential  in- 
nervation of  the  muscles  and  so  to  the  overt  behavior 
which  corresponds  to  the  idea. 

The  fact  to  note  is  that  the  future  does  not  control  the 
present  at  all  as  teleology  has  sometimes  taught.  It  is 
the  present  plan,  as  expressive  of  the  individual  and  em- 
bedded in  him,  that  controls  the  ordered  behavior  of  the 
organism.  Moreover,  there  is  no  dualism  here  as  extreme 
vitalism  supposes.  It  is  simply  a  case  of  complex  eflBcient 
causality.  Behavior  is  controlled  by  the  brain,  but  it  is 
not  the  brain  as  known  in  terms  of  the  physical  sciences 
only.  The  primary  question  comes  to  be  this.  How  is 
the  brain  able  to  control  behavior  in  this  anticipatory 
way.'*  How  is  this  peculiar  type  of  efficient  causality 
possible?  Objective  and  introspective  psychology  have 
given  two  answers  which  are  now  seen  to  be  quite  harmon- 
izable.  The  behaviorist  asserts  that  the  brain  is  a  plastic 
organ  capable  of  forming  associations  and  making  internal 
adjustments,  in  fact,  of  doing  what  corresponds  to  memory, 
association,  reasoning  and  willing.  It  is  the  organ  of  in- 
telligence. The  introspectionist  asserts  that  ideas  are 
slowly  connected  with  particular  motor  impulses.  The 
unity  theory  holds  that  the  brain  remembers,  reasons,  and 
wills  because  the  brain  is  the  mind,  that  is,  the  mind  is 
a  term  for  the  conditions  and  capacities  which  express 
themselves  in  consciousness  and  the  behavior  of  the 
organism,  and  these  conditions  and  capacities  must  be  re- 
garded as  resident  in  the  brain. 

Is  the  Brain  as  Mind  a  Mechanical  System? — Philos- 
ophers have  been  accustomed  to  regard  mind  as  non- 


PURPOSE  AND  MECHANISM  281 

mechanical.  How  can  we  connect  reasoning  with  me- 
chanical causation?  The  mind  includes  capacities  of  a 
profoundly  cumulative  and  synthetic  character.  Organi- 
zation and  interpretation  of  the  part  by  the  whole  seem 
to  be  essential  features  of  its  constitution  and  operation. 
It  may  be  replied  that  such  non-mechanical  behavior  is 
appearance  rather  than  reality  and  that  analysis  can  re- 
duce it  to  a  complex  of  purely  atomic  elements  combined 
in  such  a  way  as  to  appear  non-mechanical.  But  such  a 
reply  is  pure  dogmatism.  No  such  reduction  has  been 
carried  through  nor  is  it  apparent  that  it  would  be  possi- 
ble. The  mind  is  selective  and  planf  ul,  and  it  is  impossible 
to  deduce  selection  from  discrete  atomism. 

Both  psychology  and  physiology  are  pointing  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  brain  has  a  tremendously  complex 
organization  partly  hereditary  and  partly  developed  dur- 
ing the  lifetime  of  the  individual.  The  brain,  like  the 
mind,  forms  apperceptive  systems  which  function  as 
wholes.  There  is  every  reason  to  believe  in  a  complete 
parallelism  of  method  between  mind  and  brain.  The  one 
is  just  as  much  and  just  as  little  a  mechanism  as  the  other. 

And  if  consciousness  is  a  part  of  the  nature  of  the  brain 
and  is  literally  in  it  as  an  extensive  variant,  certain  sug- 
gestions come  at  once  to  our  minds.  The  continuity  of 
consciousness,  the  unity  and  togetherness  of  the  individ- 
ual's changing  field  of  experience,  must  reveal  the  dynamic 
continuity  of  the  active  brain.  The  systematic  char- 
acter of  our  concepts  and  purposes  must  be  an  index  of 
the  system-forming  and  system-sustaining  capacity  of 
the  brain.  And  if  the  brain  possesses  this  truly  organic 
character  in  which  the  part  plays  into  the  whole  and  the 
whole  controls  the  part,  it  is  not  a  machine.  It  does  not 
need  its  dice  to  be  loaded,  for  it  has  a  seK-sustaining  unity 


282  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

whose  action  is  intelligent  and  regulative.  Each  stimulus 
obtains  a  total  reaction.  Thus,  the  location  of  conscious- 
ness in  the  brain  throws  a  flood  of  light  upon  the  brain 
and  thence  upon  nature.  It  proves  inductively  and,  as 
it  were,  from  within  reality,  itseK,  that  reality  is  capable  of 
forming  internal  relations  and  continuities. 

How  Shall  We  Conceive  of  the  Efficacy  of  Conscious- 
ness?— Physical  science  does  not  include  consciousness  as 
such  among  its  objects  and  therefore  can  never  include  it 
among  its  factors.  Consciousness  is  here  a  means  to  knowl- 
edge and  not  the  reference  of  knowledge.  It  would  be 
absurd  for  physical  science  to  expect  to  deduce  conscious- 
ness from  its  data  or  its  theories.  It  follows  that  the 
physical  scientist  cannot  introduce  consciousness  as  a 
causal  factor  into  his  conception  of  the  mode  of  change 
in  nature.  He  must  use  objective  categories  which  fit  his 
material,  that  is,  categories  such  as  space  and  position 
and  organization  which  form  the  natural  framework  of 
the  knowledge  about  nature  which  he  achieves.  This 
situation  holds  true  of  the  biologist  as  well,  and  in  a  large 
measure  of  the  psychologist.  But  psychology,  as  we  have 
already  pointed  out,  is  in  the  peculiar  position  of  living  in 
a  complex  field  in  which  different  kinds  of  knowledge 
converge,  and  of  trying  to  see  them  together.  It  is  for 
this  reason  that  the  psychologist  has  the  mind-body  prob- 
lem on  his  hands,  and,  while  he  may  ignore  it  by  a  device 
like  that  of  parallelism,  is  always  haunted  by  it. 

When  we  realize  that  the  cortex  becomes  conscious  when 
it  functions,  we  can  draw  certain  definite  conclusions. 
First  of  all,  consciousness  should  not  be  spoken  of  as  a 
form  of  energy,  for  energy  is  a  term  which  concerns  our 
measurable  knowledge  about  reality,  and  consciousness 
is  not  a  measurable  quantity  in  this  sense.    Hence,  as  we 


PURPOSE  AND  MECHANISM  283 

have  said  before,  consciousness  cannot  enter  as  a  factor 
in  physical  science.  And  in  this  fact  lies  the  truth  of  paral- 
lelism. If  consciousness  is  within  reality,  its  efficacy  can- 
not conflict  with  the  principle  of  the  conservation  of  en- 
ergy which  holds  for  all  of  reality.  In  the  second  place, 
the  fact  that  reality  becomes  conscious  must  have  some- 
thing to  do  with  the  mode  of  change  in  the  cortex.  Can 
such  a  complex  system  as  the  cortex  win  a  satisfactory 
internal  adjustment  when  it  is  blind.'*  Is  not  consciousness 
the  system  of  cues  necessary  for  the  operation  of  mental 
capacities?  Such  is  the  position  to  which  I  am  forced  by 
my  own  thinking  and  to  which  I  can  find  no  objection  in 
either  empirical  science  or  epistemology.  Consciousness 
does  not  act  upon  parts  of  the  brain  externally  or  mechan- 
ically for  it  is  not  a  physical  thing;  it  is  the  reality  of  the 
cortex  illuminating  and  guiding  itself. 

References 

Bergson,  Creative  Evolution. 

Driesch,  Science  and  Philosophy  of  the  Organism. 

Jennings,  '*  Doctrines  Held  as  Vitalism,"  American  Naturalist, 
1913;  "  Heredity  and  Personality,"  Science,  1911. 

Loeb,  "  The  Mechanistic  Conception  of  Life,"  Popular  Science 
Monthly,  1912. 

Lovejoy,  "  The  Meaning  of  Vitalism,"  Science,  1911;  "  The  Im- 
port of  Vitalism,"  Science,  1911. 

Marvin,  A  First  Book  in  Metaphysics,  chap.  21. 

Morgan,  Instinct  and  Experience,  chap.  8. 

Schafer,  Inaugural  Address,  Nature,  1912. 

Sellars,  Critical  Realism,  chap.  9. 

Spaiilding,"  Driesch's  Theory  of  Vitalism,"  Philosophical  Review, 
1906. 

Ward,  James,  Purpose  and  Mechanism,  Aristotelian  Society, 
1911-12. 

Warren,  Psychological  Review,  1914. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 
THE  PLACE  OF  VALUES 

Knowledge  and  Valuation. — The  special  sciences  gain 
knowledge  about  the  world,  and  it  is  the  task  of  philosophy 
to  cooperate  with  them  in  a  reflective  and  comprehensive 
way  in  order  to  systematize  and  harmonize  this  knowledge. 
As  we  have  seen,  the  preliminary  problem  which  philoso- 
phy has  to  undertake  is  to  determine  the  nature  and 
conditions  of  knowledge.  In  a  strict  sense,  epistemology 
is  a  science  for  it  involves  the  tracing  out  and  solution  of 
specific  problems.  But  this  discipline  is  philosophical 
because  it  examines  the  assumptions  of  organized  experi- 
ence and  builds  upon  its  results  in  a  reflective  way.  The 
method  and  point  of  view  is  so  different  from  that  which 
characterizes  the  various  positive  sciences  that  little  ob- 
jection is  felt  to  this  classification.  It  is  so  obviously  a 
science  at  second  remove,  a  science  which  does  not  add  to 
the  content  of  the  special  sciences.  Upon  the  foundation  of 
epistemology,  metaphysics  develops  as  an  attempt  to  gain 
a  comprehensive  view  of  reality  as  known.  How  intimately 
this  reflective  discipline  works  with  the  sciences  has  been 
shown  in  the  preceding  chapters.  It  is  not  too  much  to 
assert  that  we  have  gained  at  least  an  outline  view  of 
reality. 

But  thus  far  we  have  considered  philosophy  only  as  a 
reflective  movement  working  with  the  results  of  the  various 
positive  sciences.  That  is,  we  have  been  almost  entirely 
interested  in  the  universe  as  revealed  by  the  natural 
sciences  including  psychology.    Now,  however,  we  must 

284 


THE  PLACE  OF  VALUES  285 

give  our  attention  to  another  group  of  sciences  which  cen- 
ter around  man  and  have  the  peculiarity  that  they  treat 
of  valuations  which  man  puts  upon  himself,  his  acts  and 
his  surroundings.  Man  values  as  well  as  knows.  He 
reacts  to  things  in  an  emotional  and  affective  way,  saying 
that  they  are  good  or  bad,  beautiful  or  ugly,  evil  or  benef- 
icent. This  characteristic  raises  questions  of  wide  import 
which  cannot  be  taken  up  in  a  satisfactory  way  by  a  nar- 
row discipline.  The  consequence  is  that  philosophy  is 
obliged  to  continue  itseK  and  bring  this  new  sphere  into 
harmony  with  epistemology  and  metaphysics.  Are  the 
values  we  give  to  things  actually  in  them,  or  are  they 
meaningless  apart  from  the  constitution  and  purposes  of 
human  beings?  Is  the  world  beautiful  and  good  in  itself, 
or  only  in  the  eyes  of  conscious  creatures  who  react  toward 
it  emotionally  because  their  weal  and  woe  is  bound  up 
with  it? 

Naive  Realism  and  Values. — In  order  to  get  a  clear 
view  of  the  problem,  it  will  be  best  once  more  to  begin 
with  the  standpoint  of  naive,  or  natural,  realism.  How 
do  we  ordinarily  experience  values?  To  what  do  we  refer 
them?  A  little  reflection  is  enough  to  convince  one  that 
perceptual  objects  are  considered  beautiful  or  ugly  in  their 
own  right  much  as  they  are  seen  to  be  colored  and  felt  to 
be  heavy.  This  picture  by  Rembrandt,  whose  reproduc- 
tion hangs  on  the  wall  in  front  of  me,  is  so  charming  in 
conception  and  execution  that  I  instinctively  call  it  beau- 
tiful. I  do  not  say  that  it  has  a  certain  emotional  effect 
upon  me  but,  instead,  pass  a  judgment  upon  the  thing 
itself.  And  so  with  the  various  objects  and  groups  of  ob- 
jects which  come  under  my  eye.  The  beauty  of  the  world 
whispers  to  us  from  out  there.  The  delicate  charm  of  a 
spring  morning  in  the  woods  when  the  buds  are  just  burst- 


286  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ing  on  the  trees  and  the  sap  is  flowing  through  the  branches 
and  the  birds  are  singing  and  the  clouds  are  like  soft  wool 
is  a  vital  aspect  of  the  whole  landscape  and  atmosphere. 
Nature  is  beautiful.  We  know  that  at  the  time  as  inti- 
mately and  with  the  same  certainty  that  we  know  that  the 
grass  is  green  and  that  the  birds  are  singing.  ^Esthetic 
judgments  apply  as  objectively  as  any  of  the  other  judg- 
ments we  make  about  the  perceivable  world. 

But  doubt  awakens  even  sooner  for  these  tertiary  quali- 
ties of  things  than  for  the  secondary  qualities  like  color 
and  odor.  When  we  are  in  the  aesthetic  mood  and  atti- 
tude, we  are  sympathetic  contemplators  of  perceptual 
objects.  But,  alas!  how  often  this  mood  vanishes  and 
leaves  us  staring  coldly  at  things  which  only  a  moment 
before  had  charmed  us  out  of  personal  desires  and  humors ! 
We  know  that  they  will  again  appear  beautiful  to  us,  but 
just  now  a  shadow  has  come  over  them  and  some  subtle 
quality  has  been  withdrawn.  It  does  not  take  us  long  to 
realize  that  the  fault  is  with  ourselves.  We  do  not  react 
in  the  same  way.  Nature  has  not  changed  but  we  our- 
selves have  altered.  And  reflection  soon  recalls  and  analy- 
ses other  cases  of  similar  alteration.  We  remember  that 
certain  things  appealed  to  us  as  pretty  when  they  were 
fresh  but  that  we  grew  tired  of  them,  and  then  they  were  no 
longer  the  same.  The  color  and  form,  in  fact  all  that 
depends  upon  the  eye,  remained  the  same;  yet  they  had 
lost  that  subtle  something  we  call  beauty.  But  it  is  not 
only  physical  things  which  possess  and  lose  this  quality. 
The  artist  who  deals  with  words  must  likewise  reckon  with 
the  baffling  uncertainty  of  its  presence.  High  emotion 
gives  beauty  to  a  creation  which  later  will  appear  worth- 
less and  trivial.  What  greater  and  yet  what  more  common 
disappointment  is  there  for  the  writer  than  "to  find  the 


THE  PLACE  OF  VALUES  287 

next  day,  in  place  of  the  golden  bough  miraculously 
blooming  during  a  flowing  hour,  a  dry  thorn,  a  frost-bitten 
flower!"  We  know,  again,  what  wonders  love  can  work. 
To  the  lover,  the  beloved  is  radiant  with  a  beauty  no  one 
else  can  see  and  to  whose  existence  he  himself  was  blind 
before  the  great  event  which  opened  his  eyes.  In  this 
fashion,  reflection  presses  upon  us  the  fact  that  beauty  is 
intermittent  and  that  w^e  ourselves  in  some  way  control 
its  appearance. 

A  Realism  still  more  Primitive.— The  Natural  Realism 
from  which  we  have  taken  our  point  of  departure  in  dis- 
cussing problems  of  epistemology  is  really  that  of  what 
Sidgwick  calls  'enHghtened  common  sense.'  The  physical 
world  of  the  civilized  man  of  to-day  is  far  different  from 
that  which  his  primitive  ancestors  experienced.  Our 
world  is  a  civilized  world  with  no  barbarian  depths.  It 
is  well-ordered  and  obedient  to  the  laws  which  our  scien- 
tists have  discovered  for  it.  Its  energies  are  potentially 
measurable  and  its  levers  and  springs  not  too  deeply  hid- 
den to  be  visible  to  the  keen  eye  of  the  thinker.  Man 
has  been  busy  making  nature  in  terms  of  his  scientific 
concepts,  and  his  creation  is  so  familiar  in  its  general  out- 
lines that  we  all  tend  to  picture  the  world  in  terms  of  space 
and  mass  and  movement.  Massive  and  gigantic  as  the 
physical  world  is  in  its  stellar  immensities,  for  which  our 
familiar  earth  is  but  as  a  grain  of  dust,  it  is  yet  all  of  one 
kind.  Spectrum  analysis  has  found  the  chemical  elements 
in  burning  suns  thousands  of  light-years  distant,  and  me- 
chanical analysis  has  proven  that  the  Newtonian  principles 
of  gravitation  rule  these  blind  masses  and  have  induced  a 
rhythm  in  their  movements.  It  is  a  rationalized  world,  a 
world  transparent  to  the  human  mind  and,  as  it  were, 
impersonal  and  emotionless. 


288  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

We  may  say,  then,  that  the  perceptual  world  of  the  edu- 
cated man  of  to-day  is  interpreted  in  the  light  of  this  con- 
struction of  the  science  of  the  last  four  centuries.  Proba- 
bly he  sees  a  landscape  similar  to  that  which  the  man  of 
the  old  stone  age  saw,  but  its  background  and  interior  are 
different.  It  is  to  this  difference  beyond  the  colored  sur- 
face of  things  to  which  attention  must  be  drawn.  We 
have  described  the  outlook  of  enlightened  common  sense; 
we  must  now  try  to  catch  a  glimpse  of  primitive  common 
sense. 

Primitive  common  sense  finds  its  clearest  expression  for 
us  to-day.  in  the  assumptions  and  imaginings  of  young 
children.  All  things  are  alive  for  them  and  not  greatly 
different  except  in  bulk  and  appearance  from  themselves. 
The  young  boy  of  four  years  who  is  greatly  fascinated  by 
the  aeroplane  which  flies  gracefully  above  him  wants  to 
know  where  it  sleeps  at  night.  Again,  he  may  ask  such 
questions  as  the  following:  Do  the  stones  want  us  to  walk 
on  them.?  Do  the  flowers  like  to  be  picked .^^  Now  this 
natural  interpretation  of  his  surroundings  in  terms  of  his 
own  life  was  not  stopped  and  brought  to  a  halt  in  primitive 
man  by  contact  with  a  wiser  and  older  race,  and  so  they 
had  a  longer  childhood  in  which  all  the  richness  of  a  fuller 
imagination  and  a  wider  experience  than  the  child's 
could  expand  within  this  child's  view  of  the  world.  The 
consequence  is  what  is  called  animism  and  mythology. 
These  bloomed  without  artifice  because  reflection  had 
not  made  them  artificial.  The  poet  of  to-day  knows  that 
trees  do  not  whisper  together  at  sunset:  they  whisper  only 
for  him,  not  actually.  But  for  men  untouched  by  the  stern 
rationalism  of  science  and  philosophy  they  whisper  and 
dream  and  sleep. 

"Now  the  fact  that  crude  experience  is  innocent  of  mod- 


THE  PLACE  OF  VALUES  289 

ern  philosophy  has  this  important  consequence:  that  for 
crude  experience  all  data  whatever  lie  originally  side  by 
side  in  the  same  field;  extension  is  passionate,  desire  moves 
bodies,  thought  broods  in  space  and  is  constituted  by  a 
visible  metamorphosis  of  its  subject-matter.  Animism  or 
mythology  is  therefore  no  artifice.  Passions  naturally 
reside  in  the  body  they  agitate — our  own  body,  if  that  be 
the  felt  seat  of  some  pang,  the  stars,  if  the  pang  can  find 
no  nearer  resting-place.  Only  a  long  and  still  unfinished 
education  has  taught  men  to  separate  emotions  from 
things  and  ideas  from  their  objects.  This  education  was 
needed  because  crude  experience  is  a  chaos,  and  the 
qualities  it  jumbles  together  do  not  march  together  in 
time.  Reflection  must  accordingly  separate  them,  if 
knowledge  (that  is,  ideas  with  eventual  application  and 
practical  transcendence)  is  to  exist  at  all.  In  other  words, 
action  must  be  adjusted  to  certain  elements  of  experience 
and  not  to  others,  and  those  chiefly  regarded  must  have  a 
certain  interpretation  put  upon  them  by  trained  apper- 
ception. The  rest  must  be  treated  as  moonshine  and  taken 
no  account  of  except  perhaps  in  idle  and  poetic  re  very. 
In  this  way  crude  experience  grows  reasonable  and  appear- 
ance becomes  knowledge  of  reality."  Santayana,  The  Life 
of  Reason^  vol.  1,  pp.  141-2.  Man  does  not  consciously 
read  his  emotions  and  feelings  into  nature,  that  is,  into 
that  which  he  perceives.  They  are  experienced  in  per- 
ceptual objects  and  color  them  from  the  start.  His  con- 
scious task  is,  rather,  their  abstraction  and  withdrawal 
into  the  seK.  Natural  Realism  still  remains,  but  the  world 
of  perceived  things,  regarded  as  independent  of  the  per- 
cipient, has  suft'ered  a  diminution  in  content.  Desire  and 
emotion  are  sucked  out  of  it  and  assigned  to  the  observer. 
It  is  the  contrast  between  the  original  Natural  Realism 


290  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  man  and  the  enlightened,  or  more  critical,  Natural 
Realism  of  to-day  which  should  be  clearly  apprehended. 

The  Standpoint  of  Non-Apprehensional  Realism. — 
Having  studied  the  development  from  primitive  realism 
to  that  of  enlightened  common  sense,  it  will  be  best  to 
bring  out  very  clearly  the  further  development  involved 
in  the  realism  we  have  tried  to  justify  in  this  book.  I 
offer  the  following  diagram  as  an  aid: 

The  Field  of  the  Individual's  Experience 

First  Level 

(Primitive  Natural  Realism) 

Inner  Sphere  Outer  Sphere 

sense  of  self 
attitudes  toward  other  things 

a.  theoretical 

b.  practical 

At  this  level,  the  content  of  these  apprehended  things  is 
full  of  tertiary  qualities  like  pleasure  and  pain,  joy, 
strength,  effort,  malice,  goodness,  beauty,  ugliness. 

Second  Level 

(Enlightened  Natural  Realism) 

Inner  Sphere  Outer  Sphere 

sense  of  self  physical  things 

attitudes  toward  other  minds 

a.  theoretical 

b.  practical 
mental  contents 


THE  PLACE  OF  VALUES  291 

At  this  level,  the  inner  sphere  has  become  more  complex 
with  the  definite  assignment  of  much  of  the  outer  sphere 
to  the  inner.  Ideas,  percepts,  concepts,  feelings,  etc.,  are 
now  definitely  thought  of  as  mental.  The  outer  sphere 
has  been  purified  of  elements  which  are  considered  mental. 
But  the  division  is  largely  a  compromise.  For  instance, 
apprehended  objects  toward  which  the  theoretical  attitude 
is  taken  are  sometimes  called  percepts  and  sometimes 
physical  things. 

Third  Level 

(Scientific  Realism) 

The  Individual's  Mind  or        The  Rest  of  Reality 
Consciousness 
sense  of  self 
attitudes  toward  perceptual  objects 

a.  theoretical 

b.  practical 

conceptual  intuition  of  physical  things 

analogical  knowledge  of  other  minds 

This  level  is  represented  by  the  rationalism  of  Democritus 
and  Descartes  and  also  by  the  representative  realism  of 
John  Locke.  The  individual's  mind  is  contrasted  with  an 
independent  physical  realm  and  a  plurality  of  other 
minds.  Knowledge  is  either  a  peculiar  rational  intuition 
or  a  representation  by  means  of  concepts.  The  problem 
of  knowledge  is  in  the  ascendant.  The  physical  realm 
is  thin  in  its  content  and  reduced  to  what  are  called  the 
primary  qualities.  The  knowledge  acquired  by  the  physi- 
cal, especially  the  mathematical  sciences,  is  supposed  to 
exhaust  this  realm. 


292  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Fourth  Level 

(Idealism) 

The  IndividuaFs  Mind  or        The  Rest  of  Reality 
Consciousness 
sense  of  self 

attitudes  toward  perceptual 
and  conceptual  objects 

a.  theoretical 

b.  practical 

all  sorts  of  mental  contents 

analogical  knowledge  of  other  minds 

At  this  reflective  level,  knowledge  of  a  non-mental  realm 
is  relinquished,  and  science  is  considered  a  construction 
within  consciousness  guided  by  the  architectonic  and  or- 
ganizing capacities  of  the  human  mind.  Other  minds  are 
known  only  by  analogy.  This  reflective  level  is  to-day  best 
represented  by  panpsychism.  It  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  this  level  is  so  artificial  that  it  is  reached  by  different 
thinkers  in  different  degrees.  We  have  had  occasion  to 
criticise  objective  idealism  because  of  its  appeal  to  a  uni- 
versal seK.    This  level  is  unstable. 

Fifth  Level 

(Non-Apprehensional  Realism) 

The  Individual's  The  Rest  of  Reality 

Consciousness 
The  field  of  the  individual's 

experience  with  its  distinctions. 
This  includes  apprehended  objects  (ideas) 
a.  having  no  reference 

outside  of  his  experience. 


THE  PLACE  OF  VALUES  293 

b.  given  a  reference  out- 
side of  experience  as 
knowledge  about  Nature 

a.  the     individuaFs 

mind 

b.  the  minds  of  other 

individuals 

c.  bodies 

At  this  reflective  level,  whatever  is  apprehended  is  seen 
to  be  mental.  Yet  it  is  realized  that  knowledge  of  a  non- 
apprehensional  sort  can  be  gained  of  what  is  outside  of  the 
individual's  consciousness.  The  solution  of  the  mind- 
consciousness-body  problem  enables  us  to  combine  a,  b, 
and  c  as  nature  or  reality. 

The  Place  of  Values  for  These  Levels. — We  have  seen 
that  for  primitive  Natural  Realism  values  are  distributed 
naively  throughout  nature.  "Thus  the  sun  is  not  only 
bright  and  warm  in  the  same  way  as  he  is  round,  but  by 
the  same  right  he  is  also  happy,  arrogant,  ever-young,  and 
all-seeing;  for  a  suggestion  of  these  tertiary  qualities  runs 
through  us  when  we  look  at  him,  just  as  immediately  as 
do  his  warmth  and  light.  The  fact  that  these  imaginative 
suggestions  are  not  constant  does  not  impede  the  instant 
perception  that  they  are  actual,  and  for  crude  experience 
whatever  a  thing  possesses  in  appearance  it  possesses  in- 
deed, no  matter  how  soon  that  quality  may  be  lost  again." 
Santayana,  Reason  in  Common  SensCy  p.  143.  But  at  the 
next  reflective  level,  the  majority  of  these  tertiary  qualities 
have  been  withdrawn  for  the  inorganic  world;  the  only 
one  left  being,  perhaps,  charm  or  beauty.  Physical  things 
are  not  beneficent  or  malignant,  for  consciousness  and 
desire  are  necessary  for  these  characteristics.    Hence  vital 


^94  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

exuberance  and  ethical  qualities  are  assigned  only  to 
living  things. 

At  the  second  level,  ethical  characteristics  are  removed 
even  from  animate  things  below  the  level  of  man.  It  is 
seen  that  a  knowledge  of  good  and  evil  of  some  sort  is 
essential  to  ethical  distinctions  like  right  and  wrong. 
Also,  the  conception  of  a  highest  good  as  an  end  for  which 
to  strive  is  known  to  have  conditions  unrealizable  apart 
from  reason.  The  obvious  conclusion  is  drawn  that 
ethical  values  can  have  no  meaning  for  any  part  of  nature 
below  the  human  level.  But,  as  we  have  already  pointed 
out,  aesthetic  values  are  more  perceptual  and  less  reflective 
in  character.  The  aesthetic  attitude  is  one  of  contempla- 
tion and  so  favors  the  retention  of  the  attitude  of  Natural 
Realism.  Things  are  beautiful,  charming,  interesting, 
delightful.  Yet  it  is  not  long  before  reflection  points  out 
that  human  feelings,  emotions,  sentiments  and  associative 
processes  giving  meaning  to  perceived  objects  are  funda- 
mental. The  result  is  a  psychology  of  aesthetics  which 
concludes  that  beauty  is  a  value  given  by  the  resonance 
which  a  stimulus  awakens  in  consciousness.  The  inference 
is  that  beauty  is  not  a  quality  which  can  exist  in  nature 
apart  from  the  human  mind. 

At  the  third  level,  it  is  seen  that  percepts  are  mental 
objects.  This  fact  enables  us  to  account  for  the  intimacy 
of  aesthetic  qualities  and  judgments  with  perceptual  ob- 
jects. Both  are  mental,  and  we  no  longer  wonder  at  the 
perceptual  objectivity  of  aesthetic  qualities.  The  scene 
from  Stirling  Castle  is  beautiful  because  all  that  I  see  is 
an  effect  in  me  of  stimuli  coming  from  outside  as  these  are 
interpreted  by  my  mind.  Color  is  as  mental  as  beauty, 
and  so  are  form  and  outline  as  these  are  perceived.  All 
we  can  say  is  that  the  aesthetic  attribute  of  the  perception 


THE  PLACE  OF  VALUES  295 

is  traceable  to  mental  factors  more  allied  to  the  lower  than 
to  the  higher  senses.  These  mental  factors  are  more  vari- 
able, and  it  is  for  this  reason  that  the  color  of  an  object 
and  its  form  will  not  change  for  me  while  its  aesthetic  effect 
fluctuates  disappointingly. 

This  conclusion  is  carried  over  into  the  next  two  levels 
of  epistemological  reflection  v/ithout  any  essential  change. 
Beauty  is  man's  reaction  to  his  environment.  Glad  he 
must  and  should  be  that  his  mind  has  developed  this  pleas- 
ant resonance  to  his  surroundings;  but  reflection  warns 
him  against  projecting  it  into  nature  in  a  literal  way,  just 
as  it  finally  teaches  him  that  the  real  world  is  not  colored 
and  heavy  and  odorous.  Critical  knowledge  does  not  try 
to  picture  nature. 

The  Science  of  Axiology. — Philosophers  are  compelled 
to  use  technical  terms  in  order  to  bring  distinctions  clearly 
before  their  minds.  Of  late,  the  recognition  that  judg- 
ments of  value  are  fairly  distinct  from  ordinary  cognitive 
judgments  has  led  to  the  growth  of  a  new  philosophical 
discipline  called  axiology  or  the  theory  of  values.  The 
normative  sciences,  or  those  which  concern  themselves 
less  with  fact  than  with  standards  and  preferences  and 
values,  come  under  this  general  philosophy  of  worth. 
Thus,  the  latest  German  works  on  philosophy  are  almost 
certain  to  divide  the  field  into  Wissen  and  Wert.  Under 
Wissen  come  the  physical,  biological  and  purely  descrip- 
tive human  sciences,  while  under  Wert  come  ethics,  aesthet- 
ics, economics,  sociology  and  the  philosophy  of  religion. 

Judgments  of  value  involve  preferences  on  the  part  of 
the  subject.  And  these  preferences  rest  upon  mental  proc- 
esses which  are  dominated  by  sentiment  and  desire  rather 
than  by  conceptual  analysis  and  synthesis.  "Even  the 
slightest  skepticism  shows  that  such  value-predicates  are 


^96  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

not  assigned  to  things  as  their  attributes  or  as  relations 
involving  only  themselves,  but  that  they  first  grow  to 
things  through  their  relation  to  a  valuing  consciousness." 
Windelband,  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophiey  p.  244.  The 
inference  is  that,  apart  from  sentiment  founded  on  feeling 
and  will,  worths  do  not  exist.  The  recognition  of  this 
principle  has  led  to  a  stress  upon  the  study  of  the  psychol- 
ogy of  values.  Thus  axiology  as  a  philosophical  discipline 
is  bound  up  with  the  investigation  of  feeling,  desire, 
emotion  and  sentiment  and  with  the  methods  by  which 
orders  of  preferences  arise  along  different  lines  like  the 
sesthetic,  the  ethical,  the  economic  and  the  religious. 
Not  only  are  the  different  orders  very  complex  in  them- 
selves but  they  often  conflict  among  one  another,  as  the 
ethical  with  the  economic,  and  the  sesthetic  with  the 
ethical.  Much  remains  to  be  done  along  these  lines,  even 
though  progress  has  been  more  rapid  in  the  last  few  dec- 
ades than  for  any  time  in  the  past. 

The  Objectivity  of  Values. — But  we  are  concerned  in 
the  main,  not  with  specific  problems,  however  interesting, 
but  with  epistemology  and  metaphysics.  Consequently, 
our  chief  interest  in  axiology  is  where  it  touches  the  ob- 
jectivity of  values.  Are  values  objective  or  subjective? 
And  what  must  we  mean  by  these  terms? 

Values  are  relative  to  the  individual  because  they  are 
his  judgments  and  so  are  based  upon  his  character,  con- 
stitution and  training.  This  foundation  has  led  to  varia- 
tions in  the  value  placed  upon  things  and  acts  so  marked 
that  "There's  no  disputing  about  tastes"  has  become  a 
proverb.  But,  in  spite  of  this  admitted  variation,  there  is 
undoubtedly  much  agreement.  The  exception  strikes  us 
just  because  it  is  an  exception.  We  can  at  least  say  that 
people  fall  into  groups  with  similar  tastes  and  values. 


THE  PLACE  OF  VALUES  297 

But  while  judgments  of  value  are,  like  all  other  genuine 
judgments,  individual,  we  must  never  forget  that  individ- 
uals are  conditioned  by  the  influence  of  the  other  members 
of  the  group.  My  judgment  is  actually  mine,  but  I  may 
make  it  because  I  have  had  a  certain  sort  of  education  and 
have  been  given  certain  suggestions  by  various  members 
of  society  through  conversation  or  literature.  I  know  that 
others  think  about  such  matters  in  this  way  or  that,  and 
my  judgment  cannot  help  being  influenced  by  this  knowl- 
edge. Furthermore,  my  whole  outlook  necessarily  reflects 
the  experience  of  the  race,  for  this  seeps  into  me  by  every 
avenue  of  the  senses  as  well  as  through  the  language  with 
its  distinctions.  Yet  my  outlook  is  mine  even  though  it  is 
socially  conditioned  to  such  an  extent  that  I  am  a  mere 
echo  of  the  group's  history  and  present  habits.  After  all, 
the  group  has  no  consciousness  of  its  own;  it  has  no  brain 
and  no  mind.  It  is  simply  a  name  for  individuals  of  a  cer- 
tain nature  and  training  in  causal  interaction.  It  is  a  great, 
though  easily  made,  mistake  to  talk  about  a  social  will  or 
mind  as  something  existent  apart  from  the  individuals  in 
these  actual  complex  relations  with  one  another.  My 
judgments  are  socially  conditioned  in  this  empirical  sense 
and,  to  the  extent  that  I  believe  that  others  will  agree 
with  me,  socially  qualified.  I  assign  them  automatically 
to  others  unless  I  have  good  reason  to  know  that  I  am  a 
dissident. 

It  follows  that  judgments  of  value  are  as  objective,  logic- 
ally, as  any  other  judgments.  This  object  is  beautiful  just 
as  it  is  red.  But  this  type  of  objectivity  does  not  signify 
that  the  physical  world  is  in  itseK  beautiful  any  more  than 
that  it  is  red.  That  is,  the  objectivity  of  judgment  does  not 
involve  the  truth  of  Natural  Realism.  The  actual  meaning 
of  objectivity  when  applied  to  values  can  best  be  brought 


298  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

out  by  seeking  for  a  contrast  term.  To  say  that  a  value 
is  merely  subjective  may  mean  that  it  is  whimsical  and 
temporary  and  accidental  and  arbitrary.  The  appeal, 
then,  is  to  something  more  natural  and  whole-hearted, 
something  that  arises  out  of  and  expresses  a  wider  and 
deeper  experience.  The  objective  is  the  expression  of  a 
more  satisfactory  synthesis  of  experience.  Again,  the 
subjective  is  the  personal  as  the  eccentric  and  bizarre. 
The  term  is  applied  even  to  the  sincere  judgment  of  another 
when  it  is  felt  that  this  judgment  is  out  of  the  ordinary. 
In  this  sense,  the  subjective  is  the  heretical.  But  the  valu- 
ation adopted  by  the  various  members  of  the  dominant 
group  is  not  objective  in  any  way  which  conflicts  with  the 
breakdown  of  Natural  Realism.  Values  are  not  self- 
subsistent,  nor  are  they  in  the  world  otherwise  than  as 
experience  in  the  minds  of  particular  individuals.  They 
would  have  no  meaning  apart  from  a  valuing  conscious- 
ness. And  just  because  they  are  expressions  of  human 
sentiments  and  desires,  primarily,  they  are  not  a  suitable 
foundation  for  knowledge  about  the  physical  world  by 
itself.     The  place  of  values  is  in  human  life. 

References 

Ehrenfels,  System  der  Werttheorie. 

Hbffding,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy. 

De  Laguna,  Introduction  to  the  Science  of  Ethics,  pt.  3. 

Santayana,  Reason  in  Common  Sense,  chap.  6. 

Stuart,  Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  chap.  10. 

Windelband,  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie,  2nd  pt. 


INDEX 


Abelard,  9. 
^Esthetics,  14. 
Agnostic  realism,  155. 
Albertus  Magnus,  9. 
Animism,  230. 
Appearance,  32f . 
Apriorism,  139f. 
Aquinas,  9. 

Aristotle,  7,  9,  234,  272. 
Atomism,  218,  269. 
Axiology,  science  of,  295. 

Bacon,  Francis,  10. 

Being,  and  knowledge,  131,  223. 

Behaviorism,  245f. 

Berkeley,  21;  and  Locke,  57;  and 
Natural  Realism,  56f.;  his  ani- 
mus, 58;  his  construction,  60; 
his  disproof  of  representative 
realism,  58f.;  his  general  posi- 
tion, 55;  gaps  in  his  system,  63. 

Brain,  theory  of,  280f . 

Categories,  72,  195;  Kant's  doc- 
trine of,  79f . 

Causality,  levels  of,  277f.;  and 
purpose,  278f. 

Common  sense,  17f. 

Consciousness,  is  a  flux,  67f.;  and 
knowledge,  115f.;  and  a  trans- 
subjective  realm,  118f.;  as  ex- 
tended, 203;  displaces  soul, 
236f.;  efficacy  of,  282. 


Correspondent  variation,  lack  of, 

34f. 
Creative  synthesis,  275. 
Critical  naturalism,  193f. 
Critical     realism,     definition     of, 

119f.;  reference  for,  128. 
Criticism,  142. 

Darwin,  3,  272. 

Democritus,  8,  174. 

Descartes,    10,    method    of,    46f,; 

view  of  matter,  220. 
Descriptive  empiricism,  86f. 
Discontinuity,  275. 
Dogmatism,  14  If. 
Driesch,  276. 
Dualism,  motives  for,  186f. 

Empiricism,  140. 

Energy,  227f.;  conservation  of, 
213,  256. 

Epiphenomenalism,  259f. 

Epistemology,  nature  of,  11,  146f.; 
and  metaphysics,  171. 

Ethics,  13,  296. 

Experience,  individual's  field  of, 
86f.;  and  the  self,  95f.;  distinc- 
tions within,  98f.;  dimensions 
of,  98-101. 

Galileo,  3. 

Gnostic  realism,  155. 


299 


300 


INDEX 


Heraclitus,  8. 

Historical  approach,  value  of,  42. 

Hobbes,  174.  ,^2.  , 

Hoffding,  179,  262. 

Hume,  22;  his  position,  66f.;  his 
attack  upon  mental  substance, 
67;  his  rejection  of  Berkeley's 
spiritualism,  69. 

Idealism,  definition  of,  55;  objec- 
^  I    tive  idealism,    149;   subjective, 
147;  see  spiritualism  for  meta- 
physical idealism. 
Ideas,  101,  106. 
Interactionism,  254f. 
Internal  relations,  278. 

Judgment,  defined,  124;  two  as- 
pects of,  124;  reference  of,  126; 
and  knowledge,  122f. 


Materialism,  173f. 

Matter,  216,  227;  naive  views  of, 
174. 

Mechanism,  269;  ambiguity  of, 
275. 

Mentalism,  55. 

Mental  pluralism,  88;  and  solip- 
sism, 89. 

Metaphysics,  definition  of,  11; 
Cartesian,  46;  and  epistemology, 
171f. 

Middle  Ages,  9,  10. 

Mind,  nature  of,  229,  248,  265; 
primitive  notions  of,  230;  in 
ancient  philosophy,  233;  in 
modern  philosophy,  235f.;  and 
consciousness,  238,  249;  and 
body,  252f. 

Monism,  past  failure  of,  187f. 

Morgan  Lloyd,  247,  274. 


Kant,  7;  and  Hume's  skepticism, 
74;  stresses  conceptual  knowl- 
edge, 75f.;  his  appeal  to  con- 
sciousness-in-general, 90f.;  and 
apriorism,  139. 

Knowledge,  two  meanings  of,  76; 
and  likeness,  107;  an  achieve- 
ment, 111;  involves  judgment, 
122f.;  and  individuality,  133; 
and  assertion,  158;  and  truth, 
157;  as  a  utility,  169. 

Leibnitz,  7,  178. 

Locke,  his  position,  48f.;  his  view 

of  knowledge,  50;  his  view  of 

matter,  220. 
Logic,  12;  and  knowledge,  125. 
Lotze,  23. 


Natural  Dualism,  183. 

Natural  Realism,  18f.;  recognition 
of,  21f.;  and  science,  23f.;  not  a 
system,  25f.;  difficulties  con- 
fronting, 27f.;  attack  upon,  30; 
and  memory,  36. 

Neo-realism,  152. 

Non-apprehensional  realism,  154; 
and  truth,  169;  distinguished 
from  representative  realism,  154. 

Panpsychism,  181,  262. 

Parallelism,  257,  283. 

Perceived  objects,  31;  and  in- 
dividuals, 35f.;  involve  con- 
struction, 38. 

Percept,  definition  of,  108. 

Perception,    physiological    theory 


INDEX 


301 


of,  S9;  logical  function  of,  llOf.; 
a  means  to  knowledge,  117. 
Phenomena,  78. 

Philosophy,  preliminary  defini- 
tion of,  1;  and  the  special 
sciences,  4;  older  and  newer 
conceptions  of,  7f.;  and  Natural 
Realism,  23. 

Philosopher,  attitude  of,  2;  com- 
petency of,  5;  method  of,  6;  and 
scientist,  3f. 

Philosophical  disciplines,  general, 
llf.;  special,  12f. 

Physical  reality,  128,  201,  227. 

Physical  thing,  32. 

Plato,  1,  7,  9.  234. 

Political  philosophy,  13. 
wf'^'^^'^iPragmatism,  164f. 
^  ,      Properties,  224. 

Propositions,  and  knowledge,  117; 
and  fact,  112. 

Psychologist,  purpose  of,  242f . 

Psychology,  subject-matter  of, 
240;  orthodox  type  of,  241;  and 
behavior,  245f.;  inclusive  defini- 
tion of,  246;  paradox  of,  244. 

Quantity,  and  mathematics,  274; 
and  mass,  226;  and  energy,  228. 


218;    mathe- 


Natural  Realism,  43f.;  rational- 
istic type  of,  44 ;  raises  new  prob- 
lems, 47f.;  doubts  confronting, 
52f. 

Sciences,  social  and  mental,  9; 
growth  of,  9. 

Sensationalism,  138f. 

Sense,  and  imagination,  102. 

Skepticism,  65f.;  143. 

Solipsism,  130,  148.    %  '] 

Soul,  237. 

Space,  195;  mathematical,  199,  as 
a  category,  200,  and  conscious- 
ness, 203f. 

Spiritualism,  177f.;  two  types  of, 
180. 

Substance,  Cartesian  idea  of,  220; 
as  a  category,  224. 

Teleology,  271. 

Theory  of  knowledge,  see  epis- 
temology. 

Thing,  and  thought  of  it,  103f.; 
and  attributes,  221. 

Time,  kinds  of,  205;  as  a  category, 
209f.;  as  change,  211;  and  con- 
sciousness, 214. 

Truth,  theories  of,  160f,;  as  a  cog- 
nitive value,  167;  criteria  of, 
168. 


kinds 


Rationalism,    136, 

matical,  273. 
Realism,  definition  of,  151 

of,  151;  primitive,  287. 
Reality,    and    thought,    129;    see 

being  and  physical  reality. 
Representative     realism,     follows 

Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


Valuation,  and  knowledge,  284. 
Values,  place  of,  293;  objectivity 

of,  296. 
Vitalism,  revival  of,  276. 

Warren,  264,  273. 
Wundt,  179. 


'T^HE  following  pages  contain  advertisements  of  a 
few  of  the  Macmillan  books  on  kindred  subjects. 


The  Next  Step  in  Democracy 

By  R.  W.  SELLARS,  Ph.D. 

Assistant  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Michigan 

275  pp.,  Cloth,  12°,  $1.50 

A  sensible,  moderate  account  of  what  may  be  called  the 
new  socialism.  Instead  of  being  sentimental  and  emo- 
tional, the  author  takes  a  realistic,  evolutionary  view  of 
society.  He  points  out  that  the  older  socialist  theories 
were  largely  symptoms  of  maladjustments  which  pointed 
to  the  need  for  a  more  ethical  spirit,  and  for  a  guiding 
principle,  in  accordance  with  this  spirit.  The  author 
separates  the  essential  from  the  unessential  characteris- 
tics of  the  socialist  movement,  and  reaches  the  conclusion 
that  the  socialist  agitation  has  suggested  a  principle  or 
attitude  rather  than  a  program.  The  next  step  in  democ- 
racy will  be  a  softening  of  industrialism,  which  is  already 
beginning  in  such  movements  as  co-operation  and  profit- 
sharing.  The  Great  War  is  touched  upon,  and  its  deeper 
causes  and  probable  consequences  are  considered.  Fin- 
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the  author  maintains  that  democracy  is  an  achievement 
and  not  a  gift. 


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The  History  of  European  Philosophy 

By  WALTER  P.  MARVIN 

Collegiate  Church  Professor  of  Logic  and  Mental  Philosophy  in 
Rutgers  College 

Cloth,  12°,  XV  +  439  pp..  Index,  $1.60 

The  present  work,  a  history  of  philosophy  from  the 
beginning  down  to  modern  times,  has  two  distinctive 
features.  It  is  written  from  a  realistic  point  of  view;  and 
it  contains  a  treatment  of  the  development  of  the  sciences. 

The  scholarliness  and  accuracy  of  the  book,  and  the 
fact  that  it  keeps  close  to  real,  human  interests,  and  treats 
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history  of  philosophy. 

The  subject  is  presented  in  three  separate  sections, 
of  which  the  first  is  introductory,  the  second  covers  the 
Greek  and  Roman  Periods,  and  the  third  deals  with  mod- 
ern philosophy.  The  chapter  headings  of  this  third  part 
are  as  follows:  The  Atlantic  Period,  Medieval  Thought; 
The  Age  of  Discovery;  The  Modern  Philosophical  Move- 
ments; RationaHsm  and  NaturaUsm;  PhenomenaHsm, 
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Introduction  to  the  Science  of  Ethics 

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An  outline  of  the  science  of  ethics  as  it  is  found  today, 
and  also  an  account  of  the  past  which  has  made  it  what  it 
is.  Part  I  is  devoted  mainly  to  a  discussion  of  the  sub- 
jects of  moral  judgments,  and  a  survey  of  the  various 
kinds  of  standards  according  to  which,  under  the  condi- 
tions of  savage  or  of  civilized  life,  moral  judgments  are 
made.  It  thus  presents  a  broad  background  of  facts 
against  which  the  explanatory  theories,  old  and  new,  may 
be  better  appreciated.  Part  II  is  an  interesting  and 
instructive  review,  not  a  complete  history,  of  the  princi- 
pal Greek  and  English  ethical  theories.  In  Part  III 
a  positive  treatment  of  moral  problems  is  presented  in 
connection  with  the  elements  of  the  general  theory  of 
values.  This  is  the  first  attempt  at  an  elementary  pres- 
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values  which  in  recent  years  has  undergone  a  great  de- 
velopment, and  one  of  unusual  interest. 


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A  Student's  History  of  Philosophy 

By  ARTHUR  KENYON  ROGERS 
Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Yale  University 

Revised  edition,  511  pages,  8vo,  $2.00 

A  feasible  and  practical  introduction  to  the  history  of 
philosophy  suited  to  the  mental  development  of  the  col- 
lege student.  It  gives  an  accurate  account  of  philosophical 
development  which  includes  all  the  material  that  can  fairly 
be  placed  before  the  student  beginning  the  study  of  this 
subject.  The  chief  aim  is  to  gain  simplicity  of  statement 
without  losing  sight  of  the  real  meaning  of  philosophical 
problems.  Throughout,  the  author  has  borne  in  mind 
the  viewpoint  of  the  student,  a  feature  which  has  con- 
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ophy centers  about  the  lives  of  individual  men,  he  has 
made  his  book  distinctly  a  history  of  philosophy  and  not 
of  philosophers. 

"There  are  many  such  treatises,  but  in  none  of  them,  we  be- 
lieve, is  the  subject  so  briefly,  thoroughly,  and  clearly  treated 
as  in  this.  Former  generations  of  college  students  had  to  en- 
counter the  difficulties  of  Schwegler,  who,  although  well  trans- 
lated, was  too  Hegelian  in  his  point  of  view,  as  well  as  in  his 
vocabulary,  to  be  altogether  intelligible  to  the  uninitiated.  But 
Professor  Rogers,  in  less  space,  and  in  much  clearer  language, 
has  presented  in  an  orderly  manner  the  doctrines  of  philosophers 
from  Thales  to  our  own  American  teachers.  Next  to  the  compre- 
hensiveness of  the  treatment  and  the  clearness  of  the  exposition, 
the  most  remarkable  characteristic  of  the  book  is  the  accuracy 
of  the  bibliography,  which  is  subdivided  in  such  a  way  that  one 
has  references  at  the  end  of  every  chapter." — The  Nation. 


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